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Abstract 
 
Quality Improvement (QI) interventions are complex in nature and 
evaluation focusing solely on measuring its impact is unable to answer 
questions of how or why the intervention worked. Results from the impact and 
outcome evaluation of a large QI intervention aimed at reducing newborn 
mortality in 3 central districts in Malawi had been inconclusive. I use a theory 
based evaluation (TBE) approach in my PhD, to analyse the implementation 
theory and understand the program theory behind the QI intervention in 
Malawi. 
I developed a research strategy, which includes a combination of 
Theory of Change (ToC) and Realist evaluation approaches for program 
evaluation.  I begin with a description of the Theory of Change and how it 
evolved over the course of the project. Following this I produce a summary 
and synthesis of all the available evidence in relation to this Theory of 
Change. This includes all data generated from the process evaluation as well 
as a range of documentary evidence generated through the course of the 
project. For synthesizing this evidence I use the consolidated framework for 
implementation research (CFIR), which helps to develop a structured 
understanding of the implementation theory. Next, I adapt realist evaluation 
principles to analyse the intervention mechanisms. I compare the 
mechanisms of successful QI interventions with those of the Malawi 
intervention to understand why we were unable to observe an impact on 
newborn care in our QI health facilities.    
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Various mechanisms for successful QI interventions have been 
hypothesized in literature. The strategy adopted to trigger these mechanisms 
include collaborative learning sessions, data improvement, continuous 
stakeholder engagement and feedback. While all these strategies could be 
identified within the QI intervention implemented in Malawi the implementation 
process was unable to garner enough individual or organizational momentum 
to trigger the actual intervention mechanisms. This can be attributed to a 
series of implementation challenges such as  the intervention complexity 
characterized by conceptual clarity regarding the intervention design, the 
evolving role of the implementing organization, stakeholder 
perceptions, programme planning and governance. Contextual factors such 
as availability of human and material resources also influenced 
the mechanism of the intervention.  
Impact evaluation of complex interventions is important, but seldom provides 
information to decision makers and policy advisors on ‘how’ interventions 
work. Using theory-based approaches to evaluating complex QI interventions 
provides an insight into how and why the interventions worked (or not). Such 
evaluation is important for theory building and needs to adopt a broader health 
systems research (HSR) approach to evaluation In the discussion, I critique 
the evaluation approaches used and provide recommendations for future 
evaluation of complex interventions.  
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Preface 
This thesis is organized as follows.  The introduction, Chapter 1, provides a 
brief introduction to the MaiKhanda project and the Quality Improvement 
intervention that it had initiated in health facilities across 3 central districts in 
Malawi. The Chapter also provides an overview of the evaluation design that 
was adapted at MaiKhanda to measure impact and process of the 
intervention. Chapter 2 begins with a clarification of the concept of quality of 
care and quality improvement followed by the different approaches currently 
used in the practice of quality improvement. The next section in this Chapter 
is a literature review of the quality improvement approach that was used in 
MaiKhanda-the Quality Improvement (QI) Collaborative. Chapter 3 presents a 
summary of the impact evaluation. It also explains the limitations of a RCT 
(Randomized Control Trial) design in evaluation complex intervention such as 
QI. This lays the foundation for alternate theory based approaches to explain 
the findings of the impact evaluation. Chapter 4 presents the research 
strategy that I have adopted in my thesis to analyse the program theory and 
implementation theory of MaiKhanda interventions. Chapter 5 describes the 
evolution of MaiKhanda’s Theory of Change over the course of the project. 
Chapter 6 summarizes all the available evidence generated from MaiKhanda 
to produce a cohesive picture of intervention progress through the project time 
period. The evidence repository includes the process evaluation studies 
conducted by the UCL evaluation team from 2007-2011, as well as all the 
project documents such as bi-annual and quarterly progress reports and 
programme meeting minutes. Chapter 7 is the analysis chapter and it 
provides an explanation of MaiKhanda’s program theory as well as 
implementation theory. Chapter 8 discusses the key findings from the study 
and highlights some of the methodological issues in conducting evaluation 
using theory based evaluation approaches. It also discusses some of the key 
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learning for future research. The last section of this Chapter summarise the 
limitations in my study approach. Chapter 9 concludes with a summary of key 
findings as well as issues and challenges in evaluating QI in resource poor 
settings and suggests a whole systems improvement approach as the way 
forward.  
The appendices contain a summary of the all the relevant process evaluation 
studies conducted as part of the MaiKhanda evaluation and used for 
secondary analysis in my PhD. This describes the various constructs 
considered in my evaluation and their evolution over the different intervention 
phases. As part of the requirement towards my UCL doctorate, I have 
attached as Appendix-1, a summary of my training and professional 
development, including courses and conference attended and fieldwork.  
This PhD makes methodological contributions by identifying a novel research 
strategy to evaluate complex QI interventions. The research strategy 
combines a probability and plausibility design to answer questions related to 
impact as well as understanding the mechanism of how social interventions 
such as QI work. The PhD also explores literature surrounding the evaluation 
of quality improvement interventions. It hopes to contribute towards improving 
the quality of newborn care in Malawi and more broadly, towards developing 
an evidence based approach to quality improvement interventions.  
This PhD is a secondary analysis of the data collected as part of the 
MaiKhanda QI evaluation. I had access to MaiKhanda resources, including 
trained Monitoring and Evaluation Officers to collect and collate the data for 
the various process evaluation studies considered in my PhD. The work 
presented in this thesis, however, is entirely my own, as are any mistakes. 
Bejoy Nambiar, 
Lilongwe, Malawi 
January, 2016 
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Chapter!1 Introduction!
1.1 Maternal!and!Newborn!Health!
Approximately 300,000 women are estimated to die of pregnancy-related 
causes worldwide, of which 99% occurs in the developing world(1, 2). More 
than 50% of the countries with increased maternal mortality rates are in Sub 
Saharan Africa. However, there are affordable and effective interventions that 
can prevent or avoid more than 50% of these deaths(3)   
An estimated 2.76 million newborn deaths occur each year, accounting for 
44% of under-five deaths(4). Low cost interventions with proven efficacy are 
available to improve newborn survival(5). As we move on from Millennium 
Development Goals to an era of Sustainable Development Goals, one of the 
key factors influencing and sustaining improvements in maternal and newborn 
care is quality. Quality has been described as the third revolution in global 
health(6).  
1.2 Maternal!and!newborn!health!in!Malawi!
With a GDP of $780 per capita, Malawi (Figure 1) is one of the poorest 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa(7). It is landlocked and mainly dependent on 
agriculture, especially tobacco, for its income (contributing to 35% of the GDP 
and 80% of the employment). Malawi has a population of 17.2  million with an 
annual population growth rate of 2.8%(7). Most people (85%) live in rural 
areas. The crude birth rate is 39.2 per 1000 population per year while the 
crude death rate is 8.6 per 1,000 population per year. With an HIV prevalence 
of 11%, Malawi is one of the countries severely affected by the AIDS 
epidemic. The Total Fertility Rate has been on the decline, with the current 
TFR being 5.0 overall, and lower in urban areas. The Maternal mortality rate 
has been estimated at 574 per 100,000 live births and the newborn mortality 
rate is 29 per 1,000 live births(8)  
The total health care spending for Malawi in 2012 was $625 million, which 
amounted to a health care spending of $39.3 per capita. The total spending 
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on health in 2012 was 9% of the GDP1. Donor investments in general 
increased over the years. In 2009, donors contributed about 62% of the total 
funds and within MNCH (Maternal Newborn and Child Health) it was about 
$5.3million(9, 10).  
Figure 1: Map of Malawi 
 
Although recent trends show a decline in mortality, the maternal mortality in 
Malawi is high. The main direct causes of maternal death in Malawi are 
haemorrhage, sepsis, eclampsia, and ruptured uterus; the main indirect 
causes are anaemia and HIV. The uptake of antenatal care is very high at 
96% for at least 1 antenatal visit, although women undergoing the 
recommended 4 visits is lower at 44%. Institutional deliveries are at 89% as of 
2014 and the uptake of post-natal care is 75%(8). 
Infant mortality is at 53 per 1000 live births, and neonatal mortality at 29 per 
1000 live births in Malawi. While there has been a steady decline in under five 
mortality at an annual average rate of 5.4%, over the past decade, the decline 
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has been relatively smaller for newborn health. While Malawi will be well 
within the MDG targets for child mortality, further improvements in this area 
will need evidence based investments in newborn care(10). The main causes 
of neonatal death are prematurity and low birth weight, asphyxia and 
sepsis(11).  
There is a high political commitment for maternal and newborn health in 
Malawi(12). This has provided a programmatic and policy platform to address 
quality gaps in health facilities as well as initiate community based newborn 
care. In early 2005, the Reproductive Health Unit (RHU) at the Ministry of 
Health developed a Road Map for reducing maternal and infant mortality. The 
general recommendations indicated a need to improve the quality of maternal 
and newborn health care in both the health service delivery system (supply 
side) and the community (demand side).  
It was under these circumstances that a combined supply and demand side 
intervention addressing quality gaps in facilities and mobilizing women in the 
communities respectively, was set up and what came to be known as the 
MaiKhanda programme. The objective of the programme was to impact on 
maternal and newborn survival in Malawi.  
1.3 Background!
The Health Foundation (a UK based charity) with a history of working in QI 
(Quality Improvement) in the NHS (National Health Services, UK), invited 
partners IHI (Institute for Healthcare Improvement), LSTM (Liverpool School 
of Tropical Medicine), WCF (Women and Children First-a UK based NGO) to 
form a Consortium to establish a programme in three districts in central 
Malawi, which came to be known as the MaiKhanda (Chichewa for Mother 
[Mai] and Neonate [Khanda]) programme.  
The MaiKhanda programme started its initial activities in Malawi in February 
2006 through a stakeholder meeting between The Health Foundation 
Consortium (THFC) members and key stakeholders from the MoH (Ministry of 
Health) and health facilities, explaining the purpose of the programme.  
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The Malawi implementation team recruitment started in February 2006 and by 
June 2006 MaiKhanda began work initially in 4 and then gradually 9 CEmOCi 
facilities in the three Malawian districts (Kasungu, Lilongwe and Salima) with a 
Quality Improvement (QI) intervention.  The QI intervention worked with 
providers to improve health care practices with the overall aim to reduce 
maternal and neonatal mortality.  
The programme was innovative, in that it combined 2 large-scale interventions 
addressing both, the supply and demand side of maternal and newborn care: 
• a community mobilization intervention working primarily through 
women’s groups using a participatory action cycle, that had shown 
some promising evidence from international studies. 
• a quality improvement intervention consisting of Learning 
Collaboratives and Action Periods in the health facilities, working 
primarily through QI teams in the health facilities. 
The programme was implemented in the 3 central region districts of Salima, 
Kasungu and Lilongwe over a 6 year period and mobilized a total of 879 
women’s group and worked with 9 hospitals and 29 health centres across the 
3 districts to identify and implement local strategies for maternal and newborn 
health improvement.  
The Health Foundation commissioned Institute for Global Health (IGH) at 
University College London (UCL) to undertake an independent evaluation of 
the programme between 2006 and 2010. The primary outcomes looked at the 
effect of the two interventions, individually and in combination, on maternal, 
neonatal and perinatal mortality. In addition, the study also included a process 
evaluation and an economic evaluation for the proposed interventions. 
                                            
i )CEmOC) refers) to) Comprehensive) Emergency) Obstetric) Care.) “Basic”) and) “Comprehensive”)
emergency)obstetric)and)care)(EmOC))are)defined)by)their)signal)functions:) )A)Basic)EmOC)facility)
(BEmOC)) should) offer) skilled) attendance) at) birth,) administration) of) IV) fluids,) antibiotics,)
anticonvulsants)and)oxytocics,)manual)removal)of)the)placenta,)provide)help)for)retained)products)
of) conception) (e.g.) manual) vacuum) aspiration) MVA)) and) carry) out) an) assisted) delivery) when)
necessary.)A)Comprehensive)EmONC)facility)(CEmONC))should)additionally)offer)blood)transfusions)
and)caesarean)sections.)
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1.4 MaiKhanda’s!Theoretical!Framework! !
The programmes’ theoretical framework (Figure 2) is based on the three 
delays model by Thaddeus and Maine(13) where delay 1 is defined as the 
decision to seek care, delay 2 is the delay in getting to a health facility in time 
and the third delay is the delay in getting adequate and appropriate treatment 
at the health facility.  
 
Figure 2: MaiKhanda's theoretical framework 
The framework envisaged a single programme of work where communities 
mobilized through women’s group interventions would impact on delay 1 and 
delay 2, while using a quality improvement intervention would reduce delay 3. 
Using this approach, the programme hypothesized that it would reduce 
maternal and neonatal mortality in the selected 3 districts in the central region 
of Malawi over a 5 year period. The interventions are described in detail 
below. 
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1.5 Intervention!Design!
1.5.1 DemandGside!(Community)!intervention!
The demand side interventions (community interventions) were focused on 
delays 1 and 2. The intervention consisted of the women’s group action cycle 
where women from the community were brought together regularly (usually 
monthly) to discuss issues around pregnancy and birthing and to find 
solutions to their problems. They would go through an action cycle, which had 
four phases. Phases I and II consisted of a series of 8 meetings to identify 
and prioritize issues around maternal and newborn health; these were 
followed by strategy development (Phase III) and evaluation (Phase IV). A 
facilitator who is usually a community member facilitated these action cycles. 
Several models for the facilitators had been tried previously - In the MIRA 
(Nepal) trial(14) and a recently finished trial in Mchinji district(15) in Malawi 
the women’s group facilitators were paid employees of the project, while a 
similar women’s group intervention in Ntcheu district in Malawi has used 
health surveillance assistants (HSAs) from the existing health system to 
facilitate the women’s group interventions. MaiKhanda had women 
volunteering from the community acting as women’s group facilitators. 
1.5.2 SupplyGside!facility!intervention!
The supply side interventionii consisted of a model, which integrated  Rapid 
Cycle process improvement (Plan-Do-Study-Act, PDSA) with Criterion-Based 
Audit (or standard-based audit) cycle.   This integrated model, along with 
Maternal (and Neonatal) Death Reviews formed the components of 
MaiKhanda’s ‘quality improvement’ intervention in the facilities. This 
integrated model for improvement was implemented through a process called 
‘Breakthrough Collaborative Series’ which included collaborative Learning 
Sessions amongst Quality Improvement (QI) teams from different health 
facilities and Action Periods where individual QI teams received mentoring 
and support from MaiKhanda to implement PDSA cycles in their respective 
                                            
ii)The)focus)of)my)PhD)was)on)understanding)the)effect)of)QI)interventions)on)newborn)mortality.)My)
thesis)does)not)involve)an)analysis)of)the)demand)side)intervention.))
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facilities (Figure 3). The choice of topic for improvement was guided by the 
newborn change package. The change package for newborn care included 
neonatal resuscitation; kangaroo mother care and sepsis management. 
During Learning Session, health facilities would come together and share their 
learning and experiences with each other about their improvement work, and 
during the Action Period MaiKhanda QI officers would make field visits to 
health facilities and facilitate implementation of their proposed changes, as 
agreed during the learning session. Each Learning Session was conducted 
over a 90 day period and Action Period constituted the time in between the 
two learning sessions. The QI Collaborative is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 
(§2.3.4).  
 
 
 
Figure 3: MaiKhanda's improvement model 
 
The Criterion Based Audit (CBA) approach was introduced and carried out by 
health care providers at the facility level, to achieve changes in practice and 
improve quality of care. It involved a process of reviewing existing guidelines, 
and was linked with the standards of practice. Standards of practice were 
developed by Ministry of Health to act as a guide for providers regarding the 
best standards of care in specific areas of healthcare. The CBA cycle is 
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repeated as often as needed to improve the level at which standard is 
achieved.  
 
 
Figure 4: Integrated Model for Improvement 
 
The Rapid Cycle (PDSA) approach also built on the providers’ knowledge 
base and was to be done through a structured series of small interventions, 
designed by the providers themselves, and focussed on a more efficient use 
of existing resources.  The integration of the two approaches (Figure 4) would 
occur with the process beginning with an audit cycle and then moving into 
rapid cycle change when the problems had been identified.  This model used 
a ‘bottom-up’, participatory approach and was in line with recommendations 
from the maternal and newborn health roadmap developed by RHU 
(Reproductive Health Unit) in 2005.  
Ministry of Health recommendations also included the implementation of 
Death Reviews.  MaiKhanda facilitated the local staff to conduct audits in a 
blame-free and participatory manner. The information generated by the review 
would then be used to determine the focus of the criterion-based and rapid-
cycle improvement activities. 
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This integrated model was reviewed towards the middle of the programme 
and was revised to adapt a Model for Improvement focussed more on the 
Collaborative Learning and Action Cycles (§5.1.3).  
1.6 Intervention!timeline!
The intervention was initially planned over a five-year period (2006-2010) 
covering three districts. In phase one, which would last three years (2006-08), 
facility improvement was to reach two-thirds of all facilities in the districts and 
phase two (2008-2010) of the programme was to cover all the facilities in the 
districts.  During phase two of the intervention, the ‘dosage’ of the facilities 
intervention was greatly increased from Oct-09 onwards, with more than 60% 
of the planned activities being completed. Therefore, when exploring possible 
differences in intervention effect over time, the facilities intervention period 
has been further split into two time periods. Thus the intervention can be 
considered of the following 4 phases (Table 1):  
Table 1: MaiKhanda Intervention Phases 
Intervention Phases Time Period 
Baseline period June, 2006 to January, 2007 
Pre-intervention period February, 2007 to September, 2008 
Early intervention period October, 2008 to September, 2009 
Late Intervention period October, 2009 to December, 2010 
 
A summary of events in relation to the supply side (QI) intervention is outlined 
in Table 2 
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Timeline Event 
January 2006 Proposal approved by The Health Foundation 
 Quality Improvement pilot in Bwaila hospital 
July, 2006 Quality Improvement initiated in CEmOC facilities 
 Maternal Death Reviews initiated 
January, 2007 First QI breakthrough collaborative 
 Introduction of Criterion-Based Audits 
February, 2007 1 QI officer appointed  
July 2007 Surveillance system for impact evaluation established 
July 2007 Health Centre work initiated by LSTM 
 Programme Director recruited 
Sept, 2007- 
Feb, 2008 
 
MaiKhanda strategic review and planning 
LSTM and LATH leave Consortium 
THF grants an additional year to the project for Phase II 
March 2008 Project gets registered as an NGO in Malawi-
MaiKhanda 
May 2008 Second round of proposals with a clear design in place 
June, 2008 Super-Improver training 
July, 2008 Health centre work re-initiated by IHI 
Feb, 2009 Implementation of neonatal change ideas 
July, 2009 Health Centre work being fully implemented 
Sept, 2009 FI Officers based in Salima and Kasungu districts and 
extra officers in Lilongwe district 
2010 Bi-weekly visits to health centres; regular visits to 
CEmOCs 
Table 2: MaiKhanda QI intervention timeline 
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1.7 Evidence!base!for!MaiKhanda’s!interventions!
Several prominent studies suggested the significant impact of community level 
interventions on maternal and neonatal mortality. A meta-analysis of 7 trials 
using women’s group participatory learning and action cycles showed a 37% 
reduction in maternal mortality (OR 0.63, 95% CI 0.32-0.94) and a 23% 
reduction in newborn mortality (OR 0.77, 95% CI 0.65-0.90) (16).   
Thus evidence regarding women’s group participatory action cycles for 
maternal and newborn health is well established. However, evidence 
regarding the effect of improvement models on maternal and newborn health 
is very limited and especially for low-income countries it is practically non-
existent.  
The evidence for the model for quality improvement practiced at MaiKhanda 
was based on IHI’s (Institute for Healthcare Improvement) experience of 
conducting quality improvement work in the US and other high income 
countries such as UK and Europe. Health care providers in market driven 
health care settings such as the United States need to demonstrate high-
quality care to compete in an oversupplied health care market. While in 
publicly funded health systems such as Malawi, health care providers need to 
improve quality to make scarce resources stretch further(17). Therefore, the 
intentions and objective of various health care systems in improving quality 
has an effect on the way the project is delivered at the ground level. 
Furthermore, there was no evidence to show that the methods used in high-
income settings were appropriate and could produce similar results in low-
income countries as well.  
Nevertheless, even with the limited evidence available, most of the studies did 
not report on their primary outcomes. Franco and Marquez detailed non-
controlled time-series evidence in support of quality improvement 
breakthrough series Collaboratives leading to improvement in adherence to 
essential standards of care and some health outcomes in 12 low and middle 
income countries(18). A phased, rapid national scale up quality improvement 
intervention focused on under five children in Ghana, tested process changes 
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using QI techniques, along the continuum of care from pregnancy to age 5 in 
both inpatient and outpatient settings but failed to report on the impact of the 
intervention(19). A systematic review by Schouten and colleagues on the 
evidence for quality improvement Collaboratives identified 57 studies (from a 
total of 72 studies) that were based on the breakthrough series 
Collaboratives. A majority of these studies did not have a comparison group 
for impact assessment(20). The USAID sponsored Health Care Improvement 
(HCI) Project in Niger focused on institutionalization of quality improvement for 
essential obstetric and neonatal care and introduced change packages across 
different levels of their healthcare system. The assessment looked mainly at 
performance measures but did not report on primary outcomes (21, 22).  
The MaiKhanda intervention was the first of its kind to measure the impact of 
QI intervention within the context of a low-income setting such as Malawi. The 
next Section presents an overview of the evaluation design used in the study. 
1.8 Evaluation!design!overview!
Based on the Donabedian framework of input-process and output(23), the 
evaluation was designed to include an impact evaluation, process evaluation 
and economic evaluation (Figure 5). 
1.8.1 Impact!Evaluation!
The interventions were evaluated via a two-by-two factorial cluster 
randomised controlled trial design, where all pregnant women in surveillance 
areas were eligible to take part and consenting women were followed-up to 
two months after birth via a low-cost community surveillance system using 
village-based key informants. Primary outcomes were maternal, perinatal and 
neonatal mortality. There were a total of 61 health centre population clusters 
evaluated in the trial.  
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Figure 5: MaiKhanda Evaluation Framework 
  
The two-by-two factorial design included health centres (clusters) randomised 
to either receive or not receive the Quality Improvement (QI) intervention and 
the communities surrounding each group of health centres then stratified and 
randomised to either receive or not receive the Women’s Group (WG) 
intervention(24). Thus each health facility and its catchment population were 
randomly allocated to receive a women’s group or quality improvement 
intervention or both or none (control group). Randomisation was stratified by 
the two interventions and by district, so that the numbers of intervention and 
control clusters in each district balanced.  
A separate time-series evaluation of the quality improvement work in 9 
CEmOC hospitals, that were not part of the trial design, was under-taken with 
maternal and neonatal case-fatality rates as primary outcomes. These 9 
CEmOC facilities were not included in the randomization process as they 
received referrals from both intervention and control health centres and 
including them would lead to ‘contamination’ of the groups. Nevertheless, QI 
interventions were implemented in these facilities as part of the intervention 
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design to implement QI across a ‘vertical slice’ of the health system namely 
primary, secondary and tertiary care facilities. 
Details of impact evaluation implementation and trial results are discussed in 
detail §Chapter 3.  
1.8.1.1 Secondary-outcomes-
In order to track the secondary outcomes in health centre and hospital and to 
compliment the population level mortality data collected as part of the RCT, 
the evaluation also undertook monthly health facility surveillance. The 
secondary outcomes included the signal functions as well as data on maternal 
and neonatal deaths and case-fatality rates. These were collected on a 
monthly basis directly from the Health Centres and from the Hospitals 
(CEmOC) using a standard Health Facility Surveillance form. Trends in facility 
case-fatality rates were assessed by time series analysis and quality 
improvement control chart statistics. !
1.8.2 Process!evaluation!of!QI!at!health!facility!level!
Evaluations focusing exclusively on outcomes face a number of limitations 
and are unable to answer a number of important questions, since they do not 
explore the contextual factors, the design and delivery of the intervention, the 
extent and quality of the delivery of the intervention, the mechanism of the 
intervention and the differential effects of the intervention on different 
populations(25). Without this information it is difficult to explain why an 
intervention might have worked (or failed to work), to ensure the replication of 
interventions in other settings or to assist in the further improvement of 
effective interventions. 
More recently evaluators has begun to take cognizance of the fact that these 
limitations to experimental study designs can be overcome to a large extent 
by adequately describing and monitoring an intervention and its 
implementation through a process evaluation along side conventional 
evaluation methods(26). Thus process evaluation has emerged as an 
important component of randomised controlled trials (RCTs) of complex public 
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health interventions(27). In integrating process evaluation with RCTs, the 
evaluation offers researchers, decision makers and policy implementers a 
much deeper understanding of the interventions for replication and scaling 
up(28). Recent trials of complex interventions have integrated process 
evaluation to understand and explain the trial outcomes(29). It has been 
recommended as a preferred method especially to address the gaps in RCTs 
for evaluating social interventions (30). 
MaiKhanda’s evaluation design consisted of a process evaluation to look into 
the ‘black box’ of the intervention and describe the key lessons learnt, identify 
the scope for future improvement and outline the implications for policy.  
Based on the quality of care framework suggested by Hulton(31) for maternal 
and newborn health care, the evaluation design considered three 
determinants of the quality of service provision. These were availability of 
human and material resources, provision of care and patient experience of 
care as well as the macro-system of policies within the local and national 
health system. 
 
 
Figure 6: Overview of MaiKhanda process evaluation 
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The availability of resources includes the availability of physical infrastructure, 
human resources, and the availability of drugs and supplies. The availability of 
drugs, supplies and BEmOC and CEmOC signal functions was assessed on a 
monthly basis using the Health Facility surveillance tool. The availability of 
human and material resources was determined by the Health Facility 
Resources Survey (§Appendix-2.3). Measures such as the nurse to 
population ratio; provision of water, electricity and referral services, were also 
looked at in this survey. 
In addition to the availability of human and material resources, the provision of 
care is dependent on the level of clinical knowledge and skills of health facility 
staff and their motivation to work under adverse conditions. Provision of care 
also includes appropriate management of emergencies and the referral 
system, and collection and utilization of good data for decision-making. 
Motivation and morale of staff is analysed using the Staff Psychology survey 
and clinical knowledge of staff by the provider knowledge survey.  The actual 
physical provision of care to patients, which would require direct observation 
by clinically skilled personnel, was not assessed. However, change package 
specific to neonatal clinical care such as emergency newborn care and 
neonatal asphyxia were assessed using the provider knowledge survey.  
Patient’s experience of care includes respect, dignity and emotional support 
provided to the mothers at the point of care as well as addressing equity 
concerns in service delivery. The Women Friendly Care survey provides an 
assessment of the patient experience of care 
1.8.3 Economic!Evaluation!
The primary focus of the economic evaluation was to determine the cost-
effectiveness of the interventions. Bayesian methods were used to estimate 
the incremental cost-effectiveness of the community and facility interventions 
on their own (CI, FI), and together (FICI), compared to current practice in rural 
Malawi(32). Sensitivity analyses surrounding the costs were undertaken in 
order to provide estimates of the likely costs of a future scale-up of the 
interventions.  
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In summary, evaluation design for the MaiKhanda programme consisted of an 
impact evaluation using a cRCT design to measure maternal and newborn 
mortality, a process evaluation analysing the QI intervention and its key 
components for improving quality of care and an economic evaluation looking 
at the cost-effectiveness of the intervention.  
1.9 My!role!in!MaiKhanda!evaluation!
The evaluation team included Prof.Anthony Costello and Dr.Timothy Colbourn 
and myself. Prof.Costello provided oversight for the evaluation while 
Dr.Colbourn provided technical support to the MaiKhanda team and analysed 
the study results. I was involved in the initial conceptualization and design of 
the evaluation of this project (in 2005). From 2007 till the end of the project, I 
was based in Lilongwe being the technical lead for evaluation. I was mainly 
involved in: 
! Developing the trial protocol and get ethical approval from Malawi and 
from UCL 
! Training and capacity building of the locally recruited research staff in 
Malawi 
! Ensuring data quality for the surveillance systems and the various sub-
studies conducted throughout the length of the project. 
! Developing study protocols for the various process evaluation sub-
studies 
! Develop tools for data collection for the process evaluation studies 
! Planning and monitoring data collection 
! Analysis and reporting on the sub-studies 
! Interpretation of the trial results  
1.10 Thesis!Objective!!
The MaiKhanda study was the first of its kind in a developing country setting, 
evaluating the effect of quality improvement intervention on newborn mortality 
using a RCT design for impact evaluation This is a completed trial with known 
study results(24). The randomised trial showed no impact of either of the 
interventions on maternal mortality. The trial showed a decrease in newborn 
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mortality by 22% [Odds ratio=0.78 (95% CI:0.60,1.01; p=0.057)] in areas with 
both the facility intervention at the health centre and the community 
intervention in surrounding villages compared with control areas. The 
perinatal mortality decreased by 16% [Odds ratio=0.84 (95% CI: 0.72,0.97; 
p=0.020)] in areas with the community intervention only. In areas with purely 
QI interventions, the study did not record any significant reductions in 
maternal, newborn or perinatal mortality(24). Absence of effect could be a 
result of failure of intervention design or a failure of program implementation 
or a failure of evaluation approaches. Exploration of these key questions is the 
cornerstone of my PhD thesis. 
The data collection for the study trial was completed in December 2010 and 
the final evaluation concluded in January 2012. The list of process evaluation 
sub-studies conducted through the length of the project and described in 
(Figure 6), was included in the final evaluation report to The Health 
Foundation (33). However, the report did not go as far as explaining the 
relation between the individual process evaluation studies and the intervention 
outcomes. I attempt to explore the relationship between quality improvement 
intervention and the observed outcomes of the MaiKhanda programme, in my 
PhD by conducting a secondary analysis of all the available process 
evaluation studies and other relevant programme documents, using a Theory 
Based Evaluation (TBE) approach. 
Theory based evaluation has been widely used in health promotion 
programs(34) and is especially helpful in evaluating complex interventions. It 
maps out the causal chain from inputs to outcomes and impact and tests the 
underlying assumptions(35). In trying to develop a holistic understanding of 
the MaiKhanda programme and its (non) effect, I use a theory-based 
approach to evaluate the quality improvement intervention for newborn health 
in Malawi. This approach was not included in the initial evaluation design of 
the MaiKhanda programme. However, it is constructed around the evidence 
from the process evaluation studies conducted at MaiKhanda as well as 
relevant programme documents and monitoring reports that were generated 
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throughout the intervention period. This theory-based evaluation is thus, 
based on secondary analysis of the data generated from evaluation of the 
MaiKhanda programme. 
I have limited the scope of my PhD to only consider quality improvement 
interventions for newborn health (i.e the women’s group intervention and 
maternal health have been excluded from my study) for the following reasons: 
It was recognised, even at the outset of the intervention, that it was an 
ambitious target to try and measure maternal mortality. Given the relatively 
low prevalence (675 per 100,000 live births), it was unlikely that the sample 
size would be adequate to detect reductions in maternal mortalityiii. We did not 
see an effect of either of the interventions on maternal mortality probably as a 
result of limitations to the evaluation design and sample sizes. On the other 
hand, both the interventions were sufficiently powered to detect a 30% 
reduction in newborn mortality. So the changes in newborn mortality are more 
likely to be influenced by the intervention design and implementation.  
Secondly, the evidence base regarding the success of women’s group 
intervention in reducing delays 1 and 2 is fairly well established while 
evidence regarding the effect of quality improvement on impacting delay 3, 
less so. A rigorous evaluation of QI interventions, especially in low and 
middle-income countries is lacking.  
Moreover, from a health systems research perspective, it is useful to measure 
a quality improvement intervention using either maternal or newborn (or both) 
health outcomes act as a ‘probe’ to understand how improvement works 
within the broader health system. My decision to focus on quality 
improvement of newborn health, for the purposes of my PhD was based on 
                                            
iiiExcerpts)from)MaiKhanda)Evaluation)Report:)The)randomised)trial)showed)no)impact)of)either)of)
the)interventions)on)maternal)mortality)and)given)the)observed)number)of)births)and)deaths)in)each)
arm) of) the) randomised) trial) the) probability) (calculated) using) the) properties) of) the) binomial)
distribution)) that) 30%) reductions) in) maternal) mortality) really) occurred) as) a) result) of) the)
MaiKhanda)interventions)in)the)total)population)the)sample)sought)to)represent)(intervention)areas)
vs.)control)areas))was)only)around)1%)for)the)facility)intervention.)
)
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the availability of process evaluation data that I needed for secondary 
analysis. There was an impetus right from the evaluation design stage to 
explain the ‘black box’ of the QI intervention and therefore the process 
evaluation data that was developed for the QI intervention was quite 
comprehensive, being based on Hulton’s quality of care framework(31). In 
contrast, data for the community intervention was mainly limited to 
implementation and monitoring.  
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the application of alternate 
research approaches to evaluate complex interventions in low-income country 
settings.  
The aim of my PhD is to understand and explain how (or why) a quality 
improvement intervention proclaimed to be successful in other settings failed 
to demonstrate an impact on newborn outcomes, in Malawi.  
The main objectives of this thesis is: 
• To understand the program theory behind quality improvement 
interventions i.e the interplay between a QI intervention and its context 
which triggers a mechanism (or not) to influence the quality of care and 
ultimately impact on health outcome for the newborn.  
• To analyse the relationship between an intervention’s implementation 
strength and the context and complexity in which the intervention is being 
delivered. 
• To analyse the relationship between program theory and implementation 
theory 
Based on the objectives of the study, the thesis will try to answer the following 
questions: 
! To what extent were the interventions actually implemented in the 
intervention areas (as compared to the original proposal)? 
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! How did the intensity and coverage of the QI (Quality Improvement) teams 
through collaborating learning sessions and mentoring and coaching visits 
affect the improvement efforts in the facilities? 
! What were the contextual factors that influenced the mechanism of the 
interventions? 
! What were the factors and underlying mechanisms that might have 
rendered the intervention to be (or not to be) effective? 
1.11 Structure!of!this!document!
Chapter 1, the introductory chapter gives an overview of the intervention 
design as well as the evaluation design of the MaiKhanda programme. In 
Chapter 2, I briefly touch upon some of the definition and concepts related to 
quality of care and quality improvement followed by a review of literature on 
quality improvement in low and middle-income countries. In this chapter I also 
discuss the challenges in evaluating quality of care. Chapter 3 describes the 
study trial and the results of QI intervention on newborn mortality, briefly. 
Here, I also discuss the limitations of conventional evaluation design in 
evaluating complex health care interventions.  Chapter 4 provides a 
description of the research strategy. Chapter 5 outlines the evolution of 
MaiKhanda’s Theory of Change, followed by Chapter 6, which provides a 
synthesis of the available evidence. This synthesis provides a comprehensive 
framework for analysis. Chapter 7 is an analysis of the evidence using theory-
based approaches. In Chapter 8, I provide a detailed discussion of the 
findings and also discuss some of the methodological challenges in evaluating 
QI interventions. Chapter 9 is the conclusion chapter where I provide a 
synopsis of the findings and recommendations for future research.  
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Chapter!2 Quality!Improvement:!Definitions!and!Literature!review!
The purpose of my literature review is to understand how best to evaluate QI 
interventions. In order to do this, I begin by developing an understanding of 
what quality improvement in health care means and establish a clear 
definition of the intervention. The Chapter begins with a brief history of quality 
improvement followed by a clarification on definitions and concepts related to 
quality improvement. The next section provides an introduction to the various 
approaches to quality improvement followed by a detailed description of the 
model for improvement adapted by MaiKhanda. Next I identify some of the 
challenges in defining the outcomes for QI interventions. The primary 
objective of my literature review is to analyse the effectiveness of QI 
Collaboratives. I do this by reviewing literature on the effects of QI 
Collaboratives on health outcomes and identifying key determinants that 
influence the success or failure of these Collaboratives.  Finally, having 
outlined the challenges and reviewed the literature on QI effectiveness, I 
scope some of the methods used for evaluating Collaboratives.   
2.1 Quality!in!health!care!
The concept of quality in healthcare has been in existence for a long period. 
The importance of observing patients and detailing case notes with accuracy 
was emphasised in the writings of Hippocrates as early as 400 B.C(36). In the 
pre-industrial era, standards of medicine were already described in the charter 
of Royal College of Physicians by 1518(37). 
Even before the introduction of “germ” theory, Dr.Ignaz Semmelweis in 1847, 
demonstrated that handwashing with chlorine could successfully reduce 
maternal case fatality in his hospital in Vienna(38, 39). Similarly, during the 
Crimean War of 1854 Florence Nightingale addressed the link between 
hospital sanitation and high fatality rate(40). She introduced hand washing, 
sanitizing surgical tools, changing bed linen regularly, keeping wards clean 
and was able to bring down fatality rate in wounded soldiers from 60% to 1%. 
However, during this period there was very little emphasis on systems that 
08 
Fall 
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promote quality. A systematic approach to quality in health care was adapted 
from 18th century onwards, largely from the manufacturing industry.  
The history of quality in manufacturing began with the advent of the factory 
system in Great Britain in the 1750s, followed by the industrial revolution in 
the 1800s. Industrial production meant the integration of numerous processes 
and co-operation among many different individuals to manufacture one single 
product. The main mechanism to assure the quality of this product was 
through product inspection(41) giving rise to the concept of quality control.  
Quality control gained prominence and became a critical component of the 
weapons industry during WW II and was subsequently used in the car 
manufacturing industry. It began with W.A Shewhart from Bell Laboratories 
who, in 1930 introduced a scientific approach to quality control(42, 43). Using 
his technique known as ‘statistical quality control’, the manufacturing process 
could differentiate between random variation and non-random causes thereby 
reducing waste and improving the quality of their product(44, 45).  
Meanwhile, in the Japanese Toyota Production System, Deming and 
colleagues had a very different conception of quality-it was based on methods 
for improvement of the processes rather than control and conformance. The 
Japanese system was focused on reducing waste (kaizen/muda) within the 
manufacturing industry and was influenced by Deming’s System of profound 
knowledge and was considered largely successful(46). This led many 
industries to adapt this alternate model called quality improvement.  
Quality in healthcare was greatly influenced by these quality movements in 
the other sectors(47, 48). Initially, the focus was more on monitoring individual 
performance of service providers (similar to control through inspection). More 
specifically it was on provider performance and did not necessarily touch upon 
provider-client relationships or organizational characteristics.  
Adaptation of quality assurance within the health sector was from from 1960s 
onwards with Donabedian publishing his seminal paper on framework for 
evaluation of quality in healthcare(49), providing a broad definition of quality 
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and recommending that it be measured in three areas as structure, process 
and outcome(50). Donabedian was a pioneer in the conceptualization and 
measurement of quality in healthcare. He defined quality as being an 
evaluative dimension of the elements and interaction of medical processes of 
care. The review of patient care was mainly through measuring provider 
performance but then other measurements such as client behaviour, provider-
client relationships were also considered important.  
In 1951 the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals was established in 
the US and there was a paradigm shift in the approach- from minimum 
standards of care to optimum standards of care(51). The concept of optimum 
care redefines quality given the limitations of time and resources, within a 
given setting. This is done through standards and criterion based audits- 
these audits lead to decisions within the particular context, and feedback is 
initiated. Clinical audits gained popularity in the early 1970s followed by a 
gradual shift to hospital-wide quality assurance programmes, towards the end 
of the seventies.  
A brief description of the terminologies quality control, quality assurance and 
quality improvement is provided in Box 1 
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One of the major challenges with quality interventions is the ability to  
 
associate quality interventions with outcomes(52). Moreover, since the 
outcome measure (such as quality of life) and process measures are complex 
and difficult to define, the emphasis is usually placed on evaluation of an 
element such as provider performance(53). Such a narrow model of quality 
assurance is usually met with resistance from heath workers for fear of 
regulatory agencies, litigation and external review(54). 
Quality improvement on the other hand complements quality assurance by 
adopting a coordinated and integrated approach to improving processes that 
influence patient outcomes. Here employees have a central role to play and 
the focus is on improving work processes rather than supervising 
individuals(55).  
Quality Control (QC) is the application of statistical techniques to a 
process in an effort to identify and minimize the random and non-random 
sources of variation.  
Quality Assurance (QA) refers to activities which monitor the quality of a 
service and may include methods to improve the service. Quality 
Assurance has three components: Structure, Process and Outcome. 
Structure includes the physical, human resources and organization 
concerned with the activity of interest. Process includes the acts of 
delivering of care. Outcome includes the effects of care.  
Quality Improvement (QI) is the effort to improve the level of performance 
of a key process. It involves measuring the level of current performance, 
finding ways to improve that performance and implementing new and 
better methods. 
Box 1: Brief description of terminologies related to quality in healthcare 
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In 1988, the Joint Commission adapted the technique of continuous quality 
improvement and advocated for a multi-disciplinary approach that focuses on 
improving the performance of an entire group and shifting the entire 
production curve upwards(54) rather than identify isolated poor performers.  
While the origins of quality improvement approaches in healthcare can be 
traced back mainly to the US, quality is an inherent part of the healthcare 
system within the NHS, in the UK as well.  Quality movement in the UK was 
aimed at accountability and providing quality care and at the same time 
optimizing resources(56). In an effort to improve quality, the NHS now has a 
audit of provider performance(57), which as mentioned earlier, offers limited 
understanding of the quality of health services provided.  
Quality in healthcare in Africa and other low-income countries is a fairly recent 
concept, influenced largely by the quality movement in healthcare in the US 
and UK. In Africa, most of the quality improvement projects have been 
established through USAID’s flagship Health Care Improvement project(18, 
58, 59). The QI movement in UK offers much to learn for the adoption of QI in 
most of Anglophone Africa, which have publicly funded health systems similar 
to NHS in UK.  
2.2 Quality!Improvement:!definitions!and!concepts!
Lee & Jones in their 1933 classical work -The Fundamentals of Good Medical 
Care defined quality as “… the kind of medicine practiced and taught by the 
recognised leaders of the medical profession at a given time or period of 
social, cultural and professional development in a community or population 
group”(49, 60).  
Donabedian expanded it further to include “the application of medical science 
and technology in a manner that maximizes its benefit to health without 
correspondingly increasing the risk”(61, 62). In evaluating healthcare 
improvement, Donabedian defined quality in terms of structure, process and 
outcomes. This involves evaluating health systems capacities and the 
interaction between clinicians and patients as well as  evidence about 
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changes in patients' health status(63). While all 3 dimensions are important 
for measuring quality, most of the literature on quality is focused on process of 
care, more specifically, assessing appropriateness of care (mainly through 
provider performance) and adherence to standards.  
The IOM (Institute of Medicine) 2001 report identified the “quality chasm”-the 
big gap between care that people should ideally receive and what they 
actually receive. Given the complex notion of quality, the report defined quality 
in terms of its six dimensions(63): 
Patient centeredness, i.e. providing care that is respectful and responsive to 
individual patient preferences, needs and values.  
Equity: Health care systems have to improve the health status of a population 
and at the same time reduce the disparities between them 
Effectiveness-providing services according to current best scientific 
knowledge 
Efficiency such that resources are used in a manner to get best value for 
money. This could be done through reducing ‘waste’ and reducing production 
(or administration) costs.  
Timeliness i.e avoiding harmful delays 
Safety avoiding injuries for patients from the care that is intended to help 
them.  
The WHO definition of health care is broader in scope as it encompasses both 
the health care as well as the health system in which it is operating. It adopts 
a system-wide perspective in its approach to quality and the focus is on 
organizing the care delivery system and not just on medical knowledge and 
resource availability(64). Using a system perspective, quality can also be 
defined in terms of roles and responsibilities on individuals, teams as well as 
organizations. 
As is clear from these various definitions, quality is multi-dimensional. In 
simple terms, Quality Improvement is about improving the performance level 
within these various dimensions of quality.  
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The definition of quality improvement specifically within MNH (maternal and 
newborn health) covers specific dimensions around reproductive health rights, 
effective and timely access to care, including provider needs(31, 62) 
2.2.1 Core!principles!of!QI:!!
Langley et al and others have identified the core principles underlying a 
quality improvement intervention(46, 48, 65). Key principles include: 
• Placing patients at the centre and involving them in the co-design.  
• Understanding work processes as components of a wider system and 
re-designing accordingly.  
• Improving the reliability of the system and clinical processes 
• Understanding variation and measuring the processes.  
• Using data for measuring improvement. 
• Recognizing and valuing the expertise of people in the frontline. They 
provide a broader definition of improvement science, which includes 
commitment to practical learning, generating local wisdom, contributing 
to clear and explicit theories of how change happens.  
• Focussing on the design, deployment and assessment of complex 
multi-faceted interventions(66, 67).  
2.3 Quality!Improvement!Framework!
Quality is an integral part of patient care but reference to the terms quality 
control and quality assurance implies an external agent evaluating the 
process and providing feedback. Quality improvement on the other hand is 
“the continuous and relentless effort by everyone to improve patient 
outcomes, improve system performance and capacity building”(68).  
The quality improvement framework that was used in the MaiKhanda 
programme was based on IHI’s Model for Improvement and is presented in 
detail below and diagrammatically represented in Figure 9. It consists of the 
following components, each of which is described in the sections below: 
! Deming’s system of profound knowledge 
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! Various approaches to quality improvement (with an emphasis on Rapid 
Cycle Change which was the key approach used in the MaiKhanda 
programme).  
! Model for Improvement 
! QI Collaboratives 
2.3.1 Deming’s!system!of!profound!knowledge!
For improvement to occur, it involves change and this change is influenced 
not just by the available scientific evidence but also the degree of belief that 
people have in that evidence. This intersection between belief and best 
available scientific evidence is at the heart of quality improvement(69). The 
degree of belief stems from a system of profound knowledge as described by 
Deming. He describes profound knowledge as 4 independent processes, all 
related to each other (Figure 7): 
• Appreciation of the systems 
•  
 
Figure 7: The science of improvement 
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A system is an interdependent group of items, people or processes working 
together towards a common purpose. The success of an organisation 
depends not only on the performance but also on integration of the individual  
 
parts. Multiple measures are therefore required to understand the impact of 
the changes on the various individual parts as well as whole system changes. 
Systems are not made of simple linear cause-effect relationship and changes 
in one part of the system may produce unpredicted effect in another part or at 
a later time. Unintended consequences are a common experience and leads 
to misinterpretation of results.   
• Understanding variation 
•  
 
Figure 8: Example of a run chart showing neonatal case fatality rate in MaiKhanda's 9 CEmOC 
facilities 
 
Everything that is observed or measured varies. This can be understood by  
plotting data over time. In 1920, Walter Sehwhart pioneered the theory around 
variation(43) and introduced SPC (Statistical Process Control) mainly to 
improve manufacturing. SPC has been used in healthcare since 1960s, 
initially in laboratory settings and then eventually for direct patient care 
application(70). Variation can be differentiated as common cause variation 
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where patterns in the data are predictable and special cause-these are 
variations which lead to fundamental changes within the system(71).  
Processes that affect common cause within the system are called stable 
processes, while those processes whose outcomes are affected by both 
common and special cause are called unstable processes. It is common to 
mistake a common cause variation to special cause and tweak the system or 
a special cause variation as common cause and miss the opportunity to make 
a change. The commonly used tools for understanding variation are run 
charts (Figure 8) and control charts(72, 73) developed by Shewhart in the 
1920s to improve industrial manufacturing(43)  
The control chart consists of 2 parts: a series of measurements plotted in time 
and the control chart ‘template’ which consists of a central line (usually the 
mean or median) with upper and lower control limits. When data falls outside 
the control limits it is interpreted as a ‘special cause’ variation that is variation 
caused by some inherent changes in the process. These changes in the 
process can be the result of a deliberate intervention or a natural event over 
which we have little control.   
• Building knowledge 
From an improvement perspective, a change is a prediction. So the greater 
the understanding and knowledge one has about the functionality of a system, 
the better the prediction and greater the likelihood of change resulting in 
improvement. Comparing predictions to results is a key source of learning. 
Rational prediction requires theory. Theories are built using current knowledge 
and then designing tests to validate these theories. These tests are done 
using the PDSA (Plan-Do-Study-Act) cycle(46). In improvement, more 
commonly used is the repeated deductive-inductive cycle of Plan-Do 
(deductive approach) Study-Act (Inductive approach). The tests help identify 
gaps to the prediction, and theory is updated accordingly. Action is then taken 
on the new learning.  
• Theory of psychology (the human side of change) 
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Knowledge of the human side of change helps to understand how people 
interact with each other and with the system. It helps understand the 
motivation of people and their behaviour(71). 
In summary, improvement occurs when there is overlap between subject 
matter knowledge and profound knowledge(46). From an operational 
perspective, ‘improvement science’ defines this as the use of scientific 
principles and methods to address the practical challenges of delivering better 
health care for patients and populations(74). Quality Improvement aims to 
narrow the gap between what we know from research i.e. the practice of 
evidence based medicine and what is done in clinical practice by using quality 
improvement methods. In essence, the focus of evidence based medicine 
(EBM) is doing the right things and that of quality improvement (QI) is about 
doing things right (in the right way)(75). Evidence based medicine through 
systematic reviews, practice guidelines and computer assisted clinical 
decision-making tries to improve the quality of evidence on clinical care that 
patients should receive(63). But that in itself will not address the gap in 
existing practice. Implementing EBM to improve quality of care requires 
understanding and adaptation to the context in which the guidelines are being 
introduced.  
In order to put improvement in practice, a simple ‘Will-Ideas-Execution’ 
framework has been suggested that lays the foundation for an improvement to 
be initiated. This includes the Will to do what it takes to change a system, 
Ideas on which to base the design of the new system and Execution of those 
ideas(76). There are various approaches to putting improvement into practice. 
They are briefly mentioned in the next section.  
2.3.2 Approaches!to!quality!improvement!
Powell et al(77) (NHS QI Scotland 2009) provide a systematic narrative 
review of the various QI models in health care(77). They identified 5 models of 
quality improvement: 
• Total quality management 
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• Business Process Re-engineering 
• Lean thinking 
• Six Sigma  
• Rapid cycle change 
2.3.2.1 Total-Quality-Management-(TQM)-
This is also known as Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI). It was 
developed in Japan in 1950s and used in health care since 1990s. The 
emphasis is on quality improvement as an on-going activity. It is data driven 
and has an 'empowered' mutli-disciplinary team at its core. TQM considers 
quality improvement as a normal and integrated on-going activity within an 
organization. 
2.3.2.2 Business-Process-Re?engineering-(BPR)-
The emphasis is on the importance of examining and redesigning the 
processes, e.g. re-designing care pathways in the NHS. It is usually driven 
from the top by visionary leadership. Contrary to other improvement 
approaches BPR does not focus on incremental changes-it adopts an “all or 
none approach”. BRP in health care has evolved in different ways and has in 
most instances been implemented partially.  
2.3.2.3 Lean-thinking-
This was a concept developed by Toyota in the 1950s. The principle behind 
this model is streamlining processes with minimal wasted time, effort and 
costs. It consists of value stream mapping that is analysing current processes 
to generate ideas for process re-design in order to remove any unnecessary 
steps in a process. It has been applied in health care settings with some 
success in reducing waste(78). The approach appears to be particularly 
useful in streamlining processes in support departments rather than 
mainstream clinical services. Wholesale application has not been 
demonstrated in a health care setting.  
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2.3.2.4 Six-Sigma-
One of the recent additions to quality improvement, which has been in use 
since the 1980s. It follows a structured approach known as DMAIC (Define-
Measure-Analyse-Improve-Control) to eliminate waste and reduce variation in 
the processes so as to improve outcomes. It is dependent on extensive use of 
statistical tools such as SPC (Statistical Process Control). It has only been 
applied to a limited extent in healthcare primarily because the approach 
requires statistical expertise alongside reliable local data collection. It is more 
commonly used in combination with lean thinking.  
2.3.2.5 Rapid-cycle-change-
This is based on the model developed by Nolan and Langley(46) for improving 
organizational performance in multinational companies as well as different 
industries such as healthcare and public agencies. The rapid cycle change 
consists of repeated short-cycle small-scale tests of change linked to 
reflection, known as Plan-Do-Study-Act cycles. This includes conducting re-
peated cycles of quality problem diagnosis (PLAN), development and 
implementation of small-scale improvement efforts (DO), assessment of 
effects (STUDY), and refinement and expansion of effective actions (ACT) until 
desired outcomes are achieved. PLANning involves outlining the objectives 
and determining the questions and predictions as well as planning for data 
collection. DO involves actual execution of the plan and documenting the 
observations. STUDY involves the analysis of data and comparison to the 
predictions. Data is summarized and discussed by the QI team so as to ACT 
on the changes that are to be made or plan for the next cycle. 
The rapid cycle approach was implemented in Malawi as part of the 
MaiKhanda project(24).  
 
Improvement interventions usually use a hybrid of various improvement 
techniques. One such hybrid is the QI Collaborative approach which was first 
introduced by IHI through its ‘Model for Improvement’ in 1996 (79, 80).  
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2.3.3 IHI’s!Model!for!Improvement!
The model for improvement comprises of 3 basic questions that QI teams 
have to focus on, in order to develop their PDSA(44) cycle. The questions are: 
• What do we want to achieve? This includes defining the aim of the 
project. The aim is to be succinct, time-bound and measureable. 
• How will we know that the change is an improvement? All improvement 
involves change, but not all change is an improvement. Improvement is 
usually measured using tools such as run charts. 
• What change can we make that will result in an improvement? This 
includes ideas to bring about change.  
Once the teams have answered these preliminary questions, they get 
working on the PDSA cycles. 
In order to help the QI teams answer these preliminary questions and develop 
their PDSA cycles, they are supported by improvement advisors, who provide 
the necessary mentoring and coaching to fulfill their objectives. The teams 
also receive encouragement and motivations through inter-organizational 
networking. All this is achieved through the QI Collaborative. The QI 
Collaborative consist of 2 distinct parts: the Collaborative ‘Learning Sessions’ 
where organizations get a chance to interact with each other and learn from 
each other’s improvement ideas and an ‘Action Period’ where facility QI teams 
are visited by improvement advisors and receive onsite coaching and 
mentoring. 
The length of Collaboratives varies over time depending on scope of the 
intervention, and the collaborative is characterized by a continuum of learning 
sessions and action periods. Thus the Collaboratives are a combination of 
PDSA and inter-organizational networking 
2.3.4 The!QI!Collaborative!
The “QI Collaborative” (QIC) is also known as the “Break-Through 
Collaborative Series”(77, 79-81).  
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The Collaborative consists of groups of participating health care delivery 
organizations. Each organization is represented by a 3 or 4 person team who 
are members of the QI team in their respective health facility. The teams are 
supported by a faculty of QI experts. The objective of these Collaboratives is 
to study a specific health care issue, design and implement specific solutions, 
evaluate and refine these solutions, and disseminate findings to other 
organizations. 
Method: The Collaboratives consist of a ‘learning session’ which is a series of 
2-3 day meetings over a period of several months. During the meetings, the 
team members with support from the faculty experts, learn improvement 
techniques, exchange insights and advice, and generate enthusiasm and a 
shared sense of commitment to improvement goals and outcomes. 
Followed by the Collaborative session is the “action period” when teams 
return to their organizations between learning sessions to apply their new 
knowledge and ideas in a Plan–Do–Study–Act cycle(82) using the 
improvement model framework(46).  
.  
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Figure 9: Quality Improvement Framework 
 
Figure 9 summarizes the various concepts described above. To summarize, 
QI Collaborative is an organised multi-faceted approach to QI that involves 5 
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experts provide with the evidence and change ideas, which saves time 
on the initial investigation work(83). 
2. Ideas and support for improvement: clinical and QI experts identify, 
consolidate, clarify and share scientific knowledge, best practice and 
improvement knowledge 
3. Critical mass of multidisciplinary team from multiple sites  
4. Model for improvement consisting of clear and measurable target, data 
collection, small tests of change, learning by doing 
5. Collaborative process involving a series of structured activities within a 
given time frame, exchange of ideas and sharing of experience 
between participating teams. 
2.3.4.1 Strengths-of-Collaboratives-
One of the expected outcomes for using the collaborative approach is for the 
team to take ‘ownership’ of the project or event, a necessary pre-requisite for 
successful organization change(84).  
These methods of testing small tests of change are designed within the local 
context and are therefore, arguably, sustainable in the long run. It draws on 
the ideas and ingenuity of local staff. Because of its localized nature, the 
collaborative enables low risk testing of changes in the clinical setting, it can 
be used relatively informally, and can be used to address issues at different 
levels within the health system.  
The Collaboratives provide a sharing and learning environment where teams 
are able to share successes and failures and learn from their peers at the 
same time(85). Collaboratives adhere to most of the core principles of a QI 
initiative (§2.2.1).  
2.3.4.2 Weaknesses-of-Collaboratives-
Findings from the NHS Orthopaedic Services Collaborative provides insight 
into a weak collaborative(86). Of the 37 Trusts involved in the Collaborative, 7 
Trusts withdrew, there was a high turnover of project managers, there was 
partial implementation of PDSAs, limited evidence of networking between 
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groups, lack of resources allocated to the process, insufficient attention to 
developing receptive context locally and a general lack of interest from many 
participants. In addition, conflict between teams and organizational strategic 
objectives as well as conflict between different projects within the same 
organization have been identified as potential weaknesses(87, 88). Single 
changes could displace problems on to other parts of the system. There is a 
risk of partial use of PDSA methods providing premature solutions(70). For 
Collaboratives to be successful there has to be the will and skill for data 
analysis, accountability for results and sustaining efforts(89) .Obtaining robust 
data is a challenge. There is limited evidence from peer reviewed literature in 
terms of change in outcome(18) and PDSAs could be ineffective when dealing 
with intractable systemic or bureaucratic problems(90).  
2.4 Geographic!scope!of!QI!Collaboratives!
Some of the earliest known Collaboratives were initiated in North America and 
include the Northern New England Cardiovascular Disease Study Group 
(1986) and the Vermont Oxford Network (1988)(91, 92). The first 
Breakthrough Series Collaborative was initiated by IHI in 1996(79). Since then 
Collaboratives have been used in a wide range of health care setting in the 
US(93) and elsewhere. 
Collaborativesiv are widely used in the NHS. The UK cancer collaborative was 
one of the first to be established in 2002. Others include the National Primary 
Care Collaborative, and the Scottish Primary Care Collaborative 
programme(77). 
QIC are widely used in Canada, Australia, Sweden, Netherlands, Norway(94).  
Quality improvement has been a recent introduction in the developing world. 
The majority of the QI projects in low and middle income countries have been 
implemented through the USAID funded health care improvement project(18, 
                                            
iv)This)refers)to)Breakthrough)Collaborative)Series)in)the)remainder)of)the)document.)
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59). A literature review on quality improvement in Africa done by Liu and 
colleagues yielded 10 studies(58). 
2.5 Literature!review:!Quality!Improvement!Collaboratives-
2.5.1 Defining!what!needs!to!be!reviewed!
The primary objective of any quality improvement intervention is to improve 
patient outcomes through improving quality across the inter-dependent levels 
of the health system (23, 95). This includes: 
! The individual level which includes the patients but also the various 
health care providers and other individuals involved in the direct or 
indirect provision of care. 
! The microsystem: This includes the clinical system(s) at the health 
facility for eg; maternity and labour ward, laboratory systems, data 
management systems. Most of the QI interventions act at this level of 
the health system.  
! The macrosystem: This consists of the broader health care 
organization, the referral systems between different levels of the health 
system, the Ministry of Health (MoH), the District Health Management 
Team (DHMT).  
! The environment: This is the broader context in which the micro and 
macrosystems are functioning and includes external stakeholders, the 
policy environment, the global context for (in the case of MaiKhanda) 
maternal and newborn health.  
The purpose of evaluation then is in understanding and ascertaining the 
relationship between the process changes that happens across the different 
levels of the health care system and variation in outcomes(96). The question 
of what to measure in evaluating quality improvement is important since the 
parameters chosen have an influence on the interpretation of results. Figure 
10 represents an outline of an evaluation framework for QI interventions which 
is a modification to Donabedian’s framework of structure-process-output for 
evaluating quality interventions(49).  I begin this section by discussing the 
08 
Fall 
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measurement of outcomes (Figure 10), which focuses on the  clinical (or 
health) outcome of the individual patient. There are usually includes 3 kinds of 
outcome measures: biological (such as mortality and morbidity measures), 
behavioural and psychological. Mortality is the commonly used outcome 
measure for most interventions as it is a very objectively verifiable indicator. 
Irrespective of the kind of outcome measure chosen, there is an assumption 
that improvements in quality of health care services will lead to measurable 
changes in health outcomes. 
Since these individual outcomes are complex to measure, a more commonly 
used approach is to evaluate quality of care itself. However, quality of care 
cannot be measured as an outcome per se since there is no standard 
acceptable definition of quality of care. Evaluators usually use one or more of 
the dimensions of quality of care namely patient centeredness, timeliness, 
equity, efficiency, effectiveness and safety (IoM 2001) (63) to define and 
measure quality of care. At an individual level, evaluating quality of care 
includes evaluating the provider behaviour as well as client behaviour and the 
complex network of formal and informal relationships between the client and 
the provider (50).  
 
 
Figure 10: QI Evaluation Framework 
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In the earlier on period of measuring quality of care, evaluating provider 
performance was used more frequently and commonly in advanced health 
care systems to increase transparency and accountability, while client 
experience (patient satisfaction) is now increasingly being considered in the 
evaluation of quality of care (53). It has also gained wide acceptance given 
the changing role and expectations from care providers. Health care providers 
are expected by their organizations to accept responsibility not just for the 
clinical quality of care but for other dimensions of health care system such as 
efficiency and equity. Similarly, technology is becoming an integral part of the 
care process as well as the patient provider relationship(97) and contributing 
to patients knowledge and expectations in terms of good quality care. These 
dimensions also need to be taken into consideration in evaluating quality of 
care. 
The challenges of evaluating individual outcomes or even quality of care as its 
proxy is not without limitations(49). Since it is difficult to attribute changes in 
health outcomes to quality of care exclusively, process evaluation can be 
helpful in explaining the intervention factors that may have influenced the 
outcomes. Improvement by its very definition involves change. Another 
important dimension of QI interventions is adaptability(98). Both these 
concepts are difficult to absorb within existing impact evaluation methods that 
solely look at hard outcomes such as mortality(99). Process evaluation helps 
to shed light on if the intervention actually did not show an effect or if the 
absence of an effect was due to the design or implementation of the 
intervention being sub-optimal(67). Quality improvement is a continuous and 
dynamic process constantly evolving over time and therefore evaluation 
measuring 'processes of care' parameters are more easily measurable than 
outcome parameters(100). This includes measuring improvements in the 
change package, monitoring PDSAs (Plan-Do-Study-Act). It can possibly be 
measured in terms of the QI implementation process using routine 
intervention monitoring data. Although the use of routine QI data for 
evaluation purposes requires further scrutiny, it is still an indispensable 
element of the intervention itself because it provides feedback concerning the 
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performance of the system. While process evaluation might be able to shed 
light on the issue of attribution of the intervention to the outcome of interest, 
reporting on process measures alone, is of limited value as it does not tell us 
about the effectiveness of the intervention.  
Applying a biomedical research analogy of a dose-response relationship, 
process evaluation can be considered akin to measurement of the ‘dose’ of an 
intervention, within public health interventions (also referred to as the 
programme implementation strength). Measurement of implementation 
strength of processes consists of two components namely implementation 
quality (also referred to as fidelity or integrity) and quantity (also referred to as 
dosage). Fidelity is defined as the extent to which delivery of an intervention 
adheres to the protocol, guidelines or programme model originally developed 
while the dose, duration, intensity and specificity (often referred to as 
‘dosage’) of a QI Collaborative includes monitoring of Collaborative workshops 
and action periods, change packages and PDSA cycles(98).  
The evidence regarding evaluating implementation strength of complex multi-
dimensional interventions is limited, especially from low and middle income 
countries(98). Furthermore, higher implementation strength need not 
necessarily produce better outcomes(101). This poses the first of many 
challenges for evaluation-that is establishing a causal link between 
improvements in quality of care being provided and direct measurable 
changes in patient outcomes. This linkage is difficult to establish and 
especially with complex social interventions because of the low signal to noise 
ratio - outcomes are influenced by factors other than quality of care(102) such 
as the nature and magnitude of need, provider-client relationships and the 
capabilities of medical science(49) as well as the overall context 
(characterized by the interdependent layers of the health system) in which the 
interventions are being implemented. It is difficult to link health outcomes with 
quality unless all these other factors are also considered.  
Evaluation is not just focused on summative health outcomes assessment but 
also the formative i.e. to assess the extent to which an implementation is 
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effective in a given context(103). Thus evaluation of a QI initiative could have 
measures looking at the effect on health outcomes or quality of care or the 
processes of care, but equally important for evaluation is to understand the 
embeddedness of the intervention within the health system. This requires 
evaluation of the broader context in which the intervention is being 
implemented. Thus evaluation of the context is another important aspect of 
evaluation of QI Collaboratives and focuses on other levels of the health 
system which will ultimately impact on individual patient outcomes. An 
essential feature of most interventions is that the events and processes occur 
within a particular setting. The characteristics of these settings includes formal 
and informal organization as well as social, economic and cultural factors, 
which profoundly influence all the elements of the intervention. Furthermore, it 
has been suggested that these elements interact with each other producing a 
multiplier (rather than additive) effect(104). Evaluation of quality and 
performance in health care need to look at these ‘cultural transformations’ 
alongside individual structural and process changes(105).  
More than 50 contextual factors have been identified by Kaplan et al that 
could potentially influence QI interventions(106). Some factors were more 
frequently examined, others less so. Of the commonly examined factors, 
organizational characteristics, size, organizational culture, organizational 
maturity (years involved in QI) were generally shown to influence QI 
success(106). Among the less examined factors influencing QI success 
include leadership for quality improvement, clinical integration across 
department, customer focus, microsystem motivation to change, resources 
and QI team leadership. According to Lombarts et al, the maturity of an 
organization’s experience with QI (measured in terms of an organization’s 
formal involvement in QI) showed a significant positive relationship with QI 
success(107). Similarly presence of an organizational culture supportive of QI, 
which was measured using tools such as the competing values framework, 
showed a positive association with QI success(108). In summary, 
organizational leadership, culture, QI maturity, and data infrastructure have 
the strongest evidence base for successful QI interventions in existing 
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literature(106). Factors such as motivation, leadership and culture operate 
within and across the different levels of the health system.  
Contextual factors related to the clinical microsystem and the QI team are 
directly related to the success of QI while organizational factors and external 
environment are believed to influence QI success indirectly(109). But, it is 
important to acknowledge that it is not just the influence of individual elements 
of the intervention and the health systems, but also the interaction between 
them that influences quality of care(65, 109).  
In summary, the evaluation of QI Collaboratives needs to take into 
consideration the structure and processes of care as well as quality of care 
and their influence on health outcomes. Evaluation also needs to consider the 
external and internal context in which care is being provided and the inter-
relationship between them that influences outcome. Each of these parameters 
evaluated separately and in combination offers great insight into intervention 
implementation and its sustainability and replicability.  
At this point, it is important to bear in mind that the quality of care is the end 
result of a QI intervention whereas the QI Collaborative is a technique to 
improve quality of care and health outcomes. QI Collaboratives then are a 
means to achieve quality of care in the facilities using a combination of inter-
organizational networks and learning cycle(86). It is an approach to learning 
and implementing quality of care using a combination of subject matter 
knowledge and profound knowledge. Evaluation of QI is many a time 
focussed on the implementation components such as the QI Collaboratives, 
or PDSA cycles. These are essential but by themselves are unable to provide 
insight into the success (or failure) of the intervention. 
Given this understanding of the challenges and complexities of evaluating QI 
Collaboratives, the next section reviews the available literature to outline 
design and methods that might be best suitable for evaluating QI 
Collaboratives.  
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2.5.2 Literature!review!process!
I focus on Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) Breakthrough 
Collaborative Series(110), as this was the main approach used for the QI 
interventions in the MaiKhanda programme in Malawi. 
I searched for literature on the OvidSP Medline search engine in the following 
databases-Medline, Embase, PsycInfo and HMIC (Health Management 
Information Consortium) using both MeSH and non-MeSH terms. The terms 
included: 
Quality improvement [OR] quality assurance [OR] quality of healthcare [OR] 
continuous quality improvement [AND] collaborat* [or] “breakthrough series” 
Separate searches were also done in PubMed and Cochrane database. The 
search strategy was restricted to English language and there was no 
restriction on the time period.  This search strategy yielded 766 articles. Given 
the limited number of articles on the topic I did not restrict the literature search 
to a particular clinical outcome such as maternal or newborn mortality as this 
would have generated very few hits to further explore the determinants of 
successful QI initiatives. Moreover, as discussed above, the issue of 
outcomes in QI initiatives is a widely debated topic in improvement research. 
After taking out duplicates (32) there were 734 articles left (Figure 11). Based 
on the search strategy, I only selected those articles that contained either 
“quality improvement” or “Collaboratives” in the title. This excluded 623 
articles, leaving 111 articles to be shortlisted through their abstract. Forty 
abstracts that did not meet the inclusion criteria (e.g. not Quality Improvement 
intervention or QI Collaborative, no measurement of outcome) were excluded. 
Articles which discussed the design and implementation of the Collaborative 
methodology and reported on the evaluation of the QI Collaborative were 
included in this review. Thus 71 full text articles were selected, of which 2 
were excluded because their Collaborative model was different from the 
Breakthrough Series Collaborative considered in this review. I conducted a 
manual search of references from the studies included. The search strategy 
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was further extended to include other prominent websites such as the Health 
Foundation (www.health.org.uk) and Institute for Healthcare Improvement 
(www.ihi.org). A total of 69 articles was selected through the search strategy 
and in addition 1 article was identified through the IHI website and 8 were 
references from the selected articles.  After reading through the final list of 78 
articles, I identified 15 articles that were critical to this review.  
 
 
Figure 11: Literature review flowchart 
 
2.5.3 Effectiveness!of!QI!Collaboratives!
The model for quality improvement developed by the US Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement has been widely used as a model for improvement 
Collaboratives especially in the USA, UK, Europe, Australia and also recently 
in South Africav. However, there have been few evaluations using rigorous 
methods (such as RCTs) to measure effects of quality improvement initiatives 
published in the academic literature, especially for low and middle-income 
countries. 
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Figure 12 presents a summary of the literature covered in this review, 
organized according to the QI evaluation framework discussed above. A 
review by Sifrim and colleagues identified 76 articles from low- and middle-
income countries that reported on quality improvement interventions, though 
not specifically on QI Collaboratives(111). These were mainly observational 
studies. Their characteristics included description of the problem statement, 
the improvement processes and tools, a description of the interventions itself 
and their evaluation methods(111). 60 of the 76 studies (79%) did not have a 
concurrent comparison or control group in their evaluation design. This 
literature is limited in scope since it does not analyse the effectiveness of the 
interventions (but does provide some information about evaluation methods). 
 
 
Figure 12: Summary of reviewed articles 
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useable data, and found evidence supporting the achievement of compliance 
with standards, and of performance outcomes for 87% of 135 indicators 
measured in time-series charts. This review was also limited by a lack of 
comparison groups; it was also limited by the outcomes being self-reported 
and only of process measures. 
Table 3: Summary of effectiveness of QIC from 7 controlled studies 
 
A systematic review by Schouten(20) and colleagues on the evidence for 
quality improvement Collaboratives identified 57 studies (from a total of 72 
studies) that were based on the Breakthrough Collaborative series . Of these, 
50 had an uncontrolled study design and mainly used self-reported measures 
of improvement. Of the 7 controlled studies (Table 3), one was a randomized 
controlled trial evaluating the breakthrough series integrated with the chronic 
care model. The trial did not show an effect on any of the key processes or 
intermediate outcomes of care for children with asthma(112). The studies had 
all different measures of outcomes. For instance, Landon et al looking at HIV 
infection analysed virological outcomes and quality of care provided and 
showed no significant effect(113). Baier et al showed a significant decrease in 
the prevalence of patients with pain in 21 nursing homes(115). The 
interrupted time series by Pierce-Bulger et al showed significant improvement 
in neonatal deaths(118). While still others such as Bendetti et al looked at 
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improvement in process measures (eg: annual rates of eye and feet 
examination for diabetes), while Mangione-Smith et al reported on quality of 
care such as patient education and self management.  Asch et al reported 
significant improvements in counselling and education in the care of patients 
with chronic health failure. 
The USAID sponsored Health Care Improvement (HCI) Project has nearly 15 
projects across Africa working mainly on HIV and related issues(59). The HCI 
project in Niger(22) focused on institutionalization of quality improvement for 
essential obstetric and neonatal care and introduced change packages across 
different levels of the healthcare system. The assessment looked mainly at 
performance measures but did not report on primary outcomes. A phased, 
rapid national scale-up quality improvement intervention focused on under-five  
children in Ghana, tested process changes using QI techniques, along the 
continuum of care from pregnancy to age 5 in both inpatient and outpatient 
settings but reported on effectively scaling up MNCH interventions to national 
level but, did not test effectiveness of the interventions themselves(19, 119). 
Newton and colleagues published a non-systematic review of Collaborative 
methodology and its use in heart failure research. The review identified 43 
articles. It concluded that organization and leadership were important aspects 
of Collaboratives, that Collaboratives improved outcomes of patients (with 
heart failure and chronic cardiovascular diseases) and that they facilitate 
sustainability(90). Most of the studies were observational studies, except 
three which were case control studies. The studies mainly reported on the 
determinants of a Collaborative (§2.5.4). Some of the studies also reported on 
changes in process and outcome measures, including costs. Only one case 
control study reported statistically significant improvement in outcomes (i.e 
reduction in mean HbA1c levels) (92, 120) 
Hulscher et al (2009) further explore the effectiveness of Quality Improvement 
Collaboratives reviewed by Schouten, by analysing the determinants of their 
success or failures(121). They were able to identify 13 articles from 10 
controlled studies in their review. Eight of the studies were based on the 
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Break Through Series model developed by IHI. Four of these also 
incorporated the Chronic Care model (CCM) within their intervention. Two 
studies were based on the Vermont Oxford Network (VON) approach(92), 
which is a slightly different from the Breakthrough Collaborative Series and 
therefore not considered in the analysis here. While three of the studies 
showed a positive effect, two of the studies (of which one was a RCT) did not 
show any significant effect. This review was similar to the findings by 
Schouten, but with the addition of one more study-that by Howard et al(122), 
looking at the effectiveness of Collaboratives in improving organ donation by 
eligible donors. It was a controlled before after study design and showed 
significant improvement in donor conversion rates.  
In addition, Hulscher et all in their review also identified 67 articles that had an 
uncontrolled study design (93). The uncontrolled studies reported on 
improvements made in patient care and organization performance. These 
studies mainly looked at QI Collaboratives and process pathways while the 
controlled case studies (n=13) measured and reported both processes and 
outcome parameters. Studies with process of care parameters more often 
showed positive results than patient outcome parameters. The authors 
suggest that this might perhaps be because of the timeframe chosen. Shorter 
timeframe means that the more proximal process indicators are more likely to 
show effect while outcome indicators, especially for complex interventions 
such as QI, less so because it takes time for the improved processes to effect 
improvement in outcomes. 
In summary, the evidence regarding the impact of Collaborative models on 
change in outcomes is very limited(20, 77, 80). But interestingly, some 
organisations have been able to achieve remarkable improvements using QIC 
methods while others have achieved modest results(86, 123).  So the 
question is what is it in those organisations where the intervention worked that 
was different? According to Powell et al, where there is no improvement, it 
could be because organizations overall objective could sometimes be in 
conflict with the changes proposed by QI teams. Sometimes changes to one 
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unit could displace problems to another part of the system while at other times 
addressing certain aspects of care may expose other long standing problems 
within the organization that are difficult to address(77), Some organizations 
only make partial use of the PDSA cycles It has also been argued that PDSA 
are useful for small scale changes but unsuitable for system level 
changes(124). Engagement of the senior leadership of the organizations is 
sometimes difficult and this is especially true of clinicians(85, 125). Difference 
in perspective between professionals from different health care organizations 
can also be a challenge(124). 
Hulscher et al try to review this apparent inconsistency in the evidence 
regarding the effectiveness of Collaboratives, by looking at the potential 
determinants of a successful QI Collaborative(100).  
2.5.4 Determinants!of!successful!QI!Collaboratives!
Several potential determinants of QI Collaborative have been suggested in 
literature(77, 100, 126, 127), that are necessary for a functional Collaborative. 
However, the evidence base supporting most of these determinants is either 
weak or non-existent. I have categorised the list based on the QI framework 
elaborated in Figure 9. 
• Will-Ideas-Execution: 
Leadership  
Involvement of senior management and physicians(128) is important though 
the evidence on that is not well established(106, 129).  
Alignment with organizational strategic goals.  
Teams are more likely to be successful when the work they are engaged in is 
perceived as part of the organization’s strategic goal(127, 130).  
• Model for Improvement 
Appropriate choice of topic  
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Choice of topic is considered an important determinant of QI Collaboratives. In 
general it was found that clinical projects were more successful than 
operational improvement projects(131) .  
Ideas for improvement  
Experts support for improvement is important(132). Facilitators are a huge 
resource to the Collaboratives and they provide intensive support to 
implement and maintain the QI interventions(81). 
Preliminary work and learning 
Improvement interventions are more likely to succeed when developed with, 
rather than imposed on, healthcare professionals.  
Partial use of PDSAs  
One of the challenges of QI Collaboratives has been to get the participating 
teams to fully implement the PDSA cycles. This does influence the success of 
Collaborative(86). 
• Breakthrough Series/QI Collaborative 
Data collection  
Data infrastructure is an important aspect of the QI work and presence of 
good data systems does influence the success of QI interventions(106). 
Characteristics of QI team  
In general, support of QI from clinical practitioners is limited(133), but 
physician involvement does have a greater impact on the success of 
Collaboratives(134). 
Other characteristics of the QI team include group climate i.e. group learning, 
orientation and group processes such as perceptions of feedback, task and 
relationship conflict(135).  
• Context 
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Resources 
The commitment of resources usually requires the support and commitment 
from the senior leadership. But at the same time there is also evidence to 
show that countries with highest spending on health are not necessarily the 
one with the best results(136). Along with availability of resources, the 
appropriate management of these resources has to be thought through and 
quality improvement techniques can be used to achieve this. 
Organizational characteristics  
The literature on the relationship between organizational culture and outcome 
defined in terms of quality of care, is very limited but does show a positive 
association with QI success(137-141). Other organizational characteristics 
such as organizational maturity i.e. the amount of time an organization has 
been formally involved in QI is also an important determinant of QI initiatives.  
WHO has identified 6 domains necessary for the implementation of quality 
improvement interventions which includes leadership as the primary hub 
followed by information, patient and population engagement, regulation and 
standards, organizational capacity and models of care(142).  
However, there is little empirical evidence to suggest these factors have an 
influence on the effectiveness of quality improvement interventions. The 23 
papers reviewed by Hulscher et al(100), for instance, did not find any positive 
effects of leadership support, time and resources on QICs.  
I have used the QI framework to enumerate the key characteristics of 
Collaboratives. An alternate taxonomy using Who-Where-How-What domains 
also highlighted similar Collaborative characteristics(94). There is also a 
general acceptance regarding the poor or practically non-existent empirical 
research on success factors of QI Collaboratives. For instance, while 
individual, organizational and clinical leadership have been identified as quite 
central for QI interventions (94, 100, 142), the actual evidence base 
supporting the role of leadership in QI Collaborative is very thin. The role of 
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leadership in fostering quality improvement is more of a shared perception 
among stakeholders than based on empirical data. This is especially reflected 
in studies that do not have comparison data (uncontrolled designs) and are 
largely based on participant’s opinion of what’s important.  
A purely quantitative approach identifying each single factor, as done by 
Hulscher et al in determining the success of QI interventions, might not be the 
best approach to identify the key determinants. A successful QI Collaborative 
is likely to be a combination of few factors. The existing literature does not 
address how a collective action of these factors can be evaluated to 
determine success.  Nor does it take into consideration the degree of 
influence these determinants have on each other. A quantitative approach 
ideally, would have weights attached to each success factor depending on 
various parameters, such as their degree of influence on other determinants. 
For instance organizational readiness has a bearing on QI team 
characteristics and on the preliminary work and learning that has to happen 
even before the implementation of a QI Collaborative. Current literature is 
unable to capture the inter-relationship between the various factors.  
In summary, there is limited evidence available about the effectiveness of QI 
Collaboratives(48), Also, the available literature does not provide a clear 
picture as to what constitutes a successful QI Collaborative.. The limited or 
lack of evidence regarding effectiveness of Collaboratives arises partly from 
the ambiguity regarding what constitutes a QI interventions(84, 143)and partly 
because there is lack of clarity on what needs to be evaluated. A fundamental 
question related to this is about the choice of methods for evaluating QI 
Collaboratives(144). In areas where interventions have been reported to be 
successful, scaling up remains a challenge. There is no definitive or 
consistent methodology described in literature on how one can evaluate this 
scale up. There has been a demand in recent years for a robust evidence 
base for quality improvement Collaboratives, so as to assess their 
effectiveness among diverse settings, and develop insights into the specific 
processes and mechanisms by which they operate(66, 80).  
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2.5.5 Evaluating!QI:!!Design!and!Methods!!
Using the Donabedian’ structure-process-output as a heuristic framework, I 
begin with a discussion of evaluation tools and techniques for measuring 
inputs and processes, evaluating outcomes in terms of either quality of care 
itself or health care utilization or hard health outcomes such as mortality and 
morbidity. Different evaluation design and methods for measuring QI 
Collaboratives are discussed in this next section. Figure 13 presents an 
outline of these evaluation methods.  
2.5.5.1 Evaluation-of-structure-and-process-
A key feature of measuring the effect of an intervention is measuring its 
implementation strength. The steps often include identifying essential 
components to be measured, grouping components into domains, building a 
measurement instrument, piloting the instrument and finalizing the 
instrument(98). It can be measured by calculating scores for individual 
indicators and their domains, averaging domain scores or by weighting the 
components. Despite progress in recent years in measuring implementation 
strength, there is no consensus on defining or measuring implementation 
strength(98).  
However, measuring implementation strength tells only part of the story. 
Unless one understand the interaction between the context & the mechanism 
by which the intervention is operating it will be difficult to attribute 
implementation strength to changes in outcome. This is discussed in detail in 
the discussion chapter (§8.2.6). 
A tool that has been used in healthcare since 1960s and widely used in QI 
interventions since the mid 1990’s(145) is the Statistical Process Control 
(SPC). Their strength lies in their ability to identify change that results in 
improvement-a central tenet of QI interventions. SPC has great value because 
it provides a quantitative measure of the implementation process and together 
with its primary tool –the annotated control chart provides a simple method for 
better understanding and communicating data to lay decision makers(73). It 
provides real time data on the process of care and through its feedback 
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mechanism, provides an evidence-based approach to systems 
management(70, 146). Within health care, it has been used in a wide range of 
settings and in over 20 specialties(70).  
 
Figure 13: QI Evaluation methods 
SPC can be used for improvement, monitoring as well as evaluation(70). For 
instance, Curran et al in their study on MRSA infection, demonstrate the use 
of SPC data both for improvement as well as for evaluation(147). Although in 
current practice it is not as widely considered for process evaluation, it does 
have the potential to provide valuable information on the ‘black box’ of the 
interventions and thus complement QI evaluation. However, it is not clear from 
literature if this method is applicable and appropriate for evaluation purposes. 
It be argued that SPC is similar to time series regression There is also a 
literature void in terms of detailing the possible implications of using 
improvement data for evaluation purposes(70, 148). While SPC can be very 
precise in measuring improvement in the process of care, linking this to 
outcomes can be difficult since outcomes are influenced by a host of other 
factors beyond the clinical microsystems level and as Brown and Lilford 
suggests it offers a low signal to noise ratio(149). However, SPC can be 
incorporated into integrated system measures (150) that attribute 
STRUCTURE' PROCESS' OUTCOME/'EFFECT'
QUALITY'OF'
CARE'
QI'Team'
characteris;cs'
Length'of';me'
of'project'
Choice'of'topic'
'
PDSA'cycles'
Evalua;on'of'
learning'sessions'
Monitoring'of'
Ac;on'Periods'
Biological'
Behavioural'
Psychological'
Provider'skills'
Pa;ent'Sa;sfac;on'
Pa;entJprovider'
interac;on'
'
Leadership'
Organiza;onal'culture'
Organiza;onal'characteris;cs'
Resources'
CONTEXT'
Randomized'Controlled'Trials'
Step'Wedge'Design'
Bayesian'methods'
Realist'evaluaiton'
Mixed'Methods'(Par;cpatory'
Ac;on'Research'wi;n'a'RCT'
framework)'
'
Sta;s;cal'Process'Control'
Mixed'Methods'
'
CFIR%Framework%
Characteris;cs'of'the'
interven;on'
Internal'Context'
External'Context'
Individual'characteris;cs'
Implementa;on'process'
Compe;ng'Values'
Framework'
MuSIQ'Framework'
  58 
improvements in quality of services to outcomes measures. Other techniques 
such as single case methodology have also been suggested(96).  
Another useful tool is the CFIR [Consolidated Framework for Implementation 
Research](151). CFIR is a synthesis of various implementation theories that 
provides a pragmatic structure for assessment of the implementation context 
and for evaluating implementation progress. It is composed of 5 domains with 
37 constructs(152). The five major domains are: intervention characteristics, 
outer setting, inner setting, individual characteristics and implementation 
process. Each of these domains consists of a set of constructs. There are 8 
constructs related to the intervention characteristics, 4 constructs related to 
the outer setting, 12 constructs related to the inner setting, 5 constructs 
related to individual characteristics and 8 constructs related to process, 
adding up to a total of 37 constructs. These constructs are known to influence 
implementation. However, a major limitation of CFIR is that it does not specify 
the interaction between the constructs.  
Since process evaluations focus on how an intervention is delivered rather 
than its effect on participants(153), process measures on their own are not 
sufficient. In order to know whether an intervention has had an effect on the 
outcome measure, research needs to integrate tools and techniques used to 
measure improvement process with conventional evaluation methods such as 
analytical or experimental study designs(154). Bayesian techniques which 
allows for integration of different types of evidence, allows for this type of 
synthesis(155).  
2.5.5.2 Evaluation-of-outcomes-
Various analytical designs have been suggested for the evaluation of 
outcomes(156). This includes RCT and step wedge designs, Bayesian 
methods and realist evaluation(155, 157, 158). 
The pre-post test design is one of the most commonly used designs in the 
evaluation of QI interventions but has its limitations. It is prone to post-hoc 
reasoning and cannot rule out pre-existing trends. Most of the studies in 
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Schouten’s(20) and Franco’s(18) reviews were non-randomised and non-
controlled studies. These study designs relied on post measurement, used 
before after study design without accounting for secular trends, used self-
reported parameters rather than medical records, included anecdotal 
information and selected samples from selected sites. Such uncontrolled 
studies suffer from design limitations, are methodologically weak and probably 
biased in favour of positive findings.  
Several quasi-experimental designs such as time-series, equivalent time-
series, multiple-baseline study designs have all been suggested for evaluating 
QI interventions both as a single case as well as comparative group 
application(96). These designs are not without their limitations and their 
potential has not been demonstrated in mainstream QI research. For 
instance, one of the weaknesses for time-series design is its failure to 
attribute changes to the intervention(96, 159).  
In the hierarchy of evidence(160), randomized controlled trials are considered 
the gold standard for evaluation(161). However, there are limited studies that 
have used a RCT design in the evaluation of QI interventions or more 
specifically in evaluation of QI Collaboratives and fewer still have obtained 
significant results. Homer et al evaluated the impact of a 12 month QI 
Collaborative (combined with Chronic Care Management on children with 
asthma (outcome measure)(112). They also analysed 3 process of care 
parameters. No overall effect of the intervention on the process or outcome 
measures were observed(112). The MERIT Study from Australia which used a 
cluster RCT design did not show an effect of using QI interventions on rapid 
response teams in ICUs (162). An RCT equivalence study by Gustafson and 
colleagues, on improving the effectiveness of addiction treatment services, 
showed that clinical-level coaching was equally effective as a combination of 
Collaborative components(159). A cluster randomized controlled trial 
evaluating the effectiveness of QI Collaboratives in improving colorectal 
cancer screening rates in primary care practice did not show any statistically 
significant improvements in screening rates between intervention and control 
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arms(163). The MaiKhanda trial looked at the effectiveness of a combined 
facility based QI Collaborative intervention and a community based women’s 
group intervention and showed a 22% reduction in neonatal mortality(24). This 
is perhaps one of the first studies to use a RCT design for evaluation of a QI 
intervention within a low-income country.  
All the studies covered a wide range of topics, different lengths of 
implementation period, have different levels for the unit of randomization and 
analysis, rendering any form of comparative analysis infeasible. Quality 
improvement interventions are generally classified as complex interventions. 
A major challenge in evaluation of complex QI interventions is that using 
rigorous scientific evaluation methods such as RCTs require interventions to 
be standardized whereas adaptability and change are inherent characteristics 
of such interventions.  
However, Hawe et al (164)  argue that complex interventions can apply 
rigorous evaluation techniques by standardizing the functions and process of 
the intervention rather than its components. In other words, the integrity (or 
fidelity) of the intervention is defined in terms of the evidence fitting with the 
theory or principles of the hypothesized intervention.  
A major criticism of RCT is that they do not provide an understanding of how 
or why the intervention worked (158),(165). For instance, if the trial shows a 
positive effect it is difficult to judge on the generalizability of the trial findings 
without appropriate knowledge of the context and the process. For a trial with 
negative results, one is not sure if the intervention design was flawed or if the 
implementation was ineffective or if the results were as a result of 
inappropriate evaluation design(67).  
Another limitation of RCTs evaluating complex interventions is that they are 
seldom generalizable given the rigour (where focus is on maximizing internal 
validity) applied in scientific studies. Random allocation reduces the degree of 
benefit that comes from an individual or group actively choosing to participate 
in the particular intervention. RCTs are not replicable especially in the QI 
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context where the direction of the intervention is greatly influenced by the 
character and composition of the QI teams and the organizational and other 
contextual factors(166). They are also relatively expensive.(167)  
Given issues around generalizability, replicability and the relative expensive 
nature of RCTs, it has been debated whether it is an appropriate method for 
evaluating QI interventions(146, 167). Longitudinal time-series analysis using 
SPC have been proposed over RCT as an evaluation method for QI 
interventions(73, 167, 168).  
Experimental evaluation, in general, tends to ignore the complexity of 
causality. Complex interventions are more than the sum of their parts and 
therefore one has to use a combination of evaluation design strategies to 
ascertain causality.  Such a design also needs to consider multiple outcomes.  
Supporters of realist evaluation methods, suggest a generative model of 
causality where context and mechanism interact to influence an outcome (as 
opposed to the successionist model, which underpins clinical trials, where 
“cause X is switched on and effect Y follows” (169).  
Campbell et al propose a phased approach to developing randomized 
controlled trials of complex interventions using a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative evidence(30). This includes a pre-clinical or observational 
phase where theoretical concepts are clarified and modelling techniques 
used, an exploratory phase, followed by an explanatory phase which uses 
RCT design and finally a phase IV (or long term implementation phase).  
Brown et al suggest a modified Donabedian causal chain model (structure-
process-outcome) as a framework for evaluating complex interventions. They 
suggest a mixed methods approach (using quantitative and qualitative 
methods) to evaluate across different levels of the causal chain and then 
conduct a subjective quantitative synthesis of the diverse information using 
Bayesian methods(149, 170).  
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Mixed methods have been suggested by others as well(171),(29),(27) . A 
mixed method has several advantages. Leykum et al, suggest that using 
Participatory Action Research (PAR) within a RCT framework has the 
potential to take account of the local differences in healthcare systems and 
thereby allow some degree of generalizability.  
Speroff et al advocate alternative experimental designs such as step wedge 
design(96, 170, 172). This is similar to a phased RCT, which could be the 
method of choice if it is not possible to implement an intervention 
simultaneously across an entire province or region, especially if there is 
limited or no evidence regarding the effectiveness of the proposed 
intervention. 
Another method proposed is to develop an ex-post theory of what worked in 
cases where process evaluation was not fully conducted during programme 
implementation(67). This method, for instance, provided insight into the 
Michigan keystone project which very successfully reduced central line 
contamination in 103 participating ICUs in Michigan, using a Collaborative 
approach(173). However, using such theory-based approaches is prone to 
outcome bias since the theory is developed retrospectively after the outcome 
has been observed.  
2.5.5.3 Evaluation-of-context:--
There is conceptual ambiguity and methodological weakness in the current 
research of context in QI. There is also paucity of literature in understanding 
the inter-relationship of the contextual factors to each other and their effect on 
outcome(106).  
The WHO perspective is that evaluating QI interventions cannot be 
independent of the context(142). Evaluating context involves evaluating a 
combination of summative and formative outcomes of intervention 
effectiveness. Organizational and system factors such as organizational and 
system capability, organizational culture, learning and social networks have 
been identified as drivers of change for large-scale improvement 
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interventions(174). The notion of (organizational) culture change as a key 
element of health systems improvement is gradually gaining wider 
acceptance(175). However most studies suggesting a link between 
organizational culture and health systems performance are methodologically 
weak(108) (106). A review of the quantitative instruments for the 
measurement of organizational culture in health care identified 13 
instruments. The choice of instruments for investigation depends on the 
conceptualization of organizational culture by the research team. The 
assessment of organizational culture requires greater utilization of qualitative 
methods but, there is a predominance of quantitative methods used in 
literature(108). Various frameworks, such as the competing values 
framework(105), and the MuSIQ(109) framework have been suggested to 
evaluate organizational context.   
Black and colleagues have suggested the development of a National 
Evaluation Platform (NEP) that will incorporate the broader context, by 
involving other sectors such as education and agriculture, and take measure 
factors such as women’s literacy status, rainfall and agricultural output when 
measuring impact(176). NEP uses a dose response relationship where, dose 
is program implementation strength and response is increase in coverage and 
decrease in mortality.   
The Kirkpatrick model can be adapted as a useful framework to link the 
changes in organizational context with outcomes(177). Outcomes are broadly 
categorised into reactions, learning, behaviour and results. It has been widely 
used for training interventions in the private sector, and has been adapted and 
adopted to classify and measure outcomes in healthcare improvement 
interventions (178).  
2.6 QI!Interventions:!Challenges!for!evaluation!
Mary Dixon-Woods et al identified ten challenges of QI interventions, 
categorized in 3 major categories: design and planning of improvement 
interventions; organizational context, culture and capacities; and, 
sustainability, spread and unintended consequences(179). Although these 
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challenges are for quality improvement in general, evaluation of QI also faces 
similar challenges.  
" Design and planning of improvement interventions 
One of the strengths of quality improvement interventions is their use of data 
for decision-making. This, however, requires will and support from senior 
leadership to invest in training of staff and establish a culture of accountability 
in the organization through the use of routine available data. At the same time 
QI interventions also require the skills of QI team members to collect, collate, 
analyse, present and use data routinely and consistently for decision-making. 
From an evaluation perspective, individual and collective behaviours within QI 
teams are likely to introduce variability in data quality over time and across 
sites . Behaviours are influenced by their data skills but also their belief and 
approach to evidence based decision making and therefore use of 
improvement data for evaluation purposes needs further scrutiny.  
While interventions are usually directed at the organizational unit or 
microsystem, outcomes are usually measured at the individual product or 
patient level(156). The challenge for research here is to develop and evaluate 
a logic model that links the organizational and individual level outputs to the 
patient level outcomes.  
• Organizational orientation and support 
The concepts of quality improvement, especially within the health care 
system, are fairly new to developing country contexts and require significant 
investments in training and capacity building so as to embed them within 
health systems. Evaluation therefore needs to have a considerable lag phase 
in their design. Evaluation of QI interventions also requires to recognize 
organizations as political systems(180) and study of how innovative concepts 
such as Quality Improvement get embedded within such systems. Using 
theory based approaches, such as the theory of ‘Diffusion of Innovation’ can 
help understand these mechanisms(181, 182).   
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• Health Systems Context 
The origins of quality improvement in health and medical care are largely from 
the developed country setting including the United States, UK and Europe. 
The context of medical care provision in these settings is different from that in 
the developing country settings. There is little understanding of the influence 
of ‘health systems readiness’ in influencing quality of care in such settings. 
Context classification and evaluation methods are slowly emerging and being 
considered by the research community for inclusion within mainstream 
research designs.  
• Leadership 
The challenges to leadership are many-fold especially in developing country 
settings. It might be difficult to engage leaders because they are already 
dealing with a myriad of complex and competing clinical and organizational 
demands with limited resources, inadequate staffing and shortages of 
equipment(179). There is currently a gap in literature not only in quantifying 
leadership engagement but also in trying to understand the link between 
leadership and its effect on care outcomes.  
• QI teams 
Putting a multi-disciplinary QI team together poses a challenge given the 
hierarchy within the medical care system. Lack of sustainability of leadership 
within the QI team poses a significant threat to the functioning of the QI team. 
Understanding the critical role of the QI team as the agency for change is 
fundamental to the spread and sustainability of improvement efforts within the 
health system. Equally important is to understand the “interaction between the 
emergent expressions of the agency and the dynamic elements of the 
context”(183)  Carl May-NPT).  
" Sustainability, spread and unintended consequences 
Sustainability and spread is usually threatened when there is an over reliance 
on individuals as is the case in most low and middle-income countries where 
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human resources are already stretched. Understanding the processes and 
mechanisms of spread therefore becomes more important than isolated study 
of individual behaviour change. It is also unusual for interventions to diffuse 
and spread on their own. Evaluations using theory-based approaches can use 
theories such as diffusion of innovation(181), normalization process 
theory(183) or Deming’s theory of profound knowledge(46) o help understand 
mechanisms of intervention spread. 
While improvement processes are focused on one aspect of care, other areas 
of care can get comprised. Having a sustained overall improvement effort is a 
challenge for implementers. The intervention should account for different 
needs and have a constant overview of the different moving parts of the 
intervention and their possible un-intended consequences and unexpected 
outcomes. Un-intended consequences and unexpected outcomes pose a 
challenge for prospective research methods as they are difficult to account for 
in the initial planning of the evaluation design. Evaluation methods thus need 
to be interactive and flexible to the changes in intervention design with 
evaluators and implementers working iteratively and in close collaboration 
with each other. 
• Resources 
Both human and material resources are a challenge. The challenge is both in 
terms of availability as well as in terms of appropriate and optimum 
management of these resources. Support from senior leadership is important 
for this. While a random allocation of sites might seem a desirable solution to 
balance out these resource challenges across sites, evaluation should be able 
to capture how resource availability (or non availability) can influence broader 
contextual factors (such as staff motivation), which can then indirectly 
influence programme outcomes.  
• Time 
QI interventions are demanding and require investment of time in terms of the 
programme theory, design, selecting appropriate measures and data 
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collection systems, and assessing organizational capacity. It is difficult to 
determine what amount of time is required for an intervention to reach a 
‘tipping point’ when outcomes start becoming visible and measurable. 
Interventions especially social interventions change over time(184). The 
greater the time lag between the intervention and intended outcome-the larger 
the latency period, the greater the chances of extraneous factors influencing 
the outcome and the more difficult it will be to attribute the intervention to the 
outcomes.(96) 
• Ownership 
One of the expected outcomes of using the Collaborative approach is for the 
local health facility teams to take ‘ownership’ of the project or event. This is 
also important for the sustainability of the interventions in the long run. 
However, this is one of the biggest challenges in improvement effort(175). 
There is also the constant tension between external evaluators and ‘owners’ 
of the intervention. While external evaluation is preferred, to maintain 
objectivity, evaluation designs are seldom able to capture the dynamic nature 
of complex interventions. Furthermore, while implementation data can make 
major contributions to evaluation, its interpretation can vary between 
evaluators and implementers.  
2.7 Summary!!
Quality improvement as a concept has been adapted from the production and 
manufacturing industry and is now being extensively used in healthcare 
interventions.  
The challenge for health systems today is to design knowledgeable 
healthcare systems(69) that maximise the alignment between the current best 
evidence and what can be achieved within the local context(185).  
QI in health care is focused on improving the quality of healthcare service 
delivery. This is important and works well in settings where the basic 
infrastructure and systems are in place. However, in resource poor settings, 
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improvements in service delivery alone will not guarantee changes in 
outcomes. For improving quality of care in resource poor settings, a whole 
systems approach is required. A whole systems approach looks at 
improvements required within the different building blocks of the health 
system(142) including the interaction between these building blocks as well as 
engagement of the communities that the health system is serving.  
There are different models for quality improvement in health care. The 
success of these models requires multiple approaches with strong leadership, 
a culture of participation, flexibility in implementation, adaptation to the local 
needs, and a feedback mechanism.  
Various challenges exist to the design, implementation and evaluation of QI 
Collaboratives. There is a sense of urgency and excitement to improve care, 
which is understandable but the urge to favour action over evidence does 
have implications for quality of care(186). The evidence regarding the 
effectiveness of Collaboratives is thin. Analysis of the controlled studies in 
Hulscher’s review had mixed results-while some studies reported positive 
results others did not and this was influenced by the choice of indicators. 
Various methods exist for evaluating quality improvement interventions, each 
with its own merits and challenges. The choice of evaluation design will 
depend on what within the structure-process-outcome (S-P-O) framework 
needs to be measured.  
Measuring outcomes of complex QI interventions within a complex health 
system has limitations especially when it comes to attributing changes in 
outcome to the intervention. Evaluating quality improvement interventions is 
particularly challenging in resource poor settings. Improvements in service 
delivery, as measured by SPC (statistical process control) and other 
techniques, will not necessarily measure a change in patient outcomes, 
because of the low signal to noise ratio - all the other system level factors 
which influence the outcome, other than the improvement intervention, also 
need to be factored in the analysis. 
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Nevertheless, evaluation designs range from cluster RCTs to realist 
evaluation all of which have been debated in literature. A more pragmatic 
mixed methods approach has gained credence in the recent years.  
Evaluation of the MaiKhanda project used a mixed methods approach where 
the outcomes of the intervention was evaluated using a cluster randomised 
controlled trial design while at the same time the intervention processes were 
measured using methods such as statistical process control charts as well as 
measuring determinants of quality of care.  
The next chapter presents the trial result, i.e. the outcome of the intervention 
measured using the conventional cRCT design. I look at the effect of the QI 
Collaborative on the neonatal mortality rate at the population level and 
neonatal case fatality rate at the health facility level. In this Chapter, I also 
cover some of the limitations of the cRCT design. 
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Chapter!3 Trial!Methods!and!Results!
0 provides an overview of MaiKhanda’s intervention and the evaluation 
design, which included the impact, process and economic evaluation (§1.8).  
The impact evaluation was conducted using a cluster randomized trial design. 
As part of my thesis, I summarize here the impact evaluation of only the 
supply side intervention, namely the effect of QI Collaboratives on newborn 
mortality at the health facility and population level. This study design and the 
results from the QI arm of the trial are described in Section 3.1 and 3.2 of this 
chapter. Section 3.3 contains secondary analysis and interpretation of the trial 
results. In Section 3.4 I discuss the limitations of the impact evaluation study 
and provide an introduction to the process evaluation study complementing 
the impact evaluation, used in the MaiKhanda study.  
3.1 Study!Design!
The study was conducted in the central districts of Malawi in Kasungu, 
Lilongwe and Salima covering a population of approximately 3 million. The 
choice of districts was based on the directive from the Ministry of Health 
(MoH) in consultation with the Reproductive Health Unit (RHU).  
The hypothesis was that a quality improvement intervention defined by a 
breakthrough collaborative series and rapid action cycles (§1.5.2), would 
reduce the newborn mortality in the intervention population by 30%. 
The unit of randomization was a health centre cluster and its catchment 
population. The trial design was a stratified two-by-two factorial design where 
the health facility clusters were randomized to receive quality improvement 
interventions or not and the health facility catchment population clusters were 
randomized to receive the women’s group intervention or not. The trial design 
was stratified by the two interventions and then by district so that a balance of 
the number of intervention and control clusters was maintained in each of the 
districts. 
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The average population in each cluster was 4,113. Of the 95 facilities 
identified at the beginning of the study, 13 facilities were excluded and only 82 
facilities were included in the study (Figure 14). Of the excluded, 9 were 
CEmOC facilities The major change was the exclusion of 18 dispensary 
clusters. These were health facilities that did not conduct any deliveries nor 
did they have any of the MaiKhanda interventions in their catchment areas. In 
summary, 61 health facilities and their catchment population clusters were 
included in the analysis. There were 15 health facility clusters with QI, 17 
control clusters with neither QI nor women’s groups, 15 population clusters 
with women’s group intervention and 14 clusters that had QI in their health 
facilities and women’s group intervention in their catchment population.  
In order to measure the impact, a randomly selected representative population 
cohort of 310,000 was followed through a prospective surveillance system, 
where key informants selected from within the communities actively followed 
up pregnancies, births and maternal and newborn deaths over a two-year 
period. HSAs vi  (Health Surveillance Assistants) from their respective 
catchment areas acted as supervisors to the key informants. Data collected 
by the key informants were reported to MaiKhanda evaluation team through 
the HSAs. All women of child-bearing age in this surveillance population were 
enrolled as participants in the study. Details of sample size calculations, the 
randomization process and key informant based surveillance systems can be 
found in the MaiKhanda report(33). 
The health care providers were actively involved in the quality improvement 
intervention in the selected sites and therefore, it was not possible to mask 
the service providers to the intervention. Similarly, since patients and 
populations were subject to the care giving process, it was not possible to 
mask them to the intervention.  
                                            
vi)Health)Surveillance)Assistants)(HSAs))are)part)of)the)formal)health)system)in)Malawi.)They)act)as)
the)link)between)their)catchment)population)and)the)health)facility)
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3.1.1 Primary!outcomes!
The primary outcomes included: 
• Neonatal mortality rate (overall, early and late) and  
• Perinatal mortality rate (stillbirths plus first week deaths). ICD-10(187) 
definitions of stillbirth, neonatal death and perinatal death were used in 
this study (Box 2).  
 
  Stillbirth: “A stillbirth or foetal death is a death prior to the complete 
expulsion or extraction from its mother of a product of conception, 
irrespective of the duration of pregnancy; the death is indicated by the fact 
that after such separation the foetus does not breathe or show any other 
evidence of life, such as beating of the heart, pulsation of the umbilical 
cord or definite movement of voluntary muscles.” The ICD-10 criteria for 
stillbirth was modified to include births after 28 completed weeks rather 
than 22 weeks. 
Neonatal death: death within the first 28 days of an infant after “the 
complete expulsion or extraction from its mother of a product of 
conception, irrespective of the duration of the pregnancy, which after such 
separation, breathes or shows any other evidence of life, such as beating 
Box 2:Definition for outcomes used in the study (ICD-10) 
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3.1.2 Secondary!outcome!measures!!
For the QI intervention, the secondary outcome measures included newborn 
case fatality rate, percentage of skilled attendants at birth, deliveries at facility, 
availability of obstetric care signal functions(188). Box 3 outlines the definition 
of secondary outcomes used in this study.  
 
 
Newborn Case Fatality Rate – The number of newborn deaths divided by 
the number of live births at the facility.  
Percentage of deliveries with Skilled Attendance – The percentage of 
deliveries at a Health Facility – it is assumed that all deliveries at a health 
facility are done by skilled clinical personnel such as a nurse or a clinical 
officer.  
Practice of signal obstetric care functions – The availability and practice of 
signal functions gives an indication of the status of the facility. Health 
Centres are intended to be Basic Emergency Obstetric Care (BEmOC) 
facilities and qualify as such if they are able to provide all 6 BEmOC signal 
functions: Manual removal of placenta; Manual vacuum aspiration; vacuum 
extraction and breech deliveries; parenteral antibiotics; magnesium 
sulphate; oxytocic drugs (ergometrine or oxytocin). Hospitals are intended 
to be Comprehensive Emergency Obstetric Care (CEmOC) facilities and 
qualify as such if they are able to provide all 6 BEmOC signal functions 
and the 2 CEmOC signal functions: Caesarean Section and Blood 
Transfusion. The MaiKhanda facilities intervention did not specifically work 
on improving the availability of signal functions.   
Box 3: Definition for secondary outcomes 
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3.1.3 Ethics!
An evaluation proposal was submitted to the Ethic Board in Malawi-the 
National Health Sciences Research Committee (NHSRC) for approval. The 
study was approved in Malawi in 2007 
.  
Figure 14: Trial Flowchart 
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3.1.4 Data!quality!
To ensure good quality data was collected, the following steps were taken: 
• Training: HSAs were trained on the community surveillance form at the 
beginning of the project, with refresher training at meetings every 
month. KI were trained by HSA, with refresher training by MEO at 
quarterly meetings. 
• Supervision: KI data collectors were supervised by HSA who were in 
turn supervised by MEO who were in turn supervised by UCL 
Technical Advisors (Bejoy Nambiar [BN] and Tim Colbourn [TC]) based 
in-country.  
• Data entry: data was entered into a Microsoft Access database, with 
validation rules, by two trained data clerks. 
• Data cleaning: duplicate records of women and babies were identified 
and removed from the database, and the assignment of all women and 
all deaths in the database to the correct cluster and district was 
checked and amended as necessary. 
• Data verification: Deaths were verified by verbal autopsy interview with 
relatives of the mother or baby who died. A simple WHO approved 
algorithm based on movement, breathing and crying of the baby was 
used to differentiate between stillbirths and neonatal deaths. 
3.1.5 Verbal!autopsies!
Verbal Autopsies were used to verify all deaths to ensure the quality of the 
data used in the analysis. Neonatal deaths and Stillbirths were followed up 
with a Perinatal Verbal Autopsy; The tools were translated into the local 
language (Chichewa).  
Using a more advanced Bayesian algorithm, the InterVA method(189), it was 
possible to obtain causes of death for all 1817 PVA entered into the database. 
More details of verbal autopsies are available in the MaiKhanda Evaluation 
Report(33). 
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3.1.6 Analysis!plan!
The analysis plan was prepared in advance of the trial completion and 
analysis done in Stata 11.2 for Mac by IGH epidemiologist and Co-
Investigator, Tim Colbourn. The analysis was a post-intervention comparison 
i.e. comparing mortality rates in the intervention and control group in the 
intervention period only. Differences in the intervention and control groups 
identified using the baseline data, was adjusted for potential confounding if 
they were found to be associated with mortality outcome. The analysis plan 
included a descriptive analysis followed by a cluster level analysis followed by 
individual level analysis.  
Descriptive analysis showed time trends in baseline and pre-intervention 
period (Jun’07-Sep’08) and early and late intervention (Oct’08-Dec’10) period 
for the primary outcome measures namely neonatal and perinatal mortality.  
Cluster level analysis was made of intervention effects on mortality by 
weighted t-test of cluster mortality rate summaries, taking stratification by 
district into account. Comparisons were made with and without other 
interventions, with and without adjustments for baseline mortality rates as well 
as looking at other potential confounders. The potential confounders include 
health facility deliveries, availability of signal functions within these facilities, 
nurse-delivery ratio at health centre, baseline staff psychology scores at 
health centre, geographic setting i.e. urban, peri-urban or rural, type of health 
facility (i.e. either government run or CHAM run facility), type of clusters (i.e. 
tobacco estates with high levels of migration or not). The effect of each of 
these variables on mortality rates was assessed first by descriptive 
univariable analysis followed by a step-wise logistic regression analysis of all 
variables.  
The cluster level analyses were repeated at the individual level using logistic 
regression but as there was not data on the confounders at the individual 
level, adjustment were only made for cluster-level covariates.  
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An exploratory analysis of the trends in intervention effects was conducted by 
splitting the intervention period into two phases. The first phase was from 
Oct’08-Sep’09 and the second phase from Oct’09-Dec’10 during which the 
‘dosage’ of the facility intervention was increased. There was general 
consensus from the implementation and evaluation teams that the original 
intervention inputs were inadequate to achieve the level of change desired in 
the health facilities and from October 2009 onwards the dosage of the 
facilities intervention was greatly increased.  
3.2 Trial!Results!
The trial results are discussed in detail in the MaiKhanda’s full evaluation 
report(33) and also in the subsequent publication(24). I was mainly involved in 
the interpretation of the analysis and subsequent drafting of the report and the 
paper. Here the summary result of only the QI intervention effect on newborn 
mortality is presented.  
After cleaning, data quality was assessed using cluster summaries of the 
percentage of perinatal deaths without verbal autopsies (i.e. no verification of 
deaths). For the entire period of the study, 25.3% of the pregnancies did not 
register an outcome. However, in comparing the observed births with the 
expected crude birth rates in each of the clusters, the difference was about 
3%, probably hinting at over-reporting of pregnancies by key informants. For 
baseline and intervention periods the loss to follow up was 19% and 29% 
respectively, with higher rates in the later months. 
Around 14% of stillbirths and neonatal deaths remained un-verified. The 
percentage unverified did not differ significantly by RCT arm. Despite verbal 
autopsy, some stillbirths could not be categorized correctly as fresh or 
macerated stillbirth, or neonatal deaths as early or late. The percentage of 
uncategorized stillbirths or neonatal deaths did not differ significantly by RCT 
arm. 
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3.2.1 Baseline!characteristics!
Table 4 contains baseline characteristics of the facility and non-facility 
intervention areas. In general there is a good balance between the two arms 
of the trial except for skilled birth attendance, which is slightly higher in the 
intervention arm. In addition, the CHAM run facilities are slightly more in the 
non-intervention areas as compared to the intervention areas. These baseline 
characteristics were taken into consideration in the adjusted analysis.  
 
Table 4: Baseline characteristics of non-facility and facility interventions (from MaiKhanda 
report) 
 
3.2.2 Descriptive!analysis!
A total of 35,152 births were recorded from the pregnancy surveillance of 
which 1,059 (3%) were reported as stillbirths. Of the 34,093 live births, 16,828 
were in the non-intervention areas and 17,265 were in the facility intervention 
areas. A total of 14,107 live births were recorded during the baseline period 
while 19,986 live births were reported in the intervention period.  
Neonatal mortality rate during the baseline period was 29.6 per 1,000 live 
births. The NMR was slightly lower in the intervention arm (28.6) as compared 
to the non-intervention arm (30.5) at baseline (Table 5).  
Variablesa no FI FI
number of clusters n 29 32
Baseline NMR mean 30.7 28.5
se(mean) 2.5 2.9
Baseline PMR mean 57.0 54.6
se(mean) 4.6 3.6
mean 45.5% 50.1%
se(mean) 3.1% 3.6%
mean 21.2 25.2
se(mean) 2.6 2.6
mean 1.66 1.81
se(mean) 0.24 0.28
mean 2.40 2.46
se(mean) 0.07 0.07
mean 0.16 0.19
se(mean) 0.06 0.06
mean 0.41 0.45
se(mean) 0.09 0.09
mean 0.22 0.14
se(mean) 0.07 0.07
mean 0.16 0.21
se(mean) 0.07 0.08
Baseline staff psychology 
score (average of 19 questions 
on 1(=bad) - 5(=good) scale)
Urban (=1), Peri-urban (=0.5), 
Rural (=0) setting
Deliveries per month per 
nurse at nearest HC
Signal Function availability at 
HC (number of functions)
Baseline Skilled Birth 
Attendance (%)
Tobacco Estates (=1) or not 
(=0)
Access by Tar Road (=1) or 
dirt road (=0)
CHAM (=1) or Government 
(=0) run
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Table 5: Summary of births, deaths and mortality rates by FI and non-FI arm for baseline and 
intervention period (unadjusted for clustering, factorial nature of the trial). 
Neonatal mortality during the intervention period was 29.8 per 1,000 live 
births. In the intervention arm it was 27.6 and in the non-intervention arm it 
was 31.9. Whilst there were fewer neonatal deaths in intervention areas (284) 
than non-intervention areas (310) during the intervention period (when the 
RCT analysis applies) there are actually more stillbirths (312 in FI areas 
compared to 278 in No FI areas), so when these are combined into perinatal 
mortality they cancel each other out.  
The neonatal mortality remained the same within the baseline and 
intervention period, with the mortality going slightly up in the non-intervention 
arm in the intervention period. This is analysed further by looking at the 
variation in data by month and variation in individual data within clusters. 
Figure 15 presents the neonatal mortality rate in the intervention and non-
intervention arms by month. It is interesting to note that NMR appears to be 
going down in both the arms in the last 4 months of the intervention.  
No FI FI
Births 7351 7225
Livebirths 7114 6993
Stillbirths 237 232
Macerated 44 42
Fresh 128 110
Neonatal Deaths 217 200
Early (0-6 days) 180 156
Late (7-28 days) 37 44
Perinatal Deaths 417 388
Baseline (Jun'07 - Sep'08)Outcomes No FI FI
9992 10584
9714 10272
278 312
58 49
127 165
310 284
242 236
68 48
520 548
Intervention (Oct'08 - Dec'10)
Stillbirth rate per 1000 births 32.2 32.1
Neonatal mortality rate per 
1000 livebirths 30.5 28.6
Early neonatal mortality rate 
per 1000 livebirths (0-6 days) 25.3 22.3
Late neonatal mortality rate 
per 1000 livebirths (7-28 days) 5.2 6.3
Perinatal mortality rate per 
1000 births (stillbirths and 
early neonatal deaths)
56.7 53.7
27.8 29.5
31.9 27.6
24.9 23.0
7.0 4.7
52.0 51.8
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Figure 15: Neonatal mortality by month in the intervention and non-intervention arm (from 
MaiKhanda report) 
3.2.3 Cluster!analysis!
The unadjusted cluster analysis shows a slight reduction of 4.3 neonatal 
deaths per 1,000 live births in the intervention clusters compared to non-
intervention clusters, though not statistically significant (p=0.142). After 
adjusting for health facilities that were accessible by tarmac, the neonatal 
mortality showed a slightly smaller reduction of 3.6 neonatal deaths per 1,000 
live births, also not statistically significant (p=0.213). 
3.2.4 Individual!level!analysis!
The factorial nature of trial was not taken into account in the cluster level 
analysis. This is accounted for in the individual level analysis, therefore 
making it more robust.  
The individual level analysis of the intervention effect was done by calculating 
the odds ratio using logistic regression. This takes into account the effects of 
the districts (strata), stratification of the urban health centres and clustering by 
health facility catchment area as well as the two-by-two factorial nature of the 
trial.  
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The unadjusted analysis for FI interventions showed a 14% reduction in 
neonatal mortality [Odds Ratio=0.86 (95%C.I: 0.72, 1.03)], though not 
statistically significant (p=0.110). The adjusted analysis showed a 12% 
reduction in neonatal mortality [odds ratio = 0.88 (95%C.I: 0.74, 1.06)], also 
not statistically significant (p=0.176).  
Table 6: Summary of RCT results 
Table 6 presents the observed effects of the RCT on neonatal mortalityvii and 
early and late neonatal mortality during the whole intervention period (Oct-08 
to Dec-10). The effect of QI intervention on neonatal mortality is made up of 
effects on early neonatal mortality (Odds ratio 0.92; 95%CI: 0.75, 1.11) and 
late neonatal mortality (Odds ratio 0.67; 95%CI: 0.46, 0.97. The effects are 
significant for late neonatal mortality (upper 95%CI: 0.97, p=0.035).  
 
Table 7: Summary of RCT results by two intervention periods 
                                            
vii)The)intervention)had)no)effect)on)perinatal)mortality)(OR=0.99))and)hence)not)discussed)here)
Outcomes
OR#(95%CI) p,value OR#(95%CI) p,value
Stillbirth/rate/per/1000/
births
1.18/(0.83,/1.69) 0.360 0.97/(0.77,/1.21) 0.767
Neonatal(mortality(rate(
per(1000(livebirths
0.82((0.63,(1.06) 0.124 0.90((0.69,(1.17) 0.431
Early/neonatal/mortality/
rate/per/1000/livebirths/
(0B6/days)
0.92/(0.67,/1.26) 0.599 0.92/(0.70,/1.19) 0.516
Late/neonatal/mortality/
rate/per/1000/livebirths/
(7B28/days)
0.54/(0.31,/0.92) 0.025 0.83/(0.49,/1.39) 0.473
Perinatal/mortality/rate/
per/1000/births/(all/
stillbirths)
1.04/(0.83,/1.31) 0.719 0.94/(0.77,/1.15) 0.555
1st/Intervention/period 2nd/Intervention/period
/Oct/1/2008/B/Sep/30/2009 /Oct/1/2009/B/Dec/31/2010
2"x"2"factorial"trial
Intervention"period"(Oct"1"2008"7"Dec"31"2010)
Ouctomes
OR"(95%CI) p7value
Stillbirth"rate"per"1000"births 1.06"(0.84,"1.32) 0.638
Neonatal(mortality(rate(per(1000(
livebirths
0.86((0.72,(1.03) 0.103
Early"neonatal"mortality"rate"per"
1000"livebirths"(076"days)
0.92"(0.75,"1.11) 0.373
Late"neonatal"mortality"rate"per"
1000"livebirths"(7727"days)
0.67"(0.46,"0.97) 0.035
Perinatal"mortality"rate"per"1000"
births"(all"stillbirths)
0.99"(0.85,"1.15) 0.881
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By further splitting the data into the two intervention periods, it is clear that the 
(non-significant) reductions in neonatal mortality in the first intervention period 
(OR=0.82) as well as during the whole intervention period (OR=0.86) is 
mediated largely by significant reduction in late neonatal mortality during the 
first intervention period (OR=0.54; 95% CI: 0.31, 0.92; p=0.025) (Table 7). 
Figure 16 presents the picture graphically. 
 
Figure 16: Relation between stillbirth, early and late neonatal mortality, by intervention periods. 
 
Effects on late neonatal mortality in the first intervention period by the facility 
intervention are difficult to explain because interventions during this period 
were largely focused on the maternal change package (Table 2). 
3.3 Secondary!analysis!
Since there was no statistically significant effect of the quality improvement 
interventions on neonatal mortality at the population level, a secondary 
analysis to see the effect of the intervention on neonatal case fatality rate at 
the health facility level was done. The analysis looked at the effect on NCFR 
(neonatal case fatality rate) both at the health centre level and at the CEmOC 
(Comprehensive Emergency Obstetric Care) level. 
Stillbirths
PMR 47% 53%
OR=1.04 OR=1.18 Early:NMR
p=0.719 p=0.360 73% 27% NMR
OR=0.92 Late OR=0.82
p=0.599 NMR p=0.124
OR=0.54
p=0.025
Facilities)Intervention)(Oct'084Sep'09)
:
:
Stillbirths
PMR 52% 48%
OR=0.94 OR=0.97 Early:NMR
p=0.555 p=0.767 82% 18% NMR
OR=0.92 Late OR=0.90
p=0.516 NMR p=0.431
OR=0.83
p=0.473
Facilities)Intervention(Oct'094)Dec'10)
:
:
Stillbirths
PMR 52% 48%
OR=0.99 OR=1.06 Early;NMR
p=0.881 p=0.638 77% 23% NMR
OR=0.92 Late OR=0.86
p=0.373 NMR p=0.103
OR=0.67
p=0.035
Facilities)Intervention)(Oct'084Dec'10)
;
;
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The health facility surveillance included data on the number and type of 
deliveries, maternal and neonatal complications, availability and use of EmOC 
signal functions and maternal and neonatal deaths and case-fatality rates. 
This data was collected on a monthly basis directly from the Health Centres 
by MaiKhanda staff, using a standard Health Facility Surveillance form ((33).  
Once the forms were collected, the data was entered into a specially designed 
Microsoft Excel database that produced automated summaries and graphs of 
key data. Data were checked with reference to the paper forms and corrected 
where necessary.  
Trend in facility case-fatality rates were assessed by several methods of time 
series analysis, including calculation of annual medians and means as well as 
quality improvement control chart statistics(33).  
3.3.1.1 Health-Centre-
To begin with, there was an increase in the number of deliveries in all 3 
districts for the period Jan 2007 to December 2010. The total number of 
deliveries in the health centres included in the study, went up from 28,359 in 
2007 by about 13% to 32,121 in 2008/09 and by about 30% to 41,634 in 
2009/10. The increase in number of deliveries in 2009/10 as compared to the 
baseline (2007) was about 47%. These findings are similar to the 
observations from the population surveillance data (Figure 22).  
During the same periods the number of neonatal deaths were 133, 168 and 
178 respectively.  The neonatal case fatality rate was 4.8 per 1,000 live births 
in the baseline period and 5.2 and 4.4 per 1,000 in 2008/09 and 2009/10. 
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3.3.1.2 NCFR-trends-in-the-district-
 
Table 8: Neonatal case fatality rate in Health Centres, by district 
In the 15 health centres in Kasungu, from a baseline of 6.4 per 1,000 
deliveries in 2007, the NCFR rose substantially to 11.1 in 2008/09 before 
falling back to 6.6 in 2009/10, for all health facilities in Kasungu. When 
comparing intervention and control clusters for baseline and interventions 
periods in Kasungu, the NCFR is slightly lower in the intervention facilities 
(Table 8). 
In the 34 health centres in Lilongwe, the NCFR remained fairly stable 
throughout the project at 4 per 1,000 deliveries. When comparing intervention 
and control clusters for baseline and interventions periods, the NCFR is 
slightly higher in the intervention facilities (Table 8).   
In the 13 health centres in Salima district, the NCFR was 5.8 per 1,000 live 
births in the baseline period and decreased to 3.6 per 1,000 liver births by 
2009/10. The NCFR was slightly higher in the intervention facilities in the 
baseline period but was about the same as in the control facilities in the 
intervention period.  
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10
Number.of.Health.Centres 8 8 8 7 7 7
Deliveries 2,895.......... 3,519.......... 3,755.......... 2,166.......... 2,371.......... 3,378..........
Neonatal.Deaths 17 34 20 15 31 26
NCFR.per.1000.deliveries 5.9 9.6 5.7 7.0 13.2 7.6
Number.of.Health.Centres 15 15 15 19 19 19
Deliveries 9,673.......... 9,617.......... 13,387........ 8,098.......... 9,745.......... 12,884........
Neonatal.Deaths 45 41 59 24 39 45
NCFR.per.1000.deliveries 4.9 4.3 4.4 3.0 4.0 3.5
Number.of.Health.Centres 6 6 6 7 7 7
Deliveries 2,493.......... 3,139.......... 3,760.......... 3,034.......... 3,730.......... 4,470..........
Neonatal.Deaths 16 13 12 16 10 16
NCFR.per.1000.deliveries 6.4 4.1 3.5 5.3 2.7 3.7
Number.of.Health.Centres 29 29 29 33 33 33
Deliveries 15,061........ 16,275........ 20,902........ 13,298........ 15,846........ 20,732........
Neonatal.Deaths 78 88 91 55 80 87
NCFR.per.1000.deliveries 5.7 6.0 4.5 5.1 6.6 4.9
LILONGWE
KASUNGU
SALIMA
TOTAL
Facility.intervention. Control
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Comparing across districts, the NCFR was similar in Lilongwe and Salima 
while Kasungu recorded a higher NCFR both during baseline and in the 
intervention period.  
3.3.1.3 Comparing-intervention-and-control-areas-
The number of deliveries was slightly lower in the non-intervention facilities as 
compared to the facility intervention sites, but there is a larger overall 
percentage increase in deliveries in the non-FI sites to eventually have an 
equal number of deliveries in both the sites towards the end of the intervention 
period. 
There has been an increase in the absolute number of neonatal deaths both 
in the intervention and control areas, but looking at the neonatal case fatality 
rate, there is not much change in either of the sites. The overall neonatal case 
fatality rate in the intervention arm was 5.7, 6.0 and 4.5 per 1,000 deliveries 
for the three time periods respectively. The corresponding NCFR in the control 
arm was 5.1, 6.6 and 4.9 per 1,000 deliveries. The NCFR shows an initial 
increase in 2008/09 followed by a decline in 2009/10. These are not 
statistically significant changes.  
In summary, while there has been an increase in deliveries in the health 
facilities over the period of the study, there were no real changes in the 
neonatal case fatality rates in the health facilities in the intervention and 
control areas over the period of the study.  
3.3.1.4 Analysis-of-neonatal-deaths-in-the-CEmOCs-
Although the CEmOCs were not part of the RCT evaluation, a considerable 
amount of QI activities were carried out in these facilities. However, most of 
the interventions in the CEmOCs were focused on maternal rather than 
newborn health, especially in the first intervention period (Table 2) 
The CEmOC facilities were evaluated independent of the RCT. The analysis 
included trends in NCFR over the baseline and intervention time periods. It 
also included the use of run-charts, a standard method used in improvement 
measurement. The control charts show variation and assess the stability of 
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neonatal case fatality rates. A statistically significant change is accepted to 
have occurred if there are six consecutive values observed below the baseline 
median as per control chart rules. The median is then recalculated when the 
data indicates that there has been a change in performance according to 
control chart rules(190). Data was analysed as part of the improvement effort 
by the intervention team for the period from May 2006viii to December 2010.  
Looking at the data for the 9 CEmOCs where the FI was focused (Figure 17 
and Table 9), the NCFR during the May-December 2006 baselineix averaged 
29 (median 26), decreased slightly in 2007, averaging 27 (median 26), 
decreased substantially in 2008, averaging 21 (median 20), remained at this 
lower level in 2009, averaging 20 (median 20), and increased substantially in 
2010, averaging 25 (median 23). This represents an overall decline of 14% 
using annual averages or of 10% using medians of the monthly data. 
However, it is difficult to attribute reduction in NCFR seen in 2008 and 
sustained in 2009 to MaiKhanda as there was little MaiKhanda neonatal work 
happening in 2008 (Figure 17) and although it started in 2009 was not up to 
full dosage until 2010. Secondly, in the absence of a control group it is difficult 
to ascertain if the observed reductions are attributable to the project 
interventions or a general secular trend for improved NCFR throughout 
Malawi. There was an attempt to collect data from non-participating facilities 
through an intern but getting data from the HMIS proved to be a challenge for 
the limited time period the intern was available and subsequently the plan was 
shelved.  
Since the intervention has not been able to demonstrate significant changes 
in newborn deaths either at the population level or at the health facility level, 
the next level of investigation is to see if there has been a change in 
associated mortality figures such as the stillbirth rate, the early and late 
newborn mortality rate and the overall perinatal mortality rate.  
                                            
viii)QI)work)in)the)CEmOC)facilities)started)in)2006,)earlier)than)in)the)trial)sites.)
ix)Data) for) January) to)April)2006) is)unreliable)with)data) for)Bwaila,)which)has)one)of) the)highest)
NCFR,)also)missing)for)these)months,)so)it)was)not)included)in)the)baseline)estimate.)
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Since only neonatal deaths data were collected, it is not possible to analyse 
the NCFR as early or late or the perinatal case fatality rate. Both macerated 
and fresh stillbirths, however, were recorded in the health facility surveillance 
form. Fresh Still Birth Rate (FSBR) increased throughout 2006 and 2007 
before remaining approximately the same in 2008 and then reducing in 2009 
and 2010 to around the original baseline 2006 level(33). It is unclear whether 
the initial rise was due to better recording of data or whether, given the lack of 
process data on partograph use and management of obstructed labour, the 
decrease can be related to the MaiKhanda QI work. 
3.3.1.5 Secular-trends-in-neonatal-health-facility-case-fatality-and-population-level-
mortality-in-Malawi-
Although the health facility intervention did not observe a change in neonatal 
death rates in the population or in the facility, there is a probability that this 
was because of the background changes that were happening in the country 
around the period of intervention implementation. Analysing secular trends 
gives an indication if these changes could have possibly masked the effect of 
MaiKhanda FI interventions. 
The DHS 2010 shows a slight increase in neonatal mortality from 27 per 
1,000 live births [95%CI: 23,31] during 1999-2004 (DHS 2004) to 31 neonatal 
deaths per 1000 live births [95% CI: 28,35] during 2005-2010 (DHS 2010), 
although these increases have been statistically non-significant. The 2006 
MICS (Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey) conducted for the period 2001-2006, 
observed a NMR of 33 per 1,000 live births [95% CI: 29,38]. Although 
statistically non-significant, it is suggestive of a general decline in NMR in 
Malawi during the period of MaiKhanda evaluation from 2007 to 2010. Recent 
estimates have suggested a nominal decline of around 3.3% in newborn 
mortality rates for the period 2000-2012 (12, 191) 
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Figure 17: Neonatal case fatality rate at 9 CEm
OCs com
bined, 2006-2010 (reproduced from
 M
aiKhanda final evaluation report) 
 
 
Table 9: Annual Com
parison of NCFRs in CEm
OCs, 2006-2010 
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3.4 Making*sense*of*the*results*
In summary, a cluster randomized trial looking at the effect of quality 
improvement interventions in health facilities in three central districts in 
Malawi did not detect a significant change in neonatal mortality rate at the 
population level. Further to this, a secondary analysis of the data from the 
health facilities was conducted which also showed no significant effect of the 
interventions on neonatal case fatality rates.  
Absence of effect could be due to challenges in intervention design or in 
program implementation or challenges to the evaluation itself. A summary 
account of how the impact evaluation was implemented and the rigour applied 
in evaluation of the cRCT is presented in the section above (This has been 
summarized from the much detailed MaiKhanda evaluation report(33)). This 
current section covers the challenges in using RCT as an evaluation design 
for complex interventions such as QI Collaboratives.  
RCTs are considered the gold standard in impact evaluation. The main 
advantage of this design is the availability of a randomized control cluster (or 
group) against which the interventions clusters can be compared, by 
controlling the context and other extraneous factors that can potentially 
influence the intervention attribution. Evaluation of the MaiKhanda intervention 
used a cluster RCT approach to analyse the impact of the intervention. But, 
the application of cRCT designs in the evaluation of QI (Quality Improvement) 
interventions poses many challenges both at the conceptual level as well as 
the operational level. 
I briefly present the conceptual basis of MaiKhanda’s improvement model so 
that the challenges to the use of cRCT design for impact evaluation can be 
better appreciated.  At a conceptual level, the improvement model is based on 
Everett Roger’s concept of  “Diffusion of Innovation”(181) where the rapid 
spread of new ideas or practices happens largely by imitation(182) through 
individuals categorized as innovators, early adopters, early & late majority and 
laggards(192). The ‘innovators’ form a small proportion of this category but 
depending on their network linkages and inter-personal relationships, they can 
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engage the ‘early adopters’ who then go on to influence the ‘early majority’ 
and so on. The spread is thus organic and dictated largely by interpersonal 
network, which are not limited by the boundaries of intervention groups. Thus 
comparison groups can be considered as a hindrance to the organic spread of 
QI intervention.  
In quality improvement interventions, the selections of groups or clusters 
(typically these are facilities within a health system) are influenced by their 
level of commitment or “readiness” to be part of the intervention. Such 
facilities are bound to possess individual and organizational characteristics 
that are inherently different from their comparison groups. Furthermore, 
comparison group in a cRCT are selected at the beginning of the intervention.  
The diffusion of innovation approach might be a more organic and perhaps 
pragmatic approach from an implementation perspective, but this conflicts 
with cRCT designs where the selection of a comparison group happens 
apriori.  
From an evaluation perspective, focusing on only the ‘low hanging fruits’ does 
not tell us if the intervention has the same effect on the ‘not-so-enthusiastic’ 
facilities. A comparison group gives the opportunity to analyse and 
understand the mechanisms in play with ‘innovators and early adaptors’ as 
well as the ‘laggards’. However, from an improvement science 
perspective(46) psychology plays a role in the organic spread of QI 
interventions. Focusing on the low hanging fruit and managing to get a ‘critical 
mass’ of facilities that will adhere to QI principles, is a strategy that is more 
likely to influence the intervention acceptance by ‘later adapters & laggards’. 
This aspect of psychology of influencing a larger stakeholder group by 
building a ‘critical mass’ to eventually influence the outcome is difficult to 
measure using a comparison group, especially if the comparison groups have 
to be randomly allocated. 
At an operational level, there are limitations to the identification and function of 
comparison clusters. The choice of comparison group is determined by the 
level at which the intervention takes place as well as the level at which 
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outcomes are measured. QI interventions can focus at different levels such as 
improving the processes of care or service delivery mechanism or re-
organization of the healthcare systems. In most cases it is a combination of 
these different levels. These different levels are inter-dependent, making it 
difficult to isolate intervention effects even in the presence of a comparison 
group. Randomization at a higher level (e.g. district or organizational level) 
offers a better comparison cluster but randomization at this level will allow for 
very few clusters (there are only 28 districts in Malawi and it was not possible 
within the scope of interventions such as MaiKhanda to be active in all the 
districts), invalidating the results of the analysis(193). While having a 
comparator cluster at a much lower level such as individual service provider 
level, raises challenges for an appropriate comparative sample for outcome 
measurement.  
Another important operational challenge in using RCT design is the unit of 
randomization itself i.e. determining the appropriate level of randomization for 
a QI intervention. In the MaiKhanda study randomization was at the health 
centre level whereas tertiary care and secondary care hospitals across the 
intervention sites also formed part of the QI intervention design. In fact, a 
significant proportion of the programme implementation efforts, especially in 
the earlier part of the intervention, were focused on the secondary and tertiary 
care (CEmOC) health facilities, which were not included in the trial clusters 
(Table 2).  
As such Health Centres contributed to a smaller proportion of the mortality 
(around 16%) since most of the complicated cases (and therefore deaths) 
were referred to a higher level of care(33). Moreover, the study design 
considered all HCs as BEmOC sites, based on understanding from the 
baseline report whereas this was not the case(33). This was the intent of the 
Ministry of Health (MoH) but there were facilities that were not designated as 
BEmOC sites. But even where designated, they were out of stock or had 
insufficient human resources and therefore with limited functional 
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capacity. Thus having health centres as the unit of randomization itself could 
influence the results of the intervention. 
The inclusion of CEmOC facilities in the intervention design could have 
influenced the trial results. Analysis of the CEmOC neonatal mortality data 
indicates that only 19% of all the neonatal deaths observed throughout the 
intervention period of the RCT occurred in the non-randomized CEmOC 
facilities(33). CEmOC work influenced the intervention and control arm 
equally. From an intervention design perspective, CEmOCs were a part of the 
intervention because the implementation focus was across a vertical slice of 
the health system.  
The QI interventions were being introduced within the health system, which is 
complex and adaptive and composed of inter-dependent building blocks and 
levels. Changes introduced in one level of the system has implications and 
effects on other levels, manifested through feedback loop mechanisms. It is 
this inter-dependency of the different levels of the system which enable and 
constrain change and thus improvement(194). However, the extent of this 
dependency and its subsequent effect on newborn outcomes cannot be 
explained thru the RCT design. 
Furthermore, given the inter-dependent levels of the health system, 
randomization at the health facility level will mean that comparison facilities 
will be influenced greatly by the intervention, especially since other levels 
within the health systems such as CEmOCs were also part of the intervention. 
It is not possible in complex social interventions, such as QI Collaboratives, to 
double-blind the participants and therefore difficult for trial designs have to 
take account of the biases that can be expected in such interventions. The 
design is also prone to ‘contamination’ effects as a result of these(28) 
Measuring the extent of this contamination between intervention and 
comparison groups is a difficult exercise and does influence the study results.  
The next challenge is that of intervention and implementation fidelity. For 
complex QI interventions that have long implementation periods, comparison 
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sites are prone to be influenced by the intervention (referred to as ‘spill-over 
effect’) and contamination by other interventions cannot be ruled out(35). 
A key principle of impact evaluation is to reduce bias by standardizing the 
interventions. In conventional experimental evaluation standardization of 
interventions is the norm. This means feedback loops are absent and there is 
no mid-course correction. However, these are important characteristics of QI 
interventions especially when embedding these interventions within the health 
system. It has been argued that it is still possible to account for the changes, if 
RCT designs can focus on maintaining the fidelity of the function (or 
principles) of the intervention rather than standardizing the activities (referred 
to as form of the intervention)(164).  
Improvement models assume that an intervention works and if it does not 
work, incremental adjustments are made through feedback loop mechanisms, 
thus promoting continuous improvement. Thus PDSA cycles can be iterative 
leading to emergent properties of an intervention. It is not very clear how 
these emergent properties can be accounted for within a cRCT evaluation 
design. For instance, data improvement was an important activity of the QI 
intervention and while some facilities absorbed it completely, others were less 
enthusiastic about it. In areas where this was not completely implemented, it 
can provide a false picture of the changes occurring at the facility.  For 
instance, with the increase in neonatal case fatality rates in health facilities in 
Kasungu district, it is difficult to conclude if this is a genuine increase or if this 
is a result of better recording of data. Since the data improvement is a 
continuous exercise, it is difficult to determine at what time point improvement 
kicked in and subsequently at what point the data should be considered as of 
credible quality. 
3.5 Summary**
The trial brought some interesting findings to the fore. Despite prescribing to a 
well-established improvement model, the intervention failed to measure an 
impact on newborn mortality at facility level and at population level. The 
challenges to measuring impact of complex interventions such as QI 
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Collaboratives is explored in this Chapter and it explains the limitations to the 
choice and application of evaluation design than actual implementation of the 
cRCT itself. 
The trial results were probably influenced by the choice of intervention 
clusters (random v/s organic diffusion approach), choice of control group, 
(lack of) measurement of the influence of context, and intervention fidelity i.e 
standardization versus a feedback and iteration process that leads to a 
dynamic intervention model. 
Process evaluation in the MaiKhanda evaluation report highlighted the 
contextual factors such as  severe lack of material and human resources, lack 
of clinical skills, lack of motivation and morale, lack of interest or ability to use 
quality improvement methods or a combination of these factors. The PhD 
thesis goes further to explore how all these various factors, individually and 
combined, influenced the intervention outcome. 
Evaluation also concluded that lack of observed effects could perhaps be due 
to sub-optimal implementation. This is the subject of further exploration in my 
PhD.  
Given the complexity of QI interventions and the challenges of evaluating 
context and intervention fidelity, there is a growing consensus among 
improvement researchers to consider plausibility designs alongside probability 
designs(27, 29, 171, 195). In the next Chapter I explore the reasons as to why 
we did not see an effect, through the application of a plausibility design. I use 
a theory based approach to evaluation to try and answer 2 questions: 
• Did the MaiKhanda intervention do the right things? This explores the 
characteristics of the intervention and the factors that might have 
influenced the results 
• Did the MaiKhanda intervention do things right? This will explore issues 
related to the dosage and implementation of the intervention. 
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Chapter*4 Research*Strategy*
4.1 Introduction*
Impact evaluation of the MaiKhanda intervention followed a linear logic model 
of evaluation design, analysing the input, process and outputs and finally the 
impact using a cluster randomised trial design. Results of a cluster RCT 
measuring the effect of QI interventions on neonatal mortality at population 
level did not show an effect (§3.2.4).  
As part of the process evaluation of the MaiKhanda programme, the specific 
activities of QI intervention, and the key determinants influencing quality of 
care were explored. An attempt was made to triangulate the RCT results with 
the results of the process evaluation studies to draw inferences regarding the 
effect of MaiKhanda interventions. However, this did not go as far as 
explaining the context within which the interventions were implemented or the 
mechanisms and their possible influences on the intervention. 
A theory based approach to evaluation can dwell into the black box of 
interventions and shed some light on the intervention mechanism. This 
theory-based approach to evaluation is the one that I have considered for my 
PhD. The approach involves drawing up a comprehensive research strategy 
to map out the causal chain from inputs to outcomes and impact and testing 
the underlying assumptions(35) and finally analysing the context and 
mechanism(196) by which quality improvement was delivered (or not) in the 
intervention. 
Before explaining the theory-based approaches, a brief background of the 
programme pathway that is common across most QI interventions is 
presented here. An intervention begins with a set of activities including 
intervention design, implementation strategies, assumptions and risks which 
form an integral part of its implementation framework(197). Once an 
intervention is implemented with the appropriate implementation strength, 
(characterized by the dose, duration, intensity specificity and fidelity of the 
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intervention), it stimulates a change in thinking or behaviour of the agency (i.e 
individual and collective reasoning of all key stakeholders involved in the 
project) which in the appropriate context contributes to the success (or not) of 
the programme(158). This is referred to as the ‘mechanism’ of an intervention. 
This is the key point differentiating a complex intervention such as QI from 
clinical trials. 
Thus in evaluating interventions using theory-based approach, there are 2 
major aspects of the programme to consider. First is to hypothesize and 
analyse links between programme activities and its anticipated outcomes. 
This is referred to as implementation theory, prescriptive theory, ‘little t’ theory 
and in programme management literature as programme theory(198). I use 
the term implementation theory here to avoid confusion.  
 
 
Figure 18: Overview of Theory Based Evaluation (TBE) approaches 
 
Secondly, there is the causal links between the mechanism released by an 
intervention and its anticipated outcomes. This is referred to as programme 
theory, descriptive theory, big T theory and also as middle range theory in 
realist evaluation. I use the term programme theory here. 
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There are two main approaches to theory-based evaluation (among others) 
namely, the Theory of Change (ToC) approach and Realist Evaluation (RE) 
approach, and they take into consideration both the implementation theory 
and programme theory (Figure 18). Theory of Change has a strong base in 
explaining implementation theory but is less directive when it comes to 
explaining programme theory. Theory of change is analysed through 
development and testing of logic models(199) and is usually linear in nature. 
Here programme theory is analysed mainly in relation to its implementation 
strength.  
Realist evaluation on the other hand is concerned largely with uncovering 
programme theory, usually using a C-M-O [Context-Mechanism-Outcome] 
configuration x (200). Here programme theory refers to the programme 
mechanisms (functions and strategies), outcomes the programme intended to 
generate and context that contributed to particular outcome(201). Realist 
evaluation tends to be contend with the theoretical explanation (rather than 
any empirical observation) of implementation process(67). Therefore there is 
less emphasis on the strength of implementation process within a realist 
evaluation.   
But in reality, for interventions that are being tested in new settings, 
implementation strength is an important precursor to the CMO configuration 
framework. Thus a C-I-M-O is perhaps a more appropriate configuration, 
where I stands for ‘Implementation’. I discuss this in detail in Chapter 8 
(§8.2.5).  
The challenge with complex social intervention is that it is difficult to predict 
the implementation strength ie the dose, duration, specificity and intensity of 
the intervention that is required to “trigger” the mechanism of the 
intervention(202). Nevertheless, a good understanding of implementation 
theory is important in order to conduct a realist evaluation(203). 
                                            
x A C-M-O configuration is a systematic description of the context, mechanism and outcomes 
and also the generative causal relationship between these elements 
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The evaluation strategy for my PhD involves integrating the principles 
underlying Theory of change and realist evaluation approaches to evaluate 
implementation theory and programme theory respectively. My argument for 
combining both approaches is that a comprehensive model is required to 
provide a plausible explanation of the mechanism of the intervention(204). 
The theory of change includes a broader theoretical framework followed by a 
conceptual framework. The broader theoretical framework explains the 
theoretical underpinnings of the IHI model for quality improvement used in 
MaiKhanda study (Figure 9. This entails Deming’s system of profound 
knowledge and has been covered in some detail in Chapter 2 (§2.3).  The 
conceptual framework is an operational version of the broad theoretical 
framework and includes the intervention design, implementation strategies, 
context, stakeholder engagement and both implicit and explicit assumptions 
and risks. The implementation strategies can be further classified into 6 major 
areas: organization of work, capacity building, finance strategy, restructuring, 
quality management strategies, attention to policy context (making 
programme sustainable)(205). The context refers to both the internal and 
external context. 
The next phase of evaluation involves evaluating the programme 
implementation mechanism (also referred to as the programme theory). Here, 
a wider health systems research (HSR) approach is adopted 
where implementation, rather than being focused just on service delivery, is 
considered as an organizational, social & political process involving 
stakeholder perceptions (both individual and collective) and their 
interactions(206). These stakeholder perceptions and their interactions are 
guided by the hardware such as legal and policy framework within the health 
system while the software includes beliefs, value systems of individuals 
(Figure 18). 
Stakeholder perception and their interactions form the basis for stakeholders’ 
(individual and collective) reasoning which along with the context influences 
the mechanism of an intervention. The context includes structural factors such 
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as availability of drugs, human and other resources and functional factors 
such as organizational readiness and organizational culture. It also involves 
broader health systems environment and policy context.  
The above described context and mechanism are an integral part of any 
intervention and does have an influence on its outcome. I attempt to explain 
this based on the principles of realist evaluation approach(200). A hallmark of 
theory based evaluation is its multi-disciplinary nature (and thus different from 
methods based research) and use of mixed methods. It uses a research 
strategy rather than a particular research method(206).  
4.2 Overview*of*the*research*strategy*
Using theory based approaches to evaluation, I am trying to answer two main 
questions: 
• Did the intervention do the right things? 
• Did the intervention do things right? 
The programme evaluation uses a mixed methods approach for analysis. This 
includes qualitative and quantitative methods, contextual analysis and 
narrative documents.  
The keys steps in my research strategy are outlined below:  
1. It begins by conceptualizing the theory of change of the programme 
interventions (including the risks and assumptions) and its intended 
outcomes. This is detailed in § Chapter 5   
2. Next step involves a collating and summarizing the available evidence 
from the MaiKhanda programme. This includes individual process 
evaluation studies such as staff motivation survey, resource availability 
survey, provider knowledge survey, women friendly care survey and the 
CEmOC survey (§Table 12) as well as summaries of relevant project 
documents such as the original proposal, the strategic review document 
and the ‘data deep dive’ report along with quarterly programme reports 
and Programme Management Board (PMB) meeting minutes. Field visit 
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observations from trip reports of senior technical staff are also included in 
the documentation analysis. I was involved in the design, management 
and analysis of all of the surveys as part of a research team and these 
various studies act as a secondary data source for my PhD analysis.  
3. The next step involves synthesizing the multiple and varied strands of 
evidence into a framework for analysis. I use the CFIR (Consolidated 
Framework for Implementation Research) framework(151) to outline the 
domains and constructs, to consider for my evaluation and re-organize 
the available evidence according to these domains and constructs. This 
involves consolidating all the collated evidence and then synthesizing 
them for each of the individual domains and their constructs (§Table 12). 
This gives a broad understanding of the key components of the 
intervention and also helps to shed some light on the implementation 
strength of the programme. Chapter 6 provides a synthesis of all the 
available data from MaiKhanda project. 
4. The interaction between the key components of an intervention and the 
underlying mechanisms it triggers off is analysed through an adaptation of 
‘realist evaluation’ approach. Here, instead of developing new C-M-O 
configurations, existing mechanisms of other successful QI Collaboratives 
are compared with that of MaiKhanda. This provides an opportunity to 
refine the programme theory for quality improvement interventions. This is 
covered in Chapter 7 (§7.1) 
5. The final step is to reflect back on the implementation theory, to try and  
analyse how or (why) the interventions did (not) trigger a mechanism. 
However, this cannot be done in isolation.  It includes taking into 
consideration the implementation strength and the context within which it 
is being implemented. This is covered in Chapter 7 (§0) 
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4.3 Research*Strategy*
4.3.1 STEP* 1:* MaiKhanda’s* Theory* of* Change* for* its* quality* improvement*
intervention.*
 
 
Figure 19: MaiKhanda Theory of Change (QI) 
The MaiKhanda interventions were based on the three delays model by 
Thaddeus and Maine(13) described in the introductory Chapter (Figure 2). 
The quality improvement aspect of the intervention was based on the model 
for improvement developed and implemented by IHI(82), which can trace it 
origins to the improvement principles discussed in Deming’s system of 
profound knowledge.   
The method used to describe MaiKhanda’s Theory of Change (Figure 19) is a 
narrative description from the original proposal document, the mid-term 
strategic review document, the baseline survey conducted in 2006 and the 
baseline retrospective evaluation conducted in 2007. The original proposal 
and the mid-term strategic review document gives an understanding of the 
intervention designs as well as helps define the implementation strategy. The 
2006 baseline survey provides an overview of the context in Malawi in relation 
to MNH (Maternal and Newborn Health) at the beginning of the programme. 
Continuous(Quality(Improvement((
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The 2007 baseline evaluation study provides details on intervention 
implementation at the beginning of the study i.e in the  pre-intervention period. 
4.3.2 STEP*2:*Collating*and*summarizing*the*evidence*
The various process evaluation studies related to quality improvement 
intervention that were conducted as part of MaiKhanda programme, are 
compiled and presented in Table 12. Using a quality of care framework(31), 
MaiKhanda’s process evaluation looked at patient and provider components 
and resource availability. This includes the health facility resources survey, 
the staff motivation survey, CEmOC facility survey and provider knowledge 
study (§1.8.2). A detailed description of each of these studies is available in 
the MaiKhanda report(33). In addition, the process evaluation also included a 
case study on newborn resuscitation at St. Gabriel Hospital that was not 
included in MaiKhanda’s final evaluation report ((§Appendix-2.7). Various 
programme related documents were generated by the implementation team 
such as the progress report, strategy document, PMB (Programme 
Management Board) meeting minutes, reflective evaluation (known as Data 
Deep Dive exercise) and meeting notes. These also constituted as evidence 
for implementation and program theories and were summarized directly into 
the CFIR framework. All this collated data is organized as a spread sheet and 
presented in Table 12 
4.3.3 STEP*3:*Consolidating*and*synthesizing*the*evidence**
The Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research (CFIR) developed 
by Damschroder and colleagues(151) is a framework for formative 
assessment of intervention effectiveness within a specific context. It provides 
an organized set of 5 major domains (the intervention characteristics, the 
outer setting, the inner setting, the characteristics of the individuals and the 
implementation process) and 37 constructs, which can help, hypothesize 
theories regarding the mechanism of change, which can then be tested 
empirically. While this is a long list of constructs, the intention is not to 
evaluate all of them rather, analyse key constructs in the context of the study 
and that, which will be most valuable to the study.  
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Figure 20: Programme Domains and Constructs considered for evaluation 
 
From a realist evaluation perspective, the choice of constructs would be 
guided by the middle range theory that would be developed as part of the 
theory development process. But since I was evaluating retrospectively and 
from existing data sources, the selection of the various constructs was guided 
largely by the availability of data at hand rather than the ones most valuable to 
the study. This poses some limitation to the study. Firstly, it is likely that the 
constructs developed on the basis of available data might not overlap with 
constructs developed from drawing up a MRT. Secondly there has been no 
weightage given to the various constructs that might or might not overlap, it is 
difficult to determine their influence on intervention effectiveness. For 
instance, one important aspect of the intervention that resonates throughout 
the study is the role of leadership, both within MaiKhanda and within the 
health care delivery system. This was also identified by Hulscher and 
Schouten as a key determinant of QI success(100). While every attempt is 
made to explain this in the analysis section, it is limited by the paucity of data 
on this variable. Thus, while all the domains within the CFIR framework have 
been covered to describe the QI intervention of MaiKhanda programme, the 
selection of constructs is limited by the availability of data. This is one of the 
limitations of the study.  The selected constructs are presented in Figure 20 
Program'Domains'and''
Constructs'considered'
Individual)Characteris1cs)
Knowledge'and'belief'about'
interven8on'
Self:eﬃcacy'
Mo8va8on'
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All the evidence generated through the secondary data from various process 
evaluation studies and programme documents provide information for the 
constructs listed in Figure 20. By abstracting the evidence from the individual 
studies as well as programme related documents, a general description for 
each of the constructs is developed. 
The programme has been divided into 4 phases, for the purposes of 
evaluation:  the baseline period, the pre-intervention period, early intervention 
period and the late intervention period (§1.6). For each of the constructs, I 
attempt to synthesize the change processes during each phase of the 
intervention, from the consolidated evidence summaries in order to sketch a 
picture of the programme evolution.  
4.3.4 STEP*4:*Evaluating*programme*theory*of*MaiKhanda*QI*intervention**
Next, I try to construct the mechanism of the intervention, using realist 
evaluation approaches. The crux of realist evaluation lies in understanding 
how mechanism(s) are triggered in a particular context and not others.  
There are five major steps in the design and implementation of a realist 
evaluation. The first step is to elicit the programme theory and from that 
abstract a middle range theory (MRT). The other steps include research 
design and data collection tools and finally data analysis and synthesis. The 
research design and choice of tools is determined largely, by the key thematic 
areas identified from the middle range theory. The data analysis in realist 
evaluation adapts a ‘thematic analysis’ approach similar to ones used in social 
sciences, to abstract data from the various data collected.  
Ideally, using a realist approach, especially for a retrospective study, one 
would develop a MRT (Middle Range Theory), as a first step. A MRT is 
defined as a level of abstraction that one is able to derive from the programme 
theory, but close enough to observed data such that it can be empirically 
tested”(200) (201). According to TBE, for an intervention there are several 
mechanisms, which are functional and may interact with each other in 
complex ways. These need to be considered simultaneously sometimes, to 
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make an understanding of the social phenomenon(207). Thus MRT is usually 
applied to separate the forest from the trees. Since analysing the context can 
be overwhelming, it has to be narrowed down to a level, where it can 
contribute meaningfully to refining the theory. Similarly, when dealing with 
complex adaptive systems such as the health systems, there is a need to 
focus on certain aspects of the intervention mechanism. Middle range theory 
helps achieve this objective. However this can also be a limitation for 
analysing programme theory. Thus a major drawback of MRT is that it is 
prone to ‘tunnel vision’ of the intervention as the theories are defined by the 
researcher and there are no set guidelines on how narrow the MRT needs to 
be. MRT is also drawn up in cases where the realist evaluation is 
retrospective and there is limited data (in terms of programme strategies and 
functions) available to draw up a CMO configuration 
Within a realist evaluation framework, I considered a modified approach to 
elicit MaiKhanda’s program theory, for the following reasons:  
MRT is often used in realist evaluation to guide the refinement of proposed 
theories and identify the relevant constructs to evaluate them. Firstly given the 
process evaluation data and all the documentary evidence available from the 
MaiKhanda evaluation, I could extract data from the constructs identified 
within the CFIR framework to evaluate MaiKhanda’s program theories, without 
necessarily having to develop a middle range theory. (However, a drawback 
in this case what that the choice of constructs was guided largely by the 
availability of data from MaiKhanda process evaluation). Secondly, I was 
looking at the intervention retrospectively rather than prospectively and 
developing a MRT retrospectively could be biased towards the observed 
results.  
Theory based evaluation generally attempts to explain HOW the mechanism 
and context influences the outcomes of the intervention under study. Here 
there is an assumption that the intervention has worked or has had a positive 
effect. In cases such as the MaiKhanda intervention, the study did not yield 
conclusive outcomes for newborn mortality, which could help hypothesize the 
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‘mechanism’ of the intervention. In the absence of any discernible outcome, it 
is difficult to draw evidence-based theories as to how the intervention did not 
work.  
Rather than trying to explain how the intervention did not work, I try to analyse 
why the intervention might not have worked by comparing it with well-informed 
hypotheses that outline the essential elements of successful QI interventions. 
I look at existing literature on the mechanism related to successful QI 
interventions. I identify key intervention strategies from other programmes, 
which generated these mechanisms and compare it with MaiKhanda data to 
identify key programme strategies that might be common across the various 
interventions thus making the programme mechanisms comparable across 
different settings. This process will help refine the original programme theory. 
Interventions are innovative but intervention theories are repetitive and boring. 
Program theories are comparable and the purpose of this comparison is to 
build the body of knowledge around the intervention(202).   
Peter Pronovost and colleagues developed a successful QI Collaborative in 
ICU facilities in the State of Michigan in US, that successfully brought down 
central venous catheter (CVC) blood stream infection (BSI) rates by about 
66% and was sustained throughout its 18 month study period(173). Mary 
Dixon-Woods and colleagues developed an ex-post theory of this successful 
Michigan study (known as the Keystone Project) (67). They developed well-
defined hypothesis of what might have contributed to the success of this QI 
intervention. Their paper hypothesizes possible mechanisms of how the 
interventions at Michigan might have worked. I use ex-post theory developed 
by Dixon-Woods and colleagues, to explain the mechanisms of the QI 
intervention at MaiKhanda.  
Using the evidence synthesized in Step 3, I will organize and compare the key 
strategies from the MaiKhanda study with the key ingredients(strategies) 
associated with the ‘mechanisms’ identified in the Michigan study. For 
instance, trying to compare if MaiKhanda intervention was able (or not) to 
develop a strong networked community, as observed in the Keystone Project 
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in Michigan, despite having similar Collaborative learning sessions. As 
MaiKhanda intervention strategies did not result in effectively ‘triggering’ the 
mechanisms, I will take a step deeper to analyse the implementation theory 
and trying to explain if the dose, duration, intensity and specificity of the 
intervention as well as the implementation fidelity was sufficient to ‘trigger’ the 
expected mechanisms. In doing this, I explore the relation between an 
interventions programme theory and its implementation theory.  
4.3.5 STEP*5*Evaluating*the*implementation*theory**
Hulscher and colleagues (100) identified the key structural elements such as 
the selection of collaborative topics, the experts involved, the composition of 
the collaborative groups, the improvement steps undertaken and the type of 
activities supported that are determinants of success for QI Collaboratives. 
Embedding these intervention characteristics within health systems is key for 
the scaling up and sustainability of these programmes. QI Collaboratives are 
complex interventions being implemented within a complex adaptive health 
system. The complexity of the intervention implemented at MaiKhanda could 
potentially influence the outcome but this was not captured through the impact 
evaluation. In this final stage of the research strategy, I analyse the 
implementation theory within a complexity framework adopted from the work 
of Pawson (202). The framework categorizes complexity in terms of Volition, 
Implementation, Context, Time, Outcome, Rivalry and Emergence 
(VICTORE). I begin each section with a brief description of the components 
followed by an analysis in terms of MaiKhanda’s implementation theory. 
By complementing impact evaluation with theory-based evaluation, I hope to 
develop an insight into the context and mechanism by which the intervention 
was delivered (or failed to deliver).  
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Chapter 5 Evolution*of*MaiKhanda’s*Theory*of*Change* 
This section covers the theory of change linked to quality improvement 
interventions within the MaiKhanda programme. There are different methods 
to draft the Theory of Change (also sometimes referred to as ‘initial 
programme theory’). This can be done by conducting a workshop with 
stakeholders including the designers and implementers of the intervention, 
reviewing programme documentation and reviewing literature. Other 
approaches include researchers’ own observation and inquiry (exploratory on-
site research) during the different phases of the programme. MaiKhanda ‘s 
initial Theory of Change discussed here is based primarily on review of the 
programme documents namely the project proposal at the inception of the 
project (Table 12-reference I) and the strategic review that was conducted 
towards the middle of the programme (Table 12-Reference XVII).  
The aim of the MaiKhanda programme was to measurably reduce maternal 
and neonatal morbidity and mortality in Malawi over a period of five years. 
The programme intended to achieve these objectives by implementing 
programmes at both the supply side (improve service provision) and demand 
side (community participation) level.  On the supply side the programme 
would improve the quality of skilled attendance and Emergency Obstetric and 
Newborn Care services, by working on maternal and newborn change 
packages, conducting deaths audits and data improvement.  On the demand 
side, the programme would improve community preventive and care seeking 
behaviours by mobilising communities through women’s groups. The plan was 
to implement five core activities in three districts – Lilongwe, Kasungu and 
Salima.  These core activities included: 
! Quality improvement in health facilities,  
! Data improvement 
! Structured support for conducting death audits  
! Facilitation of women’s groups at community level 
! Population level surveillance for impact evaluation.  
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For the purposes of my PhD, I am only considering the supply side of the 
intervention (ie Quality Improvement in the health facilities) for newborn care. I 
have provided rationale for this in Section §1.10. Next section covers 
MaiKhanda’s Theory of Change for quality improvement Collaboratives in the 
health facilities. 
5.1 The*original*MaiKhanda*Theory*of*Change*(2006O2008)*
MaiKhanda’s Theory of Change is based on the premise that more than two-
thirds of the delay in the utilization and provision of maternal and newborn 
care happens at the health facility due to a range of complex health systems 
related factors. Health service failures could include incorrect treatment, poor 
staff attitude, delays in referral process, poor co-ordination between various 
types of healthcare providers resulting poor quality of care. Shortage of staff 
and heavy workload can also overwhelm and discourage individual health 
care provider. Another constraining factor is the health care provider 
knowledge and skills. Also, the transient nature of the health workforce in 
Malawi creates severe weaknesses in institutionalizing knowledge within 
health facilities(208).  
The interventions were to complement Malawi’s ‘National Road Map’ for 
reducing maternal and infant mortality, by improving the coverage and quality 
of basic and comprehensive emergency obstetric and newborn care services.  
MaiKhanda’s Theory of Change included a hybrid quality improvement model 
that laid a great deal of emphasis on the choice of improvement methods to 
be used in the intervention. This integrated model for improvement in its 
operational version consisted of criterion based audits and standards of care 
integrated with the rapid improvement cycles (commonly referred to as PDSA 
cycles) (Figure 4) 
 
 
 *
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5.1.1 Rapid*Cycle*Improvement**
By giving the opportunity to front line health care providers to find local 
solutions to their problems, it is assumed that they will be major participants in 
the design and improvement of the care processes for newborns. This 
approach provided a structured learning environment at the point of care, to 
identify obstacles to access and delivery of care, and to document innovations 
that have proven to be effective in improving care. Traditionally it has been 
built around providers’ knowledge base and use of guidelines is mainly 
through top down information from technical experts from the MoH or from 
MaiKhanda..  
The operationalization of IHI’s model for improvement was a composite 
intervention consisting of multiple components such as identifying the drivers 
of change, identifying the change package, forming QI teams, collaborative 
learning sessions and action periods with rapid improvement cycles (PDSAs) 
and run charts.  
5.1.1.1 Drivers of Change 
The intervention consisted of drivers of change ie the key set of strategies that 
were deemed necessary to bring about changes in maternal and newborn 
mortality. The project had identified four key drivers of change. These were:  
• Clinically excellent care for mothers and neonates 
• Women friendly care 
• Information driven decision making  
• Effective support systems 
The bottom 3 drivers of change were common across for mother and 
newborns while there were specific secondary drivers for clinically excellent 
care for newborns.  
5.1.1.2 Change package 
The change package is essentially a list of ideas to stimulate the primary or 
secondary drivers of change to be tested in the facilities. The change 
packages were developed by the health facility QI teams and were closely 
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linked with the standards of care supported by CBA. The standards of care 
are broken down by the package into actions that the providers can do. The 
change package for clinically excellent care for newborn included Kangaroo 
Mother Care for low birth weight, neonatal resuscitation for asphyxiating 
babies and clinical management of newborn sepsis.  
Examples of ideas included in the change package were: separating sepsis 
patients from other patients, educating patients on the importance of washing 
hands and applying soap. At the beginning of the QI implementation it was 
reported that facilities chose areas to work on in the change package on the 
basis of ‘gut feeling’. However, gradually ideas to test became more ‘data 
driven’ from their own facilities and also based on evidence from literature.  
5.1.1.3 QI Teams 
Quality Improvement (QI) teams were responsible for implementation of 
change packages in the health facilities. They were the front-runners for 
testing innovative ideas in the facilities and formed an integral part of the QI 
implementation programme. The idea behind setting up QI teams was to 
harness local knowledge and build local capacity to solve their own problems.  
The teams were multi-disciplinary and included representatives from the 
various providers within the facilities, for example, QI team members typically 
included a Matron, Nurse-Midwife, Clinical Officer, Lab Technician, and Data 
Clerk.  However, a few of the QI teams, such as the team in Kasungu were 
developed from the existing MDR (Maternal Death Review) committee. 
Each QI team had a leader who would regularly liaise with MaiKhanda to 
inform them of the QI work, submit data, prepare for workshops and arrange 
meetings. QI teams were not established in all the facilities given the staff 
turnover in the health centres as well as being rotated within the larger health 
facilities.  
There were a number of ways that new people could get recruited to the QI 
teams, these included people expressing an interest in joining or being drawn 
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into the QI work to help solve a particular problem and then deciding to 
become a permanent QI team member.  
5.1.1.4 QI Collaborative workshops 
The workshops are also referred to as Collaborative workshops or 
“Breakthrough Collaborative Series”(209). During these workshops the 
facilities were taught about QI theory, and received training in the QI tools, 
such as PDSA, Maternal Death Reviews (MDRs), Criterion Based Audit (CBA) 
and data improvement. The initial QI implementation work began with QI team 
members from the 9 CEmOC facilities attending MaiKhanda workshops. Later 
on Health Centre Collaboratives were established in all the 3 districts.  
Typically the QI workshop lasted two and a half days. It involved a ‘Storyboard 
Session’, which consisted of a board depicting the facilities QI work in the 
form of progress graphs, presentations of QI tools they had developed, and 
their aim statements.  
A wider audience such as the Medical Director, representatives from MoH, 
and CHAM were invited to observe the Storyboards that allow them to learn 
about QI work going on in the facilities. This was important for improving the 
QI knowledge of stakeholder so as to have a wider engagement with them to 
get the critical buy-in during the scaling up phase later on.   
 The workshops also gave the facilities opportunities to meet with 
organizations such as the Malawian Blood Transfusion Service, who were 
potential stakeholders in resolving some of their resource issues. The 
Collaboratives also gave the QI teams the opportunity to meet with each 
other, share ideas and discuss problems and identify common solutions to 
their problems.  The facilities were also able to learn about other facilities QI 
work, and adapt their ideas if appropriate. 
The collaborative workshops served a dual objective of engaging the QI 
teams in improving the process of care by motivating staff to present their 
ideas and share ideas with other QI teams. It also engaged them in the 
content of care by providing hands-on training such as life-saving skills.  
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5.1.1.5 PDSA Cycle 
PDSAs provide QI teams with a practical method and tool to materialize their 
ideas into action. The ideas from the change packages are tested using PDSA 
cycles. PDSA Cycle stands for Plan-Do-Study-Act. This includes ‘Plan’ to 
answer a question and ‘Plan’ for collection of data to answer the question.  
‘Do’ refers to the carrying out of the change or test.  ‘Study’ involves complete 
analysis of data.  And ‘Act’ refers to reflecting on what changes are to be 
made and then plan for the next cycle. The PDSA is run to test different ideas 
generated by the facilities. .  
5.1.1.6 Run Chart 
Once the PDSA had been run, the facilities have to make sure that there is a 
certain level of reliability before that idea can be adopted as an improvement. 
Reliability is usually measured by the use of Statistical Process Control (SPC) 
charts also referred to as ‘run charts’(190). QI offers a quantitative approach 
to review intervention mechanisms thru the use of these run charts.  
5.1.2 CriterionObased*audit*(CBA)*
The approach was led by LSTM (Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine) and it 
involved five steps: agreeing on standards of care, measuring current 
practice, identifying problems encountered, introducing change, and repeating 
measurement of practice. The process in facilities began by coaching staff to 
review existing relevant guidelines. Once the review team “owned” the 
standards of practice they would be coached in using their local data and their 
own knowledge of the situation to identify local solutions to their problems and 
repeat the cycle as often as needed till the level of desired standards were 
achieved. 
5.1.3 The*integrated*model*for*improvement*
The Criterion Based Audits and Rapid Cycle Improvement were 
acknowledged to be highly complementary of each other and it was decided 
to implement them through an integrated model in such a way that the 
process would begin with an audit cycle and would then move into rapid cycle 
change, once problems had been identified (Figure 4). The approach was to 
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be ‘bottom–up,’ participatory, and linked with MoH recommendations for 
finding solutions to the issues identified through death audits.  
The reasons for integrating these different models were not clearly 
documented, especially since both LSTM and IHI had different perspectives 
on what constituted improvement and how it could be achieved. The Criterion 
Based Audits approach was based on quality assurance principles and aimed 
towards attaining minimum standards of care while Rapid Cycle Improvement 
was based on quality improvement principle and focused on continuous 
improvement. Further refinement of the model was suggested to ensure full 
integration. This was to be done through a small joint workshop between 
partners before the start of the interventions. However in practice, the CBA 
supported by LSTM and the improvement model supported by IHI were 
implemented as separate interventions particularly in the baseline and pre-
intervention period.  
5.1.4 Data*Improvement*
Data improvement is quite central to QI interventions. Improving data quality 
gave managers and clinicians the ability to make improvements on a 
continuous basis by accurately analysing events as they occur. Work on 
data improvement was to begin at the most basic level in facilities so as to 
understand health care providers needs and conditions around collection and 
immediate display of critical information. Work to improve the quality of 
information was to be conducted throughout the entire period covering all of 
the three districts. It was assumed that interventions at the facility level would 
build capacity in individuals for analysis, improvement and monitoring of basic 
processes of care. Experience from these initiatives would then be shared 
with all District Health Officers and MoH leadership through an on-going data 
improvement collaborative during quarterly meetings at the DHO. This would 
lead to changes in procedures and practices, which would establish 
permanent improvement for the facility despite turnover of staff. The 
interventions were to be implemented across the full vertical slice of the health 
care system. A vertical slice of the health systems included the randomly 
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selected health centres, rural hospitals, District Hospital and the referral 
(CEmOC) facilities.  
5.1.5 Support*for*death*audits*
Death audit was a separate unit of activity using the standardized forms 
provided by MoH. The intervention would support and enhance the reporting 
of audit results and encourage the use of data from audits in the improvement 
process as an integral part of the facility coaching. There was a greater 
emphasis on maternal death audits than newborn death audits. 
The process of a maternal death review (MDR) typically involved analysing 
one maternal death at a time followed by a discussion focusing mainly on the 
‘action points’ or activities that need to be followed up from the review. The 
review team would then target specific ideas that the facilities could take to 
prevent such a death from recurring in future. Although challenging, an 
important part of MaiKhanda programme was to introduce the culture of no 
blame during MDRs.  
MaiKhanda played a facilitatory role in conducting the death audits. The 
district teams conducted the death audits. In the pre-intervention period, 
MaiKhanda played an active role in providing technical support to the review 
process through LSTM clinical team. The project adopted a more passive role 
in the early and late intervention period focusing more on engaging facility 
improvement teams to take action on the issues arising out of the death 
audits, using PDSA techniques.  
Although facilities struggled to conduct death audits on a regular basis, this 
was a well-recognized activity institutionalized within the Malawian health care 
system as this was a direct recommendation from the MoH for district 
facilities.  
In simple terms, death reviews provided a reactive approach for improvement, 
i.e. action was initiated once an event has occurred, while criterion-based 
audit and Model for Improvement adopted a more pro-active approach 
towards improvement. 
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5.2 Implementation*
Here I provide a description of how the intervention was to be implemented on 
the ground. An examination of the original programme proposal and 
documents from the strategic review conducted by the end of phase I (2008), 
provides an understanding of the key characteristics of the intervention as 
well as organization of work associated with it. This provides the basis for 
formulating the implementation theory. This section covers key areas such as 
planning and organization of work, stakeholder engagement, district selection, 
partner role, governance and oversight, sustainability, communication and risk 
management in the project.   
The intervention was to maintain close links with the Ministry of Health (MoH) 
through the Reproductive Health Unit (RHU) and the Safe Motherhood Task 
Force (SMTF). The assumption was that this would accelerate sharing of 
programme results, both successes and failures, to benefit others at work on 
this problem.  
5.2.1 Planning*and*organization*of*work*
The improvement team was began work initially in CEmOC facilities as a way 
of learning about the system and providing support to the clinical leadership in 
these facilities. Once the districts were selected, preliminary work began with 
District Health Management Teams (DHMTs) in order to familiarize them with 
MaiKhanda’s approach to quality improvement and learn from them what 
problems they wish to address first. The exact design of district work was to 
be determined by the DHMTs and by advice received through local advisors 
and through stakeholders meetings.  
Beyond the District Hospital, the phasing of facility work within each district, 
involved two-thirds of the district in the first phase and included both public 
and CHAMxi facilities. While the intervention was intended to spread more 
organically to the newer facilities, in reality, this was influenced largely by the 
                                            
xi CHAM (Christian Health Association of Malawi) facilities have a service level agreement with MoH and are 
responsible for approximately 30% of the health service provision in Malawi.  
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randomization principles of the evaluation design.  The plan was to work 
across a ‘vertical slice’ of the facilities. Except the central level CEmOC 
facilities, all the rest of the facilities were classified as BEmOC facilities 
(although they were not fully functioning as one) and was subjected to a 
randomization process, so as to be assigned as an intervention or ‘control’ 
facility.  
Representatives from the intervention facilities were invited to a 
QI Collaborative learning session where they were  introduced to QI concepts 
through ‘storyboard’ sessions and initiate a process of sharing ideas and 
improvement across facilities. This was followed by support to local QI teams 
through on-site coaching by MaiKhanda QI officers.  
The initial plan was to coach one district at a time, with very frequent visits 
taking place over the first 2-3 months, decreasing after that time. 
Collaborative learning sessions mainly with support from Consortium technical 
advisors were to be held every quarter, followed by intensive coaching of 
district one after the other. This meant that initiation of improvement activities 
would be staggered across districts. However, in practice, all the facilities 
selected through the randomization process were initiated into the 
Collaborative learning sessions together.  Thus there was a CEmOC 
Collaborative learning session and a district Collaborative learning session for 
each of the 3 districts held simultaneously. These session were held on a 
quarterly basis (known as 90-day cycles). Throughout the implementation 
period, there were challenges with following this plan, for a variety of 
contextual reasons, discussed later in the Analysis Chapter (§7.2.3). This 
influenced the implementation strength of the interventions and consequently 
trial results as well.  
5.2.2 Stakeholder*engagement*
Important stakeholders were engaged in completing the design of the QI 
intervention. The stakeholders were oriented to fully understand the model 
being developed for quality improvement of maternal and neonatal health 
(MNH) services and would be kept aware of programme developments. 
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The primary stakeholders identified for the QI intervention were the health 
care providers from the facilities. The aim was to train and support local 
leaders so that the principles of improvement became part of the culture of the 
local health system. The collaborative model would ensure that ‘local 
champions’ developed their skills as they taught new entrants into the 
collaborative. Modest continued support, in the form of funds to attend 
meetings and continued learning and coaching in statistical techniques 
would ensure the continuation of the activity over time. 
District Health Management Team (DHMT) would be involved in the original 
planning and coordination of programme implementation so that initiatives 
developed from QI collaborative and audit cycles could be incorporated into 
DHMT plans. The programme also planned to develop leadership skills within 
the DHMT. 
Other stakeholders involved Zonal health officers and Central level MoH 
officials, in particular the Reproductive Health Unit (RHU), the Nursing 
Department and other relevant agencies such as the Health Information 
System unit. 
5.2.3 District*selection*
District selection was done in discussion with the Ministry of Health 
(MoH).  The Consortium was asked by the RHU to work in Districts that are 
among the “ten worst” based on reported maternal deaths and case fatality. 
There were practical issues and political sensitivities associated with district 
selection. Department of Nursing wanted to consider Salima and Ntcheu 
districts. The Consortium finally started work in Salima, Kasungu and 
Lilongwe. There is no documentation on the rationale for the selection of 
these districts. Nevertheless, this was discussed and reviewed with MoH and 
finalized during the initiation of the programme in February 2006. The choice 
of districts and the process that followed had implications for the ‘ownership’ 
of the programme, which will be discussed in the Analysis Chapter (§7.1.1). 
An important point to note here is that Lilongwe district is larger than Salima 
and Kasungu district put together and has a sizable urban population the size 
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of a district. However, the choice of districts was beyond MaiKhanda’s 
influence and consequently having Lilongwe as one of the intervention 
districts affected the programme planning and budgeting and implementation.  
5.2.4 Partner*role*
LSTM (Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine) provided expertise in criterion 
based audits and deaths audits to health facility staff. IHI (Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement) had expertise in quality improvement in health care 
and were instrumental in introducing QI techniques such as the rapid cycle 
improvement in the selected health facilities. Their experience of quality 
improvement in healthcare was mainly from the developed countries such as 
US and Europe.  
LATH (Liverpool Associates in Tropical Health) a subsidiary of LSTM and 
registered as a local entity in Malawi, provided the local team with logistical, 
administrative and financial management support. 
A small office was maintained in Lilongwe to accommodate technical and 
administrative staff, with district offices being established later on in the 
project. The assumption was that the Collaboratives would trigger a diffusion 
of the improvement model through the local health facility leadership that was 
engaged during the Collaborative process. In reality, the spread of the 
intervention was not as organic as it was anticipated and district officesxii had 
to be extended to build local capacity and momentum for quality improvement.  
5.2.5 Governance*&*oversight*
The programme was managed in Malawi through LATH who were responsible 
for local management of the Consortiumxiii. The team in Malawi was headed 
by a programme manager who was supported by a programme officer 
dedicated for QI activities. The team received technical support from 
                                            
xii The District Offices for MaiKhanda was established earlier on in the project but this was used by the community 
intervention and the M&E team. QI team operated centrally from Lilongwe office.  
xiii MaiKhanda had not registered as an NGO by then. 
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Consortium members. The programme implementation team at MaiKhandaxiv 
was responsible for day-to-day activities of the Consortium and also for 
maintaining the active relationship with the MoH.  
A Programme Steering Committee was to provide hands-on oversight of local 
operations. This committee would include Consortium representatives and 
Malawian advisors active in championing the development of the safe 
motherhood and neonatal health improvement, e.g. obstetricians, midwives. 
They would support staff in dealing with anticipated problems such as slow 
implementation, resistance by local facility staff, personnel problems. They 
would advise on the continued interaction with the Road Map and with other 
stakeholders interested in this area as well as on major decisions such as 
solicitation of additional funds. In terms of programme implementation, this 
Steering Committee never got established. 
A Consortium Management Committee consisting of a member each from the 
Consortium partners and The Health Foundation met at least twice annually 
and reviewed major decisions such as changes in the scope of work or other 
strategic decisions such as seeking additional funds, extension of the 
programme of work. This later on was renamed as the Programme 
Management Board and included along with representatives of the consortium 
partner and donor, the senior management team from MaiKhanda.  
5.2.6 Sustainability**
The intervention planned for a sustainable model of information sharing and 
continued learning of improvement and adaptations through the establishment 
of ‘knowledge agents’. The knowledge agents would gather, aggregate and 
analyse data and act as the connective tissue for the programme, driving 
knowledge exchange and interpersonal connections and ensuring continuous 
learning. These agents would use mobile technology (cellular phones, 
handheld computers) to collect data and knowledge, travelling from site to 
                                            
xiv The term MaiKhanda did not come in to effect till the organization was registered as a NGO in 2008. Previously it 
was referred to as ThfC-The Health Foundation Consortium.  
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site, providing caregivers with locally useful data and proactively carry to them 
resources and answers to pressing questions. The plan was to locally recruit 
from the existing cadre of front-line health facility staff so as to ensure 
programme sustainability. At an operational level, this was done by the 
Facility Intervention officers (improvement advisors) from MaiKhanda during 
their field visits to the health facilities during the ‘Action Period’. From a 
sustainability perspective, this was a challenge as the MaiKhanda officers 
were involved with, but not part of the health system in which the intervention 
was being implemented.  
5.2.7 Communication**
The Collaborative learning sessions, it was assumed, would allow for effective 
communication at different levels of the health service. The programme 
envisaged exchange of data, progress reports and ideas among care 
providers, experts and actors in the care delivery system, through the 
collaborative learning sessions. Using a common set of measures to track 
progress, participants could significantly reduce cycle times for local 
implementation, generating a growing list of improvements and adaptations. 
At the programmatic level, programme framework would include objectively 
verifiable indicators to monitor progress in relation to programme inputs, 
process and outputs. Partners had access to the indicator reports and thus 
would be able to use the indicators to continually improve the programme 
through their participation at the programme oversight level. However, this 
process of continuous improvement sometimes required considering an 
intervention redesign, which was in conflict with the evaluation design 
principles of maintaining standardized interventions.  
5.2.8 Risk*and*risk*management*
A log frame was developed as part of the planning process which 
addressed the risks and assumptions at each level of activity. The 
Consortium reviewed and discussed potential risks to the programme as part 
of the planning process. They identified both the external and internal risks. 
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External risks 
Political instability 
There was the risk of political instability at the start of the programme, which 
could aggravate the shortage of resources at the local level. This would have 
implications for intervention implementation and subsequently the outcomes.   
District support 
Malawi was going through a process of decentralization at the time of 
implementation of the project. While this was well mapped out in theory, in 
practice it was not clear how decentralization would work. There was an 
assumption that the districts would be supportive of the QI work in their 
districts.  
Human resources 
The Consortium was well aware of the human resource crisis within the health 
sector in Malawi, at the start of the programme. However, substantial 
funding from DFID through the Emergency Human Resource package, much 
of it specifically focused on improving salaries, was expected to stabilise the 
situation(210).  
Internal Risks 
Three major internal risks were identified at the start of the programme and 
documented in in the project proposal:  
! A partner decision to depart from the Consortium 
! Disagreements arising as to one partner’s performance 
! Local disagreement with scale-up plan 
The internal risks outlined provide an insight into the tensions that were 
prevailing between implementation partners even in the proposal 
development stage. These risks became obvious once programme 
implementation on the ground began. These internal risks affected the 
duration and intensity of the implementation process.  
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5.2.9 Additional*Activities*
A number of additional activities were suggested such as the leadership 
buddy system where each facility would be linked “buddy” to a high level 
leader from the health system (District Health Office, Ministry of Health, 
Reproductive Health Unit, and CHAM), exchange visits so that QI team could 
observe the improvement work going on in other facilities. However, these 
activities were not implemented during the project tenure.  
There were other strategies such as promoting ‘local experts’ within facilities, 
who would then be able to teach their skills to other facilities and to new 
members of QI teams in their own facilities. The idea behind the strategy was 
that the facilities would respond better to learning from a peer as opposed to 
learning from outside experts.  These local experts would be staff members 
with clinical skills who had become an expert in a certain area of QI.  This 
strategy was first initiated in Nkhoma (CHAM) hospital and was successful 
within that facility but did not gather enough momentum or rather there was 
not enough capacity within MaiKhanda to replicate it beyond that facility. 
There was also the strategy of supporting ‘super improvers’. The idea was 
that there would be ‘champions’ emerging from the work in the facilities-these 
were QI team members who were enthusiastic about improvement work. 
MaiKhanda would build capacity of these super improvers to conduct quality 
improvement (Collaboratives, mentoring, developing PDSAs). Their role would 
be to help expand QI work within their own hospital and within the health 
centres.  
While these additional activities were well intentioned and very strategic, their 
execution remained sub-optimal. This was linked to MaiKhanda’s own 
capacity but also shaped by the strategic vision of the partnership and the 
programme design.  
The description above provides an overview of the proposed theory of 
change. The analysis will look at the changes to the theoretical and 
operational dimensions of programme implementation over the period of the 
study. The analysis will also look at how assumptions changed over a period 
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of time and subsequently affected programme implementation.  
5.3 The*revised*Theory*of*Change*(2008O2010)*
It was evident from the baseline evaluation that there were challenges with the 
intervention design i.e integrated improvement model because of differences in 
partner views, which affected effective facilitation by MaiKhanda staff 
subsequently affecting programme implementation in the health facilities by 
the individual QI teams(33). The main point of divergence was LSTM’s 
Standard of Care approach, which had its theoretical underpinnings in quality 
assurance (QA) whereas the rapid improvement cycles promoted by IHI had 
its underpinnings in improvement (QI) theory (Also see Box 1). MDR used a 
reactive approach to achieve standards of care while CBA was a more 
proactive approach. Nevertheless both models adhered to the principles of 
quality assurance. The fundamental difference between a QA & QI is that 
quality improvement focuses on continuous improvement of systems and 
processes used in an organization while Quality Assurance (QA) focuses on 
episodic survey of performance, addressing mainly the errors of individuals. 
Coupled with this the donor affiliation was also inclined towards IHI Model for 
Improvement, having successfully funded IHI intervention in the NHS (UK). All 
this meant a revision to the theory of change, focused largely on the IHI model 
for improvement. Thus the revised model used in Malawi, was based on the 
IHI ‘Model for Improvement’ used in other developed country settings and 
emphasized on the following: 
• Change packages and improvement cycles 
• Breakthrough Collaborative Series (BTS) also referred to as 
‘Collaboratives”.  
The main difference was in the approaches. While the original framework 
suggested death reviews or criterion-based audits as the starting point of 
the intervention, the revised model was a 4 step process: 
1. Aims: Having clear aims for improvement so that local QI teams have a 
clear understanding of what they are trying to accomplish.  
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2. Measures: Measurement, especially local measurement that allows the 
actors to know when a change is an improvement (by creating a 
continuous feedback mechanism).  
3. Change Concepts: Ideas for change to the systems that are alternatives 
to the status quo designs.  
4. Cycles of Local Testing and Adoption: Opportunities for local 
organizations and teams to test those ideas for change in context so as to 
refine them and, if effective, stabilize them in place, or, if ineffective, reject 
them. These cycles are known as the PDSA (Plan-Do-Study-Act) cycles.  
The assumption was that by adapting this MFI, lots of change ideas would be 
developed at the local level. Of these change ideas, some would bring about 
improvements, which had potential to be a local innovation, which would then 
be spread widely and more rapidly. This spread was intended to be done 
through the “Breakthrough Collaborative Series”. The general architecture of a 
Breakthrough Series Collaborative (Figure 3) which includes QI teams 
attending in-person meetings (“Learning Sessions”); linkages through visits 
and electronic communications; mentoring of QI teams by “facultyxv” who 
knew the subject matter and improvement methods; systematic, transparent 
and shared local measurement; senior leadership engagement to remove 
obstacles to local QI teams’ progress; peer-to-peer exchange, local 
adaptation, and highly participative management(211). A Learning 
Collaborative consisted of a series of 3 Learning Sessions over the course of 
9 to 12 months in which organizations worked together towards a common 
aim.  One of the cornerstone philosophies of a Learning Collaborative was 
“everyone teaches, everyone learns”—promoting the spread of successful 
ideas from one QI team to another.  In the original framework, the role of 
Collaboratives was mainly focused on orientation and training on the QI 
methods. 
                                            
xv This would include the local champions from the facility but it was mainly MaiKhanda staff who were trained in IHI’s 
improvement methods.  
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By bringing ‘communities of peer groups’ together in the Collaborative 
sessions, for shared learning, the Collaboratives tried to create an 
environment where people were comfortable sharing their local innovation and 
improvements using data from their facilities. Equally important was what 
happened in between Learning Sessions; these were called Action Periods, 
when QI teams tested and implemented new ideas as well as collected and 
submitted monthly data and reports. MaiKhanda officers provided technical 
support to these communities of people (QI teams) in each facility during 
action periods, to harness their change ideas into improvements. By 
continuing this iterative cycle over a period of time, the programme expected 
to develop a critical mass for improvement, which would then support broader 
systems level change.  
Indeed, by September 2008 the donor agency decided to follow the model for 
improvement promoted by IHI, leading to the exit of LSTM and LATH from the 
Consortium. In operational terms, this meant the departure of the integrated 
improvement model which included death reviews and criterion based audits 
as intervention starting points and a greater emphasis on development of the 
change packages, improvement cycle.  
Some of the major changes to the design, as a result of this revised theory 
included a one improvement methodology i.e the use of the Model for 
Improvement(46) and data driven decision making for technical work as well 
as for programme management. There was also a change in the governance 
structure with a greater emphasis on strong in-country leadership through the 
appointment of a Programme Director for MaiKhanda. The programme 
Director main roles was to connect the technical leadership of advisors with 
the management and work of the local technical team and to lead MaiKhanda 
in advocacy with MoH and other stakeholders to ensure that the programme 
influenced and adapted to the dynamic policy environment.  
The composite set of interventions from IHI’s improvement methods had been 
well-tested in the United States, Europe, as well as in some resource 
constrained settings such as South Africa and Peru.  The key activities 
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included a customized collaborative approach for QI with emphasis on 
solidifying the local QI team, intensive on-site coaching by MaiKhanda 
officers, standardized process for coaching visits to enable use of 
improvement tools and focussed meetings. Local skill building was to be done 
through on-site clinical coaching for QI and in-situ training for clinical skills. 
The revised theory of change also emphasised on leadership development by 
enrolling “super improvers” identified from within the facilities, to a training 
course. There was to be a greater focus on engaging DHMT as well as 
leaders from all levels of the system and incorporating QI as a supervisory 
tool. The data improvement activity was to continue as before but with greater 
coordination between the implementation and evaluation team.  
5.4 Assumptions*
Some of the major assumptions associated with the intervention was that:  
• The Ministry of Health was eager to improve both the quality of data 
coming from health facilities and the use of data within those facilities to 
drive improvement. 
• Staff at the facilities would be eager, enthusiastic and motivated to 
implement the Model for Improvement in their facilities. 
• The subject matter knowledge and skills of providers in terms of maternal 
and newborn health were good.  
• Through a structured series of small interventions, designed by the local 
participants themselves, the healthcare system could be improved from 
the ground up, and local needs could be accommodated, mostly through 
more efficient use of existing resources rather than demanding for 
additional resources.  
• Staff attrition and resource availability were considered as challenges at 
proposal development stage. However, changes could be successfully 
implemented with minimal additional financial resources and technical 
assistance as long as there was strong local commitment, enthusiasm 
and leadership.  
• There also seemed to be an implicit assumption that the health systems 
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building blocksxvi within the Malawian health systems were functional and 
that model for improvement would essentially improve the interaction 
between the building blocks. 
• A lean management model, involving one QI officer to cover the 3 districts 
was proposed, assuming a rapid uptake of the intervention by the facility 
QI teams and subsequent organic spread of the model, given the level of 
engagement and communication with different layers of the health 
system.  
• There would be a buy-in and rapid uptake of the model for improvement, 
so fast that it would contaminate the control sites identified for evaluation 
purposes, making it difficult to measure impact of the intervention. 
5.5 Summary*
This Chapter provides a description of the original theory of change as well as 
a summary of the proposed programme implementation followed by a 
description of the revised Theory of Change in the later part of the project 
which formed the mainstay of MaiKhanda intervention from 2008 onwards i.e 
the period corresponding with the period when the RCT evaluation design was 
in place.  
The next Chapter synthesizes all the available evidence to provide a picture of 
the gradual evolution of MaiKhanda’s Theory of Change and the factors that 
influenced it. This will also consider the changes to theoretical and operational 
dimensions of programme implementation over the period of the study. The 
following Analysis Chapter will also look at how assumptions were influenced 
by the context and intervention complexity over a period of time and 
subsequently affected programme implementation.  
 
                                            
xvi Based on WHO definition of health systems building blocks: Service delivery, health workforce, Information, 
Medical products, Vaccines and Technology, Financing, Leadership and Governance.  
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Chapter*6 Evidence*Synthesis*
6.1 Collating*and*summarizing*the*evidence*
The evidence synthesis is preceded by Step-2 (§4.3.2) in the research 
strategy and includes the collation and summary of the individual evidence. 
This process of collating and summarizing the evidence consists of two main 
parts:  
The first part covers a descriptive summary of all the process evaluation 
studies that were conducted as part of MaiKhanda evaluation to understand 
the ‘black-box’ of the intervention. The second part is a summary of the 
information available through various project documents such as the original 
proposal, the monitoring reports, the field visit reports, the bi-annual progress 
reports, the programme management board meeting minutes as well as 
documents such as the ‘data deep dive’, which is essentially a reflective 
evaluation conducted jointly by the evaluation and implementing team to 
collate and review and reach a consensus on what actually happened with the 
intervention.   
6.1.1 Process*evaluation*studies*
 The evaluation approach for my PhD used the process evaluation data from 
the MaiKhanda study (§1.8) to outline the specific activities within the QI 
intervention, analyse their processes and mechanisms and also took into 
consideration the context within which the interventions were implemented. 
Table 10 provides an overview of the QI intervention components and their 
data sources used for the theory-based evaluation 
6.1.1.1 Process*
The process for the QI intervention consisted of collaborative learning session 
and action periods. There were also separate data improvement workshops 
and maternal death audits being conducted in the facilities. 
The dosage and implementation of the intervention was evaluated using the 
routine monitoring data from the intervention team. However, this data was 
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either incomplete or unavailable and subsequently data reported during the 
Data Deep Dive provided some additional information on the intervention 
process.  
Table 10: Secondary data sources from MaiKhanda process evaluation 
6.1.1.2 Mechanism*and*Context*
One aspect of the QI work was to motivate and encourage staff to work better 
in the face of the adversities they faced on a daily basis (lack of supplies, 
increased workload). In order to understand the attitude and outlook of health 
care providers, a survey of members of staff at all 78 health facilities 
(including facilities in the comparison areas) in the three districts and 15 in-
depth interviews were conducted between January and May 2008.  
A survey of all the non-randomized health facilities (CEMOCs) were also 
conducted at the beginning of the study to assess the QI activities being 
carried out in these facilities and to gauge the understanding and general 
impression regarding model for improvement among QI team members. 
It has long been recognized that skilled attendance at delivery can prevent 
maternal and neonatal deaths(212). The process evaluation included a 
 Quality Improvement 
Intervention 
Data source 
Process  Learning Collaboratives & 
action periods 
Project monitoring 
data 
Data improvement Monitoring data, 
Data workshop 
reports 
Project Implementation Quarterly Progress 
Reports 
Implementation of change 
packages 
Implementation 
Monitoring data 
Mechanism 
and Context 
Composition of QI teams Staff psychology 
survey 
CEmOC survey 
Provider Knowledge 
survey 
Resource availability Health Facility 
resources survey 
 Health facility 
surveillance 
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provider knowledge survey, designed to assess providers’ knowledge of best 
practice, as well as to explore providers’ perceptions of the care they provide, 
their confidence with key subject areas and the effect of training on their 
knowledge. The questionnaire was designed to identify the degree to which 
providers’ knowledge; confidence and training could explain observed case 
fatality rates(213).  
The quality of service provision at health facilities is dependent on the context 
within which the services are provided. One of the main contextual factors 
determining the quality of service provision, in the Malawian health care 
setting was the availability of human and material resources. The availability 
of material resources included the availability of physical infrastructure and 
the availability of drugs and supplies. The availability of essential drugs, 
supplies and BEmOC and CEmOC signal functions was assessed on a 
monthly basis using the Health Facility surveillance tool (33). The availability 
of human and other material resources such as the physical infrastructure 
was determined by the Health Facility Resources Survey (33).Measures such 
as the nurse to population ratio; provision of water, electricity and referral 
services, were looked at. 
6.1.2 MaiKhanda*programme*documentation*
The evaluation for the MaiKhanda interventions was conducted independently 
by the team from UCL. A reflective evaluation of the quality improvement 
interventions towards the end of the project was done to gather a collective 
knowledge of the impact of MaiKhanda’s interventions. This reflective 
evaluation included the implementing partners-IHI & WCF, the evaluation 
partner-UCL and the donor-The Health Foundation playing a mediatory role. 
The process was known as the ‘Data Deep Dive’ exercise and two such 
consultative meetings were held-the first such consultative meeting was 
conducted in July, 2010 and the subsequent meeting was held in October, 
2010. A summary of the key observations, reflections and findings from the 
meeting minutes and Data deep dive documents was collated and analysed to 
provide insight about the perception of the implementing partners as well as 
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contextual and other factors that are likely to have influenced the interventions 
on the ground.  
Other key documents included the original proposal document, the revised 
strategy document, the biannual progress report and minutes of the 
Programme Management Board meeting from 2007 until 2010, field visit 
notes from Technical Advisors.  
Table 11 provides a list of all the documents used in evidence synthesis. The 
column on the right of the table provides a numbering that has been used for 
referencing in this Chapter.  
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Table 11: List of source documents used in evidence synthesis 
List of documents used in the study Reference 
I. Original Proposal Document Oct, 2006 I 
2. Baseline Survey June, 2006 II 
3. Baseline Evaluation Aug, 2007 III 
4. Health Facility Resources Survey 2010 IV 
5. Provider Knowledge Survey 2009 V 
6. Staff Psychology Survey 2008 VI 
7. CEmOC Survey 2008 VII 
8. Women Friendly Care Survey 2010 VIII 
9. Data Deep Dive (Reflective Evaluation) Aug, 2010 IX 
10. PMB Minutes Sept, 2006 X 
11. PMB Minutes Feb, 2007 XI 
12. Evaluation Report June, 2007 XII 
13. PMB Minutes Oct, 2007 XIII 
14. Bi-annual Progress Report Dec, 2007 XIV 
15. PMB Minutes Feb, 2008 and Apr, 2008 XV 
16. UCL Evaluation Response XVI 
17. Bi-annual progress report (Including Strategy review 
document), June 2008 
XVII 
18. Handover notes to MaiKhanda Programme Director XVIII 
19. PMB Minutes Oct, 2008 XIX 
20. Director’s Report Feb, 2009 XX 
21. PMB Minutes Feb, 2009 XXI 
22. Quarterly Progress report May, 2009 XXII 
23 QPR July,2009 XXIII 
24 PMB Minutes Sept, 2009 XXIV 
25 Quarterly Progress report Oct, 2009 XXV 
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26 Quarterly Progress report Jan, 2010 XXVI 
27 Lloyd Provost Field Visit Feb, 2010 XXVII 
28 Quarterly Progress report Apr, 2010 XXVIII 
29 Quarterly Progress report July (Including St. Gabriel 
Case Study), 2010 
XXIX 
30 Strategic Review Meeting notes Sept, 2010 XXX 
31 PMB Minutes Mar, 2010 XXXI 
32 Partners Meeting Oct, 2010 XXXII 
 
6.2 Consolidating*and*Synthesizing*the*evidence*
All this data was collated and summarized into an excel spread sheet. The 
data thus generated from the various sub-studies as well as the various 
documentary information available throughout the course of the project, were 
organized according to the domains and constructs from the intervention 
framework (Figure 20). The five major domains covered include the 
intervention characteristics, health systems context; MaiKhanda’s own internal 
settings, the individual characteristics of the (human) agency involved in QI 
and finally programme implementation. By organizing the data in this manner, 
it provides a comprehensive picture of MaiKhanda QI programme action using 
a mix of qualitative and quantitative data. This is followed by a synthesis of all 
the available data within each of the constructs, identified within each domain, 
according to different phases of the intervention. There were four distinct 
phases to MaiKhanda intervention: the baseline, pre-intervention, early 
intervention and late intervention period. The reasons for splitting the 
intervention period into early and late phases have been described in detail in 
Chapter 1 (§1.6). The synthesis document is presented in Table 12 
The next section is a description of each of the synthesized constructs.  
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Table 12: Evidence Synthesis using Consolidated Fram
ework for Im
plem
entation Research (CFIR) 
 
Intervention Periods
Years
Quarters
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
A
Intervention characteristics
1
Conceptual clarity
It was decided that the programme would 
not fund procurement of drugs and 
medical supplies, but would support the 
QI activities already initiated to ensure 
systems for drug and supply inventory 
and ordering were developed at district 
and health facility level[11]. Essential 
support systems was one of the 4 
proposed change packages. This was 
because of MaiKhanda's position as a 
'facilitator' rather than 'implementer'. 
2
Intervention design
The integrated model of criterion based audits 
and rapid PDSA cycles Death Reviews and Data 
Improvement form the basic components of the 
QI implementation programme at the health 
facility level[1]. The programme would be 
delivered across health centres and CEmOC 
facilities in 3 districts over a period of 5 years in a 
phased manner.
Currently, the Programme has 37 
staff members but only 1 QI officer. 
The programme is in the process of 
recruiting new QI staff members 
(that was not in the orignial 
proposal): Data Coordinator , 
Assistant Programme Officer 
(Quality Improvement) and 3 
additional District Quality 
Improvement Officers[15]. 
3
Embeddedness
Leadership buddy system, developing local 
leadership, QI champions, exchange visits were 
activities planned in the original proposal for 
penetrating QI into the health system[1]. 
One of the CEmOC facilities reported 
encountering resistance for their QI 
activities from another organisation 
working in their facility.  They explain “that 
their newly developed labour graph met 
resistance in the sense that the Safe 
Motherhood Initiative authorities said we 
should hold using it”[12].
Strategy is to work closely  with  
both  health  centres and DHMT  so  
that  critical  needs  can  be  
incorporated and  budgeted for  in 
the  district  Implementation  
Plan[14].
Baseline period (June 2006-January, 2007)
Pre-intervention period (February, 2007-September 2008)
MaiKhanda improvement model integrating the Criterion-Based Audit (or standard-based 
audit) cycle and the Rapid Cycle process improvement (or PDSA).  The rapid cycle process 
improvement is based on IHI Model for Imrpovement which has its theoretical underpinnings 
in Deming's system of profound knowledge.[1] It was felt that an RCT design for evaluation 
would be contaminated by the rapid spread of the intervention to the control sites.
The baseline evalaution reported confusion among Malawian staff about the 
integrated model, particularly the links and overlap between criterion-based audit 
(CBA) part of the LSTM-led maternal death reviews, and Plan-Do-Study-Act 
(PDSA) part of the IHI-led QI initiatives[3,12]. There  were  uncertainties 
expressed with  regard  to  the effectiveness  of  the  combined  QI  Model. The 
senior technical team felt that the integrated model did not work in practice 
leading to confusion among MaiKhanda team members on the ground.This 
confusion extended to facility based teams as well. Email from THF Director: "In 
reality we have seen that the work in Malawi has been frustrated by the mixed 
approach"  [14]. 
W
hile the intervention(s) were designed within the framework of a RCT, the 9 referral CEmOC facilities was not meant to be part of the 
randomization (control) process. It was decided to implement the intervention across the 9 facilities as a health system strengthening exercise (for 
ethical and methodological reasons)[12] MoH recommendations led to a national pattern of implementation of the Maternal and Neonatal Death 
Review (Audit) programme. MaiKhanda programme would complement this MoH strategy by facilitating the local staff to conduct audits in a blame-
free and participatory manner. The information generated by the review was to be used to determine the focus of the criterion-based and rapid-cycle 
improvement activities. Although MDRs were taking place in four of the nine facilities prior to the work of MaiKhanda, the QI intervention helped to 
strengthen the existing MDR structure[12]. Newborn health was largely absent from early QI discussions.An increase in newborn deaths has been 
observed, probably through improved reporting. Newborn death audits were not routinely done in the facilitiesnor was it prioritized in the MaiKhanda 
interventions [12]. This model is used as a tool for improvement of quality of care in a ‘bottom-up’, participatory approach and is in line with MoH 
recommendations. It was realized that it might not be possible to define and develop QI interventions at the very beginning of the project given the 
wide variation in context in different intervention settings. An initial exploratory phase was therefore suggested in determining the factors that need to 
be focused on in a given context. Hence the pre-intervention period [12]
2006
2007
MaiKhanda's interventions aims to work alongside the Malawian Ministry of Health (MoH), in achieving 
their national ‘Road Map’ for reducing maternal and infant mortality. This includes - developing & 
implementing appropriate behaviour change interventions, conduct maternal death reviews and clinical 
audit & strengthen health facilities at all levels  with functional EmOC services [12]. The collaboratives 
and leaders appointed within the nine CEmOC facilities are expanding the intervention across the 
outreach health centres. Maternal death reviews in health facilities, in line with Ministry of Health needs 
have been used to identify problems and implement solutions[12]. 
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Intervention P
eriods
Years
Q
uarters
A
Intervention characteristics
1
C
onceptual clarity
2
Intervention design
3
E
m
beddedness
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
IH
I (C
E
O
) suggested the M
odel for 
Im
provem
ent as a unified, core technical 
fram
ew
ork for m
anaging change – The 
M
odel for Im
provem
ent w
as to provide the 
core fram
ew
ork for im
provem
ent activities 
undertaken by participating facilities and 
com
m
unities. G
eneral adherence to this 
approach w
as expected to lim
it confusion 
for program
 participants and staff as they 
seek to transform
 their outcom
es.[14,15]. 
This change in program
m
e concept w
as 
approved by the donor, TH
F. 
IH
I m
odel for Im
provem
ent endorsed in the 
revised strategy phase[20].
M
aiK
handa engaged in strategic M
oH
 
m
eetings such as S
M
TF (S
afe 
M
otherhood Task Force), Q
ATF(Q
uality 
A
ssurance Task Force), D
E
C
 (D
istrict 
E
xecutive C
om
m
ittee)[18]. 
Pre-intervention period (February, 2007-Septem
ber 2008)
2008
A revised plan for Q
uality Im
provem
ent w
as proposed w
hich consisted of the 
follow
ing com
ponents: S
trengthened technical support to M
aiK
handa M
alaw
i and Q
I 
Team
s. Q
uality Im
provem
ent (IH
I M
odel) in health facilities. C
linical S
kill B
uilding. 
D
ata Im
provem
ent. Leadership D
evelopm
ent [15]. The  opting  out  of  LS
TM
  left  a 
gap  in  the content  side of the  project  such  that  activities  related  to  criterion  
based  audits  and  m
aternal and death  review
s  w
ere  som
e how
  affected. To 
address  this  problem
,  clinical  advisors  w
ere  identified  and  they w
ere to  provide  
m
entoring  and  coaching  of  Q
uality  Im
provem
ent  team
s  on  various  issues[17]. 
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Intervention Periods
Years
Quarters
A
Intervention characteristics
1
Conceptual clarity
2
Intervention design
3
Em
beddedness
2008
Q4
Q1 
Q2
Q3
A revised plan was developed for the next 
phase of the project based on th erevised 
strategy. There was a directive from
 the 
M
aiKhanda Director suggesting QI to be 
adapted as the ovararching program
m
e 
strategy for all M
aiKhanda interventions. This 
m
eant referring “quality” im
provem
ent (QI) as 
“facilities” intervention (FI)[20]. 
Consortium
 partners  reaffirm
ed that the aim
 
of the program
 is to reduce m
aternal and 
neonatal m
ortality, using quality 
im
provem
ent in the facilities, wom
en’s 
groups in the com
m
unities, with synergy 
and coordination between them
.Donor 
(THF) clarified that M
aiKhanda is a 
decentralised program
, and that IHI is the 
lead partner with a role in QI technical 
execution and other partners also have 
roles in executions of their technical areas.  
[22]
The revised plan em
phasised leadership at 
district level and a decentralised 
approach[24].Salim
a district was proposed 
as an “Exem
plary District” (ED.) FI Team
 
believed that focusing their efforts on one 
district,  would lead to a higher level of 
success in the ED which could then be 
docum
ented and shared as proof of the 
M
aiKhanda m
odel’s success [21]. This was 
based on the "diffusion of innovation" 
theory.
Shift in program
m
e strategy to reflect  a QI 
approach throughout the program
 
(com
m
unity intervention, m
anagem
ent 
support services, m
onitoring and evaluation. 
In operational term
s it m
eant “getting wom
en 
to give birth at the facilities  and then 
ensuring that they receive a ‘skilled delivery’ 
once they get to the facility” as the prim
ary 
objective of the project [20]
There was a prospoal to put m
ore efforts 
into Salim
a district while m
aintaining the 
current level of support in Kasungu and 
Lilongwe[21]. 
RHU and DHOs involved in M
aiKhanda's 
strategic planning m
eeting. Capacity 
stregnthening of CM
ED (M
oH) on data 
collection, interpretation and 
dissem
ination[20]. 
Early intervention period (October 2008-Septem
ber 2009)
2009
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Intervention Periods
Years
Q
uarters
A
Intervention characteristics
1
Conceptual clarity
2
Intervention design
3
Em
beddedness
2009
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Difference about the 
prim
ary objective of the 
intervention. G
etting 
wom
en to give birth at the 
facilities  and then ensure 
“skilled delivery”.However 
the donor clarified that this  
was not the prim
ary 
objective[30]. 
Every project has a tim
eline 
– they need to start 
“alongside” and develop 
into “through.” There is a 
need to prove the 
intervention during 
“alongside” and then 
spread with “through.” It is 
not possible to im
plem
ent, 
spread/scale up, or be 
sustainable without working 
through the M
oH[32]. 
Because m
ost m
aternal deaths occur in 
CEm
O
C’s, the approach to random
ization 
of health centers m
ay not be able to detect 
the im
pact of Q
I. But as m
entioned above, 
we m
ay be able to work backwards from
 
the CEm
O
C data to look at deaths by 
referring health center[27]. 
Salim
a: 31/36 planned HC Q
I 
visits (86%
) achieved.  O
f the 
31 visits, 7 visits:teaching visits 
on Q
I m
ethodologies, 9: follow 
up m
eetings,16: coaching visits 
for Q
I team
s in the HCs.  
During the quarter, 17/12 visits 
were m
ade to Salim
a District 
Hospital. O
f the 17 visits, 3 
(18%
) were M
D audits, 6 (35%
) 
for data collectionand 8 (47%
) 
for coaching of the Q
I team
[29]
Q
I interventions focussed 
largely on the CEM
oC 
facilities and largely on 
m
others. (wheras based on 
evaluation, the em
phasis 
had to be on the health 
centres and equaly am
ong 
newborn and m
aternal)[9].
The project was originally 
designed to be scaled up to 
all areas of the three 
districts within five years. 
This scale-up phase was 
postponed because the 
partners felt the current 
interventions had not yet 
been successfully 
im
plem
ented[30]. 
Intensified intervention period (October 2009-Decem
ber 2010)
2010
M
any of the breakthroughs we had in “wom
en friendly care” and in standardizing data collection are now taken for granted by the 
facilities and new m
em
bers of M
aiKhanda team
[27].  The M
aiKhanda’s District Coordinators are posed to play a central role in 
working with the M
inistry of Health officials to help get the key changes developed and tested in our facility collaboratives m
ade a 
perm
anent part of the health care system
. This will include changes in policy, guidelines, form
s, job descriptions, and ongoing 
training of health care workers. They will have to play a bigger role in our Q
I efforts as we m
ove from
 testing to im
plem
entation[27].
M
ost changes are not being reliably im
plem
ented and 
have not been fully integrated into local, district, or 
national structures of the M
alawian health system
. This 
was partly due to the random
ization design , but will now 
require a deliberate design at all three levels[30]Som
e 
form
 of scale-up across the districts m
ay be the only 
way to ensure that the project m
eets its stated aim
 of 
decreasing m
aternal and neonatal m
ortality in the 
districts.   The  current patchwork of interventions m
ay 
not deliver the result that could be achieved from
 a m
ore 
integrated approach[30]. 
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Intervention Periods
Years
Quarters
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Baseline period (June 2006-January, 2007)
Pre-intervention period (February, 2007-September 2008)
2006
2007
B
Outer context
1
External policies and incentives
Road Map proposed by the MoH aims to develop 
and implement appropriate behaviour change 
intervention and advocacy strategies to address 
maternal and newborn health issues, to conduct 
maternal death reviews and clinical audit and 
strengthen health facilities at all levels to ensure 
adequate coverage with functional CEOC and 
BEOC facilities [12].
At the time of the baseline survey in 2006,  
national policy was that at  ANC  women 
were requested to bring with them during 
delivery, a clean plastic sheet to lie on, a 
clean razor blade to cut the cord, and two 
chitenjes, one to cover herself and the 
other to wrap the baby.W
omen who deliver 
in HFs adhered to this request[2].  This is 
however seems to have phased out by the 
start of the intervention period (although no 
official documentation is available on this)
The political environment in Malawi has 
been quite stable over the past year. W
ith 
the government bid to end corruption there 
is confidence in money being used optimally 
thereby providing greater confidence among 
donor agencies to invest in the health sector 
in Malawi. A good example is that of SW
Ap 
along with the EHRP (Emergency Human 
Resource Package) being implemented 
across the health sector with commitment 
from different stakeholders [12]
MaiKhanda  program  
implementation  was   affected  by  
competing  programs  of  their  
partners.  For  example ,  DHOs  in  
both  Kasungu  and  Lilongwe  are  
also  working  with  other  partners  
like  MSH  and  JHPIEGO  that  are  
involved in  Quality  improvement  
and   other health  related  MNH 
programs.  It  was  difficult  for  the  
partners  to  concentrate   fully  on 
MaiKhanda program   activities [14]
2
Health systems readiness
Malawi has almost double the recommended 
minimum number of Comprehensive EmOC 
facilities (1.8 facilities per 500,000 population) 
while only 2%
 of the recommended number of 
Basic EmOC facilities (0.1 facilities per 500,000 
population) There is no equity with respect to 
geographical distribution. The met need for 
EmOC is about 18.5 %
, which is far below the 
UN recommended level of 100%
. Only 2.8%
 of 
all expected deliveries are by caesarean section 
which is below the recommended minimum of 
5%
. Quality of EmOC services is generally poor 
as seen by a case fatality rate of 3.4%
 which is 
much higher than the UN recommended level of 
less than 1%
 [13]
928 people were working in the 29 Health 
Centres surveyed at baseline. Of these, 
only 126 (14%
) people are clinical staff and 
rest (86%
)  non clinical staff. Of the clinical 
staff, 37 (29%
) are COs/MAs and 89 (71%
) 
are Nursing Officers; and of the 802 non-
clinical Health Centre staff, 509 (63%
) are 
HSAs, 143 (18%
) are Patient Attendants 
and 150 (19%
) are other staff [4]. 
Maternal death reviews were conducted 
regularly in all 3 districts (Kasungu, 
Lilongwe & Salima). tandard Safe 
Motherhood (SM) treatment protocols for 
the major emergency obstetric 
complications were available in nearly all 
maternities in the three districts[2]. W
hile, 
there is an expectation from the MoH that 
Health Facilities will complete all their own 
MDRs, in reality the facilities are presented 
with many challenges.  For example, 
Kamuzu Central Hospital (KCH) 
experiences a large number of maternal 
deaths, and often there are not enough 
personnel available to complete each MDR 
[12]. 
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Intervention Periods
Years
Q
uarters
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Pre-intervention period (February, 2007-Septem
ber 2008)
2008
B
O
uter context
1
External policies and incentives
2
H
ealth system
s readiness
The  global rise  in  fuel  prices  has  
also  had  a negative  im
pact  on  
transport  for  project  activities.  Fuel  
prices  have gone  up  thereby  
im
pacting on the  current  budget [17]
O
ther M
N
H
 projects w
ere being 
im
plem
ented in the health facilities included: 
Antenatal C
are Im
provem
ent, M
other to 
M
other/ C
TC
, IM
C
I, C
BD
A supported by 
M
SH
, Advanced Life Support O
bstetric 
C
ourse (ALSO
), C
ESTA w
hich Provides 
refresher training to m
idw
ivesand 
allow
ances for locum
 shift m
idw
ives, hom
e-
based care by M
SH
, R
eproductive H
ealth 
sponsored by U
N
FPA, Infection prevention, 
PM
TC
T Program
m
e [7]
There is a lack of capacity w
ithin C
H
AM
 or 
G
ovt hospitals for facilitation [15]
There  w
ere  som
e  changes in  
leadership  on the  part  of  the  M
inistry  
of  H
ealth. This  did  not have a negative 
im
pact  on the project. The  new
  
m
inister  is  very  supportive of 
M
aiKhanda  project  including  the  
Principal  secretary [17]
LLW
 has a population that is nearly 6 tim
es 
the size of a norm
al district. The H
C
s have 
on average 1 0,000 additional population to 
deal w
ith thereby increasing w
orkload[6]. 
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Intervention Periods
Years
Q
uarters
2008
Q
4
Q
1 
Q
2
Q
3
Early intervention period (O
ctober 2008-Septem
ber 2009)
2009
B
Outer context
1
External policies and incentives
2
H
ealth system
s readiness
W
hile facility Q
I team
s and other health w
orkers 
are keen on im
proving the quality of care, in 
m
any facilities (e.g. in M
lare and Bw
aila) 
overcrow
ding in nursery and delivery areas and 
shortage of equipm
ent and supplies (e.g. lab 
reagents) are m
ajor constraints [19]
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Intervention Periods
Years
Q
uarters
2009
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Intensified intervention period (O
ctober 2009-Decem
ber 2010)
2010
B
O
uter context
1
External policies and incentives
2
Health system
s readiness
Health facility deliveries have risen rapidly 
across the whole program
m
e area from
 a 
low of 36%
 in the m
iddle of the 2007/8 rainy 
season to a high of 64%
 in August 2009 for 
all three districts com
bined. This increase 
m
ight be due to governm
ent policy to ban 
all TBA deliveries, im
provem
ents in the 
care offered at facilities, increased dem
and 
stim
ulated by M
aiKhanda W
om
en’s G
roups 
and possibly the effect of our village 
volunteers (com
m
unity surveillance) 
encouraging wom
en to deliver at a 
facility[31].
At national level, a num
ber 
of developm
ents have 
com
bined to slow down the 
advocacy and stakeholder 
engagem
ent efforts. , The  
appointm
ent of a new 
M
inister and Deputy 
M
inister of Health and the 
transfer of the Principal 
Secretary of Health  m
eant 
that we have to start 
rebuilding relationships at 
senior levels of the 
M
inistry[9]
April to June consistently 
has the lowest m
ortality. It’s 
speculated that this is a 
com
bination of a natural 
reduction in num
ber of 
births and the ease of 
getting to a facility in good 
tim
e due to relative ease in 
passing the roads in dry 
season[32].
Health centres in Salim
a appear on 
average to be m
ore wom
en-friendly than 
other districts. This resonates with other 
studies (HF reources survey) which indicate 
the existence of a relatively better health 
system
/service in Salim
a[8]. NND vs M
D: 
The focus on reducing NND and NNCFR is 
currently not as strong as  M
D because 
facilities have chosen to focus on M
D. This 
is because HC don’t have the equipm
ent 
that helps them
 with  NND – there are no 
am
bu-bags, etc., but even with bags,there 
is  still need  to create a system
 in place 
before hand [31]
Huge turnover of staff, so 
there isn’t a consistent 
cohort e.g. a new Q
I team
 
has only just been 
established at Bwaila[9]. 
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Intervention Periods
Years
Q
uarters
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Baseline period (June 2006-January, 2007)
Pre-intervention period (February, 2007-Septem
ber 2008)
2006
2007
B
O
uter context
3
R
esource availability
a
H
um
an R
esources
Facilities them
selves perceive there to be 
difficulties in m
otivating team
 m
em
bers and 
their colleagues to participate in Q
I w
ork.  
Every one of the nine C
Em
O
C
 facilities 
noted that a lack of m
aterial and hum
an 
resources caused problem
s w
ith Q
I 
im
plem
entation[12].
b
M
aterial  and resources
Screens for delivery w
ere available in 81%
 of the 
health facilities surveyed at baseline. 
C
om
panionship during labour w
as provided in 
only 30%
 of the surveyed facilities. Bedsheets to 
cover w
om
en during labour w
ere available in 
35%
 of the facilities. O
nly 40%
 of the expected 
deliveries w
ere being attended by a skilled birth 
attendant [2].  O
nly 31%
 of the facilites in the 
baseline survey had all the m
aterials functional[2]
Inadequate
m
aterials
and
supplies
for
obstetric
care
continue
to
affect
the
operations
of
m
any
health
centres
and
facilities.
H
ospitals
and
health
centres
continue
to
experience
som
e
problem
s
in
adequate
m
aterials
and
supplies.
O
ne
of
the
contributing
factors
is
inability
of
D
H
M
T
to
include
critical
needs
in
their
D
istrict  Im
plem
entation  Plans[14]. 
4
O
rganization culture/clim
ate
All the facilities, w
ith the exception of M
lale 
and Salim
a reported encountering problem
s 
w
ith their Q
I im
plem
entation. These 
problem
s ranged from
 poor infrastructure to 
lack of personnel. A com
m
on response w
as 
resistance to change by other staff 
m
em
bers, and a lack of m
orale and 
com
m
itm
ent of staff[12]. 
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Intervention P
eriods
Years
Q
uarters
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Pre-intervention period (February, 2007-Septem
ber 2008)
2008
B
O
uter context
3
R
esource availability
a
H
um
an R
esources
b
M
aterial  and resources
4
O
rganization culture/clim
ate
H
igh turn  over  of  staff  continues to affect  
the quality  and  progress  of  Q
I  activities  
in  m
ost  facilities  that  M
aiK
handa  is 
w
orking. M
ajority  of  the  health  w
orkers  
that  w
ere  trained  in  Q
I  have  either  left  
or  been transferred  thereby  creating  a  
gap[17]. 
A
t district  level,  there  w
as  a high  turn  
over  of  facility  staff. This affected  the  
im
plem
entation  of  m
ost  Q
I  activities. 
Tw
o  facilities w
ere  hardest  hit  by  staff  
turn  over. For  exam
ple  S
alim
a hospital  
and  Likuni  faced  a lot  of  challenges. 
A  num
ber of  staff  that  w
ere  trained  in  
Q
I  m
ethods  resigned  and  som
e  w
ent  
for further  studies  thereby  creating  a 
know
ledge gap [17]
H
F resources survey of 29 H
C
s show
ed only 14%
 of the staff are clinical w
ith a m
ajority of 
them
 nurses (71%
).Availability of nursing staff at night is low
 in S
alim
a (31%
) [4]. S
hortage of 
staff led to an increased w
orkload w
hich did not give the Q
I team
 m
em
bers enough tim
e to 
m
eet regularly and discuss Q
I activities. A
nother sim
ilar reason for the shortage of staff for Q
I 
activities w
as the high turnover am
ong the m
em
bers w
hich hindered progress in Q
I w
ork.
Lack  of  adequate  blood  supplies  also  
pose  a challenge  for  effective  
em
ergency  obstetric  care. K
asungu and  
S
alim
a  district  hospitals  continued  to 
face  som
e  problem
s  related  to  blood  
supplies. Lack of  drugs  and  supplies  
continue  to pose  a challenge  on  the  
quality  of  care  being  provided   to  
w
om
en[17]. 
14 (48%
) health centres have all the m
aterials available but only 9 (31%
) health centres have 
all the m
aterials functional. (52%
) of the health centres have both electricity and w
ater 
supply, 4 (14%
) have electricity only, 3 (10%
) have w
ater supply only w
hile 9 (31%
) of the 
health centres have nothing.These are m
ainly the rural health centres w
hich also have poor 
roads. H
ow
ever, m
ost of the health centres in S
alim
a are also rural, but m
ore than half of 
them
 have road access and all of them
 have access to w
ater supply and electricity[4]. 
O
f the facilities, Likuni M
ission hospital and 
S
t.G
abriel’s seem
ed to be the m
ost active 
in im
plem
enting the change packages 
using the im
provem
ent cycle.  B
oth are 
C
H
A
M
 facilities [7]
There are differences betw
een the 
districts on a variety of determ
inants. 
LLW
 is w
orse of on issues related to 
happiness, job interest and conflict w
ith 
patients (all of them
 are statistiaclly 
significant w
hen com
pared w
ith other 
districts).
 A
n environm
ent fostering innovation and autonom
y by staff to carry out im
provem
ent w
ork 
m
ay be lacking at tim
es, m
eaning that it m
ay be m
ore difficult for them
 to test out new
 ideas 
using the P
D
S
A cycle. In general, it appears that the m
orale of staff is good w
ith the m
ajority 
of respondents reporting that they are happy in their w
ork, that they get along w
ith their 
colleagues and can turn to them
 for w
ork advice / support, and that they don’t often have 
conflicts w
ith other staff and patients.w
hile they do report being appreciated by their 
supervisors, they are often not consulted on w
ork related issues. H
ow
ever, urban staff are 
w
orse off than their counterparts in rural H
C
 w
ith regards to w
ill and m
otivation, experiencing 
conflict w
ith other staff, accepting additional job responsibilities, having freedom
 to take 
decisions about their w
ork, encouraging subordinates at w
ork and being able to talk freely to 
their im
m
ediate supervisor[6]. 
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Intervention P
eriods
Years
Q
uarters
2008
Q
4
Q
1 
Q
2
Q
3
Early intervention period (O
ctober 2008-Septem
ber 2009)
2009
B
Outer context
3
R
esource availability
a
H
um
an R
esources
b
M
aterial  and resources
4
O
rganization culture/clim
ate
C
ritical shortage of neonatal clinicians and 
neonatal care skills in  facilities is reducing 
attention to new
born care, e.g. K
asungu has not 
had a pediatrician for 10 years[19]
C
onstant shifting and re-allocation of staff 
from
 m
aternity to other w
ards slow
s dow
n 
the pace of Q
I activities, P
osting of staff to 
other facilities has also continues to disrupt 
Q
I initiatives[25]. 
A
t health centres supplies of oxytocics and 
antibiotics have not im
proved since 2007: 
half are w
ithout these essential drugs at 
any one tim
e. M
ost of the 62 health 
centres provide only 1 or 2 of the 6 signal 
functions of basic obstetric care and som
e 
not providing any at all [31]. 
M
ost health centres not follow
ing up 
effectively on Q
I projects they have 
com
m
itted to undertake. Frequent transfers 
of health facility staff (Q
I team
 m
em
bers, data 
personnel, etc) leading to a w
eak 
organizational m
em
ory about the 
interventions. Frequent absences of health 
facility staff for various reasons, but 
especially for w
orkshops. P
articipants in data 
learning sessions keep changing, m
aking it 
difficult to m
aintain progress from
 session to 
session [19]
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Intervention P
eriods
Years
Q
uarters
2009
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Intensified intervention period (O
ctober 2009-D
ecem
ber 2010)
2010
B
O
uter context
3
R
esource availability
a
H
um
an R
esources
b
M
aterial  and resources
4
O
rganization culture/clim
ate
S
taff turnover is a huge problem
 – it takes 
about 9 m
onths for local sustenance of the 
intervention. A
lthough there’s only an 11%
 
rate of staff turn over, it’s usually the high 
functioning people that get m
oved [31]
There is a grow
ing dem
and 
for skilled delivery against 
lim
ited supply of quality 
services. W
ith m
ore 
w
om
en delivering at health 
facilities, the capacity of 
health facilities is severely 
tested [9]
O
nly 50%
 of the staff said that they w
ould 
recom
m
end a friend/relative to deliver at 
their facility[5]
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Intervention P
eriods
Years
Q
uarters
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
B
aseline period (June 2006-January, 2007)
Pre-intervention period (February, 2007-Septem
ber 2008)
2006
2007
C
Inner C
ontext
1
G
overnance and oversight
There w
as discussion in particular of the need for 
the w
orkplan to reflect the attem
pt to create a 
single, shared m
odel of Q
I and all activities to be 
ow
ned and genuinely led by the team
 on the 
ground, not by overseas organisations. It w
as 
agreed that a far greater degree of clarity is 
needed about visits to M
alaw
i by overseas 
individuals, particularly TA roles. A
ll visits – their 
tim
ing,purpose and agenda need to be driven by 
local needs, rather than by w
hat suits the diaries 
or interests of TA providers[10].
M
alaw
i team
 to m
anage at operational 
level and the experience the team
 brings 
to program
m
e developm
ent and 
identifying budget im
plications, to be 
recognized. A better balance to be 
sought for program
m
e planning and 
budgeting betw
een operational and 
strategic level and good com
m
unication 
betw
een the tw
o levels needed[11].
It has been observed that there are 
m
isunderstandings concerning the 
integrated m
odel, and w
ith regards to w
hich 
partner should take the lead in Q
I.  This has 
resulted in the perceptions that there is no 
ow
nership of the m
odel. This has led to 
confusion in the facilities, reflected in the 
confusion regarding M
aiK
handa identity. 
Identiity: There are discrepancies in how
 the 
partners of M
aiK
handa identify them
selves, 
for exam
ple som
e staff m
em
bers introduce 
them
selves as M
aiK
handa, w
hereas others 
affiliate them
selves w
ith their parent 
organization.  This inconsistency in the 
identification of M
aiK
handa as one team
 
results in confusion at the facility level[12].
A full-tim
e P
rogram
m
e D
irector 
(P
D
) w
ithin M
alaw
i, w
ho w
ill hold a 
single program
m
e budget and w
ill 
deploy it in line w
ith a single 
integrated w
orkplan w
as agreed .  
IH
I w
as the principle technical 
advisor for a single coherent m
odel 
and approach for the program
m
e 
as a w
hole w
hich integrates the 
range of m
ethods offered by the 
partners w
ithin the consortium
[13].  
LS
TM
  w
ithdrew
  from
  the  
C
onsortium
 and  all  M
N
H
  
activities  w
ill  be  taken  up  by  IH
I  
and other  partners [14]. 
2
D
onor role/partner relationship
The team
 on the ground is not being given 
adequate breathing space to develop their 
full potential given the differences of opinion 
am
ong the senior m
em
bers of the 
consortium
  on the w
ay the program
m
e 
needs to be im
plem
ented. This has caused 
a lot of grief and frustration am
ong the 
forbearers of the program
m
e on the ground 
affecting staff m
orality and level of 
functioning[12]. D
iscussions  w
ere  held  
w
ith  partners  to  see  if  there  w
ould  be  
better  w
ays of    im
plem
enting  the  
integrated m
odel.  H
ow
ever  this  did  not  
w
ork  and  resulted  in  the  exit  of  LS
TM
 
and LATH
[14]
Visits by overseas clinicians w
ere 
poorly coordinated, despite best 
efforts in M
alaw
i; and w
ere not 
delivering the best benefit. It w
as 
becom
ing clear that the lack of 
integration w
as leading to w
aste 
and duplication of effort on the 
ground, that it w
as underm
ining the 
P
rogram
m
e M
anager role and w
as 
dem
oralising for staff. A
ll partners 
to re-affirm
ed that they w
ould not 
be w
orking directly through their 
respective program
m
e officers i.e 
shift from
 “decider” to “advisor” for 
partners [13]. 
3
N
etw
ork and com
m
unication
O
n-going com
m
unication betw
een all 
partners still needs to be im
proved 
particularly in relation to the developm
ent 
of w
orkshops and betw
een facilitators 
and im
plem
entation team
 w
hen the 
w
orkshops are in progress, especially 
w
hen changes are m
ade to the 
program
m
e.M
ore prom
pt com
m
unication 
w
as requested from
 LATH
 regarding 
response from
 partners on financial 
m
atters[11]. 
C
om
m
unciation
rem
ained
a
m
ajor
problem
w
ithin
the
consortium
.The
partners
continued
to
com
m
unicate
directly
w
ith
their
responsible
P
rogram
O
fficers
w
ithout
involving
the
P
rogram
M
anager.
H
ow
ever
this
problem
has
been
addressed
by
the
proposal
to
recruit
the
P
rogram
D
irector.It
is
envisaged
that
once
the
P
rogram
D
irector
is
in
place,
all
program
officers
w
ill
be
com
m
unicating
through
the
P
rogram
  D
irector[14]
4
C
apacity w
ithin M
aiK
handa
The language of partnership is lacking betw
een the different partner organizations and therefore, w
hile 
M
aiK
handa has a very strong and com
m
itted staff w
orking on the ground, the com
m
itm
ent of these 
staff m
em
bers to their parent organizations affects their functioning as a coherent team
. The 
im
plications of such a disintegrated approach are m
ore subtle. It is not reflected in the day to day 
activities perform
ed interchangeably betw
een the staff m
em
bers rather, the im
plications are m
ore 
intrinsic. The various team
 m
em
bers during their interaction w
ith the evaluation team
, have expressed 
increasing am
ount of frustration in perform
ing their duties as a ‘team
’[12]. C
larity regarding the on-
going involvem
ent of TA
s is needed and should also be aim
ed at developing the capacity of the 
M
alaw
i team
 to lead and develop the program
m
e in M
alaw
i[11]. M
aiK
handa team
 should be asked to 
w
ork on this (integrated m
odel) first and the im
portance of their local experience m
ust be given due 
w
eight relative to the theoretical positions of the consortium
 organisations[12] The donor role as 
'partner' as opposed to donor adds to the com
plexity of the consortium
. There is a lack of clarity 
am
ong the consortium
 m
em
bers as to w
hat the donor’s role as partner is or m
ight be in the future. In 
addition their perceived close affiliation to one of the consortium
 partners is likely to have had an 
indirect influence on levels of confusion or frustration am
ong staff on the ground[12] .
It has been observed that partners are deviating from
 w
hat 
w
as w
ritten in the proposal. In addition, as one M
aiK
handa 
staff m
em
ber explains “There have not been any 
consultations or even com
m
unications w
ith the other 
partners” about these deviations.  There have been a 
num
ber issues being raised w
ith regard to com
m
unication 
w
ithin M
aiK
handa, for exam
ple appropriate staff m
em
bers 
are not receiving the correct inform
ation[12].
M
aiK
handa  does  not  have  officers  responsible  for  M
N
H
  and Q
I  activities  at  
district  level.  W
ith  the  rolling  out  of  Q
I/M
N
H
  activities  in to  health  centres,  
it  w
as  extrem
ely  difficult  for  the available  officers  to  conduct  m
entoring  and  
coaching  visits  to  all  facilities  and  follow
  up  on the  team
s projects.  There  
is  need  to  consider having  district  based Q
I/M
N
H
 officers  w
ho  could  provide  
ongoing  support   to Q
I  team
s  at  district  level. Training activities for M
K
 staff: 
Life saving skills for M
N
H
 officers, Im
porvem
ent advisory training for Q
I program
, 
Training in financial &
 accounting system
. S
uper im
porvers trained in Jul'07 &
 
Im
provem
ent A
dvisory B
oard established [14]. 
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C
In
n
e
r C
o
n
te
x
t
1
G
o
v
e
rn
a
n
c
e
 a
n
d
 o
v
e
rs
ig
h
t
2
D
o
n
o
r ro
le
/p
a
rtn
e
r re
la
tio
n
s
h
ip
3
N
e
tw
o
rk
 a
n
d
 c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
tio
n
4
C
a
p
a
c
ity
 w
ith
in
 M
a
iK
h
a
n
d
a
A
  u
n
ifie
d
  w
o
rk
p
la
n
  a
n
d
  b
u
d
g
e
t m
a
n
a
g
e
d
  
lo
c
a
lly
  b
y
  th
e
  P
ro
g
ra
m
  D
ire
c
to
r a
g
re
e
d
. 
T
h
is
 w
a
s
 to
 s
tre
n
g
th
e
n
  lo
c
a
l o
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
 
a
n
d
 p
ro
p
e
r b
u
d
g
e
t tra
c
k
in
g
 a
n
d
 
m
o
n
ito
rin
g
.C
h
a
n
g
e
s
  in
  p
ro
g
ra
m
m
e
  
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t  a
n
d
  th
e
 p
u
llin
g
 o
u
t  o
f  
L
A
T
H
  c
re
a
te
d
  a
 g
a
p
 in
 lo
g
is
tic
s
  a
n
d
  
a
d
m
in
is
tra
to
rs
  ro
le
  th
a
t  w
a
s
 q
u
ite
  
c
h
a
lle
n
g
in
g
[1
7
]. 
T
h
e
re
 a
re
 re
g
u
la
r M
o
n
d
a
y
 m
o
rn
in
g
 m
e
e
tin
g
s
 
in
 e
a
c
h
 o
f th
e
 4
 o
ffic
e
s
 fo
r a
ll th
e
 s
ta
ff in
 th
e
 
o
ffic
e
. In
 a
d
d
itio
n
, th
e
re
 a
re
 m
o
n
th
ly
 (o
n
 
a
v
e
ra
g
e
) m
e
e
tin
g
s
 in
v
o
lv
in
g
 p
ro
g
ra
m
 a
n
d
 
a
d
m
in
 s
ta
ff o
f th
e
 C
e
n
tra
l O
ffic
e
s
 p
lu
s
 th
e
 
D
C
s
 re
p
re
s
e
n
tin
g
 th
e
 D
is
tric
t O
ffic
e
s
.   
H
o
w
e
v
e
r, th
e
re
 a
re
 n
o
 re
g
u
la
r m
e
e
tin
g
s
 o
f 
w
h
a
t m
ig
h
t b
e
 c
a
lle
d
 th
e
 m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
te
a
m
.[1
9
]. 
T
H
F
 c
o
n
fo
rm
s
 to
 a
d
o
p
tin
g
 th
e
 IH
I 
a
p
p
ro
a
c
h
 a
s
 th
e
 o
v
e
ra
rc
h
in
g
 
fra
m
e
w
o
rk
[1
3
]. IH
I e
n
d
o
rs
e
s
 a
 s
in
g
le
 
d
e
s
ig
n
 fo
r im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t a
c
tiv
itie
s
 w
ill b
e
 
m
o
re
 a
p
p
ro
p
ria
te
 a
n
d
 m
o
re
 e
ffe
c
tiv
e
 in
 
p
u
rs
u
in
g
 th
e
 p
ro
g
ra
m
’s
 p
rim
a
ry
 a
im
, s
in
c
e
 
th
e
 p
re
v
o
iu
s
 in
te
g
ra
te
d
 m
o
d
e
l fa
ile
d
 to
 
w
o
rk
 a
s
 e
ffe
c
tiv
e
ly
 a
s
 n
e
e
d
e
d
 in
 a
 
c
o
o
rd
in
a
te
d
 m
a
n
n
e
r, th
re
a
te
n
in
g
 
s
u
s
ta
in
a
b
le
 p
ro
g
re
s
s
 a
n
d
 in
c
re
a
s
in
g
 th
e
 
b
u
rd
e
n
 o
n
 lo
c
a
l p
ro
g
ra
m
 s
ta
ff a
n
d
 
p
a
rtic
ip
a
n
ts
[1
3
]T
h
e
 ‘s
ile
n
t p
a
rtn
e
r’  
C
in
c
in
n
a
ti C
h
ild
re
n
’s
 H
o
s
p
ita
l a
n
d
 M
e
d
ic
a
l 
C
e
n
te
r (C
C
H
M
C
), w
a
s
 to
 b
e
 re
c
o
g
n
is
e
d
 a
s
 
a
 tru
e
 p
a
rtn
e
r in
 th
e
 p
ro
je
c
t in
 th
e
 re
v
is
e
d
 
p
ro
g
ra
m
m
e
 s
tra
te
g
y
. .  A
d
d
itio
n
a
lly
, a
 n
e
w
 
n
a
m
e
 fo
r th
e
 p
ro
g
ra
m
m
e
 is
 n
e
e
d
e
d
[1
5
].
W
C
F
 e
x
p
re
s
s
e
d
 c
o
n
c
e
rn
 th
a
t th
e
y
 w
e
re
 
n
o
t fu
lly
 in
fo
rm
e
d
 o
n
 w
h
a
t w
a
s
 g
o
in
g
 o
n
 in
 
th
e
 P
ro
g
ra
m
m
e
 –
 i.e
. th
e
y
 h
a
v
e
 n
o
t b
e
e
n
 
in
v
o
lv
e
d
 in
 th
e
 fa
c
ility
 a
n
d
 c
o
m
m
u
n
ity
 
lin
k
a
g
e
.    S
e
c
o
n
d
ly
, th
e
y
 h
a
d
 n
o
t b
e
e
n
 
in
fo
rm
e
d
 a
b
o
u
t w
h
a
t a
c
tiv
itie
s
 th
e
 
T
e
c
h
n
ic
a
l L
e
a
d
 h
a
d
 b
e
e
n
 d
o
in
g
[1
5
].
P
a
rtn
e
rs
 w
e
 w
o
rk
 w
ith
 in
 th
e
 d
is
tric
ts
 d
o
 n
o
t 
a
lw
a
y
s
 s
e
e
 u
s
 a
s
 o
n
e
 p
ro
je
c
t b
e
c
a
u
s
e
 
M
a
iK
h
a
n
d
a
 s
ta
ff fro
m
 th
e
 d
is
tric
ts
 a
re
 n
o
t 
in
v
o
lv
e
d
 in
 Q
I a
c
tiv
itie
s
. O
u
r frie
n
d
s
 fro
m
 th
e
 
c
e
n
tra
l o
ffic
e
 ju
s
t c
o
m
e
 in
to
 th
e
 d
is
tric
t a
n
d
 
w
e
 s
o
m
e
tim
e
s
 ju
s
t h
e
a
r o
f e
v
e
n
ts
 h
a
p
p
e
n
in
g
 
v
ia
 th
e
 p
a
rtn
e
rs
.M
a
iK
h
a
n
d
a
 c
e
n
tra
l o
ffic
e
 
n
e
e
d
s
 to
 fu
lly
 e
n
g
a
g
e
 d
is
tric
t s
ta
ff in
 Q
I s
o
 
th
a
t th
e
y
 k
n
o
w
 w
h
a
t is
 h
a
p
p
e
n
in
g
[1
9
].
M
a
iK
h
a
n
d
a
 p
u
ts
 g
re
a
t e
m
p
h
a
s
is
 o
n
 s
ta
ff 
d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t a
n
d
 in
 th
e
 b
u
d
g
e
t, th
e
re
 is
 
K
1
, 0
0
0
,0
0
0
 s
e
t a
s
id
e
 fo
r s
ta
ff 
d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t. In
 a
d
d
itio
n
, s
e
n
io
r s
ta
ff a
re
 
o
n
 th
e
 IA
 (Im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t A
d
v
is
o
r) c
o
u
rs
e
 
s
u
p
p
o
rte
d
 b
y
 IH
I. A
 d
ra
ft tra
in
in
g
 p
la
n
 
w
ith
 a
re
a
s
 o
f n
e
e
d
 w
a
s
 d
e
v
e
lo
p
e
d
. 
R
e
c
ru
itm
e
n
t o
f 3
 a
d
d
itio
n
a
l D
is
tric
t 
Q
u
a
lity
 Im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t O
ffic
e
rs
 p
ro
p
o
s
e
d
 
a
n
d
 a
p
p
ro
v
e
d
[1
8
]. 
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In
te
rve
n
tio
n
 P
e
rio
d
s
Y
e
a
rs
Q
u
a
rte
rs
2008
Q
4
Q
1 
Q
2
Q
3
E
arly in
terven
tio
n
 p
erio
d
 (O
cto
b
er 2008-S
ep
tem
b
er 2009)
2009
C
In
n
er C
o
n
text
1
G
o
ve
rn
a
n
ce
 a
n
d
 o
ve
rsig
h
t
2
D
o
n
o
r ro
le
/p
a
rtn
e
r re
la
tio
n
sh
ip
3
N
e
tw
o
rk a
n
d
 co
m
m
u
n
ica
tio
n
4
C
a
p
a
city w
ith
in
 M
a
iK
h
a
n
d
a
T
h
e
 a
b
se
n
ce
 o
f q
u
a
lity im
p
ro
ve
m
e
n
t sta
ff in
 th
e
 
d
istricts a
n
d
 th
e
 g
e
n
e
ra
lly w
e
a
k 
co
m
m
u
n
ica
tio
n
s b
e
tw
e
e
n
 d
istrict sta
ff a
n
d
 th
e
 
ce
n
tra
l o
ffice
 q
u
a
lity im
p
ro
ve
m
e
n
t te
a
m
,h
a
s 
b
e
e
n
 a
 co
n
stra
in
t o
t M
a
iK
h
a
n
d
a
 d
istrict-fo
cu
se
d
 
a
p
p
ro
a
ch
. In
 th
e
 e
ye
s o
f m
a
n
y o
f d
istrict le
ve
l 
sta
ke
h
o
ld
e
rs it h
a
s lo
o
ke
d
 a
s th
o
u
g
h
 th
e
re
 a
re
 
tw
o
 se
p
a
ra
te
 o
rg
a
n
iza
tio
n
s in
 o
p
e
ra
tio
n
 -- a
 
co
m
m
u
n
ity-b
a
se
d
 o
n
e
 a
n
d
 a
 fa
cility-b
a
se
d
 
o
n
e
[1
9
]
L
A
T
H
 T
ru
st/T
h
e
 H
e
a
lth
 F
o
u
n
d
a
tio
n
 
C
o
n
so
rtiu
m
 o
fficia
lly b
e
co
m
e
s M
a
iK
h
a
n
d
a
 
[2
0
]T
h
e
 M
a
iK
h
a
n
d
a
 S
e
n
io
r M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
Te
a
m
 (S
M
T
) w
a
s fo
rm
e
d
.C
re
a
tio
n
 o
f D
istrict 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t Te
a
m
 [2
1
]. D
istrict C
o
o
rd
in
a
to
rs 
to
 ta
ke
 u
p
 ro
le
 a
s D
istrict M
a
n
a
g
e
rs a
n
d
 b
e
 
re
sp
o
n
sib
le
 fo
r a
ll a
ctivitie
s w
ith
in
 th
e
ir d
istrict 
[1
9
]. M
a
iK
h
a
n
d
a
 h
e
ld
 a
 h
ig
h
ly su
cce
ssfu
l 
S
tra
te
g
ic P
la
n
n
in
g
 W
o
rksh
o
p
 in
 Ja
n
u
a
ry to
 
d
e
ve
lo
p
 a
 3
-ye
a
r S
tra
te
g
ic P
la
n
 (2
0
0
9
-2
0
1
2
) 
a
n
d
 a
n
 A
n
n
u
a
l W
o
rkp
la
n
 a
n
d
 B
u
d
g
e
t[2
0
]. 
D
e
ce
n
tra
liza
tio
n
 –
 th
e
re
 is g
ro
w
in
g
 u
n
ity o
f 
a
m
o
n
g
 fu
n
ctio
n
a
l te
a
m
s a
cro
ss d
istricts 
a
n
d
 g
ro
w
in
g
 u
n
ity a
cro
ss u
n
its w
ith
in
 
d
istricts. T
h
e
 in
cre
a
se
d
 ca
p
a
city o
f th
e
 F
I 
te
a
m
 w
ith
 d
istrict p
re
se
n
ce
 a
n
d
 g
ro
w
in
g
 Q
I 
kn
o
w
le
d
g
e
 a
n
d
 skills. G
ro
w
in
g
 o
p
e
ra
tio
n
a
l 
sta
b
ility is in
cre
a
sin
g
ly a
llo
w
in
g
 th
e
 te
a
m
 
m
o
re
 tim
e
 a
n
d
 sp
a
ce
 to
 fo
cu
s o
n
 a
d
vo
ca
cy 
a
n
d
 sta
ke
h
o
ld
e
r e
n
g
a
g
e
m
e
n
t[2
5
]. 
S
tru
ctu
re
 w
ith
in
 M
a
iK
h
a
n
d
a
 h
a
s b
e
e
n
 co
n
fu
se
d
 
b
y p
o
w
e
r re
la
tio
n
sh
ip
s.T
h
e
re
 h
a
ve
 b
e
e
n
 
o
cca
sio
n
s w
h
e
n
 p
a
rtn
e
r re
p
re
se
n
ta
tive
s h
a
ve
 
a
rrive
d
 in
 M
a
la
w
i a
n
d
 h
a
ve
 a
cte
d
 in
 so
m
e
 w
a
ys 
a
s lin
e
 m
a
n
a
g
e
rs o
f M
a
la
w
ia
n
 sta
ff, sa
yin
g
 
th
in
g
s su
ch
 a
s “Y
o
u
 m
u
st d
o
 th
is a
ctivity”[1
9
]. 
Th
e$d
esign
$o
f$th
e$R
C
T$is$a$co
n
strain
t$o
n
$
th
e$sp
read
$o
f$th
e$p
ro
ject[30].
T
h
is h
a
s b
e
e
n
 a
 ch
a
lle
n
g
e
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 u
s d
istricts 
a
n
d
 w
ith
 ce
n
tra
l o
ffice
. M
a
n
y p
ro
b
le
m
s h
a
ve
 
a
rise
n
 d
u
e
 to
 la
ck o
f co
m
m
u
n
ica
tio
n
, fo
r 
e
xa
m
p
le
, o
n
 a
llo
w
a
n
ce
s –
 e
a
ch
 d
istrict h
a
s 
ch
o
se
n
 its o
w
n
 le
ve
ls o
f a
llo
w
a
n
ce
s a
n
d
 th
is is 
co
n
fu
sin
g
 o
u
r p
a
rtn
e
rs w
h
o
 th
in
k w
e
 a
re
 
d
iffe
re
n
t o
rg
a
n
iza
tio
n
s. C
o
m
m
u
n
ica
tio
n
 fro
m
 
ce
n
tra
l o
ffice
 h
a
s a
lso
 b
e
e
n
 a
 p
ro
b
le
m
 –
 "m
a
n
y 
tim
e
s yo
u
 ju
st g
e
t a
 ca
ll o
r a
n
 e
m
a
il sa
yin
g
 
th
in
g
s h
a
ve
 n
o
w
 ch
a
n
g
e
d
 a
n
d
 yo
u
 a
re
 to
 d
o
 th
is 
o
r d
o
 th
a
t w
ith
o
u
t a
n
y w
ritte
n
 fo
rm
a
l 
co
m
m
u
n
ica
tio
n
 sta
tin
g
 th
e
 p
o
licy; w
ritte
n
 
co
m
m
u
n
ica
tio
n
 is im
p
o
rta
n
t"[1
9
].
S
ch
e
d
u
lin
g
 a
n
d
 m
a
in
ta
in
in
g
 a
p
p
o
in
tm
e
n
ts 
fo
r fo
llo
w
 u
p
 a
t H
C
s is o
fte
n
 d
ifficu
lt- th
is is 
la
rg
e
ly d
u
e
 to
 lim
ite
d
 sta
ff o
n
-site
. • 
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt: tra
n
sp
o
rt co
n
tin
u
e
d
 to
 b
e
 a
 
ch
a
lle
n
g
e
 d
u
e
 to
 th
e
 a
g
e
 o
f m
o
st o
f th
e
 
m
o
to
rb
ike
s a
n
d
 th
e
 lim
ite
d
 n
u
m
b
e
r (a
n
d
 
p
o
o
r co
n
d
itio
n
 o
f o
n
e
) o
f th
e
 fo
u
r-w
h
e
e
l 
d
rive
 ve
h
icle
s[2
5
]. 
“C
o
m
m
u
n
ica
tin
g
 w
h
a
t w
e
 a
re
 le
a
rn
in
g
": a
 
S
kills B
u
ild
in
g
 W
o
rksh
o
p
 fo
r M
a
iK
h
a
n
d
a
 
S
ta
ff [2
0
]. S
ig
n
ifica
n
t fo
cu
s o
n
 p
ro
fe
ssio
n
a
l 
d
e
ve
lo
p
m
e
n
t fo
r b
o
th
 e
xistin
g
 te
a
m
 
m
e
m
b
e
rs a
n
d
 th
e
 n
e
w
 re
cru
its. O
rie
n
ta
tio
n
 
o
f n
e
w
 F
I m
e
m
b
e
rs  a
n
d
 o
n
g
o
in
g
 o
n
-th
e
-jo
b
 
co
a
ch
in
g
 a
n
d
 m
e
n
to
rin
g
 o
f th
e
 e
n
tire
 te
a
m
 
b
y IH
I fa
cu
lty[2
3
]. 
Q
I tra
in
in
g
 is d
o
n
e
 in
 F
I Te
a
m
 M
o
n
d
a
y 
m
e
e
tin
g
s[2
4
]. R
e
cru
itm
e
n
t o
f d
istrict-b
a
se
d
 
F
I o
ffice
rs h
a
s sta
b
ilize
d
 a
n
d
 im
p
ro
ve
d
 
fo
cu
s o
n
 Q
I a
ctivitie
s w
ith
 m
o
re
 fre
q
u
e
n
t 
co
a
ch
in
g
 visits to
 Q
I te
a
m
s, w
h
ich
 is 
critica
l in
 in
flu
e
n
cin
g
 Q
I a
p
p
lica
tio
n
 o
n
 th
e
 
g
ro
u
n
d
 [2
5
]
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In
te
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e
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a
rte
rs
2
0
0
9
Q
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Q
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Q
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Q
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te
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 p
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rio
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c
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b
e
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0
0
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-D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r 2
0
1
0
)
2
0
1
0
C
In
n
e
r C
o
n
te
x
t
1
G
o
ve
rn
a
n
ce
 a
n
d
 o
ve
rsig
h
t
2
D
o
n
o
r ro
le
/p
a
rtn
e
r re
la
tio
n
sh
ip
3
N
e
tw
o
rk a
n
d
 co
m
m
u
n
ica
tio
n
4
C
a
p
a
city w
ith
in
 M
a
iK
h
a
n
d
a
C
o
n
ce
rn
 is ra
ise
d
 o
ve
r w
h
o
 
u
ltim
a
te
ly m
a
ke
s d
e
cisio
n
s. 
A
g
n
e
s su
g
g
e
sts th
a
t th
e
 
S
a
lim
a
 P
ro
p
o
sa
l a
n
d
 th
e
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ica
tio
n
s S
tra
te
g
y 
d
ie
 b
e
ca
u
se
 th
e
 d
e
cisio
n
s 
a
re
 u
ltim
a
te
ly m
a
d
e
 “o
ve
r 
th
e
re
” [3
2
]. 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ica
tio
n
s w
o
rksh
o
p
 
h
e
ld
 in
 Ju
n
e
 2
0
1
0
 to
g
e
th
e
r 
w
ith
 a
 le
a
rn
in
g
 e
ve
n
t. T
h
is 
g
e
n
e
ra
te
d
 a
 lo
t o
f e
n
e
rg
y 
a
n
d
 e
n
th
u
sia
sm
 a
m
o
n
g
 th
e
 
d
iffe
re
n
t te
a
m
s (d
istrict a
n
d
 
ce
n
tra
l). T
h
e
 d
istrict te
a
m
s 
w
o
rke
d
 to
g
e
th
e
r to
 p
re
p
a
re
 
th
e
ir d
istrict q
u
a
rte
rly 
re
p
o
rts[W
4
3
]. 
T
h
e
 M
a
iK
h
a
n
d
a
 p
ro
g
ra
m
 sta
ffe
d
 to
 p
ro
vid
e
 
re
a
so
n
a
b
le
 Q
I su
p
p
o
rt to
 th
e
 fa
cility 
im
p
ro
ve
m
e
n
t te
a
m
s. C
E
m
O
C
’s m
u
ltip
le
 
visits p
la
n
n
e
d
,  a
d
d
itio
n
a
l a
cce
le
ra
te
d
 
su
p
p
o
rt to
 B
w
a
ilia
 w
ith
 m
u
ltip
le
 visits e
a
ch
 
w
e
e
k to
 th
e
ir Q
I te
a
m
s. M
K
 sta
ff co
m
p
le
tio
n
 
o
f th
e
 Im
p
ro
ve
m
e
n
t A
d
viso
r D
e
ve
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
p
ro
g
ra
m
 p
re
p
a
re
s th
e
m
 to
 a
ssist S
e
n
io
r 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t in
 Q
I.  T
h
e
 d
a
ta
 ca
p
a
b
ilitie
s o
f 
th
e
 F
I te
a
m
 a
re
 stro
n
g
. E
ffo
rts to
 p
ro
vid
e
 
th
e
 d
a
ta
 a
n
a
lysis to
 g
u
id
e
 F
I o
ffice
rs[2
7
]. 
C
u
sto
m
-d
e
sig
n
e
d
 w
e
e
k-lo
n
g
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t a
n
d
 le
a
d
e
rsh
ip
 
d
e
ve
lo
p
m
e
n
t w
o
rksh
o
p
 
a
tte
n
d
e
d
 b
y 1
6
 m
e
m
b
e
rs o
f th
e
 
d
istrict a
n
d
 se
n
io
r m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
te
a
m
s in
 Ju
n
e
 [9
]. 
T
h
e
re
 h
a
ve
 b
e
e
n
 ch
a
n
g
e
s 
in
 th
e
 F
I te
a
m
 m
e
m
b
e
rs 
th
a
t h
a
ve
 e
ffe
cte
d
 o
u
r 
co
n
tin
u
ity in
 su
p
p
o
rtin
g
 
fro
n
t-lin
e
 Q
I te
a
m
s [9
]. 
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Intervention P
eriods
Years
Q
uarters
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
B
aseline period (June 2006-January, 2007)
Pre-intervention period (February, 2007-Septem
ber 2008)
2006
2007
D
Individual characteristics
1
K
now
ledge and beliefs about the 
intervention
S
om
e facilities felt that they w
ere being 
pushed too m
uch by Q
I activities, and felt 
frustrate at being steered too m
uch into 
different directions.  O
ne facility reported 
that they w
ere not able to keep up to date 
w
ith everything, and spread the changes to 
all the staff.  This w
as because the changes 
are happening too quickly, in addition to the 
fact that there w
ere too m
any changes 
occurring as part of the Q
I program
m
e [12]. 
W
ith  the  introduction  of  w
om
en  
friendly  standards,  delivery  of  
pregnant  w
om
en  at  facility  level 
has  im
proved.  H
ow
ever  the  
hospitals  are  also  seeing  an  
increase  in the  num
ber  of  
m
aternal  deaths.  P
erhaps  this is  
so  because hospitals  are  now
 
able  to  attend  to  cases  that  
w
ould have  delivered at  TB
A
s or  
H
om
e[14]
2
S
elf efficacy
In the facilities there is not the sam
e level of 
aw
areness of neonatal deaths as there is 
for m
aternal deaths, and this m
ay result in 
less confidence in previous neonatal data 
from
 the facilities[12]
Q
uality  im
provem
ent  activities  
especially  criterion  based   and 
m
aternal  deaths  audits  have  
proved  very  effective  in  the 
provision  of  quality obstetric  care. 
W
ith  the  introduction  of  w
om
en  
friendly  standards,  delivery  of  
pregnant  w
om
en  at  facility  level 
has  im
proved[14]. 
3
M
otivation
M
inority of facilities felt that they w
ere being 
pushed too m
uch by Q
I activities, and felt 
frustrated at being steered too m
uch into 
different directions.  O
ne facility reported 
that they w
ere not able to keep up to date 
w
ith everything, and spread the changes to 
all the staff because the changes w
ere 
happening too quickly[12]
4
Team
 w
ork and stability
In general, a team
 w
as to be com
prised of 
representatives from
 the various provider roles 
w
ithin the facilities, for exam
ple, Q
I team
 
m
em
bers typically included a M
atron, N
urse-
M
idw
ife, C
linical O
fficer, Lab Technician, and 
D
ata C
lerk.  H
ow
ever, a few
 of the Q
I team
s, 
such as the team
 in K
asungu, developed from
 
the existing M
D
R
 com
m
ittee. It w
as observed 
that Q
I team
 m
em
bers have a high level of 
com
m
itm
ent to the Q
I w
ork, for exam
ple often the 
team
 m
em
bers w
ill attend a Q
I m
eeting even if 
they have been on duty the previous night.  
Feedback on the Q
I program
m
e has been m
ainly 
positive, w
ith a num
ber of team
 m
em
bers 
reporting personally that they really enjoy the Q
I 
w
ork[12]. 
Q
I program
m
e has facilitated the form
ation 
of a netw
ork of facilities that are able to 
share ideas, know
ledge and also resources.  
O
ne such exam
ple is that of a situation that 
arose w
hen M
tundu w
ere out of antibiotics, 
and N
khom
a shared w
ith them
 som
e of their 
near expiration antibiotics[12]
5
Leadership
Facilities them
selves perceive there to be difficulties in 
m
otivating team
 m
em
bers and their colleagues to 
participate in Q
I w
ork.  E
very one of the nine C
E
m
O
C
 
facilities noted that a lack of m
aterial and hum
an 
resources caused problem
s w
ith Q
I im
plem
entation[12].  
C
ollaborative w
orkshops allow
s for regular interaction betw
een the facilities, and a num
ber of facilities 
use the Q
I w
ork as an opportunity to m
eet w
ith clinical staff from
 other facilities. The m
otivations for 
individuals to becom
e involved in Q
I range from
 being in a team
, to learning from
 others to being able 
to identify problem
s and find the solution. [12]. 
A num
ber of team
s are com
posed of a w
ide range of facility staff representatives including: the 
M
edical O
fficer, the C
hief C
linical O
fficer, the M
atron and the driver on duty.  This w
ould ensure that all 
the perspectives of care w
ithin the facility are considered, including transportation issues[12]. 
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D
In
d
iv
id
u
a
l c
h
a
ra
c
te
ris
tic
s
1
K
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 a
n
d
 b
e
lie
fs
 a
b
o
u
t th
e
 
in
te
rv
e
n
tio
n
2
S
e
lf e
ffic
a
c
y
3
M
o
tiv
a
tio
n
4
T
e
a
m
 w
o
rk
 a
n
d
 s
ta
b
ility
5
L
e
a
d
e
rs
h
ip
A
b
o
u
t 5
2
%
 o
f th
e
 re
s
p
o
n
d
e
n
t fe
lt th
a
t 
th
e
 Q
I s
y
s
te
m
s
 fits
 in
to
 th
e
ir c
u
rre
n
t 
s
y
s
te
m
 o
f w
o
rk
 b
u
t w
ith
 s
o
m
e
 e
ffo
rt. 
T
h
is
 w
a
s
 m
a
in
ly
 b
e
c
a
u
s
e
 o
f th
e
 
s
h
o
rta
g
e
 o
f s
ta
ff. A
 m
a
jo
rity
 o
f th
e
 
re
s
p
o
n
d
e
n
ts
 fe
lt th
a
t Q
I q
a
s
 a
 little
 b
it 
d
e
m
a
n
d
in
g
 , b
u
t w
o
rth
 th
e
 e
ffo
rt.Q
I 
te
a
m
s
  fe
lt th
a
t th
e
y
 c
o
u
ld
 im
p
ro
v
e
 th
e
 
q
u
a
lity
 o
f c
a
re
 a
t th
e
ir h
e
a
lth
 fa
c
ility, 
d
e
s
p
ite
 th
e
 m
a
n
y
 c
o
n
s
tra
in
ts
 o
f m
a
te
ria
l 
a
n
d
 h
u
m
a
n
 re
s
o
u
rc
e
s
. T
h
is
 w
a
s
 a
ls
o
  
o
n
e
 o
f th
e
 re
a
s
o
n
s
 m
o
tiv
a
tin
g
 th
e
m
 [7
]. 
A
s
  p
a
rt  o
f c
lin
ic
a
l  s
k
ills
  b
u
ild
in
g
  fo
r  Q
I  
te
a
m
s
,  M
a
iK
h
a
n
d
a
 id
e
n
tifie
d
  a
n
d
  
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
  c
lin
ic
a
l  a
d
v
is
o
rs
  to
  s
u
p
p
o
rt  th
e
  
Q
I  te
a
m
s
  o
n
  v
a
rio
u
s
  is
s
u
e
s
  re
la
te
d
  to
  
im
p
ro
v
in
g
 q
u
a
lity
  o
f  c
a
re
. T
h
e
s
e
  
s
e
s
s
io
n
s
  re
v
e
a
le
d
  th
e
  n
e
e
d
  fo
r  o
n
g
o
in
g
 
s
u
p
p
o
rt  fo
r  n
e
o
n
a
ta
l  re
s
u
s
c
ita
tio
n
  a
s
 
m
a
n
y
  h
e
a
lth
  w
o
rk
e
rs
 la
c
k
e
d
  a
d
e
q
u
a
te
  
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 a
b
o
u
t b
a
s
ic
  re
s
u
s
c
ita
tio
n
  
m
e
a
s
u
re
s
[1
7
].
A
ll re
s
p
o
n
d
e
n
ts
 fro
m
 C
E
m
O
C
 s
u
rv
e
y
 v
a
lu
e
d
 
v
is
its
 b
y
 M
a
iK
h
a
n
d
a
 s
ta
ff. 5
2
%
 o
f th
e
m
 
s
u
g
g
e
s
te
d
 th
a
t M
a
iK
h
a
n
d
a
 s
h
o
u
ld
 v
is
it th
e
ir 
fa
c
ilitie
s
 tw
ic
e
 a
 m
o
n
th
; 4
4
%
 s
u
g
g
e
s
ts
 th
a
t 
o
n
c
e
 a
 m
o
n
th
 v
is
it  w
o
u
ld
 b
e
 a
d
e
q
u
a
te
 fo
r 
th
e
ir fa
c
ilitie
s
. S
h
o
rta
g
e
 o
f s
ta
ff le
d
 to
 a
n
 
in
c
re
a
s
e
d
 w
o
rk
lo
a
d
 w
h
ic
h
 d
id
 n
o
t g
iv
e
 th
e
 
Q
I te
a
m
 m
e
m
b
e
rs
 e
n
o
u
g
h
 tim
e
 to
 m
e
e
t 
re
g
u
la
rly
 a
n
d
 d
is
c
u
s
s
 Q
I a
c
tiv
itie
s
. “S
in
c
e
 w
e
 
a
re
 s
h
o
rt s
ta
ffe
d
 s
o
m
e
tim
e
s
 it b
e
c
o
m
e
s
 
d
iffic
u
lt to
 fo
llo
w
 a
n
d
 d
o
 a
 p
ro
to
c
o
l 
Im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t  p
ro
je
c
ts
  a
re
  in
s
tillin
g
  
s
o
m
e
 k
in
d
  o
f  d
is
c
ip
lin
e
  a
m
o
n
g
  Q
I  
te
a
m
s
  s
u
c
h
  th
a
t  th
e
y
  ta
k
e
  it  a
s
  th
e
ir  
re
s
p
o
n
s
ib
ility
  to
  e
n
s
u
re
  th
a
t w
o
m
e
n
  
c
o
m
in
g
  to
 th
e
m
  fo
r  c
a
re
  d
o
  n
o
t d
ie
  o
f  
c
o
m
p
lic
a
tio
n
s
 th
a
t  c
o
u
ld
 b
e
  
a
v
o
id
e
d
[1
7
].
A
n
 im
p
o
rta
n
t m
o
tiv
a
tin
g
 fa
c
to
r w
a
s
 th
e
 n
e
w
 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 th
e
 p
a
rtic
ip
a
n
ts
 g
a
in
e
d
 fro
m
 
a
tte
n
d
in
g
 Q
I w
o
rk
s
h
o
p
s
 a
s
 w
e
ll a
s
 th
e
 
le
a
rn
in
g
 th
e
y
 d
e
riv
e
d
 fro
m
 th
e
 Q
I w
o
rk
 o
f 
o
th
e
r h
o
s
p
ita
ls
[7
]. 
O
n
e
 o
f th
e
 p
rim
a
ry
 re
a
s
o
n
s
 m
o
tiv
a
tin
g
 th
e
 
Q
I te
a
m
s
 w
a
s
 th
a
t th
e
y
 fe
lt th
a
t th
e
y
 c
o
u
ld
 
im
p
ro
v
e
 th
e
 q
u
a
lity
 o
f c
a
re
 a
t th
e
ir h
e
a
lth
 
fa
c
ility, d
e
s
p
ite
 th
e
 m
a
n
y
 c
o
n
s
tra
in
ts
 o
f 
m
a
te
ria
l a
n
d
 h
u
m
a
n
 re
s
o
u
rc
e
s
. S
ta
b
ility
 o
f 
Q
I te
a
m
 m
e
m
b
e
rs
 d
o
e
s
 s
e
e
m
 to
 h
a
v
e
 a
n
 
e
ffe
c
t o
n
 Q
I w
o
rk
 b
e
in
g
 c
a
rrie
d
 o
u
t in
 th
e
 
h
e
a
lth
 fa
c
ilitie
s
. C
h
a
lle
n
g
e
 o
f a
 la
c
k
 o
f 
te
a
m
w
o
rk
 is
 p
re
s
e
n
t a
n
d
 is
 lin
k
e
d
 to
 th
e
 
h
u
m
a
n
 re
s
o
u
rc
e
 c
ris
is
. B
e
c
a
u
s
e
 h
u
m
a
n
 
re
s
o
u
rc
e
 is
 re
a
llo
c
a
te
d
 w
h
e
n
e
v
e
r n
e
c
e
s
s
a
ry, 
s
o
 e
a
c
h
 tim
e
 n
e
w
 s
ta
ff c
o
m
e
 in
 th
e
y
 h
a
v
e
 to
 
b
e
 o
rie
n
te
d
.[7
]
7
0
%
  o
f  th
e
  q
u
a
lity
  im
p
ro
v
e
m
e
n
t  te
a
m
 
s
to
p
p
e
d
 c
a
rry
in
g
  o
u
t  th
e
ir  p
ro
je
c
ts
  
d
u
e
  to
  la
c
k
  o
f  s
u
p
p
o
rt  fro
m
  s
e
n
io
r  
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t  a
n
d
 la
c
k
  o
f  te
a
m
  s
p
irit 
[1
7
].
O
n
a
v
e
ra
g
e
,
s
ta
ff
e
n
jo
y
a
‘g
o
o
d
’
re
la
tio
n
s
h
ip
w
ith
th
e
ir
s
u
p
e
rio
rs
.
L
e
a
d
e
rs
h
ip
d
o
e
s
n
o
t
s
e
e
m
to
b
e
in
c
lu
s
iv
e
a
s
s
ta
ff
a
re
le
s
s
lik
e
ly
to
b
e
a
s
k
e
d
b
y
th
e
ir
s
u
p
e
rv
is
o
rs
fo
r
s
u
g
g
e
s
tio
n
s
a
n
d
c
o
m
m
e
n
ts
o
n
w
o
rk
re
la
te
d
is
s
u
e
s
.
S
ta
ff
a
ls
o
c
o
m
p
la
in
o
f
a
la
c
k
o
f
s
u
p
e
rv
is
io
n
 b
y
 th
e
ir s
u
p
e
rv
is
o
rs
[6
] 
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Intervention P
eriods
Y
ears
Q
uarters
2008
Q
4
Q
1 
Q
2
Q
3
E
arly in
terven
tio
n
 p
erio
d
 (O
cto
b
er 2008-S
ep
tem
b
er 2009)
2009
D
Individual characteristics
1
K
now
ledge and beliefs about the 
intervention
2
S
elf efficacy
3
M
otivation
4
Team
 w
ork and stability
5
Leadership
D
ata clerks in the data collaborative are 
building on the run charts initiated in the 
D
ata W
orkshop in June 2009 and they are 
show
ing a w
ider understanding in 
interpretation of run charts[23]
Q
I S
kill: health centres are show
ing great 
im
provem
ents in their day to day w
ork, 
especially in the area of data capture and 
use; for exam
ple, during the last series of 
H
C
 learning sessions, 80%
 of health 
centres captured and used fam
ily planning 
data alongside data on deliveries – 
dem
onstrating a grow
ing grasp of the 
w
hole system
s approach. G
ood progress 
noted w
ith S
alim
a team
- team
s able to 
present progress using run charts [25]
C
oncerted support to Q
I team
s in facilities 
yields good results. F
requent coaching 
visits to Q
I team
 in the facilities m
otivates 
them
. T
here is now
 an increased 
dependency on data for decision-m
aking 
am
ongst Q
I team
s in the facilities, H
ealth 
C
entre and C
E
m
O
C
 C
ollaboratives have 
changed the m
indset of m
any team
s on 
the provision of quality care for the better 
as they continuously learn from
 each other 
and develop new
 change ideas for testing 
[25]. 
130 m
em
bers have once been m
em
bers of Q
I 
team
s from
 m
id-2006 to m
id-2008 (till the 
C
E
m
O
C
 survey w
as conducted), w
ith 88%
 still 
retaining their association/involvem
ent in the Q
I 
team
. A
nother 11%
 are no longer Q
I m
em
bers. 
A
lthough only 15 of the Q
I team
 m
em
bers 
dropped out during the survey period, there is 
anecdotal evidence to say that they w
ere the 
m
ost dynam
ic w
ithin the team
 and exhibited 
som
e exem
plar leadership qualities[7]
S
taff
do
have
a
netw
ork
w
ithin
their
facility
for
support
and
discussion
of
problem
s
w
hile
netw
ork
betw
een
facilities
is
not
that
w
ell
established.
T
he
overall
picture
is
that
staff
do
get
on
w
ell
w
ith
each
other,
can
discuss
problem
s
w
ith
colleagues,
encourage
each
other
and
have
good
relations
w
ith
their
superiors.
H
ow
ever,there
needs
to
be
m
ore
links
betw
een
facilities.T
hese
inform
al
links
are
necessary
especially
for
the
spread
ofQ
I
intervenions[6].  
2-day learning session for leaders from
 
Lilongw
e health areas to orient them
 on Q
I 
and strengthen relationships betw
een them
 
and different levels of m
anagem
ent at 
D
H
O
 level[25]. 
Y
ounger staff (18-30 year old) are consistently better off than others w
hen it com
es ot 
m
otivation. H
ow
ever, older staf (i.e above 50 years) seem
 to be m
ore content and settled in 
their w
ork lives and m
ore com
fortable w
ith authority. S
taff in C
H
A
M
 facilities are better off in 
term
s of m
otivation, and com
ing up w
ith new
 ideas at w
ork. N
urses are w
orse off than m
edical 
assistants in m
aintaining relations w
ith other staff m
em
bers. M
A
s are w
orse off w
hen it com
es 
to know
ing the patients by their nam
e. T
he degree of engagem
ent of nursing staff w
ith the care 
being provided is m
uch m
ore. M
otivating factors: helping other people, team
 w
ork, personal 
gains such as electricity in rural area.D
em
otivating factors: lack of support system
s(drugs, 
staff), high w
orkload, lack of career progression. O
n average, staff are interested in their w
ork 
and often w
illing to w
ork beyond their job responsibilities if required, but are som
etim
es lacking 
in m
otivation, partly due to the fact that they are alm
ost universally com
pletely dissatisfied w
ith 
the salaries they receive [6]. S
taff m
otivation survey: Lots of anecdotal evidence of poor 
resource availability in the facilities and how
 it affects staff m
otivation and m
orale[6]. 
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Intervention P
eriods
Y
ears
Q
uarters
2009
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
In
ten
sified
 in
terven
tio
n
 p
erio
d
 (O
cto
b
er 2009-D
ecem
b
er 2010)
2010
D
In
d
ivid
u
al ch
aracteristics
1
K
now
ledge and beliefs about the 
intervention
2
S
elf efficacy
3
M
otivation
4
Team
 w
ork and stability
5
Leadership
O
nly 42%
 of the H
F
 staff felt that the care they 
provided w
as ideal. 37%
 of the repondents (m
ainly 
nurses) felt that w
om
en should labour in the position 
of their choice. K
now
ledge in C
E
m
O
C
 facility staff 
w
as greater than B
E
M
O
C
 facility staff[5]. P
rovider 
know
ledge survey
T
he team
s have trem
endously im
proved in 
the w
ay of reporting w
hich show
ed a 
m
aturity and understanding in w
hat they 
are doing. T
he form
at of presentations, the 
language and the graphical presentation all 
displayed an advanced level of 
understanding of the quality im
provem
ent in 
all the health centers[28]. 
C
linical and senior 
leadership w
as lacking in 
m
ost health facilities. In 
places w
here leadership 
w
as strong and supportive 
of M
aiK
handa's 
interventions, visible 
im
provem
ents w
ere m
ade- 
for exam
ple S
alim
a and 
N
khom
a hospital[9]. 
S
alim
a district, m
ainly due 
to its activated leadership, 
is poised for rapid spread 
and could be a catalyst for 
the other district m
anagers 
to follow
 suit[30]. 
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Intervention P
eriods
Years
Q
uarters
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
B
aseline period (June 2006-January, 2007)
Pre-intervention period (February, 2007-Septem
ber 2008)
2006
2007
E
Im
plem
entation process
1
O
rganization of w
ork. 
A better balance sought for program
m
e 
planning and budgeting betw
een 
operational (local team
) and strategic 
level(TA
s) and good com
m
unication 
betw
een the tw
o levels on program
m
e 
m
anagem
ent issues[11]. The size and 
cost of Q
I w
orkshops has far exceeded 
than expected or planned.The on-going 
need for large, centralised w
orkshops 
needs to be review
ed and guidance from
 
the M
alaw
i team
 sought in this 
respect.[11]. 
P
M
 and the local team
 to becom
e m
uch 
m
ore active “com
m
issioners” of TA
. A
ll visits 
should be added to w
orkplan so that 
som
eone’s presence can be properly 
m
anaged and utilised by the local team
[10]. 
Focus on district and central hospital(s) 
(w
hile continuing to w
ork w
ith sm
aller 
hospitals at sam
e tim
e)[13]. 
D
istrict  based Q
I/M
N
H
 officers  to 
provide  ongoing  support   to Q
I  
team
s  at  district  level[14]. 
2
E
ngagem
ent(stakeholder)
The program
m
e w
as initiated in M
alaw
i in 
February 2006 w
ith a stakeholder m
eeting 
betw
een M
aiK
handa m
em
bers and key 
stakeholders from
 the M
oH
 and health facilities to 
develop the program
m
e plan of action[2].
The R
H
U
 (M
O
H
)  w
as keen to have other 
districts involved in scaling up 
M
aiK
handa program
m
e.H
ow
ever, it w
as 
explained that w
ith the current level of 
hum
an resource in the program
m
e in 
M
alaw
i it w
as difficult for M
aiK
handa to 
take on m
ore w
ork in other districts[11]. 
The institutional environm
ent has been quite 
conducive
to
the
im
plem
entation
of
Q
I
activities.
M
em
bers
of
the
R
H
U
have
been
involved
during
our
program
m
e
m
anagem
ent
board
m
eetings
providing
valuable
inputs.
The
February
w
orkshop
w
as attended by the H
onourable M
inister for 
H
ealth.
S
he
appreciated
the
efforts
of
the
program
m
e
and
encouraged
the
participants
to
be
actively
involved
in
the
Q
I
w
ork being conducted by M
aiK
handa[12]
Involvem
ent of the district 
stakeholders in the C
ollaboratives 
rem
ained poor. There  w
as little  
involvem
ent  of  district  based  
stakeholders  in  Q
I  activities  as  
such  som
e  problem
s requiring 
intervention by D
H
M
T  or  D
istrict  
assem
blies[14].
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E
Im
plem
entation process
1
O
rganization of w
ork. 
2
E
ngagem
ent(stakeholder)
E
xpanded Facilities Intervention Team
 – 3 
new
 m
em
bers have been recruited to the 
team
 (one each for S
alim
a, Lilongw
e and 
K
asungu and one to m
anage B
w
aila[23]. A 
new
 accounting package, S
age P
astel 
E
volution, w
as procured, installed, and is 
operational, replacing the LATH
 accounting 
package, PA
S
 and a new
 chart of accounts 
w
as developed. The B
oard of Trustees and 
the P
artners B
oard both had successful 
m
eetings.[22]. 
N
on-active involvem
ent of stakeholders; 
need to share data w
ith other 
stakeholders[15]. 
Four  m
eetings w
ere  conducted  
betw
een M
aiK
handa  and  m
em
bers  of 
the  district  health  m
anagem
ent   and  
hospital  m
anagem
ent team
  in 
K
asungu, Lilongw
e  and  S
alim
a.D
istrict 
E
xecutive C
om
m
ittee (D
E
C
) m
eeting in 
S
alim
a. 30 A
D
C
 (A
rea D
evelopm
ent 
C
om
m
ittee) m
eetings to sensitize 
stakeholders re the program
 [17]. 
M
aiK
handa also engaged w
ith the S
afe 
M
otherhood Taskforce, Q
uality 
A
ssurance Task Force[18]. 
D
ifficult to develop ‘one plan one budget’ as the initial arrangem
ent has som
e 
elem
ents (i.e. travel, partner expenses) that are still controlled by partners outside 
the M
aiK
handa. C
urrent B
udget lines still reflect partner’s expenditure. There is no 
clear linkage betw
een in-country plans and partners activities[18]. 
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Intervention P
eriods
Years
Q
uarters
2008
Q
4
Q
1 
Q
2
Q
3
Early intervention period (O
ctober 2008-Septem
ber 2009)
2009
E
Implementation process
1
O
rganization of w
ork. 
2
E
ngagem
ent(stakeholder)
O
ngoing m
anagem
ent im
provem
ents 
focused on strengthening the district as a 
unit of im
plem
entation[23]. 
A
ll districts reported a constant flow
 of 
funds to the district; this has brought 
satisfaction to the team
 as they have 
m
anaged to m
eet their program
 
targets[25]. M
aiK
handa vision of the future 
to use districts as the unit of planning and 
im
plem
entation.  M
aiK
handa to have an 
integrated design and m
anagem
ent in 
each district. D
istrict C
oordinators 
presented a consolidated report (for FI, C
I 
&
 M
&
E
) for their districts[24]
W
eak statutory coordinating m
echanism
s (e.g. 
R
H
U
/M
oH
, local governm
ent institutions such 
as D
istrict E
xecutive C
om
m
ittees and 
com
m
unity level developm
ent com
m
ittees) force 
M
aiK
handa and other N
G
O
 partners to spend 
too m
uch tim
e coordinating (though not alw
ays 
successfully as w
ithout m
andate)[19]. 
P
articipation of a significant num
ber of key 
stakeholders in the strategic planning 
m
eeting including R
H
U
 (M
oH
); S
ave the 
C
hildren; W
orld H
ealth organization; 
M
aiM
w
ana; M
other to M
other; K
asungu, 
Lilongw
e and S
alim
a D
H
O
s; and N
urses and 
M
idw
ives A
ssociation of M
alaw
i.  O
ngoing 
dialogue w
ith S
akaram
enta, N
IC
E
 (N
ational 
Initiative for C
ivic E
ducation), W
hite R
ibbon 
A
lliance M
N
H
 A
dvocacy C
am
paign for 
A
spiring M
em
bers of P
arliam
ent, R
adio 
Zodiak[20].
M
aiK
handa involved in the developm
ent of 
D
istrict Im
plem
entation P
lans (D
IP
s) and 
budgets for the year July 2009 to June 2010 
for Lilongw
e, K
asungu and S
alim
a districts 
for the first tim
e[22]. Frontline staff continue 
to be challenged by the huge expectations 
fueled by the extrem
e poverty in the areas 
M
aiK
handa w
ork and the “handout 
syndrom
e” that has becom
e so prevalent in 
M
alaw
ian society over the last 10-15 
years[23]. 
D
irector presented a detailed w
ritten 
briefing to the new
 M
inister of H
ealth  
follow
ed by an introductory m
eeting. 
M
inister  convinced that M
aiK
handa’s 
unique approach to m
aternal and new
born 
health has a lot to offer to the country. H
e  
challenged M
aiK
handa on how
 they 
intended  to take this sm
all-scale “pilot” 
and apply it to the rest of the country[25]. 
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Intervention P
eriods
Years
Q
uarters
2009
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Intensified intervention period (O
ctober 2009-D
ecem
ber 2010)
2010
E
Im
plem
entation process
1
O
rganization of w
ork. 
2
E
ngagem
ent(stakeholder)
S
cheduling and m
aintaining appointm
ents/m
eetings 
for follow
 up often difficult, largely due to lim
ited staff 
on-site. Together w
ith P
artners, M
aiK
handa has also 
devised som
e solutions to the m
ajor transport 
problem
s, w
hich are about to be im
plem
ented[25].
M
et w
ith D
H
O
(K
asungu) and one-on-one 
m
eetings w
ith Q
I team
 m
em
bers to find out 
reasons for absenteeism
 from
 Q
I m
eetings. 
E
xplained to them
 the im
portance of such 
m
eetings. Im
m
ediate plan is to m
eet w
ith 
the new
 D
H
M
T for support of the w
ork[28]. 
 A
t national level, a num
ber of developm
ents have 
com
bined to slow
 dow
n the advocacy and stakeholder 
engagem
ent efforts. The appointm
ent of a new
 national 
G
oodw
ill A
m
bassador for S
afe M
otherhood, w
hich took 
a few
 m
onths, m
eant w
e had to put on hold som
e of the 
initiatives that had been in the planning pipeline, e.g., 
discussions on organizing a m
ajor national event to 
share lessons learned/best practice. E
qually, the recent 
appointm
ent of a new
 M
inister and D
eputy M
inister of 
H
ealth and the transfer of the P
rincipal S
ecretary of 
H
ealth (new
 one yet to be appointed) m
eans that w
e 
have to start rebuilding relationships at senior levels of 
the M
inistry [9]
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Intervention P
eriods
Years
Q
uarters
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
B
aseline period (June 2006-January, 2007)
Pre-intervention period (February, 2007-Septem
ber 2008)
2006
2007
E
Im
plem
entation process
3
E
xecution
a
Fidelity
S
ize of the intervention: The intervention 
w
as designed taking into consideration the 
norm
al district structure. H
ow
ever, the 
M
oH
 had LLW
 thrust upon us as they 
considered it as one of the districts w
hich 
needed m
ore attention. LLW
 is as big a 
S
alim
a and K
asungu put together. W
hile, 
these w
ere events beyond M
aiK
handa's 
control, it has had significant m
anagem
ent 
and budgetary im
plications. A
lthough there 
w
as an excellent team
 in LLW
, the required 
scope of w
ork w
as stretching them
 to their 
lim
its[12]
Turnover of staff m
akes organizational 
learning, m
em
ory  w
eak. S
ignificant 
confusion, parallel w
ork and very heavy 
reliance on num
erous training sessions (low
 
reliability)[13]
b
Intensity
A neonatal expert m
eeting w
as conducted 
by content experts in neonatal and 
paediatric care along w
ith representatives 
from
 the facility Q
I team
s[12].
c
D
osage/C
overage
Interventions started in 2006  w
ith a focus on the 
9 C
E
m
O
C
 facilities in the 3 districts. A
n initial 
target of 50%
 reduction in m
ortality in the first 
year of Q
I w
ork w
as set[3]
The  key  activities  im
plem
ented 
w
ere: the rolling  out  of  the  90  
day  project  on quality 
im
provem
ent  w
ork  to  health  
centers; establishm
ent of an  
im
provem
ent  advisory  team
; 
super im
provers  training; 
im
plem
entation of a D
ata  
collaborative  session; Follow
  up 
on C
B
A
, 4 M
D
R
s, facilitating 
im
plem
entation of w
om
en  friendly 
standards  for  health  centers; 
training  on  life  saving  skills  for  
all  the  C
E
M
O
C
  facilities  and  
health  centers; learning  session  
on  care  of  the  neonate[14]. 
A num
ber of innovative w
ays have been developed by the 
facilities to generate ideas for im
plem
entation. These 
developm
ents m
ay be considered to be a positive step 
tow
ards sustainability, in that facilities are developing their 
ow
n w
ay of doing Q
I in a w
ay that w
orks best for them
. 
W
hile the intervention(s) w
ere designed w
ithin the 
fram
ew
ork of a R
C
T, the 9 referral C
E
O
C
 facilities w
as not 
m
eant to be part of the random
ization (control) process. It 
w
as decided to im
plem
ent the intervention across the 9 
facilities as a health system
 strengthening exercise[12]. 
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E
Im
plem
entation process
3
E
xecution
a
Fidelity
b
Intensity
c
D
osage/C
overage
The question w
as posed if M
aiK
handa 
should start providing essential m
aterials 
used during hospital training (in addition to 
the $30,000 w
orth of supplies provided 
quarterly by C
incinnati C
hildren’s). This cost 
could be budgeted into P
hase Tw
o.  The 
im
plications of being a provider need to be 
further review
ed as the current policy is to 
provide the evidence to allow
 the hospitals 
to ask the M
inistry, or budget it in 
them
selves. This w
as not approved by the 
P
M
B
[19].
In total there w
ere 162 ideas throughout the 
10 C
E
m
O
C
 and that m
ost (87) of these 
ideas w
ere related to clinically excellent 
care. O
nly just over half (56%
) of the total 
num
ber ideas w
ere tested w
ith P
D
S
A cycles 
how
ever, and w
hen tested these ideas had 
only an average of about tw
o P
D
S
A run on 
them
[7]
1 C
ollaborative, Q
I, 3 M
D
A
s, C
oaching 
and m
entoring visits[17]. 
O
nly 44%
 of the respondents from
 the 
C
E
m
O
C
 survey reported that N
eonatal 
D
eath R
eview
s (N
D
R
) w
ere being 
undertaken[7]. 
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Intervention P
eriods
Years
Q
uarters
2008
Q
4
Q
1 
Q
2
Q
3
Early intervention period (O
ctober 2008-Septem
ber 2009)
2009
E
Implementation process
3
E
xecution
a
Fidelity
b
Intensity
c
D
osage/C
overage
Lack of resources at the end of the last 
financial year affected the tim
ing of the 
Learning S
essions. A
s a result, in this 
quarter, sessions w
ere done back to back to 
catch up w
ith lost tim
e, and it w
as 
necessary to com
bine the closing of 2008 
C
ollaboratives and beginning for 2009 
C
ollaboratives w
hich w
as not ideal[22]. 
C
larification of the S
alim
a P
roposal 
focused on packaging w
hat has been 
learnt  and the essential elem
ents 
necessary for spread. P
roposal provides a 
starting fram
ew
ork for long term
 planning 
i.e. for spread and sustainability [24]. 
C
oncerted coaching and m
entoring visits are 
beginning to yield results in health centres as 
health centre staff take increasing 
responsibility for testing change ideas: E
gs 
form
 S
anthe, K
aw
aba and K
alulum
a H
C
s[20]. D
uring H
C
 C
ollaboratives: C
hallenges and 
progress for the learning period w
ere 
shared, aim
s for the next stage of the 
collaborative agreed, a rem
inder of P
D
S
A 
(plan, do, study, act) theory w
as m
ade as 
w
ell as clinic based P
D
S
A
, P
rocess m
ap 
review
, change package introduction and 
selection of change idea and sharing of 
plans w
as done[23]. In K
asungu, there is 
now
 im
proved focus on the district hospital 
and its health centres centred on 
strengthening leadership, form
ation of a 
new
 Q
I team
 and strengthening of 
K
angaroo M
other C
are[23]. 
H
ealth C
entre and C
E
m
O
C
 C
ollaboratives 
have changed the m
indset of m
any team
s 
on the provision of quality care for the 
better as they continuously learn from
 each 
other and develop new
 change ideas for 
testing[25]. 
M
entoring &
 coaching visits: C
E
m
O
C
s w
ere 
visited every tw
o w
eeks, and m
ost of the 
health centres every m
onth[22]. 3 H
ealth 
C
entre C
ollaboratives in S
alim
a and 
K
aungu and Lilongw
e and 1 C
E
m
O
C
 
C
ollaborative[22,23].
In Lilongw
e, 110/145 planned visits w
ere 
m
ade by FI O
fficers. There has been an 
im
provem
ent in the visits of the FI O
fficers 
to facilities. A
lm
ost 80%
 of the visits are 
taking place; the 100%
 target w
as not m
et 
because of the Learning S
essions and 
attention being diverted to other needs, 
especially data deep dive follow
-ups. The 
visits generally focused support tow
ards Q
I 
Team
s identification of high risk m
others 
and follow
 up, em
ergency referral checklist 
usage, and identification of blood donors[9]
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Intervention P
eriods
Years
Q
uarters
2009
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Intensified intervention period (O
ctober 2009-D
ecem
ber 2010)
2010
E
Im
plem
entation process
3
E
xecution
a
Fidelity
b
Intensity
c
D
osage/C
overage
M
ethodology doesn’t change 
over tim
e but the areas for 
im
provem
ent and therefore 
change ideas that are tested 
do[9]. 
The design of the R
C
T is a 
constraint on the spread of 
the project[30].
C
E
m
O
C
 C
ollaborative: O
n the neonatal the 
team
s w
ill be w
orking on reducing the 
deaths due to prem
aturity by having 
w
orking kangaroo facilities w
ith trained 
K
angaroo M
other C
are M
aids running 
these facilities[28]. In S
alim
a, for the first 
tim
e, the filling and sending of referral 
feedbacks to health centers cam
e up to 
100%
 and has been m
aintained since 
M
arch'10. The team
 has now
 started doing 
resuscitation drills on birth asphyxia[28]. 
In K
asungu, 40 visits out of 54 planned coaching 
visits w
ere done to the health centers in this quarter, 
representing 74%
[28]. This quarter has show
n a 
drop in planned versus actual coaching visits and 
supervisions (to only 50%
 in tw
o districts in 
January). The m
ain reasons behind the drop w
ere 
C
hristm
as holidays, annual leave and the severe 
national fuel shortages in N
ovem
ber and 
D
ecem
ber[26]
Frequency of visits (dosage) only achieved 
6 m
onths ago;  U
sing the D
H
M
Ts for 
spread, building on existing relationship 
betw
een D
H
M
T and H
C
 S
taff and their 
m
onthly visits[10]. 
R
ules of Q
I m
eetings: D
ata has to be presented at each 
m
eeting (FI officers to check w
hether data is being 
presented). D
ata w
as placed at the centre of the 
intervention. D
ata clerks w
ere part of the Q
I team
 
especially in the C
E
m
O
C
 facilities. Learning sessions 
w
ere conducted w
ith data clerks. D
ata sessions w
ere 
conducted w
ith super-im
provers. H
ow
ever, the data w
as 
not very 'encouraging' since im
provem
ents in data 
collection and reporting usually show
ed an increase in 
the no. of deaths[9]. 
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6.3 Intervention Characteristics 
In this section I try and synthesize the following aspects of the intervention 
such as how well the intervention was designed, its adaptability and flexibility 
(i.e changes to the design over time), its ease of understanding (conceptual 
clarity) across different levels of stakeholders and its embeddedness within 
the health system. 
6.3.1 Conceptual/clarity/
The original proposal, which was prescriptive of an integrated model for 
improvement, led to parallel work and very heavy reliance on numerous 
training sessions, which was a strain on the already stretched human 
resources within MaiKhanda. According to IHI, MaiKhanda’s QI interventions 
was supposed to be based on the IHI collaborative learning model but had 
morphed into an untested model that was neither integrated nor scientific and 
unlikely to get sustainable results [XI]  
Majority of facility staff claimed to have a broad understanding of quality 
improvement.   The most frequent response for their understanding of QI was 
that it was the improvement of patient care or the testing of changes.  
Some respondents who did report the link between CBA and PDSAs, reported 
as: 
“It is an objective, systematic and critical analysis of the quality of obstetric 
care against set criteria of best practice. This is by plan, do, study and act” (QI 
Team Member Mlale Hospital). 
They understood the integrated model as a continuous process. Figure 21 
below illustrates how the integrated model was perceived by the facilities. It 
represents the integrated model as a complimentary set of processes that 
feed into the PDSA cycle.  The PDSA test and implement ideas generated 
from the MDR, CBA and Change Package.  In addition, there were 
recommendations that were developed directly from the MDR.  The standards 
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fed into the CBA and also into the change package. The standards were 
considered important for setting how things should be in the facilities. 
 
Figure 21: Facilities' perception of the integrated improvement model 
 
The QI teams found their own way to use and link the QI tools-they had not 
necessarily copied the change package ideas identified by MaiKhanda. A 
number of innovative approaches to QI had been developed by the facilities. 
The teams were generating ideas independent to the combined approach by 
learning from other facilities. 
However the MaiKhanda team was upset and confused by the different and 
disjointed approaches, particularly the links and overlap between criterion-
based audit (CBA) part of the LSTM-led death reviews, and Plan-Do-Study-
Act (PDSA) part of the IHI-led QI initiatives. There were uncertainties 
Maternal 
Death 
Direct 
Recommendation
Standards 
Criterion 
Based 
Audit 
Recommendations: 
Implement 
improvement directly 
-Identify gaps in 
practice 
-Develop ideas 
to close gaps 
PDSA 
Cycle 
Change 
-Identify gaps in 
practice 
Examples: 
Direct Maternal Death Recommendations: 
- Implementing theatre rest room (Kasungu) 
Indirect Maternal Death Recommendations: 
Standard:  
- Puerperal Sepsis 
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expressed with regard to the effectiveness of the integrated QI Model [XIV].  
As noted by a senior leader at IHI “… they (the integrated model) have failed 
to work as effectively as needed in a coordinated manner, threatening 
sustainable progress and increasing the burden on local programme staff and 
participants”  [XIX]. 
This confusion persisted into the pre-intervention period as well with 
acknowledgement from THF (The Health Foundation), the donor agency that 
“in the two approaches advocated by the IHI and LSTM, we (MaiKhanda) 
have been working with two very different paradigms for quality 
improvement”[XIV]. IHI with support from the donor agency suggested that 
MaiKhanda embrace the IHI Model for Improvement as a unified, core 
technical framework for managing change. It was asserted that a general 
adherence to this approach would limit confusion for program participants and 
staff as they seek to transform their outcomes.  
As a foundation to the early intervention period, the strategic review of 
programme intervention suggested “A single collaborative improvement 
project as a unified social action system to guide improvement activities. A 
focus on keeping care providers in their facilities and deeply valuing subject 
matter expertise i.e abundant skill, good will, knowledge and energy of the 
local health workforce and the communities in which they reside”[XIV]. This 
modification to the original concept meant revision of the intervention 
components.  
Following this there was a directive from the MaiKhanda Director, in the early 
intervention period (2009), suggesting a move from “quality” improvement (QI) 
to “facilities” intervention (FI)[XX]. This reflected the intent mentioned in the 
above statement to consider QI as the overarching approach throughout the 
programme. In 2009, there was a move to describe the entire set of 
interventions (including the community interventions) within MaiKhanda as QI.  
Thus the quality improvement work in the facilities was to be re-worded as 
‘Facilities intervention (FI)’ with QI being the overarching programme strategy 
for all of MaiKhanda’s interventions. Discussion on this was triggered by 
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concerns among staff, especially at the district level, about MaiKhanda’s 
“multiple identities” – something that seems to be perceived by the different 
groups of staff as well as by the stakeholders.  
“It was observed that calling one component of our work “Quality 
Improvement” suggests that attention to quality improvement is limited to just 
that one part of the program. Hence, the (MaiKhanda) team agreed to change 
the terminology and that from now all our work must reflect a quality 
improvement approach, i.e. we must infuse a QI approach throughout the 
program (community intervention, management support services, monitoring 
and evaluation).”[XX]  
This shift in the programme strategy from a facility based quality improvement 
intervention to having quality improvement as the overall strategy of the 
organization meant using the QI principles in the community intervention as 
well. This was never tested before and was not part of the original intervention 
design. In operational terms it was perceived as  “getting women to give birth 
at the facilities and then ensuring that they receive a ‘skilled delivery’ once 
they get to the facility” as the primary objective of the project[XXIX].  
External agents had a big role to play in developing the conceptual clarity 
around the intervention, with the donors subscribing to the changes suggested 
at different time points in the project (in fact, they were the ones suggesting 
and supporting this). However, in 2010, the donor reverted back to saying that 
“… all partners have a role to play in their respective expertise areas and thus 
women’s group interventions (though modified) and QI (also known as FI) 
were to be considered as independent interventions”[IX]. There was also 
general agreement that getting women to deliver at the facilities was not the 
primary objective of the project [IX]. 
Some other general areas of conceptual dissonance are presented. While it 
was agreed that improvement would be implemented across a vertical slice of 
the health system, the unit of analysis were the health centres-this was 
discussed and agreed to in the proposal. Much of the work though, was 
focused in the CEmOC facilities initially. But this was justified since it was the 
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baseline period where the interventions were being ‘tested’ in the Malawian 
context.  However work in the CEmOCs continued through the intervention 
period, with the rationale given by the implementing team that these facilities 
bear the maximum burden of deaths in the facility. The implicit assumption 
behind working along a vertical slice of the health systems and having health 
centres as the unit of analysis was that improvement of care in the health 
centres would help decongest the CEmOC facilities and thereby influence the 
mortality rate in these facilities. Secondly there was a greater emphasis on 
maternal mortality reduction and maternal change packages with newborn 
change packages being considered seriously only in the late intervention 
period. Thirdly, the original proposal was focusing on both mortality and 
morbidity-though morbidity was never addressed at anytime during the 
programme intervention-the focus being solely on mortality.  
And finally, throughout the length of implementation, there was greater focus 
on improving outcomes rather than improving processes of care. Based on 
the literature for quality improvement, QI is focused on improving the process 
and this is done using tools such as statistical process control chart and run 
charts. In a health system context, it means improving the processes of care. 
The process of care itself can be categorized into organizational service 
delivery and the actual process of care giving, which in turn is based on the 
values and beliefs of the care provider and their relationship and position 
within the organization and with their patients. Therefore, in order to improve 
quality of care, QI interventions need to focus on improving organizational 
service delivery and influencing individual behaviour change along with 
improvement methods, such as PDSA, at clinical microsystems level. But in 
practice, the focus at MaiKhanda was largely on improving the outcomes 
(case fatality rates). Focus on outcomes, especially distal outcome, can be 
misleading and demoralizing for staff, especially if one looks at them at 
frequent time intervals. 
In the late intervention period, there was a focus on improving the processes 
of care such as measuring and improving staff skills in neonatal resuscitation 
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within the “golden minute”[XXVII]. There was also a greater focus on engaging 
with the DHMTs [XXIV]. 
6.3.2 Intervention/design/
There were two models of improvement at the outset, which was supposed to 
be developed into an integrated model. These approaches, along with the 
Death Reviews and Data Improvement formed the core components of the QI 
implementation programme. But the recommendations from the original 
proposal[I] to develop an integrated improvement model never happened 
given the difference in approaches to QI amongst the two models. 
The integrated approach as used by the consortium was specialized in that, 
criterion based audit identified the WHAT question-i.e the gaps in MNH while 
PDSA tried to resolve the HOW question ie how these gaps could be filled. 
Thus the rapid PDSA cycles would come into play as soon as facilities had 
identified their own problems and begun the analysis of possible solutions.  
The death review (Audit) programme was based on MoH recommendations 
from the Malawi MNCH Roadmap.  Death reviews was an established 
practice within the Malawian health system and MaiKhanda’s role was to 
facilitate the local staff to conduct audits in a blame-free and participatory 
manner. The advantage with integrating death reviews within the integrated 
improvement model was that it was a directive from the MoH. As MoH had 
identified MDRs as one of their priority areas, it was less likely to face 
resistance from key stakeholders, especially at the district and sub-district 
level.  
A mid tem strategic review was held in 2008, where discussions were held 
with partners  to  see  if  there  would  be  better  ways of    implementing  the  
model[XV].  The intervention re-design suggested was the “IHI Model for 
Improvement as a unified, core technical framework for managing change”. 
Thus the IHI Model for Improvement was to provide the core framework for 
improvement activities undertaken by participating facilities. 
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Standards of care and criterion based death audits, which formed the basis for 
initiating improvement in the facilities, in the baseline and pre-intervention 
period, were not part of the intervention design in this revised model for 
improvement. The rationale was that the integrated model was incomplete as 
it included only one aspect of IHI’s suite of tools, positioned within the context 
of CBA and thus focused more on expert guidance for individual health care 
providers rather than motivating teams and building their capacity to identify 
implementation issues in the local context, recognize system weaknesses and 
work as a team to test solutions (for improvement) [XIX]. 
The donor expressed their rationale to follow IHI’s re-designed Model for 
Improvement and this culminated in the departure of LSTM (and subsequently 
LATH-the management arm of LSTM providing administrative support to the 
MaiKhanda programme) out of the Consortium.  
By the start of the early intervention period, there was a strategic shift from an 
integrated MaiKhanda specific improvement model to an IHI model for 
improvement.  
The revised activities included strengthened technical support to MaiKhanda 
and QI Teams, adherence to IHI model for improvement in health facilities, 
clinical skill building, data Improvement and leadership development, 
coaching and mentoring and technical support from MaiKhanda team. during 
action period. 
Improvement activities were initiated from the change packages developed as 
part of the intervention rather than from death reviews or audits. These 
change packages were developed initially on the basis the death reviews but 
later on was developed based on ‘gut-feeling’ and data emerging from the 
facilities.  
The intervention design, consisting of the model for improvement and 
breakthrough collaborative series remained stable throughout the rest of the 
implementation phase. The Rapid Cycle Improvement (PDSA) approach 
formed the crux of the intervention. It built on the providers’ knowledge base 
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and was to be done through a structured series of small interventions, 
designed by the providers themselves, thus using a ‘bottom-up’, participatory 
approach. MaiKhanda provided a facilitatory and supportive role rather than 
direct implementation of the intervention..  
 Overall neonatal mortality rate in the MaiKhanda intervention areas had not 
declined in the 30 months when the intervention was active, partly because of 
less focus on this as compared to maternal outcomes. The implementation 
review team acknowledged that effective change packages were under-
developed and there had been a lesser focus on neonatal outcomes [XV].  
The revised improvement model was not designed with decentralised 
implementation for the facilities intervention-it assumed a more organic spread 
of the interventions from the CEmOC facilities to the health centres. However, 
the original model was to use a vertical slice approach, which would take into 
consideration the district health services structure. Moreover, at the time of 
commissioning the study, the health centres were chosen as the unit of 
analysis. Thus the focus of the implementing partner was on improving 
service delivery at the CEmOC facilities. 
IHI had initially proposed a lean management structure  (with only one QI 
officer to cover the 3 districts) with the assumption that the intensity of 
coaching would reduce over time. But, in practice coaching had to be on-
going given the constant turn-over of staff and the fact that the concept of QI 
was new to the facilities. . The dynamic nature of staff movement within the 
facilities was anticipated but was not factored in the initial intervention design. 
It was clear throughout the course of programme implementation that stability 
of QI team was likely to have an effect on success of QI interventions, since it 
contributed to organizational memory and skills retention within the facilities. 
The initial intervention design had overestimated the capacity and the 
capability available within facilities to support the interventions. Some of the 
concepts also lacked clarity. For instance, super-improvers were trained for 
the CEmOC facilities but their position, role and status was not well justified in 
the programme. Furthermore, there was underestimation of human and 
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material requirements and logistics required by MaiKhanda to deliver the 
intervention. Data management strategy (ie linking the monitoring data from 
the implementation team with evaluation data from the evaluation team) was 
not designed from the outset. 
The project was originally designed to be scaled up to all areas of the three 
districts within five years. This scale-up phase was postponed because the 
partners felt the current interventions had not yet been successfully 
implemented [XXIX].  
6.3.3 Adaptability/
Adaptability of an intervention is key to its success and sustainability. 
Adaptability refers to the degree to which an intervention is flexible to the local 
context. Although there was a technical working group within the Ministry of 
health in Malawi for improving quality, the concept of ‘quality improvement’ 
was fairly new in the country and adaptability of a ‘quality improvement’ model 
was often overshadowed by the ‘quality assurance’ approach propagated by 
the Ministry’s technical working group on quality [XVIII].  
Taking this into consideration, the original program design had proposed 
death reviews as part of its core interventions. In Kasungu and Salima 
districts, monthly reviews of (maternal) deaths that occurred in the district, 
were conducted at the district hospital while in Lilongwe, reviews were 
conducted during monthly review meetings, which brought together 
representatives of the various health facilities to the district health office. 
Standard Safe Motherhood (SM) treatment protocols for the major emergency 
obstetric complications, which were developed by the national safe 
motherhood project, were available in nearly all maternities in the three 
districts [II]. At rural health facilities, facility-based reviews were not done in 
any of the three districts.  
Using the integrated QI approach (standards of care & death reviews), it 
would have been easier for MaiKhanda to create greater in-roads into the 
health centres as these interventions (i.e death reviews) were based along 
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MoH recommendations and therefore had better buy-in from the facilities [XII]. 
While death reviews were part of the original proposed integrated 
improvement model for MaiKhanda, it was not considered as part of the 
intervention after MaiKhanda’s strategic programme review in 2008 [XVII].   
The intensity of support provided by MaiKhanda’s facilitation team was an 
important factor affecting the adaptation of the PDSA cycles in the health 
facilities. In the initial stages of the intervention, the programme was 
implemented largely by the technical experts from the Consortium without 
much engagement of the MaiKhanda staff [X]. The idea was to hand over the 
knowledge and expertise directly to the QI teams on the ground. By the early 
intervention period, MaiKhanda was established as a local NGO within Malawi 
(rather than a project) and programme implementation through MaiKhanda 
was encouraged, with the Consortium members providing technical support 
where required [XV]. However, in the early intervention period there was only 
one QI officer responsible for all three districts [XIV], and this did not change 
until 2009 (the late intervention period) where there were QI officers at the 
district level and also for the CEmOC facilities [XVIII].  
Adaptations depend on the frequent testing of ideas. Conceptually, the 
PDSAs are rapid cycles of intervention done on as frequent basis as possible. 
There were assumptions regarding the ‘rapidity’ of the action cycles. In reality, 
the rapid action cycles could not be carried out at the speed and frequency, 
which was expected of the intervention. From the CEmOC survey, for the 
period form June 2006 to August 2008 a total of 92 QI activities (ideas to test) 
were reported to be conducted amongst the different CEmOC facilities. Of the 
92 ideas that were generated through the change packages, 26 ideas did not 
have any PDSAs run on them. For the 66 ideas that were tested, there were 
about 180 PDSAs run, giving an average of 2-3 PDSAs for each idea to test 
[VII]. This ability of QI teams to adapt the PDSAs to their local context was 
related to factors such as stability of the QI teams in the health facilities and 
their grasp of QI concepts. Although coaching was to be provided through an 
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initial intense phase followed by phasing out, in reality, coaching continued 
throughout the length of the project, given the staff turnover in the facilities.  
Adaptability of the intervention was also limited by the length of its 
implementation chain. The MaiKhanda interventions were characterized by 
long implementation chains. The programme strategy was handed down from 
the technical lead of consortium partners to the local team (MaiKhanda) on 
the ground. The MaiKhanda staff in turn built capacity of the implementation 
teams (QI teams) in the health facilities and facilitated the intervention. The QI 
teams were ultimately responsible for implementing the intervention on the 
ground.  
6.3.4 /Embeddedness/
Leadership buddy system, developing local leadership, QI champions, 
exchange visits were all additional activities planned in the original proposal 
for embedding QI into the health system [I]. MaiKhanda's interventions aimed 
to work alongside the Malawian Ministry of Health (MoH), in achieving their 
national ‘Road Map’ for reducing maternal and infant mortality. This included 
developing & implementing appropriate behaviour change interventions 
conduct maternal death reviews and clinical audit & strengthen health facilities 
at all levels with functional EmOC services [XII]. Maternal death reviews in 
health facilities, in line with Ministry of Health needs were used to identify 
problems and implement solutions in the baseline period of the intervention 
[XII]. However, facilities did report encountering resistance for their QI 
activities from other organisations working in their facility, during this period.  
“… their newly developed labour graph met resistance in the sense that the 
Safe Motherhood Initiative authorities said we should hold using it”(nursing 
staff, KCH) [III] 
While there was a strategy is to work closely with both health centres and 
DHMT (District Health Management Team) so that critical  needs  could  be  
incorporated and  budgeted for  in the  district  Implementation  Plan [XIV], 
MaiKhanda only engaged in strategic MoH meetings towards the end of the 
pre-intervention period [XX].  
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There was engagement with RHU and DHOs in MaiKhanda's strategic 
planning meeting which formed the basis for the final intervention. Capacity 
strengthening of MoH staff on data collection, interpretation and dissemination 
was done so that routine health facility data could be of good enough quality 
to be used for improvement purposes by the local QI teams. [XX].  
Towards the end of the late intervention period, it was noted that many of the 
breakthroughs in “women friendly care” and in standardizing data collection 
were being taken for granted by the facilities and new members of MaiKhanda 
team [XVII], suggestive of a degree of embeddedness of the women friendly 
change package within the health care system.  
Also, during this period, the MaiKhanda’s District Coordinators were to be 
entrusted with a central role in working with the Ministry of Health officials, to 
help get key changes developed and tested during facility Collaboratives, to 
be embedded within the district health care systems. This would include 
changes in MaiKhanda’s policy, guidelines, forms, job descriptions, and on-
going training of health care workers. A bigger roles for District Coordinators 
was envisaged as the QI intervention moved from testing to embedding within 
facilities [XVII]. 
However, toward the end of the late intervention period, it was documented 
that most changes were not being reliably implemented and had not been fully 
integrated into local, district, or national structures of the Malawian health 
system. This was attributed partly to the randomization design [IX, XXX].  
6.4 Health Systems Context 
Context can be considered at different levels like the rings of an onion, but 
unlike the onion rings, they do not have strict boundaries and there is usually 
an iterative and dynamic interaction between these different levels of the 
context. The different levels that I have considered here include the external 
environmental, the health systems context, the organizational context within 
the health facilities and MaiKhanda’s own internal context.  
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6.4.1 External/environment/
The level of political commitment for maternal and newborn heath in Malawi 
was very high as evidenced by the commitment to the Road Map proposed by 
the MoH. The Road Map for maternal and newborn health aimed to develop 
and implement appropriate behaviour change intervention and advocacy 
strategies to address maternal and newborn health issues, to conduct 
maternal death reviews and clinical audit and strengthen health facilities at all 
levels to ensure adequate coverage with functional CEmOC and BEmOC 
facilities.  
At the time of initiation of the project, the political environment in Malawi had 
been quite stable over the past year. With the government bid to end 
corruption there was confidence in money being used optimally thereby 
providing greater confidence among donor agencies to invest in the health 
sector in Malawi. A good example was that of SWAp (Sector Wide Approach), 
the EHP (Essential Health Package) and EHRP (Emergency Human 
Resource Package) being implemented across the health sector with 
commitment from different stakeholders. The Emergency Human Resources 
in Health initiative supported by providing salary top-ups and other incentives 
for health care workers(210). 
With Malawi receiving funds from GFATM (Global Funds for AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria) for health systems strengthening, ‘global HSAs’ 
were trained and deployed by the government with each HSA covering a 
catchment population of not more that 1,000 (while previously it was a 
population of 4,000). These initiatives although directed towards broader 
health systems, had an indirect influence on maternal and newborn health in 
the country(10, 12, 214).   
The quality improvement programme facilitated by MaiKhanda came into 
Malawi at a time when the maternal and newborn mortality in Malawi was 
comparatively very high (§1.2). Quality was beginning to be considered an 
essential element of care and various interventions such as the quality 
assurance project by JHPIEGO was being institutionalized in many district 
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hospitals. Ministry of Health had also constituted a Quality Assurance 
Technical Working Group.  
Despite these national level efforts, there were challenges in the facilities. 
Implementation of essential BEmOC signal functions, was erratic and most 
facilities did not qualify as a BEmOC site.  The MaiKhanda programme had 
effective supportive systems as one of its change packages. Death reviews as 
supported by MoH had little value as it was mainly for reporting purposes with 
hardly any action being taken on the recommendations. MaiKhanda through 
its innovative tools and techniques such as rapid improvement cycles (PDSA) 
and criterion based audits hoped to support QI teams in making the 
recommendations from the death reviews actionable. The establishment of 
change packages was also aimed at bringing about improvements in maternal 
and newborn care in the health facilities at the microsystems level. 
Despite all the external initiatives characterized by donor funding and external 
budget support, availability and utilization of drugs and supplies at the district 
and CEmOC facilities was perennially inadequate [II,IV,VII]. From the facility 
resources survey, it is clear that districts with better resources performed 
better, despite staff shortages. For example, Salima district was a role model 
district, with its better availability of drugs and materials was relatively better 
performing district as compared to Kasungu and Lilongwe [XXI, XXV].  
With the EHRP, the donor community was trying to address the gap in human 
resources existing in Malawi. However, the problem of human resources 
availability within the health system persisted throughout the length of 
MaiKhanda project and this had implications on how the interventions were 
delivered on the ground. The problem persisted through the early and late 
intervention period and it varied across the districts [IV]. The health facility 
resources survey of 29 HCs showed only 14% of the staff were clinical, while 
HSAs constituted the bulk of remaining non-clinical staff. Of the clinical staff, 
majority of them were nurses (71%).  
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At the time of the baseline survey in 2006, it was a national policy that at the 
ante-natal clinic women were requested to bring with them when they come to 
a health facilities to give birth, a clean plastic sheet to lie on, a clean razor 
blade to cut the cord, and two chitenjes (pieces of cloth worn as a sarong, 
usually by women), one to cover herself and the other to wrap the baby. Most 
women who delivered in health facilities would adhere to this request [II]. It is 
not clear whether this policy had an effect on the perceived quality of delivery 
care at health facilities. However, this policy was no longer in existence when 
MaiKhanda started its project in Malawi in 2007. 
Another policy of the government at that time, which affected the intervention 
in the early intervention phase (2008), was the comprehensive ban on 
traditional birth attendants by the government to conduct deliveries at 
home(215). This was supported by village chiefs and Traditional Authorities, 
who imposed ban (such as a goat or chicken) for women delivering outside of 
facilities. This had implications for programme implementation as facility 
deliveries went up significantly between 2007 and 2010, from about 40% of 
deliveries to about 80% of deliveries (Figure 22). The ban got lifted in 2010 as 
quickly as it was imposed. 
Programme implementation  was  also  affected  by  competing  programmes  
of  other  partner organizations. Other MNH projects that were being 
implemented in the health facilities included: Antenatal Care Improvement, 
Mother to Mother/, IMCI (Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses), 
CBDA (Community Based Distribution Agent) supported by MSH 
(Management Sciences for health), Advanced Life Support Obstetric Course 
(ALSO), CESTA (an Italian NGO) which provided refresher training to 
midwives and allowances for locum shift midwives, home-based care by 
MSH, reproductive Health sponsored by UNFPA, Infection prevention, 
PMTCT Programme [VII]. DHOs  in  both  Kasungu  and  Lilongwe  were  also  
working  with  other  partners  like  MSH  and  JHPIEGO  who  were involved 
in  quality  assurance interventions  and   other health  related  programmes.  
As such sometimes it was difficult   for the  implementing partners (QI teams)  
to  concentrate   fully  on  MaiKhanda programme   activities. As much as 
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MaiKhanda was competing for the same pool of local talent as other partners, 
there was also competition in terms of ideologies regarding quality 
improvement.  
Fuel prices  had gone  up  impacting on programme budgets [XVII]. The 
global rise  in  fuel  prices  has  also  had  a negative  impact  on  transport  
for  project  implementation.  
6.4.2 Health/systems/readiness/
6.4.2.1 BEmOC+and+CEmOC+facilities:+
At the time of initiation of the MaiKhanda project in 2006, Malawi had almost 
double the recommended minimum number of Comprehensive EmOC 
facilities (1.8 facilities per 500,000 population) but only 2% of the 
recommended number of Basic EmOC facilities (0.1 facilities per 500,000 
population). There is no equity with respect to geographical distribution. The 
met need for EmOC was about 18.5%, which is far below the UN 
recommended level of 100%. Quality of EmOC services is generally poor as 
seen by a case fatality rate of 3.4% which is much higher than the UN 
recommended level of less than 1% (216). In the baseline survey conducted 
in 2006, none of the surveyed health centres could be classified as a fully 
functioning BEmOC facility. None of them had all the 6 signal functions 
working at the time of the survey [II]. This was similar to the findings in the 
EMoC assessment survey conducted by the RHU.  
Maternal and newborn health services were provided by 13 hospitals and 60 
health centres in the three districts where MaiKhanda was to start its project 
implementation. Nine hospitals functioned as CEmOC facilities - one in 
Kasungu, one in Salima and seven in Lilongwe. None of the health centres 
could provide all the BEmOC signal functions at the time of the survey. LLW 
has a population that is nearly 6 times the size of a normal district. The HCs 
have on average 10,000 additional population to deal with thereby increasing 
workload [VI]. 
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6.4.2.2 Care+provision+
In the early part of the project, all three districts of Kasungu, Lilongwe and 
Salima, the proportion of expected deliveries conducted in health facilities, 
was around 40%. There was however, district level variations with the 
proportion of expected deliveries being higher in Lilongwe (45.4%) as 
compared to Kasungu (27.7%) or Salima (28.9%) [II]. In general, there 
seemed low utilization of delivery services. Only a limited number of signal 
functions were available at the facilities and that too remained 
inconsistent(33). 
Almost all health facilities were baby-friendly facilities- babies were wiped dry 
and wrapped in a cloth after birth, given to the mother shortly after delivery 
and the mother was encouraged to initiate breastfeeding the baby. Screens or 
curtains were available in the delivery room in 59 out of 73 health facilities 
(81%). In most health facilities women are allowed to take food and move 
around while in labour. However a companion – such as her mother or sister - 
was allowed to stay with the mother in the labour ward only in 22 out of 73 
health facilities (30.1%).  A bed-sheet to cover the mother while in the delivery 
room was available in 26 out of 73 maternities (35.6%)  [II].   
In the pre and early intervention period, while facility QI teams and other 
health workers were keen on improving the quality of care in the early 
intervention period, in many facilities (e.g. in Mlale and Bwaila hospital) 
overcrowding in nursery and delivery areas and shortage of equipment and 
supplies (e.g. laboratory reagents) were major constraints [XIX]. 
For Lilongwe, the more urban a health centre was, the more nurses it had and 
thus also lower nurse to delivery ratio. This perhaps suggests an inclination of 
health centre staff for work in more urban areas with their amenities and 
access to better schools for their children. Despite this staff motivation is 
lowest in Lilongwe as compared to other districts [VI]. In Kasungu and Salima, 
health centres are generally more rural. However, Salima health centres 
appear less disadvantaged than those in Lilongwe and Kasungu, with more of 
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them having access to electricity, mains water and tar roads, lower nurse to 
delivery ratios and lower case fatality rates [IV].  
6.4.2.3 Referral+system+
Long distances to health facilities, particularly emergency obstetric care 
facilities, and lack of means of transport were major problems affecting the 
referral system in the rural areas of the three districts, while during rainy 
season navigating the un-tarred roads was difficult. At baseline, Salima and 
Kasungu districts had a better-organised referral system, based on a 
functional radio communication system between health facilities, so that they 
were able to call for an ambulance from the district hospital when an 
emergency case needed referral. In Kasungu, all health facilities had a radio 
communication system or a ground telephone line, and a car ambulance 
available in 5 out of its 28 health facilities (28%).  In Salima, all health facilities 
had a functional radio communication system, but only two health facilities 
had a car ambulance. In Lilongwe all health facilities had radios, but only 13 
out of the 42 (31%) were functioning, and 13 out of 42 (31%) health facilities 
had a car ambulance [II].  
6.4.2.4 Death+reviews+
At the time of baseline survey in 2006, few maternal deaths (MDs) happened 
at rural HCs and most MDs occur either in tertiary hospitals or at home. In 
Kasungu and Salima, regular reviews of maternal deaths (MDs) that occurred 
in each district was conducted at the district hospital on a monthly basis. In 
Lilongwe, MD reviews were conducted at monthly review meetings, which 
brought together representatives of the various health facilities to the district 
health office. At rural health facilities, facility-based MD reviews were not done 
in any of the three districts. While, there was an expectation from the MoH 
that health facilities would complete all their own MDRs, in reality the facilities 
had many challenges.  For example, Kamuzu Central Hospital (KCH) 
experienced a large number of maternal deaths, and often there were not 
enough personnel available to complete each MDR.  
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Peri-natal or neonatal deaths reviews were reported to be done at a few 
health facilities only [II].  
The focus throughout the initial part of MaiKhanda project was largely on 
maternal death review. Neonatal death review had not been initiated in most 
facilities at the time of the survey. The focus on reducing neonatal deaths was 
not as strong as maternal deaths because facilities chose to focus on 
maternal deaths. This is because health centres did not have the equipment 
such as ambu bags that would help them with managing neonatal 
complications. But even with equipments, there was still need to create a 
system in place before hand[XXXI].  
6.4.2.5 Resource+availability:++
A serious set-back to the provision of quality maternal health care services 
was the critical shortage of qualified health workers, especially professional 
midwives. Most health facilities in the three districts, particularly health centres 
in remote rural areas, were understaffed and health centres usually were 
staffed with only 1 or 2 midwives, which was inadequate to ensure continuity 
of maternity services. In some rural health facilities the nurse-midwife also had 
attend to general outpatients as well, which also had an affect on the quality of 
maternal health services being provided [II].  
Shortage of staff meant that staff transfers lead to void in the facilities where 
the staff were moving out from. In addition, in the bigger CEmOC facilities 
there was also the issue of being transferred within the hospital to other 
wards. Thus, health workers  that  were  trained  in  QI either  left  or  were 
transferred  thereby  creating  a  gap in the continuity of the intervention [VII]. 
In theory, training and coaching in QI at MaiKhanda was to be done in a 
phased manner, such that local champions were able to take lead in QI 
coaching over a period of time. But in reality the high turnover of  staff  meant 
that coaching had to be continued throughout the period of the project and this 
slowed down the quality  and  progress  of  QI  activities  in  most  facilities  
that  MaiKhanda  was working in. 
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Another issue related to human resources was the non-availability of the 
already limited staff in their facilities given the vast number of training and 
workshops that were being conducted by various stakeholders in the country. 
Despite all these trainings, there was a critical shortage of neonatal clinicians 
and neonatal care skills in some facilities this led to reduced attention to 
newborn care. For example, Kasungu did not have a paediatrician for 10 
years and when provided with support for QI work, they requested a 
paediatrician for 2 days a week [XIX]. 
Cleanliness of the maternity environment, availability of water, electricity for 
lighting, equipment, drugs and supplies have a bearing on the quality of 
maternity care. Several rural health centres relied for their water supply on 
borehole water, which was kept in buckets in the labour ward [II]. The health 
facility resources survey conducted later in the programme was not any more 
encouraging than the findings that were at the baseline period. While (52%) of 
the health centres have both electricity and water supply, almost one third of 
the health centres (31%) had neither water nor electricity. These were mainly 
the rural health centres, which also had poor roads [IV]. However, most of the 
health centres in Salima were also rural, but more than half of them had road 
access and all of them had access to water supply and electricity. 
Health centres are very under-resourced in general with the minority having 
functional ambulances, some not even having functional clocks in their labour 
ward or functional BP apparatus and most not having clinical officers available 
at night and some not even having nurses available at night. While 14 (48%) 
of health centres had all the materials available, only 9 (31%) health centres 
had all the materials functional. 
In terms of comparisons between districts there were some differences such 
as Salima having fewer health centres with functional ambu bags but more 
with functional car ambulances, and more with functional clocks in their labour 
wards; Lilongwe having fewer health centres with functional radio 
communication. Salima health centres are generally better off than Kasungu 
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and Lilongwe health centres with respect to electricity, water and deliveries 
per nurses per year; but they were worse off on indicators such as deliveries 
per bed.  
At health centres supplies of oxytocins and antibiotics had not improved from 
the time since the interventions were initiated- half were without these 
essential drugs at any one time. Most of the 62 health centres provided only 1 
or 2 of the 6 signal functions of basic obstetric care and some not providing 
any at all.  Lilongwe health centres, with an average of 1.0 of the six BEmOC 
signal functions available in any given health centre in any given month, were 
worse off than Kasungu health centres (average of 2.3) which are worse off 
than Salima health centres (average of 2.9) [IV]. 
6.4.2.6 Organizational+Culture+
Based on the findings from the Staff Psychology Survey and CEmOC survey, 
the organizational culture in Malawi is very hierarchical in nature [VI,VII]. The 
relationship of staff with their supervisors was perceived to be good, but 
consultations by the senior leadership or supervisors on work-related 
decisions was usually lacking. This lack of freedom to take decisions about 
their work, meant that it was more difficult for staff to test out new ideas using 
the PDSA cycle. An environment fostering innovation and autonomy by staff 
to carry out such improvement work was apparently lacking at times. Staff 
also complained of a lack of supervision by their supervisors [VI]. 
Nurses were worse off than medical assistants when it comes to relationships 
with other staff and colleagues in their setting [VI]. Medical assistants were 
less engaged with the patients as compared to the nurses. Urban health 
centre staff were worse off than their counterparts in rural areas in terms of 
their motivation, interest in the current job and relationship with colleagues 
and other members of staff in their setting. 
The climate in the facilities was generally pleasant-staff got on well with each 
other, could discuss problems with colleagues, encourage each other and had 
good relations with their superiors. 
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Staff are not always accommodating to patients. A third of the respondents, 
from the staff psychology survey, said that staffs speak rudely at their health 
facility some of the time. Only 50% of the staff said that they would 
recommend a friend/relative to deliver at their facility [V]. Government staffs 
were consistently worse than CHAM staff facility in this regard. But there are 
differences between districts as well. For example, Salima appear on average 
to be more women-friendly than those in Lilongwe [VIII]. This resonates with 
other studies, which indicate the existence of a relatively better health service 
in Salima [IV]. In the intensified intervention period, 37% of the respondents 
(mainly nurses) felt that women should labour in the position of their choice 
[V]. There are other differences as well between the districts on a variety of 
determinants. LLW is worse of on issues related to happiness, job interest 
and conflict with patients [VI].  
In general, CHAM facilities (for example Likuni Mission hospital and 
St.Gabriel’s) were more active in implementing the change packages using 
the improvement cycle as compared to government facilities.  
While the social network within the facilities were reported to be good, the 
network between facilities was poor [VI]. The QI Collaborative provided an 
opportunity for links between health centres thus improving the potential for 
spreading QI work between facilities.  
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6.5 Internal context within MaiKhanda 
This section describes the evolution of MaiKhanda as an organization and 
includes its structural characteristics, governance and oversight mechanism, 
donor role and partnership, network and communication and capacity within 
MaiKhanda.  
6.5.1 Structural/Characteristics/
To begin with, although the Programme had 37 staff members on board for 
the project, for the QI intervention, there was only one officer at the beginning 
of the project responsible for QI and another officer responsible for criterion-
based audits and maternal death reviews, both based at the central office in 
Lilongwe [XV]. MaiKhanda had established district offices, but these were not 
utilized for the purposes of QI intervention. 
The reason for adapting such a centralized lean model was based on IHI’s 
theory of improvement as well as their experience of having done similar work 
in Peru and certain regions in Russia. IHI’s model for improvement is itself 
based on the approach of diffusion of innovation, where innovation and ideas 
for improving care surface in local settings and the IHI role was that of a 
catalyst to help cultivate these innovative concepts and facilitate the spread of 
these ideas through peer-to peer learning such as the “Breakthrough 
Collaborative Series”. Their previous experiences in Peru and Tula Oblast 
region in Russia had used similar team based approaches and were hailed as 
success stories (126, 169). 
The plan for the project in Malawi was to develop a focused change package 
and begin initial work in the Central hospital in Lilongwe and CEmOC facilities, 
providing support to the clinical leadership and identify ‘champions’. By 
working with District Health Management Teams (DHMTs) and having 
Collaborative learning sessions across the ‘vertical slice’ of the health system, 
the project expected to cover two-thirds of all the facilities in the 3 districts 
over a period of 2 years. ‘Knowledge Agents’ were to be identified from within 
the Ministry of Health who would be trained and coached, so that they sustain 
the interventions in the long run[I]. 
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The intervention design, therefore, envisaged a single QI officer operating 
centrally from Lilongwe facilitating activities in all 3 districts and in the CEmOC 
facilities. The focus was on district and central (CEmOC) hospitals while 
continuing to work with smaller hospitals at same time [XI]. The focus on 
health centres (the main unit of analysis for the cRCT) was less of a priority in 
the pre-intervention period, the rationale being that pre-intervention period 
was used mainly to understand the health system and also to test the 
combined model of improvement.  
However, the rapidity and spread of the intervention was perhaps over-
estimated. Towards the end of 2007, the Collaboratives were still focusing on 
the CEmOCs and mainly on maternal change packages. The rapidity of 
spread of intervention as originally envisaged for the QI intervention was also 
perhaps dampened by the consideration to develop a combined model of 
improvement, which would integrate the criterion-based audit with the rapid 
cycle improvement (PDSAs). This was complicated by the fact that part of the 
integrated model, the CBA and MDR, managed by the MNH Programme 
Officer (with its affiliations to LSTM), reported through MaiKhanda’s existing 
management structures while the rapid cycle improvement component of the 
intervention was reporting directly to the Technical Leads, bypassing 
MaiKhanda’s organizational structures [XIII].  
This complicated structure was thus perceived to be incapable of producing a 
cohesive outcome, leading to waste and duplication on the ground, 
undermining the role of the in-country team and demoralizing staff [XIV]. 
A re-design of the intervention was approved by the Board of the donor 
agency and this had implications for the structural and functional aspects of 
the programme. The changes included the appointment of a full-time 
Programme Director within Malawi, who would be the single point of contact 
for the Consortia partners, a single integrated workplan with a single 
programme budget. In addition, a Faculty Lead from IHI would be the principle 
technical advisor to the Programme Director in order to support the 
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development of an integrated workplan covering all elements of the technical 
support [XIII].  
In the early intervention period (i.e 2007-08), with the appointment of a 
Director the programme transitioned from a project to a locally registered 
NGO in Malawi and came to be known as MaiKhanda. Quality Improvement 
was proposed as the overarching strategy for the programme, with the quality 
improvement in the facilities being renamed as facilities intervention. This 
facility intervention had some new team members joining them namely a Data 
Coordinator and Asst. QI Officer. There were also plans to have district level 
QI Officers but they were not recruited until July 2009 [XXIII]. 
The logistics of engaging the relatively large number of health centres from 
across the 3 districts, mainly for the QI work, was not really well thought 
through in the early intervention period. The other components of the 
intervention such as the community intervention work and the evaluation team 
in the districts working through the District Co-ordinators. But, for QI, the 
Officer worked directly with the QI teams (both district and central), bypassing 
MaiKhanda’s district structures.  
There were constant changes to the QI staff at MaiKhanda during the later 
intervention period that affected the continuity in supporting front-line QI 
teams [IX].  
6.5.2 Governance/and/oversight/
There was discussion at the beginning of the project in 2006, in particular of 
the need for the workplan to reflect the attempt to create a single, shared 
model of QI and all activities to be owned and genuinely led by the team on 
the ground. There was also a plea for greater degree of clarity about visits to 
Malawi by overseas individuals, particularly roles of Technical Advisors (TA). 
It was agreed that all visits, their timing, purpose and agenda need to be 
driven by local needs, rather than by what suits the diaries or interests of TA 
providers [X]. 
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There were misunderstandings concerning the integrated model, and with 
regards to which partner should take the lead in QI.  This resulted in the 
perception that there was no ownership for the integrated model. There were 
also discrepancies in how MaiKhanda’s consortium partners identified 
themselves when introducing themselves in the facilities. For example some 
staff members introduce themselves as MaiKhanda, whereas others affiliated 
themselves with their parent organization (such as IHI or LSTM).  This 
inconsistency in the identification of MaiKhanda as one team resulted in 
confusion at the facility level [III]. 
During the pre-intervention period, the management capabilities of the team 
on the ground saw the programme evolve within a short span of time despite 
the initial delay in implementing the project.  However the team felt that they 
were not being given adequate breathing space to develop their full potential 
given the differences of opinion among the senior members of the consortium 
on the way the programme was to be implemented. This caused a lot of grief 
and frustration among the forbearers of the programme on the ground 
affecting staff morality and level of functioning [III]. 
The interventions in the baseline period were implemented directly by a 
resident improvement advisor from IHI. Local management structure was not 
clear before the start of the intervention and evolved over a period of time.  
As much as there was tension regarding the integrated model for 
improvement, it partly stemmed from individual partners perception regarding 
their position within the organization. IHI considered itself the lead partner in 
the organization while LATH was responsible for managing the activities of the 
Consortium in country.  
During the baseline period, the team in Malawi was lead by a Programme 
Manager, but the extent to which some lines of accountability within the team 
were not clear. The Programme Manager was line managed by LATH on 
behalf of the whole Consortium. LSTH, IHI and WCF were to provide advice to 
the Programme Manager about the technical content of the intervention.  The 
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QI officer was line manage by IHI directly, but as a member of the Malawi 
team, was accountable to the Programme Manager. The QI officer was an 
expatriate and a direct employee of IHI, but there were plans in place to 
identify a local counterpart who would eventually takeover the role. There was 
this implicit assumption that such a local QI officer would be under the direct 
line management of the Programme Manager. This was made explicit during 
the mid-term strategic review in 2008 [XVII].  
The idea to promote local ownership gained prominence in 2008 
characterized by the establishment and registration of MaiKhanda as a local 
NGO and the appointment of a Director for the programme. In the early 
intervention period, MaiKhanda Senior Management Team was formed which 
discussed and developed a “committee” structure of management which was 
shared and discussed with the full MaiKhanda staff during the annual strategic 
planning meeting in 2008 [XVII]. A three-tier management structure was 
adopted: (i) Senior Management Team (SMT) based centrally in Lilongwe; (ii) 
Operational Management Team (OMT) consisting of all the members of the 
SMT and the three District Coordinators; and (iii) the District Management 
Team (DMT) consisting of key MaiKhanda district staff [XX].   
Since the establishment of MaiKhanda as a NGO under the local leadership, 
the Director reported a significant improvement in MaiKhanda team wellbeing 
“with a growing sense of cohesion and capacity for collegial decision-
making”[XX]. 
By the beginning of the early intervention period in 2009, governance was 
affected by the absence of quality improvement staff in the districts and the 
generally weak communications between district staff and the central office 
quality improvement team. This was seen as a constraint to MaiKhanda’s 
district-focused decentralized approach. It was perceived by district level 
stakeholders as though there were two separate organizations in operation -- 
a community-based one and a facility-based one [XIX]. 
Despite the move towards local in-country leadership and a furthermore 
decentralized district based approach, technical advisors still played a major 
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say in the programme management leading to misunderstandings between 
the local team and the technical partners. Strained relations between 
MaiKhanda Director and IHI Technical Lead in the late intervention period 
were a further detriment to smooth governance on the ground. Concern were 
raised over who ultimately makes decisions. The Programme Director 
criticized the consortium governance stating that “…the Salima Proposal and 
the Communications Strategy died because the decisions are ultimately made 
‘over there’”. [XXXII] 
6.5.3 Donor/role/and/partner/relationships/
There were frequent strategic changes to the intervention during the lifetime of 
the project, mainly influenced by the donor agency and technical partners.  
At the beginning of 2007, after the first combined workshop in February, 2007 
there was support for the integrated model for improvement from the donor. 
There was a strong recommendation from the donor that “the ‘lead’ column 
should be removed from the workplan and… for all activities to be owned and 
genuinely led by the team on the ground, not by overseas organisations.” [XI] 
However by end 2007, there was recognition by the donor that the integrated 
model was not viable. It felt that the ‘integrated’ approach was not 
materialising in practice, in large part because there were separate budgets 
were being held for the individual strands of the work, separate workplans for 
the different technical inputs and separate decision-making processes, often 
with key decisions being made outside the country. In November 2007, The 
Health Foundation issued a statement aligning with IHI model for 
Improvement, calling for a reorganization of the set up. Thus the donor 
engagement in the project had a great influence on the intervention planning 
and design and eventual roll out of the interventions [XIII]. A pre-intervention 
period had to be considered, since the intervention was not considered ready 
for uptake, which lasted for 20 months [XIV].  
LSTM and IHI were the main partners responsible for the QI intervention.  
Although the partners were responsible for different components of the QI 
work (LSTM – MDR, standards and CBA, IHI – PDSA, data improvement) as 
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MaiKhanda approach aimed at integration, so the roles of the partners would 
ideally also have been integrated.  For example, IHI would use the information 
available from MDRs to facilitate the development of ideas, which would be 
implemented in the PDSA. The MDR and the CBA were used by LSTM for 
identifying problems, and areas for improvement, and then the role of IHI was 
to take these problems and work with the teams to find and test ideas to 
rectify these problems, before implementation. Therefore there needed to be a 
strong link between the work going on with MDR, CBAs and PDSAs.  
However, the senior members of partner organizations did not necessarily 
agree with this shared sense of responsibility. They felt that a lot of resources 
and time had been spent working on the collaboration and coordination, and 
that the integrated approach had not worked successfully as originally 
envisaged and that the integrated model was not implemented effectively in 
the facilities. The language of partnership was felt as lacking between the 
different partner organizations and therefore, while MaiKhanda had a very 
strong and committed staff working on the ground, the affiliation of these staff 
members to their parent technical partners affected their functioning as a 
coherent team. The implications of such a disintegrated approach was more 
subtle. It was not reflected in the day-to-day activities performed 
interchangeably between the staff members rather, the implications were 
more intrinsic. Various team members during their interaction with the 
evaluation team for the baseline evaluation, had expressed increasing amount 
of frustration in performing their duties as a ‘team’ [XII] 
“… we need to get clarity in terms of what the combined approach is...we 
need to blend the expertise, and for us to blend we need to reach a 
consensus”  (MaiKhanda staff member) [XII]. 
The donor’s dual role as 'partner' as well as ‘donor’ added to the complexity of 
the arrangement. There was a lack of clarity among the consortium members 
as to what the donor’s role as partner was. In addition they made it clear that 
their affiliation was with IHI’s model for improvement, having collaborated on 
previous projects with them in the NHS in UK [XIII].  
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However, by the early intervention period, The Health Foundation clarified that 
MaiKhanda was a decentralised program, and that IHI is the lead partner with 
a role in QI technical execution and other partners also have roles in 
executions of their technical areas [XXII].  
6.5.4 Network/and/Communication/
The programme design had outlined channels of communication amongst 
Consortium partners and with the MaiKhanda team. There were also regular 
forums for communication such as the biannual Programme Management 
Board (PMB) meeting (which included MaiKhanda facilitation team, technical 
advisors, consortium and donor representatives). In addition, monthly and 
quarterly progress reports were shared with all partners. Yet communication 
was identified as a challenge in the beginning of the programme [XV] and 
remained a challenge throughout the programme.  
It was observed in the baseline evaluation (2007) that IHI was deviating from 
what was agreed upon in the proposal and more importantly, “There have not 
been any consultations or even communications with the other partners” 
about these deviations”.  There were a number issues being raised with 
regard to communication within the Consortium, for example appropriate staff 
members were not receiving the correct information [III]. 
There were other instances when partners expressed concern that they were 
not fully informed on what was going on in the Programme – i.e. they were not 
engaged in discussions regarding the strategic shift from quality improvement 
to facilities improvement and QI being the overall unifying programme 
strategy. Secondly, they had not been informed about what activities the 
Technical Lead had been doing [XV]. 
Initial challenges were with the external consortium partners and the 
MaiKhanda team. Partners continued to  communicate  directly  with  their  
responsible Program  Officers without  involving the  Program  Manager. This 
settled in 2008 with the appointment of a Programme Director. But as the 
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programme became decentralised there was a need for strengthening 
communication between the MaiKhanda central team and districts.  
Nevertheless, internal communication improved in the early intervention 
period, with the Programme Director focused on understanding and reviewing 
the internal management systems and operations and working with staff to 
make improvements at two levels, namely the strategic management level 
and the operational level. Despite all the structures and forums, 
communication still remained a challenge between districts and with central 
office. Many problems were identified due to lack of communication. 
Stakeholders in the districts did not always see MaiKhanda as one project 
because MaiKhanda staffs from the districts were not involved in QI activities. 
“Our friends from the central office just come into the district and we 
sometimes just hear of events happening via the partners. MaiKhanda central 
office needs to fully engage district staff in QI so that they know what is 
happening”(Kasungu District Office). [XIX] 
Another example was that on allowances – each district had been choosing 
its own levels of allowances and this was confusing to partners who thought of 
MaiKhanda as a set of different organizations. Communication from central 
office was also identified as being problematic, as one of the District 
Coordinators quoted, “ Many times you just get a call or an email saying 
things have now changed and you are to do this or do that without any written 
formal communication stating the policy; written communication is important. 
Written communication to District Co-ordinators needs to be streamlined” 
[XIX]. 
Scheduling and maintaining appointments for follow up at HCs was often 
difficult, largely due to limited staff available at the district level. This was 
resolved with the appointment of district QI staff but then there were other 
issues such as lack of transportation. 
Towards the end of the early intervention period, communication from the 
Technical Lead was mainly with the Facility Improvement (although it had 
been agreed that QI would be the overarching theme for MaiKhanda), by-
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passing the MaiKhanda organizational structure leading to conflict with the 
role of Programme Director.  
6.5.5 Capacity/within/MaiKhanda/
During the pre-intervention period, MaiKhanda did not  have  officers  
responsible  for QI  activities  at  district  level.  With the rolling  out  of  QI 
activities  into  health  centres,  it  was  extremely  difficult  for  the available  
QI staff  to  conduct  mentoring  and  coaching  visits  to  all  facilities  and  
follow  up  on the  teams projects.  There was a felt need to consider having  
district  based QI officers  who  could  provide  on-going  support   to QI  
teams  at  district  level. Subsequently, a number of training activities for 
MaiKhanda was recommended and infact, also took place [XX]. These 
included training in life saving skills for MNH officers, improvement advisory 
training for QI programme, training in financial and accounting system. Others 
included super improvers (from facilities) training and establishment of an 
Improvement Advisory Board (although this was not sustained through the 
length of the project). Thus, there was a special focus on capacity building in 
the early intervention period. There was a significant focus and investment in 
professional development for both existing team members and new recruits. 
This included initial orientation of new FI members with support from IHI 
technical advisors, and an ongoing on-the-job coaching and mentoring of the 
entire team by IHI technical team [XXIII]. In addition, senior MaiKhanda staff 
were on the IA (Improvement Advisor) course supported by IHI. A draft 
training plan with areas of need was developed.  
Recruitment of district-based officers had stabilized and improved focus on QI 
activities with more frequent coaching visits to QI teams, which was critical in 
influencing QI application on the ground [XV].  
By early 2010, MaiKhanda staff had completed their Improvement Advisor 
Development program, preparing them to assist Senior Management in QI.  
The data capabilities of MaiKhanda team were also developed [XVII]. 
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In addition to the QI trainings, custom-designed week-long management and 
leadership development workshop was also supported by THF in 2010 [IX]. 
6.5.6 Self/Efficacy/within/MaiKhanda:/
In the pre-intervention period, MaiKhanda was not able to engage district  
based  stakeholders  in  QI  activities  especially the DHMT  or  District  
assemblies. The strategy was to work closely with both health  centres and 
DHMT  so  that  critical  needs  could  be  incorporated and  budgeted for  in 
the  district  Implementation  Plan [XIV]. 
With the establishment of district based  QI team leadership at  district  level 
in the late intervention period,  involvement  of  DHMT  in  QI  activities was 
perceived by MaiKhanda to be  very  effective.  They felt that QI teams  and  
DHMT  owned  the  programme  activities  and worked  together  to  improve 
the  quality  of care  in  their  facility.  However, a lack  of  budget allocation for 
QI  activities  in  their  DIPs (District Implementation Plans) affected  effective  
implementation  of  the  programme activities [XX], reflecting a lack of 
embeddedness of QI activities at the district level.  
MaiKhanda perception regarding uptake of QI intervention by the facilities was 
usually positive but with very little data to substantiate the claims. For 
instance, during the early intervention period, improvement  projects were 
perceived  as instilling  some kind  of  discipline  among  QI  teams  such  that  
they  took  it  as  their  responsibility  to  ensure  that women  coming  to them  
for  care  do  not die  of  complications that  could be  avoided [XVII]. 
However, there was no evidence to support this claim. Routine monitoring 
data within MaiKhanda was lacking throughout the length of the project. 
During the late intervention period, according to MaiKhanda QI team, 
concerted support to QI teams in facilities yielded good results. Frequent 
coaching visits to QI team in the facilities motivated them. Health Centre and 
CEmOC Collaboratives had changed the mindset of many teams on the 
provision of quality care for the better as they continuously learnt from each 
other and developed new change ideas for testing [XV]. All this reflected an 
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increased confidence within MaiKhanda team to deliver QI interventions but, 
there were challenges in actual implementation on the ground. Frontline staff 
continued to be challenged by the huge expectations fuelled by the extreme 
poverty in the areas MaiKhanda worked in and the “hand-out syndrome” that 
has become so prevalent in Malawian society over the last 10-15 years 
[XXIII]. 
6.6 Individual Characteristics 
This refers to the dynamic interplay between individuals in the health facilities 
and their organizations context that influences individual or organizational 
behaviour change. This section covers staff knowledge and belief about the 
intervention, their self-efficacy, motivation, teamwork and stability and 
leadership within the system.  
6.6.1 Knowledge/and/beliefs/about/the/intervention://
At the launch of the intervention in 2006, quality improvement was still a 
relatively new concept for the health care system in Malawi. While there 
seemed to be a better understanding of what the intervention was supposed 
to achieve, the links between the various QI activities proposed was less 
clear. A number of facilities suggested that they enjoyed the QI work and 
believed that it facilitated the formation of a network of facilities that were able 
to share ideas, knowledge and also resources. In fact this perception that new 
knowledge could be gained from attending QI workshops was an important 
motivating factor for the participating QI members [III].  
However, facilities perceived difficulties in motivating team members and their 
colleagues to participate in QI work and attributed this to a lack of material 
and human resources [XII]. But at the same time, QI teams also felt that they 
could improve the quality of care at their health facility, despite the many 
constraints of material and human resources. While this was the belief of the 
staff, it was not clear how they would overcome the constraints. .  
Some of the facilities felt that they were being pushed too much by QI 
activities, and felt frustrated at being steered too much into different directions.  
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One facility reported that they were not able to keep up to date with 
everything, and spread the changes to all the staff.  This was because the 
changes were happening too quickly, in addition to the fact that there were too 
many changes occurring as part of the QI programme [XII]. 
From the CEmOC survey, more than half (52%) of the respondents felt that 
the QI process fits into their current system of work but with some effort and 
12% of the respondents said that it fits in with great difficulty. Shortage of staff 
was the most common reason cited for the QI process fitting into the current 
working systems with some effort. About 44% of the respondents also felt that 
while QI was worth the effort, it was a little bit demanding [VII].  
6.6.2 SelfLefficacy://
In the pre-intervention period, there was not the same level of awareness of 
neonatal deaths as there was for maternal deaths in the facilities, and this 
perhaps resulted in lesser confidence to conduct neonatal death reviews in 
the facilities [XII] 
According to the CEmOC survey, all the survey respondents unanimously 
responded that they were aware of data improvement activities happening at 
their health facility and that they were all involved in it. They were confident 
that appropriate records of births and deaths were being maintained at their 
respective health facilities. There were lot of improvements to the process of 
data collection, compilation and analysis but little progress in terms of 
reporting or using the data for decision-making. The use of run charts was not 
very common with the QI teams. Only 54% of the QI team members were 
aware of the use of run charts for analysis and decision-making. Even when 
there were improvements in data, they did not necessarily translate into data 
driven decision making [VII]. 
While there was a greater emphasis on profound knowledge, subject matter 
knowledge was not addressed in the intervention. On average respondents 
from the provider knowledge survey conducted in 2009 [V] , only got 70% of 
the questions correct with significant difference between staff at CEmOCs 
who answered 86% of questions correctly and staff at BEmOCs who got only 
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64% correct. Even simple knowledge such as the correct frequency of 
monitoring patients in routine labour was equally lacking in BEmOCs and 
CEmOCs with an average of only 36% and 33% correct responses 
respectively(213). 
Knowledge regarding emergency newborn care was low with an average of 
only 58% correct answers. The biggest gaps in knowledge was about 
management of a baby who did not breathe spontaneously (only 35% 
answered this correctly) and management of a baby with low Apgar scores at 
1 minute. Infact, 23% of respondents gave potentially life-threatening 
responses, including 8% who said no action was required and 4% who said 
they did not know what to do. There was a limited understanding of simple life 
saving procedures such as newborn stimulation and resuscitation, skin to skin 
contact and early initiation of breast feeding.  
There was a lack of correlation between how recently a respondent had 
studied a specific subject and the likelihood that the respondent would get the 
answer to a question on that subject correct. Also, there was no positive 
correlation between the number of years of professional training received and 
the number of correct responses. Neither was there a correlation between 
how confident a respondent indicated that they were in a specific subject and 
how likely they were to get the answers to questions on that subject correct. 
Individuals’ belief in their own capabilities to execute a course of action was a 
poor indicator and unrelated to their level of clinical knowledge. Only 42% of 
the staff felt that the care they provided was ideal. Only 50% of the staff said 
that they would recommend a friend/relative to deliver at their facility. 
While staff generally had a negative perception regarding the care they 
provide, this was more so in the CEmOC facilities as compared to the health 
centres. For instance only 27% of respondents indicated that their facility was 
always clean enough and only 42% indicated that patients got enough 
information to look after themselves at home.  Interestingly staff perceptions 
seemed better in BEmOCs (48% ideal on average) than in CEmOCs (28% 
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ideal on average). CHAM facilities were better off in coming up with new ideas 
at work, as compared to MoH facilities [V].  
By the late intervention period, the teams had tremendously improved in the 
way of reporting which showed a maturity and understanding in what they 
were doing. The format of presentations, the language and the graphical 
presentation all displayed an advanced level of understanding of the quality 
improvement in all the health centres [XXVIII]. 
6.6.3 Motivation/
Intrinsic factors such as achievement, recognition, the work itself, 
responsibility and a sense of purpose seemed to have a far more important 
role to play in motivating people. The motivation for individuals to become 
involved in QI ranged from being in a team, to learning from others to being 
able to identify problems and find solutions. A number of individuals cited their 
reason to become involved in QI was to reduce maternal and neonatal deaths 
[VI].  
The Collaborative sessions were considered motivating because these 
meetings and learning opportunities allowed the team members to gain 
knowledge and experience which they could take with them to benefit their 
own facilities [XII].   
During the baseline period, facilities received input from LSTM’s technical 
advisor, which allowed facilities to gain knowledge, and technical expertise.  
Feedback from a number of facilities revealed that the presence of the LSTM 
technical advisor greatly enhanced their learning experience when conducting 
their MDRs and that this was one of the motivating factors for the facility staff 
to complete the MDR forms [III]. 
General feedback on the QI programme was mainly positive, with a number of 
team members reporting that they really enjoy the QI work. MaiKhanda QI 
programme allowed for regular interaction between the facilities, and a 
number of facilities used the QI work as an opportunity to meet with clinical 
experts from other tertiary care facilities. These meetings and learning 
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opportunities allowed the team members to gain knowledge, which could be 
used to benefit their own facilities. The QI programme facilitated the formation 
of a network of facilities that were able to share ideas, knowledge and also 
resources [VI].   
In addition, MaiKhanda programme was seen as raising awareness of quality 
issues in their facilities, when previously providers had not given any thought 
to it.  For example, a QI team member from one of the health facilities 
explained that they had never prioritized hygiene measures in the facility prior 
to MaiKhanda QI work. 
Motivation varied across districts and also by age of respondents. Lilongwe 
was one of the worse off districts in relation to staff motivation and patient 
engagement. Given its larger size, administrative management of Lilongwe 
has always been a challenge. Despite its geographical proximity to the 
Ministry of Health, it had a low staff to population ratio. Limited availability of 
resources (including human resources) was often cited as the reasons for low 
staff morale. Another similar reason for the shortage of staff for QI activities 
was the high turnover among the staff, which hindered progress in QI work 
[VI].  
CHAM facilities were usually better off than MoH facilities in terms of staff 
motivation. The reasons for this could be the financial incentives related to 
working at CHAM facilities. While salaries for CHAM facilities were provided 
by the Malawi government, the staff got an additional 10-15% top up on their 
salaries. Further career opportunities were perceived to be better within 
CHAM organizations than MoH [VII]. 
The overall picture with regard to the will and motivation of staff to work is 
that, on average, staff are interested in their work and often willing to work 
beyond their job responsibilities if required, but were sometimes lacking in 
motivation which may partly be due to the fact that they are almost universally 
completely dissatisfied with the salaries they received [VI].  
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Lack of support systems such as drugs and human resources, high workload, 
lack of career progression were identified as the key demotivating factors. 
Towards the end of the early intervention period, it was reported that Health 
Centre and CEmOC Collaboratives had changed the mindset of many teams 
on the provision of quality care for the better as they continuously learnt from 
each other and developed new change ideas for testing [XV]. 
6.6.4 Teamwork/and/stability/
The QI teams were an integral and central part of the QI intervention, 
especially since MaiKhanda role in the intervention was facilitatory rather than 
direct implementation. MaiKhanda was dependent on the QI teams for the 
delivery of the intervention at the facility level. A number of teams were 
composed of a wide range of facility staff representatives including the 
Medical Officer, the Chief Clinical Officer, the Matron and the driver on duty.  
This would ensure that all the perspectives of care within the facility were 
considered, including transportation issues[XII]. 
The baseline evaluation observed no changes in the QI teams or leadership, 
unlike during the implementation phase of the intervention when having a 
stable QI team proved to be a challenge. This might probably be because the 
survey was conducted very early on in the project and health care providers 
were perhaps still excited with the novelty of the improvement model. 
By the time of the CEmOC survey in 2008, 130 members had once been 
members of QI teams from mid-2006 to mid-2008, with 88% still retaining their 
association with the QI team. Another 11% were no longer QI members. 
Although only 15 of the QI team members dropped out during the survey 
period, there was anecdotal evidence to say that they were the most dynamic 
within the team and exhibited some exemplar leadership qualities [VII]. A lack 
of teamwork was present and linked to the human resource crisis. Because 
human resource was reallocated whenever necessary, each time new staff 
came in they had to be oriented.  
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Stability of QI team members also did seem to have an effect on QI work 
being carried out in the health facilities. Using number of PDSAs run as an 
indicator for the QI work in the health facilities, facilities with a greater number 
of PDSAs being run have had no drop outs in the QI team [VII].  
Stability of QI teams was a huge challenge throughout the implementation 
period. One of the tertiary CEmOC facilities, for instance, had a completely 
new QI team, as the interventions were coming to an end in 2010 [IX]. 
Turnover of staff made organizational learning and memory  weak and also 
hindered progress in QI work [XIII].  
6.6.5 Leadership/
QI programme hoped to introduce innovations such as leadership buddies, 
local experts, super improvers and learning other facilities through exchange 
visits. Except for a learning programme of super-improvers, rest of the ideas 
did not take flight.  
At one point in the pre-intervention period, 70%  of  the  quality  improvement  
team had stopped carrying  out  their  projects  due  to  lack  of  support  from  
senior  management  and a perceived lack  of  team  spirit [XVII]. 
Leadership was not considered to be inclusive as staffs were less likely to be 
asked by their supervisors for suggestions and comments on work related 
issues [VI]. MaiKhanda conducted a 2-day learning session for leaders from 
Lilongwe health areas to orient them on QI and strengthen relationships 
between them and different levels of management at DHO level [XV]. 
Clinical and senior leadership were lacking in most health facilities throughout 
the intervention period. In places where leadership was strong and supportive 
of MaiKhanda's interventions, visible improvements were made. For instance, 
Kasungu in 2010 had the lowest performance of the teams in the second 
quarter of 2010. This was attributed to the change of District Health Officer, 
weak QI leadership, QI projects not being executed without MaiKhanda 
supervision, disjointed agreements on the agenda between MaiKhanda and 
what DHO want to achieve and how. On the other hand Salima performance 
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had improved during the same period, (for eg: 60 days without any maternal 
deaths in their facilities). The reason cited for this success was the 
appointment of one of the Clinical Officers who was also a long time QI 
leader, as the safe motherhood leader for Salima district [XXVIII]. The senior 
team at MaiKhanda felt that Salima district, mainly due to its activated 
leadership, was poised for rapid spread and would act as a catalyst for the 
other district managers to follow suit [XXX]. 
6.7 Programme/Implementation/
6.7.1 MaiKhanda’s/role//
The programme execution was by the frontline staff (QI teams) within the 
health system. MaiKhanda’s role was that of a facilitator. MaiKhanda’s QI 
officers would conduct field visits to CEmOCs and health centres to ensure 
implementation of the change packages and the testing of new ideas using 
PDSA cycles by the QI teams. This intended role of MaiKhanda was based on 
the diffusion of innovation model where improvement is supposed to happen 
through influencing organizational and behaviour change at the local level. 
This strategy meant that the intervention had to have a lean management 
structure within MaiKhanda. Indeed, at the baseline and pre-intervention 
period there was only one QI officer covering the 3 districts and 9 CEmOC 
facilities. However, not enough attention was given to organizational context 
and health systems capacity to absorb these relatively new concepts in quality 
improvement. Eventually, there was need for a closer and much intense 
engagement from MaiKhanda to help build capacity around the concept of QI 
at the health facility level. While this was still a challenge, MaiKhanda itself as 
an organisation was evolving. It was transitioning from a project to be 
established as a local NGO within Malawi. This was coupled with poor 
planning and budgeting for the QI aspect of the project as a result of poor 
understanding of the existing health system. This however, stabilized in the 
late intervention period and more district staff were recruited in 2009. But staff 
capacity to understand and implement the QI concept was limited. It was 
overwhelming for MaiKhanda staff to develop a clinical understanding of the 
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situation at the same time apply QI practice to it and being very stretched 
across the district. Capacity building initiatives such as QI course and other 
efforts were made to bring the MaiKhanda team to speed with the current 
trends in QI [XX]. 
As mentioned above, the actual interventions were implemented by QI teams 
from within the health facility and consisted of collaborative learning sessions 
and actions periods. The collaborative learning sessions provided a platform 
for peer group learning. The QI teams met together on a quarterly basis 
during the collaborative learning sessions to share the ideas they had 
implemented and learn from other QI teams. The QI teams received support 
from the MaiKhanda officers during action periods to ensure that the change 
packages and shared ideas were actually implemented by the QI teams to 
improve changes in current practice in their facility. Actual implementation of 
this strategy on the ground was difficult. Firstly there was the constant mobility 
and dynamics of the health system, including staff shortages and staff 
transfers [VI]. Secondly, MaiKhanda staff were delivering the interventions 
through existing structures in the facilities where the mood for individual gains 
(incentives, per diems) superseded that of social gains [XXIII]. This was 
because there were so many stakeholders incentivizing the same staff to do 
so many of their own activities. Thirdly, some of MaiKhanda improvement 
advisors were non-clinical staff and this might have had implications for how 
they were perceived by front-line staff on the ground, given the hierarchical 
nature that exists within the Malawian health system. And finally, the concept 
was as new to the QI teams as it was to MaiKhanda staff and there was a 
steep learning curve, which had to be maintained within the constantly 
changing environment within the health facilities.  
6.7.2 Programme/Execution/
At the start of the intervention there were 3 major implementation activities. 
These were, as described in the Theory of Change, data improvement, quality 
improvement activities which included a combination of criterion based audit 
and model for improvement and support for death audits. 
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Data improvement was one of the first and a key activity that was undertaken 
as part of the MaiKhanda intervention. Data clerks from the facilities were part 
of the QI teams and were involved in separate data learning sessions and 
received support from MaiKhanda during the action period. One of the key 
areas of capacity building was the collection, presentation and interpretation 
of data [XIV].  
In the pre-intervention period, all the facilities, with the exception of Mlale and 
Salima, reported encountering problems with their QI implementation. These 
problems ranged from poor infrastructure to lack of personnel [XII].  
Most QI work, especially up to the early intervention period, focused on 
maternal deaths and only MDRs were taking place, thus fostering 
improvement specifically in maternal health. However, some of the facilities 
under MaiKhanda project had initiated QI work for neonatal health in their 
facilities. For example both Salima District Hospital and Bwaila Hospital 
implemented patient attendants in the labour room, while CHAM facilities- 
Nkhoma and Mtundu developed neonatal sepsis checklists to help with sepsis 
diagnosis in the neonates [IX].   
Acknowledging the discrepancy in neonatal focus, MaiKhanda had organised 
a neonatal expert meeting that was conducted by content experts in neonatal 
and paediatric care along with representatives from the facility QI teams.   
Clinical knowledge regarding newborn health across the health system 
remained very weak for both essential and emergency newborn care. The 
intervention did intend to build capacity for clinical improvement without 
removing clinicians from the front line of care. Thus the focus was on in-situ 
training. In pockets where in-situ trainings were implemented, such as in St. 
Gabriel’s hospital, improvements were noted in the competency and skills of 
the nursing staff in labour ward to conduct neonatal resuscitation [XXIX]. 
However, the intervention was not implemented at scale and despite attempts 
at clinical skills building both by MaiKhanda and other stakeholders 
throughout the length of the project, sustained progress was not achieved. 
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In the early intervention period, the revised plan for quality improvement 
consisted of the following components: Strengthened technical support to 
MaiKhanda and QI Teams, quality improvement in health facilities, clinical skill 
building, data improvement and leadership development.  
With the slow progress of the interventions and the many logistical challenges 
of running the intervention, a suggestion for a shift from QI work in 3 districts 
to focusing on a single district i.e Salima was proposed. The idea was to make 
focused interventions in one district to show impact. "Salima was chosen as it 
is the district most passionate about QI methodology, has made the largest 
commitment to the MaiKhanda work and has the highest level of DHO 
engagement." However, this proposal was shelved mainly due to reservations 
from the evaluation team about preserving the integrity of the randomized trial 
study design [XXII].  
By the middle of 2009, Health centres QI teams were largely working on 
tracking and managing high-risk pregnant women. Enhanced coaching visits 
was reported as being useful since teams were now not only generating data, 
but also using it to drive change in their facilities by continually testing new 
ideas. For example, 80% of health centres captured and used family planning 
data alongside data on deliveries – demonstrating a growing grasp of the 
whole systems approach. Good progress was noted especially with Salima 
team where they were able to present progress using run charts [XXV]. In 
Lilongwe QI officers managed a total of 200 against 229 planned visits in the 
second quarter of 2009 [XXII].  
In the last quarter of 2009, there was a drop in planned versus actual 
coaching visits and supervisions (to only 50% in two districts in January). The 
main reasons behind the drop were the severe national fuel shortages in 
November and December [XXVI].  
Overall, there was an improvement in the visits of the FI Officers to facilities. 
In the late intervention period, almost 80% of the planned field visits were 
covered by MaiKhanda staff [XXV]. It is interesting to note that even when the 
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programme was functioning fully well and was at its peak performance, 100% 
target was not met. This was partly because of over-planning- for time needed 
for attending Collaborative Learning Sessions was not included in the plan 
and attention was constantly being diverted to other needs, especially follow-
ups on missing data and partly because of external circumstances beyond the 
control of the team such as rising fuel prices and fuel shortages affecting 
programme budgeting and implementation.  
The visits generally focused support towards QI Teams in the health centres 
for identification of high risk mothers and following them up to deliver at the 
CEmOC facility, identification of potential blood donors before delivery for 
every high risk mother, use of referral checklist for every mother referred in 
labour [XXVI]. The use of the referral checklist and identifying high risk 
pregnant women was established in all the health centres in Salima, during 
this period.  
In the late intervention period, QI work was still focused on reducing maternal 
deaths in the CEmOC facilities, mainly through an intervention to reduce 50% 
of deaths due to postpartum haemorrhage (PPH) [XXIX].  
Change packages related to newborn care were not yet being implemented 
to scale. Where they were being implemented, the focus for most of the 
facilities was on reduction of neonatal death due to asphyxia by enhancing 
skills in neonatal resuscitation, reducing deaths due to prematurity by putting 
babies in Kangaroo Mother Care. A few facilities were using the neonatal 
sepsis protocol to reduce NNDs due to sepsis. The choice of the intervention 
was based on Pareto Graphs created by each facility to show their highest 
cause of neonatal death [IX]. 
The interventions gained momentum only in the last 18 months of the 
intervention (June 2009-December 2010). The intervention tried to touch up 
on all the critical success factors such as frequent coaching visits, team 
functioning, leadership support, learning sessions and refresher meetings. 
However these interventions were fragmented and manifest as isolated 
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pockets of excellence, rather than part of a coherent strategy. There was 
some achievement in neonatal sepsis treatment protocol and KMC protocol at 
Nkhoma hospital and this was attributed mainly to the clinical leadership 
available there, while there was evidence of improvement in resuscitation and 
deaths due to asphyxia in Mlale. The intervention produced isolated pockets 
of success in different health facilities on different parts of the intervention 
package. It was therefore difficult to establish if changes were happening 
independent of the intervention or if indeed it was influenced by the 
intervention [IX].  
The project was originally designed to be scaled up to all areas of the three 
districts within five years, including the control areas designated by the 
evaluation design. This scale-up phase was postponed because the partners 
felt the existing set of interventions had not been successfully implemented. 
In summary, by the end of the intervention period in 2010, the focus was still 
largely on CEmOCs and mainly on maternal change package. Neonatal 
change package had not started until 2009. Health centre collaborative were 
functional but, focus was mainly on referrals and no measurable outcome 
were established to measure this progress. 
6.7.3 Finance/
Although, great efforts were made to maintain a constant flow of funds for the 
project, in reality there were challenges to financial management of the project 
in Malawi.  
During the baseline period (2007-08), the global rise  in  fuel  prices had  a 
negative  impact  on  transport logistics for  project  activities.  Fuel prices  had 
gone  up, impacting on MaiKhanda budget [XVII]. 
After the strategic review in 2008, there were changes to the intervention 
design, which also had implications for management. With LATH exiting the 
programme, the financial management of the programme was taken over by 
IHI. A new accounting package had to be installed [XV]. This transition 
brought about some delay in funding at the country level, which in turn 
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affected the timing of the Learning Sessions. As a result, some of the 
collaborative learning sessions conducted in the beginning of 2009 were done 
too close to each other without adequate time in between for action periods, to 
catch up with lost time. Also some of the collaborative had to be combined- 
the closing of 2008 Collaboratives and beginning for 2009 Collaboratives, 
which was not ideal [XXII].  
In the late intervention period, the flow of funds was regular and much better 
managed. For instance reports from Salima, mentioned a constant flow of 
funds to the district which, brought satisfaction to the MaiKhanda facilitation 
team as they managed to meet their programme targets. This point was also 
echoed by the other two districts. District Coordinators presented a 
consolidated report (for facility and community intervention and for M&E) for 
their districts [XXIV].  
6.7.4 Stakeholder/engagement://
The QI intervention developed by MaiKhanda was in line with the national 
‘Road Map’ for reducing maternal and infant mortality, developed by the 
Ministry of Health. But, the concepts of QI were still relatively unknown to the 
Ministry and other key stakeholders at the beginning of the intervention [XII].  
All the respondents in the CEmOC survey valued the visits by MaiKhanda 
staff to their health facilities, during the action period. Majority of the 
respondents thought that visits by MaiKhanda staff were adequate, while 52% 
of the respondents suggested that they should visit the facilities atleast twice a 
month [VII].  
MaiKhanda was perceived to have an influential and complementary role to 
play in the intervention by helping identify the problem area, develop plans 
and implement them 
“…sometime you are doing things blindly but the way MaiKhanda  has helped 
is to look back on data, analyse data and try to learn from data and implement 
what can make the situation better”. (Nursing staff, St.Gabriel Hosptial) [XXIX] 
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Towards the end of the baseline period, there were  some  changes in  
leadership  on the  part  of  the  Ministry  of  Health. This however, did not 
have a negative impact on the project. The new minister was  very  supportive 
of MaiKhanda  project. But the challenge was the non-active involvement of 
stakeholders [XIX]. 
In the early intervention period, MaiKhanda was involved in the development 
of District Implementation Plans (DIPs) and budgets for the year July 2009 to 
June 2010 for Lilongwe, Kasungu and Salima districts for the first time [XXII].  
During the early and late intervention period, at national level, a number of 
developments have combined to slow down the advocacy and stakeholder 
engagement efforts. There were also changes at ministerial level with the 
appointment of a new Minister and Deputy Minister of Health as well as 
transfers in the Ministry of Health (including key positions such as the 
Principal Secretary of Health). This meant MaiKhanda had to start building 
afresh, relationships at senior leadership levels in the Ministry. This also had 
an impact on the project implementation timeline [IX].  
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Chapter/7 Analysis/
 
Having provided an overview of the project in the previous Chapter, I go on to 
analyse the program theory and implementation theory for the QI intervention. 
Analysis of program theory begins with a comparison of MaiKhanda’s 
programme strategies with established mechanisms of successful QI 
intervention from the Michigan Keystone Project. The choice of Michigan 
Keystone Project as a comparative study was limited by the literature 
available at the time of analysis. There was not any successful QI study 
published, which described or hypothesized its QI intervention mechanisms. 
The only other study, which described intervention mechanisms, was the 
study by Greenhalgh and colleagues on modernization of health care services 
in the inner borough of London(217). However, this study focused on 
evaluation of the processes for whole scale transformation of health care 
services, rather than a specific QI intervention and was therefore not 
considered suitable for comparison. The choice of studies for comparison was 
thus limited and this in turn narrowed the scope of analysis.  
Justification of this method of comparing studies with different context and 
outcomes is elaborated in Section §8.2.3.  
In the subsequent section (§7.2), I try to develop an understanding of why 
MaiKhanda’s programme strategies did not translate into intervention 
mechanisms. In doing so, I use a complexity checklist suggested by Ray 
Pawson(202) to outline and analyse MaiKhanda’s implementation theory.  
7.1 Understanding/MaiKhanda’s/Program/Theory/
One of the very successful QI interventions described in improvement 
literature has been the Michigan Keystone Project, which was able to reduce 
central venous catheter, blood stream infections by about 66% over an 
eighteen-month period, engaging 108 ICUs in the process(173, 218). Mary 
Dixon-Woods and colleagues identified key mechanisms that influenced the 
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successful Michigan Keystone project(67). They articulated the success of the 
QI projects on:  
1. Generating isomorphic pressures to join the programme and conform to its 
requirements.  
2. Creating a densely networked community with strong horizontal links that 
exerted normative pressure on the members 
3. Reframing the problem as a social problem with a strategic solution.  
4. Using several interventions that functioned in various ways to shape a 
culture of commitment to doing better in practice 
5. Harnessing data on infection rates as a disciplinary force 
6. Using ‘hard edges’ 
My first step is to compare if the mechanisms identified in the Michigan study 
are also present in the MaiKhanda study. In reality, the key QI strategies 
adopted by MaiKhanda were similar to Michigan study but that however, did 
not trigger a mechanism for the QI interventions in Malawi.  In trying to 
understand why the strategies did not materialize into mechanism for 
improvement, I review in detail, the programme strategies adopted in the 
Michigan study and compare that with the programme strategies in the 
MaiKhanda intervention, to check for similarities and differences.  
7.1.1 Generating/isomorphic+pressures/to/join/the/programme/and/conform/to/its/
requirements:/
Institutional isomorphism is where institutes try to mimic each other. In 
Michigan, a collaborative model for QI in healthcare (similar to IHI’s 
breakthrough collaborative series) was used in programme design which 
eventually involved 103 ICUs across Michigan all of whom agreed voluntarily 
to commit to the initiative (that is >85% of the ICU beds in Michigan joining the 
programme). According to Mary Dixon-Woods, isomorphism can be of three 
types: normative, mimetic and coercive. The ICUs within the Keystone Project 
exhibited either normative or mimetic isomorphism. 
It is important to know the reasons why a facility would like to engage with a 
QI intervention. The health centres in MaiKhanda study had no say in their 
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choice of joining QI interventions. Their decision to be part of the intervention 
was approved by the Ministry of Health after the process of randomization 
done by the evaluation team. While in the Michigan study, ICUs voluntarily 
agreed to be part of the QI Collaborative (as a result of peer pressure), in the 
MaiKhanda interventions, the choice of participating health centres was 
decided based on their random allocation to particular arm of the cluster 
randomized controlled trial study design. This was approved by NHSRC 
(National Health Sciences Research Council) but, the districts were oriented 
on the randomization and the allocation of the intervention they were to 
receive, only after the process of randomization was completed.  
On the other hand, the CEmOC facilities (which were not part of the cRCT 
design) were recruited through a process of orientation and stakeholder 
engagement. All CEmOC facilities within the three districts were engaged in 
the Collaborative.  
Thus institutional isomorphism might have existed to some extent in the case 
of CEmOCs but not perhaps in the case of collaborating health centres. Even 
when it did, it is most likely to be through subtle coercion rather than 
normative or mimetic isomorphic pressures i.e coercive isomorphism-rules 
and regulations imposed by external agents. For instance, the decision to be 
part of the QI intervention was discussed first with the Ministry of Health and 
the district teams informed after the randomization process was complete. 
This lead to a perception as the intervention being externally developed and 
thereby influenced on how the model for improvement was taken up by the 
CEmOC facilities and the health centres. There were reports of health 
facilities feeling frustrated at being steered too much in different directions 
(§6.6.1). QI work was considered additional to the existing scope of work by 
members of staff and therefore lower in their priority list, affecting the 
ownership and therefore embeddedness of the intervention within the health 
systems in the long run.  
The reason for isomorphic pressure not to have worked could also be 
because of the way the health system was targeted by MaiKhanda. Whereas 
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in Michigan study there was a targeted approach towards 103 ICU facilities, 
similar in form and function, in MaiKhanda, the intervention was rolled out 
across a vertical section of the health system. The health facilities organised 
across this cross section such as the CEmOCs, the district hospitals, CHAM 
facilities and health centres, all had very different capabilities. The structural 
and human resource arrangements across the facilities were different and a 
one size fits all approach would not have been the most ideal. For e.g. at the 
health centre level, a QI team would be a medical assistant and a nursing staff 
(this in many cases would also constitute the entire staff of a health centre). 
CEmOC facilities on the other hand had a multi-disciplinary QI team including 
data clerks and safe motherhood coordinator, since these facilities  
 
were larger and employed a range of staff.  A replication of the 'Michigan 
model' would perhaps be best suited for the CEmOC facilities rather than the 
health centres. Furthermore, there were differences between district 
capacities as well. Salima, for instance, was considered an exemplar district 
Box 4: Checklist for participating facilities in the Michigan Keystone Project 
Unit requirement for participation (reproduced from Dixon-Woods et al):  
• Provide a commitment letter from the hospital CEO to the 
programme team 
• Identify a project team leader, typically a nurse manager, who can 
devote approximately 10 percent time to this effort 
• Form a multi-disciplinary project team 
• Submit baseline and monthly infection rates data 
• Complete a culture survey at the outset 
• Participate in weekly immersion calls 
• Participate in one or two conference calls a month 
• Participate in a state-wide face to face meeting every six months 
• Implement the programme’s improvement tools  
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where there was perceived commitment from the district leadership and better 
women friendly care as compared to Lilongwe which was worse off in terms of 
staff motivation and workload (§6.6.3). 
In Michigan study, participating hospitals had to make number of explicit but 
non-binding commitments signed by a hospital executive, along with a list of 
hospital team members and the amount of time they would devote to the 
project- See Box 4  
In contrast, in MaiKhanda, commitments were made verbally and not signed 
by senior hospital executives. Infact, the senior hospital executives in the 
Malawian health system comprised of the District Health Management Teams 
(DHMTs) and they were passive rather than active participants in the 
intervention. As per the original intervention plan, DHMT were to be involved 
in planning and coordination of programme implementation and their 
leadership skills built (§5.2.2) but MaiKhanda was not able to engage  them in 
QI activities in the baseline or pre-intervention intervention period (§6.5.6). 
Working with the DHMT as a strategy gained momentum only in the early 
intervention period (§6.3.4, §6.5.1, §6.7.4). While, involvement of DHMT  in  
QI  activities was perceived by MaiKhanda to be  very  effective (§6.5.6), there 
was a  lack  of  budget allocation for QI  activities  in  the District  DIPs (District 
Implementation Plans) reflecting a lack of embeddedness of QI activities at 
the district level (§6.5.6) 
It was also difficult to get a QI team to commit fully to the intervention given 
the staff turnover in the facilities and limited staff availability. Since there was 
limited staff capacity and it was usually the brightest that got taken away, it 
affected the team functionality as also organizational memory and learning 
(§6.6.4).   
MaiKhanda’s mentorship and coaching was spread too thin across the health 
centres and with a greater focus on the CEmOC facilities. Although 
programme implementation did improve over time, with more QI officers being 
deputed to the districts by 2009, it was challenging for the MaiKhanda QI 
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officers to support all the capacity gaps within all the 32 health centres and 9 
CEmOC facilities. 
Despite MaiKhanda QI interventions fulfilling most of the elements of the 
checklist (Box 4), they were unable to build the kind of isomorphic pressure 
mentioned in the Keystone Project. Some elements such as identification of a 
project team leader, getting a commitment of their time, completing a culture 
survey, or having a signed commitment letter from the hospital senior 
management, made the underlying assumptions and expectation for the 
Project explicit rather than implicit. It is likely that some elements, for instance, 
having a project team leader (§2.5.4) had a greater degree of influence in 
building isomorphic pressure among facilities, as compared to other elements 
on the checklist. This is not explored further in the Michigan study by Mary 
Dixon-Woods and colleagues. These elements were missing from 
MaiKhanda’s engagement of the health facilities.  
Another point related to the organisation of care and its links to isomorphic 
pressure is the organisational incentive to be associated with. Mimetic 
isomorphism in Michigan played an important role because it would have 
perceived it to "be unacceptable or damaging not  to participate in a particular 
programme"(67), thus building a critical mass over a short span of time for the 
rapid uptake of the intervention and further scale up and spread. This is 
important in the context of American healthcare system where hospital 
reputation is linked to profits(219) However, such pressures were absent 
within the Malawian health system which are publicly funded and with limited 
resources for healthcare. The interest in quality of care and its continuous 
improvement is driven by different motives. Health care providers in health 
care settings such as the United States need to demonstrate high-quality care 
to compete in an oversupplied health care market. In publicly funded systems 
such as Malawi, health care providers need to improve quality to make scarce 
resources stretch further (17). Thus the broader health systems objectives 
also influence the kind of pressures that individual organizations will succumb 
to. This in turn, will effect the way the project is delivered at the ground level. 
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In MaiKhanda programme there was a greater emphasis on improving 
newborn outcomes using PDSAs whereas a focus on optimizing the limited 
resources would perhaps have been a better acceptable strategy for the 
health care providers who are front-runners of the health care system and 
have to manage within the resource constrained settings. This could be 
achieved by initiating Criterion Based Audits which builds on local facility 
performance, based on their local situational analysis. This was indeed part of 
the programme in the pre-intervention period.  
Given how the intervention was organized in terms of the evaluation design, it 
would not have been possible to reach a ‘tipping point’ where it would be 
possible to exert isomorphic pressure. In Michigan, the spread was more like 
a ripple effect with more facilities joining the Collaboration over time, based on 
the principles of innovation diffusion theory (181),  whereas in MaiKhanda 
participating facilities were spread out across the 3 districts based on random 
allocation.  
7.1.2 Creating/a/densely/networked/community/with/strong/horizontal/ links/that/
exerted/normative/pressure/on/the/members//
In Michigan ICUs were asked to collect baseline data, participate in education 
and meetings through weekly teleconferences followed by a 2 day residential 
workshop. Submission of monthly data, monthly teleconferences and face-to-
face workshop at 6 monthly intervals was also part of the intervention. The 
important aspect of the regular teleconferences, meetings and communication 
in addition to supplying information was to promote a networked, community 
based approach to the problem. However, the form evolved over time and 
modifications to the collaborative sessions (deviation from the protocol-
referred to as implementation (in)fidelity) included ‘cocktail hour’ and 
networking session, a project token (such as a T-shirt), encouraging teams to 
lead sessions and present success stories, openly discuss problems and 
ways to overcome them, encouraging teams to learn form each other. A 
horizontal relationship among hospitals was encouraged leading to a learning 
community where people often spoke to each other outside the formal 
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structure. Collaboratives especially of professional communities help change 
professional practices by taking their 'directions for performance' from inside 
rather than outside their professional group”(67). They were also more likely 
to sustain collaboration and activity in the long run. Thus a "sense of 
community" in Michigan was fostered by opportunities for interaction and 
communication. 
MaiKhanda programme envisaged the use of ‘Knowledge Agents’, recruited 
locally from the existing cadre of front-line staff for information sharing and 
continued learning and improvement and adaptation. They were to gather, 
aggregate and analyse data and act as the connective tissue for the 
programme, driving knowledge exchange and interpersonal connections and 
ensuring continuous learning. In reality, this was done by the MaiKhanda staff 
(QI officers) at MaiKhanda i.e ‘external agents’ from outside the health 
system. This was done during their ‘Action Period’ field visits to the health 
facilities. Submission of monthly data was thus dependent on the MaiKhanda 
staff making field visits and this was never a smooth process since there were 
financial delays leading to postponement of field activities (§6.7.3) and 
sometimes other extraneous factors such as fuel shortages, which were 
beyond the control of the MaiKhanda team, which affected data collection on 
the ground (§6.4.1). Even when MaiKhanda was at its best performance in the 
late intervention period, MaiKhanda staff were able to cover only 80% of the 
planned field visits (§6.7.2) 
Even where data was collected, its use for analysis and decision making was 
limited. Most of the respondents in the CEmOC survey were not familiar with 
run charts, which is one of the commonest and routinely used method for data 
analysis in the model for improvement (§6.6.2). While data clerks were 
engaged in QI in CEmOC facilities for data collection, for the health centres 
data collection on key indicators was actually done by the M&E team, who 
were not part of the local QI teams or of the intervention.  
It was only towards the later part of the early intervention period that health 
centres were showing great improvements in the area of data capture and use 
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(§6.7.2). The use of data and data as an engagement process, possibly 
happened towards a period when evaluation was coming to an end. 
Monthly teleconferences in MaiKhanda were introduced in the early 
intervention period. However, the monthly calls mainly involved the 
MaiKhanda improvement advisors and external Technical Leads and not 
necessarily the front-runners in the hospitals ie facility QI teams.  The purpose 
of the calls was mainly to build capacity of the project staff and develop a 
close network within MaiKhanda as an organization. There was participation 
from QI team members but this was not regular or well organized. In contrast, 
the network in Michigan study was with the individual QI teams from the 
participating hospitals.  
Another important characteristic of the Michigan project in strengthening the 
network was the feedback mechanism- teleconference notes were recorded 
and available on CDs and a toolkit of materials to support implementation was 
distributed. In MaiKhanda, team engagement through regular teleconference 
calls was not practical since it would have been very expensive and was also 
logistically challenging to organize these with all the QI teams across the 3 
districts. MaiKhanda did not have the infrastructure to support this. A greater 
emphasis at MaiKhanda was the on-site coaching provided to QI teams when 
MaiKhanda QI officers visited the facilities during the action period. This was 
greatly supported by the QI teams who felt that these visits were helpful 
especially in terms of supporting the teams with data from decision-making. 
MaiKhanda QI officers constantly reiterated to the QI teams, the purpose of 
the intervention, reviewing their data and discussing progress toward project 
goals. However, the coverage of these visits in the initial period was very low 
with one QI officer covering all 3 districts. Later in the programme in 2009, 
there were QI officer based in districts that had more frequent interaction with 
the district facility teams. Although on-site coaching visits gained momentum 
in the intensified late phase of the intervention, even then it was limited by 
contextual factors such as delayed fund availability and fuel shortages at 
national level. 
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The Collaborative learning sessions were held quarterly in MaiKhanda, unlike 
in the Michigan project where it was held bi-annually but, these were lead 
mainly by the facilitating team at MaiKhanda rather than senior programme 
leaders from within the health facilities as was the case in Keystone Project. 
Collaborative workshops apparently allowed for regular interaction between 
the facilities, and a number of facilities use the QI workshop as an opportunity 
to meet with clinical staff from other facilities [12]. Health facility staffs were 
interested and motivated from the learning sessions, as it “provided an 
opportunity to network and improve their knowledge”. Collaboratives seemed 
to change the mindset of many teams on the provision of quality care for the 
better as they continuously learnt from each other and develop new change 
ideas for testing (§6.6.3).  However, there was little involvement of district  
based  stakeholders  in  QI  activities. This was a drawback from an 
improvement perspective, as some of the improvement activities required the 
engagement of district teams from the MoH. The Collaborative learning 
sessions had QI teams presenting at the storyboard session, but was not 
sustained throughout the length of the project.  
The Michigan programme had features of a grassroots or "bottom up" 
movement. This approach was supported with a strong internal direction and 
'top down ' leadership that empowered all stakeholders to participate. QI 
communities combined “horizontal momentum with vertical integrating 
structure” that not only coordinated activities but also potentially competing 
interests and motives. An important point of distinction here is that in the 
Michigan project, these vertical core structures were still part of the internal 
structure within the health system, unlike in Malawi where MaiKhanda was 
external to the health system and attempting to work through it.  
In Michigan, they deliberately brought different stakeholder groups together. 
They targeted 3 groups: senior leaders, middle managers and staff of ICU. 
Workshops and teleconferences & other communications ensured that all 
voices were heard. In the Malawi programme, getting an inter-disciplinary 
team of people to come together and look at the problem collectively was one 
of the hallmarks of the project. This was successful in the CEmOC facilities 
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where there was a larger group of participants and less of a success in the 
health centres where the human resources was very limited. Again, this 
process was not led by the team leaders on the ground. In MaiKhanda, 
attempts were made to bring together different target groups. There was some 
initial success in this but, it was difficult to get hold of senior leadership to 
engage with the programme as, they were usually very busy (with various 
competing programmes vying for their time). Also the context in which the 
health system operates is different. Senior leaders for instance are not located 
within the same geographical space as the health facility staff. Distances exist 
and communication is very structured and hierarchical. Hierarchy in the 
workplace is very strong in Malawi. Staffs are generally reluctant to express 
what they think best fits their context. (§6.4.2.6). Thus participation in team 
meetings and collaborative was considered more of MaiKhanda’s necessity 
rather than the local team taking ownership of these activities.  
Finding the right team of project leaders to act on the “vertical core” was one 
of the highlights of the Michigan project. Unlike the MaiKhanda team, the 
Keystone project team seemed to have the right balance of scientific expertise 
as well as “ability to engage emotionally with participants”(67). The scientific 
expertise of MaiKhanda team was being built mainly through the external 
technical support and training courses (§6.5.5). The MaiKhanda team was on 
a steep learning curve even as it was providing technical support to the QI 
teams in the facilities.  
While the Michigan team used a combination of hard and soft tactics to 
ensure discipline but at the same time gave participants responsibility and 
sense of ownership, MaiKhanda team had a facilitatory role to play and being 
external to the health system, it did not have the clout to influence or change 
clinical practices through an “insider” effect. The numbers of staff involved in 
the MaiKhanda programme were from a diverse background and with a 
stronger focus on QI. This could also have been a challenge for the QI teams 
in facilities to accept ‘non-peer’ groups as leaders or advisors to the 
interventions being considered.   
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Furthermore, MaiKhanda was not the only organisation, which was 
implementing interventions in these facilities, There were other organisations 
who were working on other aspects of MNCH as well (§6.4.1). In addition, 
there was also conflicting interventions such as the quality assurance 
programme run by other organizations that was closely linked with the quality 
technical working group at the Ministry of Health and thus able to exert a 
greater influence on improvement work happening at the district and sub-
district levels (§6.3.3). 
Despite all its activities, MaiKhanda failed to have a similar effect in promoting 
a networked community approach to the problem and developing a ‘sense of 
community’, as evidenced in the Michigan study. The key activities such as 
the monthly data collection, the teleconferences, the learning workshops and 
the coaching, all of which improved interaction and communication and 
thereby develop a sense of community in the Michigan gained implementation 
momentum only in the late intervention period in MaiKhanda. Moreover, the 
concept of QI was new to Malawi and the QI teams found the whole approach 
demanding of their time and effort (§6.6.1) 
Some further exploration of the role of the human agency in the Michigan 
study could have helped to understand the intervention mechanism better. For 
instance, how many people from the Michigan project team was involved in 
reviewing the data and giving feedback through monthly teleconferences? 
Who were the people from Michigan leading on the calls and their standing in 
the medical community within Michigan? What was the power relationship 
between the call initiators and the call participants? Was it the same group of 
people participating in the residential workshops (exploring continuity of 
intervention)?  
7.1.3 Reframing/the/problem/as/a/social/problem/with/a/solution:/
In Michigan, the intervention aimed at getting a community consensus on the 
problem as a social problem and this required: disrupting norms that treated 
central venous catheter-blood stream infections (CVC-BSI) as inevitable, 
developing a set of standardized interventions that the ICU community would 
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accept and implement. The programme was able to create something like “a 
professional movement”.  
While there has been significant gains in child mortality(10), the rate of 
mortality decline in newborn mortality in Malawi has been relatively 
slower(12). Maternal health has had more visibility over newborn health in the 
country. Malawi’s problem of high maternal mortality was politically 
acknowledged, and the political leadership had the issue of safe motherhood 
high up on their agenda. For eg: Likuni  hospital had a campaign for 100 free 
maternal death days. They organised a press conference where the Minister 
for health and other key stakeholders were invited, including the press. The 
high profile gathering helped project the problem as a social problem that 
could addressed through appropriate change packages being implemented in 
the facilities.  
The QI strategy for newborns in MaiKhanda was to persuade health facility 
staff of the existence of a shared problem such as newborn or perinatal death 
around which they could organize. This was supported by developing and 
implementing a set of change packages around birth asphyxia, low birth 
weight and neonatal sepsis that the QI teams would accept and implement. 
The baseline evaluation recorded newborn change package had the most 
number of ideas to be tested along with data improvement, indicating a shift in 
the norms considering newborn deaths as unacceptable. However, in the pre-
intervention and early intervention period, much of the focus was on maternal 
health.  
Historically, newborn has been placed within the ambit of the Reproductive 
Health Unit whereas the sick newborn is covered by the ARI Unit within IMCI 
(Integrated Management of Childhood Illness) unit at the MoH. RHU does not 
have any newborn specialist clinicians or nursing faculty. Newborn is also 
under-represented in the emergency signal functions(188). The lack of health 
system capacity around newborn care is evident from the provider knowledge 
survey where only 58% of the survey respondents were able to answer 
correctly about emergency newborn care (§6.6.2). This usually prompts a 
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vicious cycle where clinical staff did not have the confidence to carry out 
certain procedures such as neonatal resuscitation, which eventually results in 
failure of the procedure and death of newborns. In-situ trainings were 
implemented in some facilities such as in St. Gabriel’s hospital and 
improvements were noted in the competency and skills of the nursing staff in 
labour ward to conduct neonatal resuscitation (§6.7.2). Poor availability of 
resources was often cited as one of the reasons for not conducting perinatal 
death audits (§6.4.2.4). Although it was within these very constrained 
resource settings that maternal death reviews were being implemented.  
Reframing a social problem is often met with resistance and Michigan used 
two strategies to counter this-story telling and hard data to overcome 
resistance and secondly, transform into a social problem the perception of 
CVC-BSI as a non-normal occurrence. 
The MaiKhanda QI Collaboratives had story board sessions where facilities 
would present their stories using data collected by their QI teams. These were 
supposed to overcome any internal resistance and transform perceptions 
regarding newborn deaths as routine occurrence to an aberration. The 
capacity of facilities and QI teams within Malawi, to use their data and story 
effectively to transform perception and behaviour, was limited. Data collection 
in the Malawian health system is routinely collected to feed into the HMIS 
(Health Management Information System). A culture of reviewing data at the 
facility level and using it for decision making did not exist. As mentioned in the 
CEmOC survey, the number of people involved in data analysis and using it 
for decision-making was very sparse (§6.6.2). Although, data improvement 
was one of the change packages within the intervention, data collection 
remained a challenge for reasons mentioned above. Also, there was a greater 
emphasis on outcome indicators such as neonatal case fatality rate than on 
the processes of care. Focus on more proximal indicators of the processes of 
care (for eg: resuscitation rate) are more appealing to QI teams as they are 
able to relate to these indicators, take action and hold members accountable 
and these indicators usually have a story to tell. They also reflect the changes 
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in the facility influencing the processes. The distal indicators such as neonatal 
case fatality rates are usually influenced by factors beyond the control of the 
QI teams and can be de-motivating, if the results are not moving in a positive 
direction. This performance data (non-positive results) can be independent of 
the clinical improvement activities conducted by the QI teams- as increased 
mortality rate, for instance, can sometimes even be a function of improved 
data collection systems. It is therefore questionable if the storyboard sessions 
held during the Collaborative sessions, motivated staff and generated the kind 
of empathy that would instigate people to take action. 
The transition from evidence to action in the Michigan project was mainly 
through peers with whom members of the ‘community’ could identify and by a 
process of reflection and discussion to arrive at a consensus. This provided 
members with identity and cohesiveness.  
In MaiKhanda, it was the external technical advisors who reviewed most of 
the evidence for the interventions used in the programme. The MaiKhanda QI 
officers presented this evidence at various forums such as during QI 
collaborative and field visits, which was well accepted by the team but more 
as passive rather than active participants. Nevertheless, the programme 
would focus on a well-identified solvable problem. However, the use of 
evidence for decision-making was limited amongst QI teams and the health 
system in general. 
As mentioned previously, the programme team (from MaiKhanda) leading the 
evidence based improvement interventions were not ‘insiders’ with whom the 
QI teams could identify. In places where MaiKhanda did manage to engage 
local leadership such as in Nkhoma hospital, these team leaders were 
expatriate doctors working in those setting and it is not clear if they shared the 
same relationship with local staff as other peers.  
Identifying change agents and champions from within the health system was 
an important strategy within the intervention design of MaiKhanda so as to 
lead social processes that would influence change in the organizational 
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culture within the health system. But senior leaders from within the system 
were too busy to be engaged at a scale required by the project  since there 
were also other competing programme which perhaps placed similar 
demands on their time [XIV]. Secondly, champions who were identified at the 
micro level either had competing programmes, which demanded their time, or 
attrition of this group of people was higher as compared to other QI team 
members. Thus there was the stable upper cadre in the human resource 
chain (such as at the MoH, DHO level) who could provide the leadership but 
were too busy to engage fully with the programme, followed by a lower cadre 
in the human resource chain (staff at health facility level) which was highly 
unstable since they were very migratory to engage fully with the intervention. 
Bwaila hospital, for instance, had a completely new QI team, as the 
interventions were coming to an end in 2010 (§6.6.4) Staff turnover was a 
huge problem and although the staff turn over proportion was much smaller 
(11%) during the intervention period, it was usually the high performing people 
that got moved, leaving a gap in the QI facility work (§6.4.2.5).  
Similar to Michigan, MaiKhanda provided platform for critical reflection and 
discussion, mainly through collaborative learning sessions and action periods, 
which would enhance consensus and legitimacy. However, the major 
difference here was that in Michigan this was done ‘within’ the system with 
senior leaders from within the participating ICUs taking lead while in Malawi 
this was through an external NGO-MaiKhanda with a facilitatory role and 
limited decision-making authority. Thus, although the processes adopted in 
the Keystone project and at MaiKhanda were the same, in terms of bringing 
large number of people from many different organizations together and 
building a community consensus -the mechanism that worked in Michigan 
might not have had the same effect for the programme in Malawi. 
Michigan Keystone Project had adopted a dynamic standardization process 
where key elements of the intervention were presented as ‘essential 
ingredients’ with a scope for local variation. This was a deviation from the 
original protocol which advocated the use of PDSA cycles. In contrast, in 
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Malawi there was a great emphasis on the methods i.e developing and 
reporting PDSA cycles.  While local teams were innovative, they were 
required to report within the PDSA format which most often they did not since 
they found it to be time consuming. There was a greater push from the 
evaluation team to monitor the  'process' using PDSA tools. However, in doing 
so, evaluation failed to record the innovations that local teams were doing that 
could have been adapted by other teams during the collaborative sessions. 
Local adaptations did happen within the facilities such as the provision of 
cycle parking space for men accompanying the women to the facilities as part 
of the women friendly care change package. But this was not captured well 
either by the implementation team or the evaluation team.  
Standardization has its own place in the organizational culture of the 
Malawian health system. Protocols and hierarchy are rigidly followed in 
Malawian health system. For instance, the Safe Motherhood Initiative from the 
MoH was not very appreciative or supportive of the changes to the labour 
graph proposed by MaiKhanda in its participating facilities, since it was not in 
line with WHO guidelines (§6.3.4). MaiKhanda also invariably ended up 
standardizing its interventions, mainly because  of the difficulties of logistics 
management of such a large and diverse group of teams and secondly 
because of pressure from the evaluation team to maintain intervention fidelity.  
Nevertheless, while MaiKhanda managed to put newborn health high on the 
priority list of health facilities in the baseline and pre-intervention period, it was 
unable to co-ordinate a kind of ‘professional movement’ in the early 
intervention period, similar to the maternal campaign it had rolled out in Likuni 
hospital. This could be linked to the organizational transition within 
MaiKhanda and the paucity of QI facilitators to build the momentum for 
newborn health, and the prioritization of newborn care within the health sector. 
With improvements in implementation ‘dosage’, there was a gradual increase 
in focus on newborn change packages in the late intervention period,  
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7.1.4 Change/ practice/ and/ culture/ at/ the/ hard/ end/ through/ interventions/ that/
function/in/different/ways://
This meant achieving defined goals but at the same time also serving social 
functions. For example in the Keystone project, clinical QI interventions such 
as preparation of the surgical trolley (to reduce time) or use of a (locally 
adapted) checklist also fulfilled a social function. A fully prepared trolley 
served as an expression of the financial, logistical and operational capacity of 
the unit while checklists made visible the discrepancies between ideal & 
actual practice. Checklist increased the visibility of individual contributions to 
the process … and made the process of CVC insertion into a ritual (67) 
Checklists were also used in the MaiKhanda programme. This was the 
referral checklist for mothers and newborns being transferred from the health 
centres to the CEmOC facility.  But implementation remained poor. Data on 
implementation is also limited because of poor documentation. Criterion 
based audits, which were part of the baseline period but later discontinued in 
the project, also served the function of distinguishing between ideal and actual 
practice. Another intervention activity, which also served a social function, was 
the neonatal in-situ training and mentorship programme (§6.7.2). The 
neonatal resuscitation drill conducted at St. Gabriel Hospital required staff 
from the QI facilities to perform drill every week amongst all team members, 
making this into a ritual among the facility teams. In addition to improving the 
basic resuscitation skills and staff morale, the intervention also served a social 
function by bringing together all relevant staff at the same level but whether it 
had an effect in breaking the hierarchy, is something that would need further 
investigation.. Patients attendants along with nurses, midwives and clinical 
officers all took part in the resuscitation drill. Thus the checklist and the 
resuscitation drills could have influenced the restructuring of organisational 
and professional roles, relationships and identities within St. Gabriel. 
However, the intervention was not implemented at scale and despite attempts 
at clinical skills building both by MaiKhanda and other stakeholders 
throughout the length of the project, sustained progress was not achieved. 
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7.1.5 Harnessing/data/as/a/disciplinary/force./
Systematic collection of data and feedback was a key feature of the Michigan 
programme. Data collection and analysis was centralized and feedback was 
provided to the individual teams. Data was visualized with posters and 
displayed in the wards. Feedback to the teams identified the data gap 
between programme goals and their  current status. The team’s also received 
anonymous report of their performance as compared to the other facilities in 
the Collaborative.  
Data improvement and use for decision making is an important part of QI 
interventions. There was a strong focus in Malawi to use data for decision 
making and data improvement was one of the four change packages included 
in the model for improvement. Improvement in data required a two-part 
strategy that improved the quality of data production (the “push” strategy) and 
also improved the analytic skills of potential users of data for decision-making 
(the “pull” strategy). The data improvement change package at MaiKhanda 
tried to work around both these strategies. In MaiKhanda, primary data 
collection was usually done by the ward clerks and statistical assistants in the 
CEmOC facilities, while MaiKhanda M&E staff collected this data for the 
health centres. Separate learning sessions and on-site coaching and 
mentoring was provided to the data clerks by MaiKhanda staff. Data clerks 
were usually part of the QI team in the facilities. However, those collecting, 
processing and feeding back data to the participants did not have the 
necessary skills and resources for data management or analysis.  
Most of the data analysis was done centrally and feedback on newborn case 
fatality rates were given to visiting QI team members during the collaborative 
sessions (as in the Michigan programme) as well as during supervisory 
mentorship visits to the facilities. But, this was not consistent during the 
project period with the national fuel crisis and internal programme funding 
delays affecting implementation activities and hampering long term 
engagement of team members. Further frequent staff turnovers, meant that 
feedback and follow up actions were also affected. It was also difficult to 
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establish ownership of data at the facility level.  
While measurement of the infection free rates in Michigan study is likely to 
have encouraged “tight coupling between infection rate and cultural 
change”(67), this was not achieved in the MaiKhanda set up, especially for 
newborn care. Here the choice of indicators is critical. In MaiKhanda the key 
facility level indicator was newborn case fatality rate. While infection free 
days-the indicator used in the Keystone Project was within control of the 
hospital staff and was a reflection of their commitment, the effect of choosing 
case fatality rate as a measure of improvement had slightly different 
implications for the Q teams since all deaths were not within the control of the 
facility staff (for eg: women are brought dead to the facility). Thus infection 
free days (as observed in Michigan) is a measure of the process which is 
more within the implementers control whereas case fatality rate is a measure 
of outcomes and less within the control of the implementing QI teams at 
MaiKhanda. A greater emphasis on process improvement data such as 
proportion of babies receiving essential newborn care (for eg: immediate 
breast-feeding) or proportion of low birth weight babies receiving Kangaroo 
Mother Care is likely to have been well-received by facility QI teams.  
7.1.6 Making/skilful/use/of/hard/edges.//
Michigan programme worked primarily through consensus and although it had 
no legal or formal authority, it did have some coercive features. For instance 
at ward level, rituals such as checklists increased visibility and  procedural 
accountability. This gave the checklist a ‘hard edge’. A second hard edge was 
the use of activists tactics to ensure cooperation. For e.g. ICUs failing to 
return data were subject to a number of sanctions by programme leaders(67) 
Michigan team had a lot of influence among the participating teams and 
although not explicitly mentioned in the paper, the engagement of the senior 
leadership, especially those leading the programme, might have had a 
significant role to play in this. On a parallel, the MaiKhanda team could not 
have the same level of assertion within the facility teams. Not only did they not 
have the power to exert authority, in many instances, they were infact 
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undermined. The Quality Assurance programme was operational over a 
longer period of time in Malawi and given their reach and relation within the 
Ministry (they were part of the Ministry’s technical working group on quality) it 
was difficult to assert the Model for Improvement as a parallel or alternative, 
as suggested by MaiKhanda. The QI leadership within MaiKhanda did not 
have a clinical background and for a profession so much governed by the 
rules of hierarchy, it could be difficult on their level of organisational readiness 
to accept advice and support from a non-medical person.  
7.1.7 Conclusion/
The above section provides a summary of the programme strategies adopted 
by MaiKhanda and as can be seen, despite having programme strategies 
similar to the successful Michigan study, MaiKhanda did not ‘trigger’ 
intervention mechanisms similar to that Project. Some of the key factors 
emerging are MaiKhanda’s role as an external agent, challenges to its internal 
setting, the external context of resource availability, challenges to engaging 
the health system, the health system’s readiness for QI and scale up of 
interventions. While most of the strategies were implemented within different 
health facilities, the intervention did not manage to scale up to the proportions 
that was anticipated at the initiation of the project (§5.4). As the strategies 
failed to ‘trigger’ the mechanisms, I tried to explore further if the intervention 
was doing things right ie analysing its implementation theory in greater detail. 
This is the next section in my analysis.  
 /
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7.2 Understanding/implementation/theory//
Evaluating what caused a programme not to work is prone to 
misinterpretation. This can be avoided by reviewing the programme theory 
and implementation theory(220, 221). The distinction between programme 
theory and implementation theory is that the former identifies the contextual 
variables and examines the causal mechanisms that produce change while 
the latter relates to the justification and rationale of the programme ie 
uncovering the programme objectives and assumptions(222). Evaluating 
programme implementation theory is an important precursor to understanding 
programme mechanism and should be an integral component of theory based 
evaluation approaches. 
An important point to consider in evaluating implementation theory is that 
interventions are not implemented as a linear model where the intervention 
effect can be determined solely by the dosage and fidelity of the 
implementation. Rather it is introduced into a complex health system which is 
built up of a large number of mutually interacting sub-units and exhibit 
complex systems properties such as synergism (i.e. the whole is more than 
the sum of its individual parts), self-organization and emergence (i.e. the 
whole cannot be reduced to the sub-units)(223). I explain this with an 
example. 
Trying to fully implement all aspects of the change package was difficult within 
the limited resource settings within MaiKhanda and dynamic changes within 
the Malawian health system. Nevertheless, the interventions were 
implemented, but in a fragmented manner and manifest itself as isolated 
pockets of excellence, rather than as part of a coherent strategy. Bwaila 
hospital in Lilongwe, for instance, recorded a reduction in NCFR in the pre-
intervention period even though they had not conducted neonatal death 
review, which was one of the key intervention strategies being facilitated by 
MaiKhanda then. But the QI team had worked on the neonatal change 
packages and tested four ideas related to referrals (3 PDSAs run), Kangaroo 
mother care (2 PDSAs run) and one PDSA for ideas related to correct use of 
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drugs and management of premature babies.   On the other hand, Mlale and 
Nkhoma hospitals, which did undertake neonatal death review, did not have 
had a reduction in their NCFR. These facilities, incidentally also had less 
number of PDSAs being run in their facilities. In contrast, Likuni hospital which 
undertook neonatal death review, did have a significant reduction in their 
NCFR. In addition, they had also run about 22 PDSAs for four ideas which 
they wanted to test. This raises questions as to whether it was the nature of 
the facilities and their organizational readiness or the intervention 
characteristics of neonatal death reviews and change packages or a 
combination of these and other factors that influenced the NCFR in the 
aforesaid facilities. In terms of the implementation theory, there is a need to 
understand not only the implementation ‘dosage’ and intensity of the various 
intervention components such as death reviews, newborn change packages, 
data improvement but also their interaction with the health system.  
It is difficult to establish if changes where reported, were happening 
independent of the intervention or if indeed it was influenced by the 
intervention. Linked to this is the issue of intervention attribution i.e if the 
interventions were making a difference and how much of it could be attributed 
to intervention efforts. While results observed in the MaiKhanda intervention 
areas were not significantly different than in non-intervention areas, its not 
clear if this is due to lack of impact of MaiKhanda in its target areas or due to 
MaiKhanda having impact beyond its target areas (as was the assumption at 
the beginning of the programme regarding the rapidity of the intervention 
spread) (§5.4)  
Complexity is defined as “systems display (of) behavioural phenomena that 
are completely inexplicable by any conventional analysis of the systems’ 
constituent parts”(164). In simple terms, the more difficult it is to describe the 
active ingredients of an intervention and their relation to each other, the more 
complex an intervention is. Complexity also needs to be understood as 
complexity of the intervention versus complexity of the system(224) although 
there is considerable overlap between the two. 
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I explain the implementation theory taking this aspect of complexity into 
consideration and use the acronym (VICTORE) suggested by Ray Pawson in 
his book  ‘The Science of Evaluation’(202). VICTORE stands for Volition, 
Implementation, Context, Time, Outcome, Rivalry and Emergence. I begin 
each section with a brief description of the acronym followed by an analysis in 
terms of MaiKhanda’s implementation theory. I have re-arranged the variables 
according to their relative importance.  
7.2.1 Time++
Programmes change over time and intervention components that are shown 
to have an effect when a project is introduced, because there is impetus and 
novelty of the intervention, might not have the same effect towards the end of 
the project. For example while there was engagement of the QI teams in the 
earlier Collaboratives, absenteeism from QI meetings in the late intervention 
period prompted MaiKhanda staff to meet with DHO(Kasungu) and convince 
him of the importance of such meetings. [XXVIII]. 
The inter-relationships between the component parts of the intervention can 
vary the ‘tipping point’ of the intervention to either shorten or prolong the time-
to-effect, sometimes rendering the intervention, premature for evaluation. For 
eg there were effects on late newborn mortality in the MaiKhanda 
interventions towards the end of the evaluation period and perhaps this was 
the beginning of the tipping point for MaiKhanda interventions. But the 
evaluation was completed by then and it was beyond scope of the evaluation 
team to measure these changes. Thus the time when a programme is being 
evaluated has significant effect on the interpretation of results.  
A time-series study of breakthrough series quality improvement Collaboratives 
in low and middle income countries by Franco and Marquez found the 
average time to reach 80% compliance with standards or other measures of 
performance was 9.2 months and to reach 90% was 14.4 months(18). For 
traditional quality improvement projects Alemi and colleagues reported an 
average length of 17 months from identification of problem to completion of 
first pilot improvement while the average length of time to show effect for QI 
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Collaboratives, has been identified as ranging from 12 months to 24 
months(225). The Michigan study (time series) showed improvement 18 
months post intervention but, the outcomes were most significant in the latter 
half of the intervention period(218).  
The breakthrough series collaborative meetings of MaiKhanda were held at 
90-day intervals, over a two year period whereas in Michigan it was held 
biannually over a 18 month period. The rationale and evidence for this 
spacing remains unclear. It was perhaps influenced by the project time frame, 
but whether such short cycles are able to effect performance and outputs 
remains debatable. Despite the Collaboratives being implemented similar to 
the Michigan project, unlike Michigan there were several factors which 
influenced MaiKhanda’s time-to-effect. 
Firstly the pre-intervention phase of the programme was focused in the 
CEmOC hospitals. While the interventions in the health centres were initiated 
from 2007 onwards, it is not until the beginning of 2009 that the intervention 
activities were being conducted with regularity when there was a significant 
increase in “dosage” of support as a result of expanding the MaiKhanda team 
from one to six. Nevertheless, MaiKhanda time period was similar to other 
studies, for intervention effect. 
Secondly, capacity related to QI was limited both within MaiKhanda and the 
field implementation staff at MoH. The key intervention components -the 
learning Collaboratives and QI team meetings in facilities was being 
implemented in parallel to capacity building of MaiKhanda on QI. There was 
no lag time between training and orientation of MaiKhanda staff and 
facilitation in the health facilities. 
Thirdly, MaiKhanda evolved form being a project into a NGO and the process 
took about 2 years to have a larger local presence with increased ownership 
by the team on the ground. It was only around 2009 i.e almost 24-30 months 
after implementation of the Data Improvement package, when data started 
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getting reported into the reports [XXV]. It took this amount of time before data 
could be reported even within MaiKhanda.  
From an intervention perspective, the setting up of MaiKhanda as an 
organization was a diversion from the core objective, and subsequently we 
see that the ‘Model For Improvement’ was actually implemented only from 
September 2008 to December 2010. 
7.2.2 Implementation/
The strength of an intervention implementation can be defined in terms of its 
dose and duration, intensity and specificity as well as implementation fidelity.  
7.2.2.1 Implementation+strength:+Dosage+of+the+intervention+
The QI teams were regularly engaged by MaiKhanda, initially receiving a 
‘bolus’ dose by way of “Breakthrough Collaborative Sessions”, followed by a 
more ‘sustained’ dose during the action periods. Collaborative sessions for 
CEmOCs and health centres were held separately. They were visited by 
MaiKhanda field officers during the action periods, so as to facilitate the teams 
in thinking through the PDSA cycles. However, the field visits were hampered 
initially by non-availability of adequate MaiKhanda staff in early intervention 
period, especially at the district level and later by other external contextual 
factors such as the fuel shortages in Malawi and financial delays.  
During the reflective evaluation (also referred to as the Data Deep Dive), the 
implementing team expressed their concern that improvements in one sphere 
of the intervention was counter balanced by failures in other parts of the 
intervention. This produced patchworks of excellence, which the programme 
was not able to sustain at scale [IX]. A system level interaction so that 
improvements in one area were not offset by failures in others was 
required. This was the dilemma facing MaiKhanda. There was a certain level 
of implementation ‘dose’ required to reach 'critical mass'. Knowing what that 
dose was, is important. Having a large scale of the project (usually without 
adequate resources) stretched existing facilitating (MaiKhanda) and 
implementing (QI) staff, thereby affecting the dosage of the intervention. For 
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instance one of the intervention districts Lilongwe, was bigger that the other 2 
districts put together. MaiKhanda had little control over this decision, as this 
was decided at the level of the MoH [§5.2.3]. However, concurrent 
adjustments to the budget or implementation plan was not made to take this 
into consideration. On the other hand, having few health facilities with intense 
QI work may not yield desired results, since most of the interventions were 
linked to the ‘vertical slice’ of the health system and influencing improvements 
in the system requires a certain amount of scale. Finding the right balance of 
the optimum number of facilities and the optimum number of interventions was 
therefore crucial for the implementation of QI interventions.  
The project lacked in capacity to follow through with some very innovative 
ideas such as the leadership buddy system, designed in the original proposal, 
where each facility would be connected to a higher level leader from the 
health system. The project was over-ambitious in that it had too many 
components of the intervention with limited staff from MaiKhanda to facilitate 
the activities.  
Implementation was also influenced by MaiKhanda’s capacity to implement 
the intervention. First, there was limited human resource available within 
MaiKhanda to implement QI interventions and when additional hiring was 
done later in the programme, it required time to bring them to speed with 
concepts of QI. Many efforts were made towards capacity building of 
MaiKhanda as a quality improvement organization, and staff were adequately 
trained in Improvement models. But the learning curve from being a learner to  
a facilitator was very steep, with improvement staff providing support to the 
facility team concurrently even as they were trying to absorb the QI concepts 
themselves. 
Inadequate planning at the beginning of the project lead to limited human 
resources for QI being available within MaiKhanda ([XIV, XIX]. The design of 
QI intervention was not commensurate with the budget allocated to it. There 
was under-estimation of the resources (both human and material) required for 
programme implementation. This is a reflection of the technical partner’s 
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assumption that key QI concepts would undergo rapid diffusion and be readily 
absorbed by the health facilities and teams without investment in human and 
material capital at the district level. This was realized and corrected by the 
early intervention period when QI staff were deployed to the districts. 
7.2.2.2 Implementation+strength:+Intervention+specificity+
The specificity or conceptual clarity of an intervention is influenced by the 
length of its implementation chain. The longer the implementation chain the 
more it is prone to inconsistency and re-interpretation. The length of the 
implementation chain can be an important source of complexity. 
The implementation chain in MaiKhanda involved a series of steps beginning 
with the engagement of the external technical advisors who would bring in 
their theory and advice and introduce it to the local team at MaiKhanda. This 
team had a limited understanding of QI concepts, only being introduced to QI 
as part of MaiKhanda intervention. They would then impart their skills and 
knowledge to the facility ‘QI teams’ through QI collaborative workshop and QI 
team meetings in the respective facilities. QI team members would then 
implement the intervention in their facilities where other non-QI staffs were 
also working.  
One of the challenges was MaiKhanda’s role definition. MaiKhanda was an 
independent organization facilitating the Malawian health system to improve 
their quality of service delivery and were not direct programme implementers. 
MaiKhanda’s facilitatory role meant that they were largely dependent on the 
(already burdened) facility staff to take up QI on their own initiative. This was a 
challenge for successful programme implementation. While MaiKhanda’s role 
in facilitating the intervention was appreciated, health care providers in the 
facilities felt that the QI models fits into their current system of work but with 
some effort. A majority of the respondents in the CEmOC survey felt that QI 
was a little bit demanding, but worth the effort [VII].  
There were strategies to decrease the length of the implementation chain 
within the health system, by identifying QI team leaders and champions from 
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within the health system who would champion and lead the QI methods in 
their respective facilities. While this was a great initiative, challenges in 
retaining the staff persisted. Firstly in the larger hospitals there was transfers 
between the wards. Equally challenging were the staff transfer  between 
facilities and district. As observed in the CEmOC survey, it was usually the 
most dynamic staff within the team that got transferred and they would usually 
also be the ones leading the QI work [§6.6.4, VII]. In places, where strong 
leadership was available, there was greater acceptance and adaptation of the 
QI work such as in Salima [§6.6.5, XXX].  
7.2.2.3 Implementation+Fidelity+
One of the factors affecting outcomes was the implementation fidelity of the 
intervention. In public health interventions, it is difficult to predict this path 
given the involvement of the human agency at different stages along the 
pathway. This agency is not passive but makes its decision based on 
individual experiences and beliefs and is also greatly influenced by its 
organization culture. While this is difficult to measure, one simple descriptive 
method is to document intervention as planned and intervention as 
implemented. This documentation was lacking in MaiKhanda.  
There were changes to the implementation strategy throughout the different 
phases of programme intervention. The key changes included shifting from an 
integrated model to an IHI prescribed model for improvement, shifting the 
strategic focus of MaiKhanda to be a QI organization from a MNH 
organization, decentralization of QI to the district level and greater 
engagement of the District Coordinators and towards the later intervention 
period, narrowing the implementation focus from 3 districts to a singular well-
preforming district-Salima. These changes affected the implementation 
fidelity. Increasing the profile of the District Coordinators meant that there had 
to be greater communication and coordination of the central QI leadership 
with the district teams. communication remained a challenge between districts 
and with central office and as a result, stakeholders in the districts did not 
always see MaiKhanda as one project [6.5.4, XIX].  
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Should the implementation be considered of poor fidelity if the intervention 
deviates from original protocol? For complex interventions, it is likely that the 
intervention will deviate from the protocol and in most cases this is essential 
since the intervention is adjusting to the context such as the adoption of the 
in-situ training in MaiKhanda in the intervention period, based on the needs of 
the staff involved in QI, although this was not a component of the revised 
improvement model. But this poses a problem for measurement of 
implementation strength as it is not clear how the measurement scale would 
look like. 
 Adaptability (rather than conformity) is a key feature of QI interventions. 
However, even when there is agreement that intervention deviation from 
protocol is a good thing in the case of QI interventions, it still needs to be 
clarified, how far from the protocol can the deviation be and what degree of 
this deviation can still be considered as part of the program intervention. For 
instance, if the project had agreed to deviate from the original protocol and 
consider providing materials to hospitals or to go ahead and focus on Salima 
district rather than trying to cover 3 districts, would it still be considered as 
part of program intervention?  
Furthermore, program fidelity is influenced by elements such as time. As time 
goes by the intervention matures and influences program fidelity. Even when 
intervention design remains unchanged and direction of causality is 
established, interventions can still vary over time and findings will be very 
sensitive to the point in time in which impact is measured. Impact over time 
can take a 'J' shaped curve. i.e. things get worse before they get better(35). 
For FI interventions, projects might have been on the J curve with changes in 
NCFR just beginning to show in the latter half of the intervention period. It 
depends on how long it takes for the QI concept to "sink into the system". 
Currently, there is no criterion denoting the appropriate time for evaluation of a 
complex intervention. Although studies are known to have shown results 
within 12-14 months and in the case of Michigan study it was 18 months (218, 
225).  
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7.2.2.4 Implementation+strength:+Intensity+of+the+intervention+
The intensity of support provided by MaiKhanda’s facilitation team was also 
an important factor affecting the implementation of the PDSA cycles in the 
health facilities. By the early intervention period, MaiKhanda was established 
as a local NGO within Malawi (rather than just a project, as was initially 
envisaged) and programme implementation through the facilitation team was 
encouraged with the Consortium members providing technical support where 
required. This transformation could have affected the intensity with which the 
intervention was being delivered on the ground.  
Also the initial programme strategy was based on the innovation diffusion 
theory such that, a single MaiKhanda QI officer was facilitating the 
intervention across three districts, including Lilongwe which was a very large 
district. This influenced the intensity with which the intervention was delivered. 
While there is no documentation for earlier part of the intervention, it is clear 
from reports in the later intervention period that even when MaiKhanda was at 
full capacity ie having additional district based staff, it was able to complete 
only 80% of its planned activities [§6.7.2, XXV]. This was much lesser in the 
early intervention period (but documentary evidence on this is lacking).  
There was an intense focus on micro-level application of the PDSA method 
without much efforts to improve the wider systems influence. MaiKhanda QI 
interventions by way of the Collaborative and Action Periods, was very 
structured and focused towards improving quality of health care in the 3 
districts it was working. However, this was not supported by changes in 
resource availability to the facilities in these districts. This was a risk 
assumption that the project was aware of during its intervention design. There 
was indeed a change package within the QI interventions at MaiKhanda to 
consider efficient use of resources within its implementing facilities [§5.1.1.1]. 
But in a system where resources are scarce it is difficult to get facilities to 
prioritize, especially when MaiKhanda was external to the health system and 
did not intend to make a direct contribution to the resource gap. There was a 
change package dedicated to efficient use of resources. The change package 
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focused more on efficiency of existing resources rather than generating more 
resources. Attempts to bring in more resources mainly by the implementation 
partners was contemplated at one point, but the Programme Management 
Board (PMB) decided against it since that would not have been a sustainable 
model. Also there was a majority consensus that implementation fidelity 
needed to be preserved so as to  compare the effect of  QI intervention alone 
on quality of care in the absence of material resources.  
The shortage of resources was linked to staff morale. As observed in the staff 
psychology survey, motivation was usually low and staff participation and 
engagement was also influenced by the hierarchal nature of 
the organization. There was little supervision (again limited by resources of 
human and logistics) and there was a culture of accepting directives rather 
than creative brain-storming [§6.4.2.6, §6.6.5]. Setting up of QI teams in the 
facilities was an attempt to challenge this status quo but maintaining and 
running QI teams till they reached a certain level of maturity to independently 
engage themselves in creative thinking, was itself a challenge given the staff 
shortages and the constant turn-over in the facilities. The QI teams needed a 
constant support from MaiKhanda’s facilitation team throughout the period of 
the project.  Also as seen from the CEMOC survey an environment fostering 
innovation and autonomy by staff to carry out improvement work was lacking, 
meaning that it would have been more difficult for them to test out new ideas 
using the PDSA cycles. The scope for creative thinking was limited since 
there was not enough support from the supervisor and other senior leaders in 
the hierarchy (§6.6.5). For instance, health facilities struggled to produce 
documents outlining their PDSAs. 
The intense coaching that was to be provided throughout the period of the 
project, coupled with MaiKhanda’s own internal transition, slowed down the 
progress  of  QI  activities  in  most  facilities  that  MaiKhanda  was working 
in. 
Other innovations such as developing local leaders had limitations because 
as was seen from the provider knowledge and skills survey, the knowledge & 
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practice related to MNH was very low among the staff despite the various 
trainings conducted by a range of stakeholders (§6.6.2). Their QI expertise 
was also limited, given that the exposure was very recent and mainly from 
IHI's learning sessions. Furthermore, as QI was a new concept within Malawi 
and therefore required an initial saturation of the concept (obtained through 
wide-spread orientation) for it to seep through into implementing teams. While 
much of MaiKhanda’s staff efforts were focused on this, it was difficult to 
determine how or when this ‘tipping point’ would be reached.   
There was little, if any, attempt to monitor MaiKhanda’s work in the facilities 
and the intervention therefore was ill-equipped to analyse QI capability 
building amongst front line teams or the intervention intensity.  
7.2.3 Context//
Context usually comprises of the wider system level context as well as the 
local context. Here I refer to the context within the health system in Malawi 
and the broader political and social context. The context can be considered 
multi-layered consisting of different layers. Starting from the innermost layer 
and going outwards these can be described as individuals working in the 
health facilities, MaiKhanda relationships with the health facilities, 
organizational settings within the Malawian health care system as well as the 
wider policy and political context. 
Beginning at the individual level, participants in the CEmOC survey were of 
the opinion that while QI was important to bring about improvements in MNH, 
it was time consuming and required some effort from their end. It is difficult to 
conclude from the available data whether the motivation to be involved in QI 
Collaboratives was influenced by the lure of personal incentives (such as per 
diems for attending workshops and meetings) or by individual’s commitment 
to broader social gains (ie reduction in newborn case fatality rates in their 
facility) (§6.5.6, XXIII). Whatever the case, the capacity of the staff within the 
health facilities, in terms of their knowledge and skills related to newborn 
health was very limited. This is an important precursor for improvement since, 
it is the subject matter knowledge along with ‘profound’ knowledge that is 
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responsible for improvement according to Deming’s theory of profound 
knowledge(46). While this was addressed explicitly in the pre-intervention 
period, through activities such as death reviews and criterion based audits, 
this was not given enough attention in the intervention period. In-situ trainings 
to address skills gap was introduced in the facilities and competency of 
nursing staff, for instance, increased after introducing neonatal in-situ drills at 
St. Gabriel’s hospital. But the knowledge gap remained largely unaddressed 
in the intervention period and a clear strategy  in this regard was lacking. 
There was also no clinical leadership within MaiKhanda with expertise in 
newborn care.  
MaiKhanda’s role as a facilitating agency has been explained above. This 
meant that the actual implementation of QI interventions was done by health 
facility staff working in the facilities, who were employees of the Ministry of 
Health with no formal affiliation to MaiKhanda. These staff were already 
stretched and their level of commitment towards QI might not have been as 
MaiKhanda would have expected. As MaiKhanda was external to the health 
system, peer influence would also have been very minimal. Furthermore, the 
facility staff was also participating and collaborating in various other MNH 
initiatives, which were simultaneously running in these districts. All these 
factors might have influenced their level of engagement and commitment to 
MaiKhanda’s intervention. 
Resource availability and staff turnovers were major contextual factors for 
MaiKhanda interventions. Essential supplies remained in short supply 
throughout the length of the intervention period as witnessed in the baseline 
survey as well as in the health facility resources survey . In a study conducted 
in 7 NHS hospitals in the UK, the systems reliability was about 81to 87% 
(226).This is much lower in Malawi (227). For instance availability of 
equipment in OT in a leading tertiary facility is around 63-67%. From the 
human resources survey at MaiKhanda, facilities had 1-2 signal functions 
available at any given point in time (33). In other words the reliability of the 
system was very low in terms of availability of resources. The degree of 
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organizational readiness for QI was also low characterized by the transient 
nature of the QI team members and the continued coaching that had to be 
provided throughout the length of the project so that QI team could grasp the 
concepts. Also, the hierarchal nature within the healthcare system 
characterized by a subordination and control mechanism that was prevalent 
across all levels including the staff-patient relationship was an additional 
challenge to promoting the model for improvement in these settings.  
Every one of the nine CEmOC facilities in the CEmOC survey noted that a 
lack of material and human resources caused problems with QI 
implementation [VII]. Facility staff perceived difficulties in motivating 
colleagues to participate in QI work as a result of this. Shortage of staff led to 
an increased workload, which did not give the QI team members enough time 
to meet regularly and discuss QI activities. This in turn influenced their 
commitment to QI work as it was considered additional to their existing scope 
of work and therefore lower in their priority list. 
Staff turnover was a huge problem because it took about 9 months for local 
sustenance of the intervention. Thus turnover of staff meant that there wasn’t 
a consistent cohort to continue the interventions. For instance, a new QI team 
had only just been established at Bwaila only in 2010, one of the CEmOC 
facilities where MaiKhanda had been working since the beginning of the 
project in 2006.  
“Because human resource is reallocated whenever necessary, so each time 
new staff come in we have to orient.” “Since we are short staffed sometimes it 
becomes difficult to follow and do a protocol properly"[Clinical Officer, Bwaila 
Hospital VII].  
Critical shortage of neonatal clinicians and neonatal care skills in  facilities 
was also responsible for reducing attention to newborn care, e.g. Kasungu 
has not had a paediatrician for 10 years(§6.4.2.5, XIX) 
Towards the early intervention period, there was a growing demand for skilled 
delivery against limited supply of quality services, expounded by external 
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factors such as the government ban on TBAs. With more women delivering at 
health facilities, the capacity of health facilities was severely stretched [IX] 
In addition, other system level contextual factors such as the influx of ‘global’ 
HSAs also happened within the timeframe of MaiKhanda programme. The 
influence of these external factors on the attribution of MaiKhanda 
interventions to achieve improvements in newborn mortality is complex.  
 
Figure 22: Increase in facility delivery in MaiKhanda (Source: Evaluation Report) 
 
Firstly, there was an increase in deliveries across all health facilities (Fig)  and 
this increase is more likely to be related to enforcement of the government 
ban on TBAs, by local leaders than any of the intervention change packages. 
Secondly, improvements in some aspects of the QI intervention could 
potentially have been masked by the sudden influx of patients coming to the 
facilities for delivery.  
7.2.4 Volition//
Social interventions do not work by themselves, such as in a drug trial, but 
rather it is the interpretation of the subjects implementing the programme, in 
this case the QI teams, that produce the results and these subjects are active 
agents not passive recipients. Their understanding of the interventions is 
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greatly influenced by how the programme theory is introduced to them and the 
interactions they have throughout the programme implementation with the 
different contextual elements in the health system.  
MaiKhanda came into existence from a consortium of partners based in 
London and Boston. While the Consortium agreed on the larger role for local 
leadership, it was not until two years into the programme that due attention 
was given to this issue. Even when MaiKhanda got registered as a local NGO 
in 2008 and had a Director, the technical leads (represented by various 
consortium partners) were not necessarily engaged with the senior leadership 
at MaiKhanda, often by-passing them to work directly with QI programme staff 
at MaiKhanda. This gave rise to tensions within the organization. The root 
cause of this tension lay in the conceptual understanding of the programme. 
While MaiKhanda had a supply and demand side intervention, IHI considered 
this a quality improvement intervention and deemed itself to be the lead 
partner with principles of QI overarching all programme interventions in 
MaiKhanda. They were supported by the donors in this decision. This 
difference in conceptual understanding had implications for the intervention 
design and subsequent implementation.  
The rising tension between the different partners manifested as follows. 
Partners were of the opinion that MaiKhanda had the mandate for decision 
making, yet they were not using it for decision making. There were also issues 
around flexibility and attitude of the Director and her capacity to adapt QI as 
well as issues around not being able to engage MaiKhanda’s Board. At first 
instance these appear as management issues, yet the underpinnings of these 
lie in the programme focus and approach. The fundamental question that 
remained unanswered was if MaiKhanda was a QI organization or if it was a 
maternal and newborn organization This was never resolved neither was a 
shared common vision reached. As the programme evolved, the issues 
started manifesting as management or personality issues. This had 
implications such that, as MaiKhanda the community based women’s group 
empowerment model and advocacy had relevance within MaiKhanda’s scope 
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of work. However, as a QI organization, the focus of engaging women was 
merely to get them to the facilities where they would be managed 
appropriately (using QI methods).  
Secondly, MaiKhanda was a facilitator rather than a direct implementer of the 
intervention and this also had implications of how the programme was 
articulated, among different levels of stakeholders within the programme 
(Figure 23).  
 
Figure 23: MaiKhanda's role as facilitator in the intervention 
MaiKhanda’s programme theories were generated by external change agents 
such as the Consortium partners which had first to be imparted to MaiKhanda 
staff who (the assumption is) would have accepted the theory of improvement. 
They would then introduce this concept to selected personnel from different 
cadres of Ministry of Health forming the QI teams, who would go on to 
implement the intervention at the health facility level. Initially the idea was to 
engage different stakeholders from various categories in the health systems 
through the leadership buddy system and knowledge agents. However, in 
programme implementation phase, it was only the QI teams (i.e. facility level 
staff) from the health facilities that the MaiKhanda programme closely 
engaged with. At the health centres level, these QI teams included the 
medical assistant and nursing staff who were often the only clinical staff 
available for facility, round the clock. Nevertheless, the assumption here was 
that the health facility staff would easily buy into the theory and implement it, 
within the context of a myriad of other similar interventions also vying for the 
same staff to implement their respective programmes.  
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The intervention theory did not take into consideration the existing perceptions 
related to quality improvement and quality of care amongst the staff in the 
facilities. The concept of QI was relatively new to the facility staff and 
introduction of improvement intervention was subject to their interpretation of 
quality of care in their setting. This influences their choice in engaging with the 
QI interventions. The collaborative workshops objective was to develop a 
collective understanding of quality improvement and how it could be 
implemented in the participant's respective settings. However, given the 
limited exposure health facility staff have had to ‘the ideal settings of care 
provision’, a good starting point could have been the MoH approved 
interventions such as Criterion based audits or death reviews and then use 
them as a channel to introduce the Model for Improvement. Although part of 
the initial intervention design, this was not part of the early or late 
implementation period.  
Along with the processes of care, quality improvement at the microsystem 
(health facility) level also involves the content of care and these together are a 
crucial and integral part of continuous quality improvement (CQI). The focus of 
content of care is towards developing and advancing subject matter 
knowledge (the knowledge of medical sciences) and ensuring that standards 
and protocols are well understood so as to provide atleast the minimal level of 
care to all beneficiaries. In well-developed health systems, the underlying 
assumption is that there exists sufficient subject matter knowledge (content of 
care) within the health systems and that standards and protocols are well in 
place. Therefore in such settings the emphasis on quality improvement is 
focussed towards improving the processes of care. However in the context of 
Malawi, there needs to be an equal emphasis on traditional quality 
improvement methods as much as we would have on the processes of care. 
The assumption here regarding subject matter knowledge (i.e medical 
sciences knowledge) among health care providers is good and that standards 
and protocols are in place and being stringently followed, does not hold true. 
The lack of subject matter knowledge was evident from the provider 
knowledge survey.  This was also the experience of the evaluators as well as 
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the TAs who had been conducting maternal death reviews in different health 
facilities in the different districts in Malawi. Content knowledge thus needed to 
be enhanced by repeated and continuous training on the essential elements 
of care along with training and mentorship for quality improvement. 
7.2.5 Outcome//
An intervention usually has multiple outcomes all of which would ideally need 
to be captured within the evaluation, but is seldom possible for any one 
evaluation to cover all the multitudinous outcomes.  
The tendency of the impact evaluation of MaiKhanda, using conventional 
evaluation methods was to standardize interventions so as to maintain 
intervention fidelity. It did not establish feedback mechanism for programme 
implementers to make mid-course correction. However, dynamic change is an 
important characteristic of an improvement model and maintaining the fidelity 
of the intervention posed a major challenge to measuring outcome.  
MaiKhanda intervention had a range of outcomes and effect indicators, the 
most important ones being captured in the process evaluation (Figure 6).  
Linking the outcome to particular aspects of an intervention remained a 
challenge. It is not clear if the increase in health facility deliveries observed in 
the intervention period, was a consequence of the interventions such as 
women friendly care or an influence of the external context such as a ban on 
TBAs. Whatever the reason, the influx of mothers to deliver at the health 
facilities without addressing the issue of staff shortages lead to increase 
burden on the already over-stretched staff to provide skilled delivery at birth.  
Choice of outcome in the initial stage is important. Working in QI areas where 
the outcomes are less sensitive to behaviour change, providing positive 
feedback to the teams is difficult. For instance, project was focused on 
measuring neonatal case fatality rates from the beginning using SPC 
(Statistical Process Control) measures. Statistical process control is adapted 
mainly from the manufacturing industry and is best used to measure changes 
in processes (72). Reporting and feedback on distal outcome (rather than 
process) indicators such as NCFR (Neonatal Case Fatality Rate) is likely to 
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have far less influence on the QI teams than the visibility of proximal process 
data such as use of partograph or skill score for neonatal resuscitation drills. 
Analysing outcome measures on a monthly basis can only offer little in terms 
of systems insight and is likely to cause more dissatisfaction and de-
motivation for the QI teams.  Rather, more tangible and proximal indicators 
such as the use of partograph could readily appeal to the QI teams. Along 
with visibility such local level process data also influences the micro-level 
point of care which QI teams have more control over rather than higher levels 
of the system. 
Also from an evaluation perspective, it is difficult to associate changes in case 
fatality rates with improvements in service delivery as it is only one of the 
factors that influence case fatality rates. Non-linearity is an inherent property 
of any system and it is difficult to establish direction of an intervention(228). 
For instance, a study at St.Gabriel hospital, on improvements in neonatal 
resuscitation, showed a fall in asphyxia case fatality rate in late 2010. 
However, this was unrelated to a concomitant change in neonatal case fatality 
rate at St. Gabriel during the same period. Similarly, it is difficult to link PDSA 
cycles (QI intervention components) to improvements in service delivery. 
Context also has a bigger role to play. In addition, other system level factors 
might also influence the intervention.  
From the MaiKhanda interventions we have seen that changes in CFR do not 
necessarily co-relate with the introduction of the neonatal change packages 
(Figure 17). However, as part of the improvement efforts for maternal health, 
QI concepts were introduced into the facilities which included general system 
wide improvement efforts, for eg: data improvement, which might have been 
taking place and could have had an indirect influence on newborn case fatality 
rate even before the neonatal change package was implemented.  
According to Stames, evaluation implemented at local level does not 
immediately inform evaluation of the impact of the overall programme. This is 
because, while the overall programme might have a common causal theory, 
particular sites may have different implementation theories of how to activate 
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this causal theory(229). As reported by the Technical Lead from MaiKhanda 
[XXXI] during the intervention period, there have been islands of excellence 
within the MaiKhanda programme such as the resuscitation drills, use of 
partograph, referral systems. But the impact of this (defined by facility NCFR) 
on the overall programme could not be determined perhaps because the 
critical mass to impact on the common causal theory was not achieved. The 
programme would have benefitted if evaluation could dwell deeper into the 
implementation theories in these pockets of excellence, alongside various 
process implementation studies.  
There are also unexpected outcomes. Although FSB (Fresh Still Birth) was 
not a primary outcome to measure, there were reductions in FSB rates in the 
health centres. This was an unexpected outcome of the intervention. Perhaps 
the maternal change packages that were more prominently implemented 
throughout the intervention period is more likely to have had a greater 
influence on stillbirth outcome as compared to neonatal case fatality. Although 
neonatal change packages were implemented, this was not until the late 
intervention period.  
7.2.6 Rivalry//
Programmes are usually implemented alongside existing interventions and 
therefore are competitors. The QA (Quality Assurance) programme by 
JPHIEGO was already in existence when the MaiKhanda quality improvement 
interventions were being rolled out. This produced a challenge, since they 
were part of the MoH quality technical review group and had different 
conceptual stand-point regarding ‘quality improvement’. The Ministry through 
the Quality Technical Working Group was more oriented towards a ‘Quality 
Assurance’ model and thus focused on standards and audits. Infact, 
MaiKhanda intervention did have standards and criterion-based audits as part 
of the programme component in the pre-intervention phase. However, the 
inclusion of the Model for Improvement in the intervention design for the 
project was controversial from the very start. The intervention design based 
on the IHI model for improvement included implementation of key change 
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packages for improving newborn mortality with the use of PDSAs by facility 
staff supported by an improvement advisor. The fundamental difference 
between the two models was that CBA was based on the principles of quality 
assurance and thus concerned with maintaining minimum standards, while 
the Model for Improvement was based on the principles of quality 
improvement, where focus is on constantly evolving and improving the 
standards of care. 
The re-design of the intervention in 2008, ended up with the exit of LSTM the 
key implementing partner for standards and criterion based audits. On 
hindsight, this could have influenced the uptake of QI interventions more 
promptly by the facility based staff, as the line of thinking with the Criterion 
Base Audit was more closely aligned with the ‘Quality Assurance’ model that 
the Ministry was promoting.  
It was not only internal rivalry that MaiKhanda had to deal with. From the 
survey of the MaiKhanda CEmOCs in 2008 it is clear that the MaiKhanda 
facilities intervention was not done in isolation and faced competition from 
other projects that were also in operation at the CEmOCs, vying for the same 
human resources. An average of two other projects were also concurrently in 
operation in each of the CEmOCs in 2008 [VII]. This lead not only to the 
competing demands on health care workers time but also of competing 
influences on the health outcomes and the resulting problem of attribution to 
specific interventions.  
7.2.7 Emergence//
Programme components come together to produce another novel component 
that actually changes the conditions that make them work. This component 
cannot then be broken down into its individual sub-units.  
 Criterion based audits and  death reviews were part of the design in the pre-
intervention phase. The death reviews were conducted by staff from LSTM 
and MaiKhanda.  The expertise of the clinical mentors from LSTM during the 
death reviews gave rise to impromptu clinical skills mentorship during site 
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visits. Clinical mentorships became an important component of the pre-
intervention period, later being replaced by in-situ clinical training sessions in 
the early and later intervention periods. These were emergent properties of 
the intervention that was not part of the original intervention design.  
MaiKhanda started off as a project supported by external technical support to 
bring in the model for improvement within health facilities in the central region 
of Malawi. To gain legitimacy and acceptance and accelerate the QI work in 
Malawi, the PMB (Programme Management Board) supported the 
establishment of MaiKhanda as a locally registered Malawian NGO. Thus 
what started of as a project, evolved into a local organization, gradually 
building on to its own set of culture and value practices.  But this was more 
demanding and time consuming than expected and not part of the original 
proposal. Much effort was directed towards getting MaiKhanda established as 
an organization and this affected the core functioning of the intervention which 
was to impact on newborn health in Malawian health facilities using Model For 
Improvement techniques.  
There was a lack of senior leadership within the programme from the start. 
This was acknowledged and corrective steps were taken to get a Director on 
board. However, the skill set of the senior leadership was geared towards 
establishing MaiKhanda as a NGO and focusing more on advocacy for MNH. 
The technical advisors were more in alignment and working closely with the FI 
Team Leaders bypassing the senior leadership thereby leading to conflict 
between the local leadership on the ground and the technical lead on the 
project while the programme struggled to deliver on its core functions[§6.5.4, 
XXXII]. One of the ideas emerging from this was a proposal to focus work only 
in Salima district, since Salima district was perceived to be more engaged and 
involved in the QI work. The strategy was that quick gains there would trigger 
other districts to have a pull factor towards QI interventions. This was however 
never cleared by the Programme Management Board because of strong 
pressure from the Evaluation team to maintain the fidelity of the intervention 
for the purposes of the evaluation design.  
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7.3 Conclusion/
In summary, most of the programme strategies associated with the 
mechanism of successful QI interventions, that were observed in the Michigan 
study were also present in MaiKhanda programme. Yet we do not see the 
translation of those programme strategies into ‘mechanism’ within the 
MaiKhanda programme. I then looked at actual programme implementation to 
explore how programme implementation might have influenced the 
mechanism of the intervention.  
Similar to the Michigan project, MaiKhanda project also demonstrated 
different levels of success and contextual factors might have had a key role to 
play in it. For instance, availability of resources in Salima was relatively better 
as compared to Lilongwe and Kasungu. This had implications for staff 
motivation as well as uptake of QI interventions. The leadership was also 
reported to be very committed to improving maternal health. Thus the picture 
of QI interventions in Salima were different from those observed in Kasungu 
or Lilongwe 
MaiKhanda was a project, initially known as the THF consortium, entailed with 
the task of implementing a supply and demand side intervention in 3 central 
districts of Malawi with the aim of reducing maternal and newborn mortality 
and morbidity. However, it later on registered as a NGO with its own 
governance structure. This transition did consume a lot of the time of the 
senior management team and diverted their attention from the core 
components towards governance and institution building. 
Another major challenge was the internal capacity within MaiKhanda to 
facilitate the QI interventions. Staff were being trained and capacitated in QI 
as interventions were taking place simultaneously. 
Death reviews and criterion based death audits which formed the basis for 
initiating improvement in the facilities, in the pre-intervention period, were not 
part of the intervention design in the re-defined model for improvement. As 
death reviews were part of the roadmap it could have larger buy in from the 
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staff, stakeholders on the ground to implement, which could have been the 
foundation stone for Model for Improvement work and also as a strategy to 
make in-roads into health facilities where there were other competing projects.  
Given the wider system influences, it is difficult to link PDSA cycles or 
Collaboratives with outcomes 
The project observed an increase in health facility deliveries. It is not clear if 
this was a result of contextual factors such as the government ban on TBAs  
or an attribute of women friendly care change package implemented as part of 
the Qi intervention or a combination of both.  
The emphasis throughout the project was on the model for improvement and 
implementing it as described in the protocol rather than considering the MFI 
as a framework for implementing QI within the Malawian context. For e.g. the 
evaluation emphasized an adherence to monitoring the PDSA cycle. Given 
the varying context, it would have been prudent to focus on the theories of the 
intervention rather than the focusing on the key intervention activities per se.  
The dosage of the interventions was probably adequate but the duration and 
intensity of the QI interventions were perhaps not optimum to trigger the 
intervention mechanism. There was also a lack of conceptual clarity from the 
very inception of the project. Long implementation chain of the intervention 
and intervention and the emergence of MaiKhanda as a local NGO also 
affected the programme implementation.  
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Chapter/8 Discussion/
 
This PhD describes the evaluation of a quality improvement intervention to 
reduce newborn mortality in three central districts in Malawi. I begin this 
chapter with a summary of the key findings and then go on to discuss some of 
the emerging methodological issues related to evaluation of QI interventions. 
Following this, I outline the key learnings from the study that can contribute to 
future evaluation designs and highlight the scope for future evaluation designs 
involving QI interventions in resource poor settings. In final section, I outline 
the limitation of the study.  
8.1 Key/findings/
8.1.1 Choice/of/improvement/theories/
MaiKhanda’s programme theory for quality improvement is based on 
Deming’s theory of profound knowledge, where subject matter knowledge is 
complemented with profound knowledge(46). The scale up and spread of this 
improvement is hypothesised to happen through a technique known as 
Breakthrough Collaborative Series. The theoretical underpinnings of this 
spread model are based on the diffusion of innovation theory where the rapid 
spread of new ideas or practices happens largely by imitation(182) mainly 
through the (human) agency categorized as innovators, early adopters, early 
& late majority and laggards(192) (§3.4). Based on the diffusion theory, the 
idea behind the MaiKhanda’s collaborative workshops was to provide a 
platform where informal networks would be established alongside information 
sharing and the influence of opinion leaders and change agents harnessed. 
By identifying the innovators and early adopters of the intervention from the QI 
teams and promoting and building a conducive environment, it is assumed 
that scale up of these ideas will take place at a rapid pace. Innovation and 
scale-up happen almost simultaneously or parallel to each other. One of the 
reasons for this parallel approach is because of a whole systems 
engagement, that is, involvement of the human agency and other inter-
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dependent contextual factors of the health system that facilitate the 
intervention outcomes (although they are not direct components of the 
intervention package)(95). Examples of newborn interventions led by IHI in 
the Tula Oblast region of Russia(230) and the Ghanaian Fives Alive project 
reflect such a model of spread (19). Sustainability and spread are thus an 
inherent property of the Model for Improvement. 
Theories are both formal and informal. The use of formal theory in 
improvement such as Deming’s theory of ‘profound knowledge’ (46)and 
Roger’s ‘diffusion of innovation’ theory(181) guiding MaiKhanda interventions, 
help in learning and understanding of how improvement can work (or not) 
across a range of context.  
For a program such as MaiKhanda that deals with multiple layers of the health 
system, theories of organizational behaviour change are crucial to understand 
health system dynamics but need to be considered alongside theories of 
individual behaviour change and social network theories of collective 
behaviour(183). Theories of organizational culture such as ‘competing values 
framework’(108)are equally important to understand the culture and thereby 
the context in which collective behaviour is influenced.  Other theories such as 
the Normalization Process theory, which help explain social processes that 
lead from an interventions inception to its normalization within a system(183), 
could have been considered over the diffusion of innovation theory. 
One of the main challenges in theory formulation has been on deciding the 
rationale for the choice of theories as there is no set prescription for the 
selection of theories. A wide range of theories are applicable for an 
intervention ranging from agriculture, medicine, public health, organizational 
behaviour, psychology, political sciences, marketing to name a few(183). 
There are more than 60 theories, models and frameworks relevant to 
implementation available to practitioners & researchers, providing a bouquet 
of theories to choose from. There have been recent attempts in coming out 
with a taxonomy of theories for implementation research(231) and more 
specifically for improvement research(232).  
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8.1.2 Developing/Theory/of/Change/
The ‘best fit’ theories can be determined by developing a comprehensive 
programme theory based on the logic model of the intervention. Development 
of the logic model is considered an important step in theory-based evaluation. 
However, developing a logic model with all the underlying assumptions and 
rationale (also referred to as Theory of Change) is easier said than done and 
literature on how to do this is only slowly emerging now(233).  
The challenge is partly because interventions are very context specific, 
implemented within a complex system and it is therefore difficult to prescribe a 
generic logic model, which can be applicable across a wide range of 
interventions. The other challenge is in establishing objectivity in the 
development of a logic model so that scientific rigor can be maintained. 
Nevertheless, the ‘Model for Improvement’ and ‘Breakthrough Collaborative 
Series’ provide a logic framework for MaiKhanda’s interventions. These logic 
models (with slight variations) have been used in other settings, such as the 
Keystone project in Michigan and the Fives Alive! Project in Ghana, which 
have been proclaimed as successful projects(19, 67).  
These formal theories need to be complemented with informal theories. 
Stakeholder engagement to elicit underlying theories and identify and develop 
iterative context specific interventions has been acknowledged as an 
important step in theory based evaluation(35). Although these informal 
theories and local field experience make important contributions to the logic 
model, they are prone to selection bias. Given paucity of resources in health 
systems settings such as Malawi, stakeholder usually tend to focus their 
theories around structural changes such as new infrastructure, replenishing 
resources (such as drugs and supplies) and sustaining human resource, 
which might not be within the remit of an intervention project. In Malawi there 
is also a culture of perdiemitis that affects stakeholder engagement(234). 
While projects are geared towards achieving a higher social goal (safe 
motherhood, healthy newborns), individual incentives (per-diems, allowances) 
can take precedence over the larger social gain. 
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Moreover, most interventions are prescriptive, decided largely by donor and 
facilitating agencies before the beginning of the study. For instance 
MaiKhanda prescribed to IHI’s Model for Improvement when other 
approaches to improvement were already in existence within country at the 
time of implementation. Since most projects are time bound and closely linked 
to the evaluation design, the degree of flexibility to incorporate informal 
theories to influence interventions is usually very limited.  
Convincing stakeholders and getting their buy-in is crucial for intervention 
success. Evaluations that do not take informal theories into consideration 
have limited value in a theory-based evaluation. But on the other hand, if 
informal theories are to be part of the evolving intervention, then the 
evaluation design can be challenged by the intervention infidelity where mid-
course correction of the intervention based on stakeholder feedback will lead 
to deviation from the original prescribed intervention. For instance, in the late 
intervention period it was felt that the intervention was not working as 
anticipated and a proposal to re-strategize the program and focus only on 
Salima district was suggested. This was based on the informal theories 
around the performance of health facilities in Salima. It was felt that there was 
a strong district leadership and the organizational ‘readiness’ was better in 
comparison with other districts (§6.7.2). This organizational readiness was 
characterized by the relatively better availability of human and material 
resources, better accessibility of the terrain and relatively better standing as 
women friendly facilities (§6.4.2.6). But a fixed evaluation design meant that 
the intervention could not be modified on the basis of the informal theories. On 
the other hand. even if evaluation design had been flexible and modified its 
design based on the emerging informal theories, the scope of current 
evaluation methods and tools  to measure intervention fidelity and predict 
impact, is limited. 
8.1.3 MaiKhanda’s/programme/theory/for/QI/
The program activities associated with MaiKhanda’s improvement model were 
based on the theories of successful QI interventions elsewhere. Program 
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activities such as collaborative learning sessions in addition to knowledge 
sharing could in theory help build pressure within participating organizations to 
mimic other QI facilities. But the collaborative learning sessions were 
organized and lead mainly by MaiKhanda rather than senior programme 
leaders from within the healthcare system. This raised the issue of ownership 
and the intervention was perceived as something that was externally driven. 
While the mechanism of spread in the Michigan study was achieved through a 
ripple effect where the innovations in participating health facilities built 
pressure on other facilities to emulate them thus reaching a critical mass of QI 
facilities, at MaiKhanda participating facilities did not exhibit mimetic pressure 
on the other facilities. This is related to the issue of ownership mentioned 
above but could also be linked to the intervention’s implementation strength.  
There was no binding commitment for the health facilities to be involved in the 
QI activities since the decision to join the intervention was made at the MoH 
level. It was also difficult to get commitment from staff because of the frequent 
movement of staff within and across facilities. Although regular 
teleconferences and workshops provided a feedback mechanism, which lay 
the foundation for a networked community, their implementation was 
frequently hampered by logistics and financial challenges. MaiKhanda placed 
a lot of emphasis on data improvement exercises and feedback but the choice 
of key indicators such as NCFR was not a true reflection of the performance 
of the health facilities and anyways it was a complex measure to have 
warranted behaviour change at the individual or facility level. Checklists and 
elements of the change package provide a neutral platform for changing 
culture and practice around newborn care. But while checklists were 
introduced as part of the change packages, there was no organizational 
incentive for the Malawian health system to perform or change their culture of 
practice.  
Program theories usually contain assumptions (either implicit or explicit) of 
how and why the program activities will bring a change, which are specific to 
each context and are subject to scrutiny within a TBE approach. Mechanisms, 
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which are an affirmation of the assumptions, cannot be directly observed-only 
inferred(220) and program theories help in drawing up this inference. Given 
the challenges on how to choose appropriate theories, it is likely that some of 
the mechanisms might have been overlooked. 
8.1.4 MaiKhanda’s/implementation/theory//
Measuring implementation strength as an important precursor to intervention 
mechanism is not adequately acknowledged in literature. One of the reasons 
for using a modified theory based evaluation method for the MaiKhanda 
programme, combining Theory of Change and Realist Evaluation approaches, 
was to understand the link between intervention mechanism and 
implementation strength.  
There are 2 major components to measuring implementation strength- it can 
be quantified in terms of the dose, duration, intensity and specificity of the 
intervention while implementation quality refers to the implementation fidelity. 
Drawing an analogy from clinical studies, in terms of dosage of the 
intervention, MaiKhanda received a ‘bolus’ dose (through the QI 
Collaboratives) followed by ‘sustained release’ (equivalent to QI team 
meetings in the action period). This ‘dose’ was to be maintained at regular 
intervals both at the CEmOC level and health centre level, but this was not 
consistent and there were collaborative sessions conducted too close to each 
other followed by very short action periods affecting the process of continuous 
QI team engagement. The interventions got into full implementation mode as 
intended, only in the last 12-15 months of the intervention. Ovretveit(83), 
Alemi (225) and Pronovost(173)  have identified the length of time required for 
successful QI Collaboratives to show outcomes is between 12 to 24 months. 
However this was much longer in Malawi.  The intensity of the intervention 
was also very limited because of the limited capacity within MaiKhanda until 
the late intervention period. In terms of implementation specificity, the 
intervention did sway away from the agreed implementation plan, the focus 
being more on the CEmOC facilities and attention being paid to the neonatal 
change package only in the late intervention period.  
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Implementation theory can be plotted as a spider-web graph with the following 
elements, theoretical assumptions, intervention design, intervention 
implementation context and outcome, each scored on a likert scale (Figure 
24). However, such a measurement is very subjective and not comparable  
with other interventions.  
 
Figure 24: Measuring implementation (Illustrative only) 
 
Plotting Implementation strength would include dose, duration, intensity, 
specificity and fidelity on a likert scale 
One of the challenges for evaluation, in terms of implementation theory, is that 
there is no general consensus of a method for standardizing or objectively 
measuring individual elements of implementation and it is even more difficult 
to measure a pooled effect of the various elements.  
But more importantly, it is difficult to determine how much implementation 
efforts are needed to achieve change in outcomes. Wilson et al have argued 
that while implementation effort is significantly associated with changes in 
activities related to the intervention, the implementation strength need not 
necessarily influence the outcome measures(101). This is because 
implementation strength cannot be measured in isolation as it is greatly 
influenced by the complexity of the intervention and of the context in which it 
is operating.  
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8.1.5 Complexity/
I explore this assumption about the complexity of the intervention a bit further 
here. The basic premise of the model for improvement is for people to test 
their ideas within their local setting and where successful to share it with a 
larger peer forum through platforms such as the Collaborative learning 
sessions. Simple as the theory guiding QI intervention is, it is the actual 
design of the interventions that make it more complex.  
As is true for most complex interventions, it is certain aspects of the 
intervention that make it complex rather than the intervention as a whole(235). 
For MaiKhanda, some elements of its intervention characteristics (such as 
intervention fidelity)(§6.3), its own internal context (§6.5), individual and 
organizational characteristics such as the subjective interpretation of the 
intervention by the human agency (§6.6) are factors that make it a complex 
intervention.  
One of the major strategic changes in the early intervention period of 
MaiKhanda programme was to work across different levels of the health 
system so as to secure sustained and significant change. This change was 
influenced by The Health Foundation’s (donor agency) learning and 
experience, which was shaping their own Theory of Change regarding quality 
improvement work. In essence, there was a recognition to work across 
different levels of the health system-the patient/community level, the clinical 
microsystem, the macro system (organization) and the environment, in order 
to make sustainable gains. In terms of intervention fidelity, this was different 
from the intervention design as envisaged in the original proposal. There the 
focus was on an integrated model for improvement combining criterion-based 
audits with rapid cycle improvements and use of MDAs as root cause 
analysis. Nevertheless, even in the revised Model for Improvement promoted 
by IHI there was a greater focus on improvement methods such as PDSAs 
and Collaborative cycles. However, a whole systems approach considering 
organizational maturity, staff motivation and MaiKhanda’s internal stability and 
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capacity to embed interventions into existing health care systems perhaps 
would have been a better model for improvement, on hindsight.   
Furthermore, MaiKhanda was ‘facilitating’ the intervention from outside the 
health system, with the actual implementation on the ground being conducted 
by the QI teams in the health facilities. This meant a long implementation 
chain with varying roles of the human agencies involved. The agencies 
involved donor perception, contextual understanding of technical advisors, the 
conceptual clarity of MaiKhanda facilitation team, the motivation of QI 
implementation team in the facilities, perception of staff in the facilities, the 
support of DHMT members in the district. In the process of introducing 
MaiKhanda interventions into the health system, the intervention had to 
manoeuvre itself through all these different agencies so as to effect 
implementation. MaiKhanda’s degree of influence on the local teams would be 
determined by their level of engagement and degree of acceptability (through 
peer influence). While peer influence was a strong determinant of success in 
the Michigan study(67), MaiKhanda despite having QI officer with a clinical 
background in the late intervention period was considered external to the 
health system. The relationship between MaiKhanda staff and the QI teams 
on the ground could have been explored in greater detail as it bridges the 
important vital link between the NGO and the health system. Using methods 
such as social network analysis could help understand these vital links but 
also the power relation that influence this relationship (236).  
Complexity also arises from a (health) system’s inter-dependent parts. 
Because of this inter-dependence, improvement interventions need to focus 
across the different levels of the health system. A ‘one-size fits all’ 
methodology (such as the PDSA) might not be appropriate for improvement 
across other levels of the health system. By focussing on a single 
improvement method within just the microsystem level can make the gains 
from the improvement interventions unsustainable in the long run. For 
example: use of partograph in labour was affected by the non-availability of 
partograph forms; improvements in neonatal resuscitation was unsustainable 
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as a result of loss of institutional memory arising form the frequent transfer of 
nurses.  
8.1.6 Context/
Another important element influencing implementation strength is context and 
this includes both internal and external context. When MaiKhanda initiated the 
quality improvement initiative in Malawi, it was not being introduced in vacuum 
(or where nothing previously existed before). Even before the introduction of 
MaiKhanda interventions CBA (Criterion Based Audits) and IP (Infection 
Prevention) protocol and Performance assessment were being used in the 
Malawian health system. The Ministry of Health already had a technical 
working group on quality of care. This historical background and context is 
essential to understand when introducing QI concepts into the Malawian 
health care system. An early situational analysis done at the beginning of the 
intervention did describe this context. However, this was not taken into 
consideration in developing the intervention design and implementation. For 
example, it would have been easier for the QI intervention to gain acceptability 
into health facilities using CBA as the starting point, since this was an already 
established and accepted approach to improvement within the Malawian 
health care setting. Introducing a fairly new concept such as QI within existing 
models of quality of care, created conflict and confusion within the 
implementing agencies and with the health facility teams. This, perhaps, also 
contributed to the long lead-time in the programme interventions being 
adopted and implemented by the health facility teams. 
MaiKhanda itself was an organization in transition. From starting off as a 
project, it later went on to register itself as a local entity in Malawi, with its own 
governance structure. This transition did consume a lot of the time of the 
senior management team and diverted their attention from the core 
components towards governance and institution building.  
In MaiKhanda, there were isolated pockets of excellence within the QI 
intervention. These are the implementation theories contributing towards the 
common causal theory. But the impact of this (defined by facility NCFR) on 
 267 
the overall programme was not seen because the critical mass to impact on 
the outcomes was perhaps not achieved. The programme would have 
benefitted if evaluation could have a greater focus into the implementation 
theories along side impact measurement of neonatal case fatality rate. I try to 
dwell deeper into the implementation theory here in my PhD, but this is  done 
retrospectively and better evaluation designs  could have been used, if the 
implementation theory was articulated at the beginning of the intervention. For 
instance, a case study approach of the ‘outliers’ identified in the control charts 
(for eg: best or worst performing facilities) could provide more insight into how 
interventions get accepted within the health system.  
Other contextual factors that can influence implementation strength and it 
relation to outcomes are the extent of organizational readiness and 
organizational maturity within the health system. The Michigan study was able 
to reduce central venous line infection rates by applying QI to a complex 
clinical procedure among 108 hospitals within a span of 18 months(173).  The 
degree of professional cohesion and organizational maturity that existed prior 
to start of the QI intervention could possibly have had a part to play in its 
success. But these elements were not described in the Keystone project nor 
were they adequately explored in the MaiKhanda project. Contextual 
‘software’ factors such as organizational readiness and organizational culture 
influence implementation strength. There are iterative versions of 
measurement and classification of these ‘softwares’, such as organizational 
maturity index(107, 237) and COACH tool (238), but a consensus on 
standardization of these tools is required so as to help comparisons across 
interventions. Secondly, a close inter-relationship within different levels of the 
health system is key to intervention success at the microsystems level. In the 
Michigan study for example, there was a tight network between the hospital 
participating in the Collaboratives and the leadership within the hospital 
management was engaged in the improvement process(67). In contrast, in 
Malawi there is strong hierarchy between the higher levels of management 
(Ministry of Health officials) and the district and health facility staff (§6.6.5) 
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and this was generally seen as a hindrance for the cultivation of innovative 
ideas. 
8.1.7 Intervention/Characteristics/
Closely related to the issue of context was that of the intervention 
characteristics. The MaiKhanda intervention is adopted largely from the Model 
for Improvement based on IHI’s experiences in Northern America and Europe 
where QI interventions focussing specifically on the process of care have 
been successfully implemented. However, in comparison with the Malawian 
context these are relatively well functioning (resourceful) health systems. 
Introduction of QI concepts and techniques into less (or non) functional health 
systems needs to have a broader remit and needs to consider not just the 
care-giving processes but also the interdependent layers of service delivery 
mechanism and re-organization of care, in order to show impact. This concept 
of whole systems improvement approach is not new and has been suggested 
by others as well (23, 95), but the key challenge has been the implementation 
and evaluation of such an approach.  
Another important intervention characteristic was that, in MaiKhanda, the 
interventions were mainly focussed on improvements in the process of care 
giving. For instance, the change package was mainly focussed on clinically 
excellent care at the microsystems (inpatient ward) level, conducting PDSA 
cycles on newborn resuscitation, management of sepsis and kangaroo mother 
care. Interventions focussing on the processes of care at the clinical 
microsystems level are able to generate localized improvement models, but 
without interacting with other layers across the health system, they are unable 
to develop a critical mass that will lead to measurable, sustainable and 
scalable improvements in outcomes. 
8.1.8 Measuring/implementation/strength/
Although context and complexity are important mediators of implementation 
strength, existing measurement methods for implementation strength do not 
take them into consideration(98). This is similar to a Theory of Change 
approach (in the evaluation of program theories) where context is considered 
 269 
independent of the other components and evaluated separately (unlike in 
realist evaluation where context is an integral part of the intervention 
mechanism). The relationship between implementation strength and 
intervention outcomes is not linear and the 'tipping point' can only be achieved 
after a certain threshold of implementation strength is reached after which the 
change in outcome might be exponential. However, it is not possible to 
determine this threshold a priori and factor it in the evaluation design mainly 
because of its non-linear nature. It is also not clear if higher implementation 
strength will produce better outcomes. This will, to some extent, depend on 
how closely the various implementation elements reflect the theory of change.  
In summary, the impact evaluation of QI intervention for reducing newborn 
mortality in 3 central districts in Malawi did not show an effect. This was 
probably related to its inadequate implementation strength, which did not carry 
enough momentum to trigger a change mechanism within the health facilities 
that MaiKhanda was working in. 
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8.2 Methodological/issues//
8.2.1 Theory/Based/Evaluation/
There has been a plea and a thrust in recent years to look at wider research 
methodologies to evaluate complex interventions such as QI(169). For 
probability designs, in addition to RCTs, other approaches such as Bayesian 
methods (149) and Step Wedge Trials (SWTs) (172) have been suggested. In 
case of plausibility designs, theory based evaluation approaches have gained 
greater acceptability in recent years.  
Theory based approach developed by Chen & Rossi in the 1980's is a 
paradigm shift from the methods based approach to evaluation (197). Data 
collection in theory based evaluation uses mixed methods and the mode of 
synthesis is qualitative and the approach follows a logic of configuration i.e. to 
assemble or arrange unlike conventional (or experimental) evaluation which 
follows the logic of aggregation. In conventional methods, strength lies in the 
numbers and the power to determine causation lies in effect size while in 
theory based evaluation, the focus is on context and mechanism to unearth 
the root cause of outcomes and causation is determined through the process 
of arranging critical pieces of evidence together. In conventional evaluation, 
the prevalence of cause-effect is more relevant than the mechanism of the 
intervention while in TBE, the mechanism behind the effect is more useful 
than the prevalence . 
QI evaluation is interested in studying outliers and why they perform differently 
and TBE is well suited for evaluation of such outliers. Theory-based 
approaches can shed some light on how and why the intervention worked in 
certain setting and not in others. 
TBE is an approach to evaluation that requires surfacing the assumptions that 
the program is based on, in considerable detail and following each step in the 
sequence to understand how the expected mini steps actually materialize. 
Theory based approach thus, by its very nature is multi-disciplinary and 
involves mixed methods. The main advantage is that TBE provides knowledge 
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of how or why a program is improving (or failing) thus providing leads on how 
to improve the existing program. There are various approaches to theory 
based evaluation (221) but Realist Evaluation and Theory of Change are the 
most commonly used applications of a theory-based approach(239). 
The two commonly used approaches in TBE namely Theory of Change and 
Realist Evaluation have their strengths when it comes to implementation 
theory and program theory respectively and this is my rationale for using a 
hybrid TBE approach. While ToC hypothesizes links between programme 
activities and its anticipated outcome (and evaluates context independently), 
realist evaluation hypothesizes causal links between mechanisms released by 
an intervention and its anticipated outcome. Therefore theory testing in the 
former, focuses more on the implementation theory while in the latter theory 
testing is based on the program theory(198).  
The hybrid theory based evaluation (TBE) approach used here in my PhD 
begins by mapping out the program theory, a rigorous evaluation of the 
context, mechanism and outcomes, followed by an analysis of the 
implementation theory. 
8.2.2 Research/Strategy/
The use of research strategy, instead of a particular research method, 
consisting of a mix of methods to answer specific questions related to the 
program theory is the hallmark of theory-based evaluation of the MaiKhanda 
program (§4.1). A similar approach using comprehensive research strategy 
has been suggested by Greenhalgh and colleagues in their study on the 
modernization of health services in London, where they use an interpretive 
cases study design(217). While the MI (Modernization Initiative) study 
organized and collated primary data and produced preliminary thematic 
summaries, in MaiKhanda this was done using the CFIR framework. Both 
studies undertook evaluation at regular intervals but in the MI study, there was 
presenting, defending and interpreting particular action and events both within 
the research team and also stakeholders. These interpretations were further 
tested in subsequent rounds of evaluation and fragments of the case study 
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rewritten. In MaiKhanda similar meetings with key stakeholders existed 
through the data deep dive meetings and annual program management board 
meetings but this was mainly for information sharing and did not influence or 
modify the research strategy. The MI study used cross case comparisons to 
determine how the same mechanism played out in different context to 
produce different outcomes. There was a discussion at MaiKhanda about 
cross-comparisons, for instance focusing on a case study of Salima district. 
However it was not within the scope of research then to accommodate 
revisions to the evaluation design.  
8.2.3 Comparing/theories/
A key question considered in my choice of research strategy is the 
methodological appropriateness to compare the MaiKhanda interventions with 
the successful QI interventions from the Keystone Project in Michigan, US. It 
can be argued that the ‘context’ is different in both the settings and that 
implementation was influenced by the particular context in which it was set, 
making the studies not suitable for comparison. While it is true that context 
does influence how the intervention eventually gets implemented, in terms of 
evaluation, the comparison was for the purposes of evaluating program 
theories (and the mechanisms associated with QI) and constantly building on 
them, not the individual activities, making such comparisons acceptable(164). 
An explanation offered by Pawson(202) stemming from Popper’s philosophy, 
is to look at evaluation as a theory building exercise rather than a complete 
answer to the research question that can be generalized across different 
settings. Here program theories are considered repetitive and transferable 
and a source of cumulative evidence. By evaluating program theories of 
various similar (but unique) interventions, evaluation will eventually end up 
building up a picture of what works for whom and under what circumstance 
(and over what time duration). This more conventional approach to evaluation 
of program theories using realist evaluation approaches is through the 
application of a middle range theory (MRT). But this also has its limitations. It 
is prone to ‘tunnel vision’ of the intervention as the theories are defined by the 
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researcher and there are no set guidelines on how narrow or broad the MRT 
needs to be. 
8.2.4 Data/synthesis/
I use the CFIR (Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research) (151) 
to synthesize the available data and organize the critical pieces of evidence 
together. The CFIR is very comprehensive and provides a wide range of 
domains and concepts to consider within a health systems intervention(151). 
One of the highlights of such a theory based programme evaluation is the use 
of all available forms of evidence, including the various evaluation studies, the 
annual and other reports developed by the implementing team. One limitation 
of the CFIR framework, though, is that it is not able to explain the interactions 
between the various elements. There are about 12 models specifically for 
implementation research, but there are no criteria or ranking of these models 
that would help researchers choose the most relevant framework for their 
evaluation(231). I chose CFIR as it was comprehensive but at the same time 
offered flexibility over the choice of constructs relevant to my research.  
8.2.5 Program/Theories/
Program theories are at the crux of theory based evaluation. They ascertain 
the assumptions and help to draw inferences about the often unobservable or 
hidden intervention mechanisms. In realist terms, “Interventions are theories 
incarnate”(240)and realist evaluation considers a C-M-O configuration as a 
direct explanation of program theory. But in fact, interventions are theories in 
action and it is perhaps better to distinguish and explicitly outline the 
implementation of these interventions in the causal pathway. Thus a CIMO 
pattern configuration instead of CMO pattern configuration has been 
suggested (where ‘I’ stands for intervention implementation)(241). In terms of 
the C-M-O configuration itself, there is debate if it should be C!M=O or 
M!C=O i.e if it is the context that influence the mechanism or vice versa, to 
produce the outcome. Other views of the configuration define outcome as a 
function of the interaction between context and mechanism [O=f (M,C)] (242) 
while still others have considered outcome as an iterative interaction between 
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context and mechanism [O "! f(M,C)](241). My view is that context 
influences intervention implementation and intervention mechanism in 
different ways and that there is a constant interplay between implementation, 
context and mechanism to deliver the outcomes of an intervention. For an 
intervention to produce the desired outcomes certain mechanisms have to be 
‘fired’ and this trigger is linked to the intervention’s implementation strength, 
although not necessarily in a linear manner. Implementation plays a 
substantial role in shaping the context and mechanism of the intervention and 
vice versa and should be considered alongside programme theory. Consider 
the mechanism of ‘harnessing data as a disciplinary force’ (§7.1.5). 
MaiKhanda QI district teams, improved in the way of reporting which showed 
a maturity and understanding in what they were doing. The format of 
presentations, the language and the graphical presentation displayed an 
advanced level of understanding of the quality improvement in all the health 
centres [XXVIII]. This was approximately 36 months since data improvement 
workshops were being conducted as part of the intervention. Implementation 
factors such as data collection and learning sessions for data were 
consistently hampered by contextual factors such as shortage of human 
resources as well as the organizational context such as team maturity to view 
data as a learning point.  
Evaluation of mechanisms in isolation using realist evaluation approach is 
perhaps best suited for evaluation of social programs but for interventions that 
are innovative pilot projects, yet to be embedded within a system, analysis of 
the implementation theory is perhaps a necessary precursor, before drawing 
inferences on the intervention mechanisms. 
If there is good implementation data then mechanisms can be extracted 
directly from implementation theory.  and then realist evaluation can be 
applied without necessarily having to develop a Middle Range Theory (MRT) 
(§ 4.3.4) 
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8.2.6 Implementation/Theories/
Implementation strength has been defined as “The pooled effect of dose, 
duration, specificity and intensity of an intervention-in order to determine how 
much implementation efforts are needed to achieve a meaningful level of 
change in coverage and health outcomes.”(98) In addition to this quantitative 
estimation of a program strategy, it also incorporates some qualitative 
elements commonly referred to as fidelity of the intervention.  A key drawback 
of current evaluation methods is that it does not differentiate between 
intervention fidelity and implementation fidelity.  
The current practice in measuring implementation strength includes identifying 
essential components to be measured, grouping components into domains 
(thematic areas), building a measurement instrument and then piloting and 
measuring. Various methods have been suggested for measuring 
implementation strength such as use of different scales with detailed 
descriptions, percentage scales or binary scales showing if an intervention 
component has been implemented or not(98). One of the major drawbacks 
with the existing methods of measurement is that it treats each of the 
components as independent events and is not able to explain the inter-
relationship between them. Nor is it clear if all elements have a common 
weightage. It also does not take the interaction effect with the context into 
account. 
Another key limitation of current measurements in implementation strength is 
that it is viewed as a linear process. A host of factors come in and exit during 
various time periods of an intervention cycle all of which affect implementation 
strength differently.  
Measurement of implementation strength tends to focus on outcomes rather 
than processes and is measured at definite time points rather than 
continuously(98).  Alternative measurements such as the use of well 
annotated Statistical Process Control (SPC) charts as in the MaiKhanda 
intervention, is in my opinion a better tool for measuring implementation 
strength. Unfortunately, the SPCs in MaiKhanda was mostly focused on 
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measuring outcomes rather than processes and was not considered in the 
original evaluation plan to be used as a tool for measuring implementation 
strength.  
The current methods are all static in nature i.e. they are measured at certain 
points in the intervention timeline whereas quality improvement is a 
continuous, dynamic, iterative process and needs to be measured as such. 
This is the reason that the implementation theory needs to be taken into 
consideration and not just implementation strength of the intervention. This is 
the approach that I have adopted in my study and I use the VICTORE 
framework to describe implementation strength as well as the associated 
factors influencing implementation strength such as context, emergence, 
length of implementation chain.  
8.2.7 Criticism/of/Theory/Based/Evaluation/approach/
A recent systematic review of TBE approaches concluded that there is 
“no evidence to support contention that theory based evaluations are more or 
less proper, useful, feasible or accurate than other forms of evaluation”(243). 
According to some critiques, it is difficult to apply a theory-based approach to 
evaluation of complex adaptive systems that are dynamic in nature and 
unpredictable (244). Health systems are recognised as complex adaptive 
systems comprising a network of adaptive agents that exhibit system 
properties such as feedback loops, self–organization and emergence(245). 
While there is agreement that evaluation needs to take account of these 
properties as well as all the complex pathways(246, 247)and come up with a 
coherent explanation for the intervention, the use of TBE approaches to 
evaluate these complexity dimensions has been contested. Critiques argue 
that such complexity stretches the application of TBE to such a point where it 
becomes both methodologically and theoretically fragile(248). While others 
have argued that the basic tenet of evaluation designs using theory-based 
approaches is essentially to take account of this composite nature of theories 
in complex health systems and provide a meaningful understanding of the 
intervention(249).  
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One of the reasons for the methodological and theoretical weakness is 
interaction between different interdependent levels of health system and 
therefore mmultiple theories are needed to understand multiple levels of the 
system(194). Westhorp has suggested explaining these complex processes of 
change through layering of theories, where theories are organized within a 
hierarchy to reflect multiple levels of the system within the intervention. This 
has been described as “layering theories” (104). In the case of MaiKhanda, 
there could be the theory of profound knowledge as the overarching theory 
with diffusion of innovation theory explaining intervention scale up and spread, 
network and organizational theories to understand collective behaviour, 
normalization process theory to understand intervention embeddedness (and 
therefore sustainability). The list of theories to choose from is 
overwhelming(231) and logic models have been known to help refine the 
choice of theories. 
An alternate approach would be to develop a middle range theory (MRT) as is 
usually done within a realist evaluation framework.  A MRT is an intermediate 
between general theories of social systems and the specific intervention 
strategies(250). However, in using this approach there is a tendency to 
develop a ‘tunnel vision’ of the intervention mechanism, since the theories are 
developed a priori and specific to the intervention. However, the theories are 
formulated by the researchers (in consultation with the stakeholders rather 
than by the stakeholders) and are therefore prone to researcher bias.  
One of the main criticisms of existing impact evaluation designs such as cRCT 
is that generalizability or external validity of an intervention is restricted. 
However, this issue is not resolved using a TBE approach either. Issue of 
generalizability still persist.  
There has been criticism that TBE tends to prioritise program theories over 
the program itself(251). However, eventually, this prioritization and choice of 
evaluation design depends on the views of the funder and key stakeholders 
on what research questions they want answered. 
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Finally there is argument on whether the research should be prospective or 
retrospective. It is also not clear if having outcomes known (or not known) 
before drawing in on the theories will introduce some kind of a bias in 
theorizing what we know worked (or did not work)(252) 
8.3 Key/learnings/
Evaluation of the MaiKhanda programme has been challenging from the 
inception for want of a proper definition of quality improvement. Quite often 
there is confusion regarding quality of care and quality improvement(142) 
Quality of care can be thought of as an end product while quality improvement 
is a process that involves improving the quality of service delivery-which it is 
assumed will then improve quality of care. Quality improvement within a 
healthcare context can be defined in terms of improving quality of: 
Processes of care: This is usually at the clinic or ward level and also 
sometimes referred to as the micro level. This involves the actual process of 
care giving such as ‘dorikas’ to escort patients to the labour room as in 
Kasungu district, use of partograph during labour. These processes of care 
are directly related to the knowledge and skills of the service provider, as well 
as their attitude, behaviour and belief systems. However, this process of care-
giving is greatly influenced by the service delivery mechanism. 
Service delivery mechanisms: This includes all the ancillary service linked to 
improving the process of clinical care at the ward level (micro level). This 
would include for instance resource availability, improving signal functions,  
structural relationship associated with human resources.  
(Re)organization of healthcare systems: This includes the broader macro level 
such as the organization and the functional relationships associated with the 
different departments, human resources, understanding and balancing power 
relationships, engaging senior leadership. 
In practice, focus is generally on the microsystem to improve processes of 
care. At MaiKhanda, focus was not even on the processes of care, rather it 
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was on the outcomes of care at the micro-systems level (i.e neonatal case 
fatality rate). Focus on outcomes can be misleading especially if one 
measures it at frequent time intervals. 
The microsystem is where suffering actually gets relieved and everything else 
is ancillary to the microsystem to achieve its objective(95). But these different 
levels of the health system are interdependent on each other and greatly 
influence the microsystem. 
8.3.1 Adopting/a/whole/systems/improvement/approach/
Literature on the success of QI is mainly from the developed countries. The 
context of the health system in these countries is very different to the set up 
that exists in developing countries. In Malawi, it is not just the human 
resources which is a challenge but most of the health system building blocks 
that are in various stages of incompleteness(59). QI operates well in building 
the inter-relationship between the various building blocks of the health system 
and therefore struggles in the absence of these building blocks. A certain 
minimum threshold of organizational readiness is necessary for QI to function 
well at the micro-system level. However, it is difficult to predict what minimum 
level of organizational readiness is needed before QI can kick in.   
Improvement models, especially in developing countries such as Malawi need 
to take a whole systems approach to improvement (23, 95). This includes 
thinking not only about methods and tools such as PDSA cycles, but also 
considering other approaches, which are fit for purpose for different levels of 
the health system.  
8.3.2 Institutional/v/s/Organizational/Challenges/
More often institutional challenges are mistaken as organizational challenges. 
Shortage of human resources is an institutional challenge, which cannot be 
resolved by individual QI teams developing PDSA cycles. This has to be 
approached as an industry problem. Shortage of health care workers globally 
is 7.2 million(253). In Sub-Saharan Africa, 11 of the 47 countries have no 
medical school for training and education in medical sciences. In Americas, 
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where 70% of the countries do have adequate health care workers, 
challenges even for basic universal health coverage exist in terms of 
distribution of the professionals, migration and appropriate training and skills 
mix. These are institutional challenges, which need to be differentiated from 
organizational challenges (179). The strategies to resolve them need a higher 
level of engagement across different levels of the health system. 
Meanwhile fragmented structuring of the health care service delivery poses an 
organizational challenge.  In Malawi, while newborn health is within the 
purview of the Reproductive Health Unit at the Ministry of Health, newborn 
illnesses fall within the remit of Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses 
(IMCI) Unit. It is difficult to maintain continuity and quality of care in such a set 
up and is usually beyond the scope of most QI interventions to influence any 
change. Nevertheless, this needs to be taken into consideration during the 
design phase of the intervention.  
The distinction between institutional and organizational challenge is important 
to keep in mind in the design of QI interventions as there will be certain factors 
beyond the scope of implementing QI teams and unrealistic expectations can 
hamper the morale of the team.  
8.3.3 Intervention/Design/
The primary function of evaluation design is to be able to tell if and how the 
observed effects are indeed due to the intervention under consideration.  
Conventional impact evaluation methods have their limitations when 
evaluating complex interventions such as quality improvement. While it is 
necessary to understand if an intervention works or not, an equally important 
question to answer is ‘what works for whom under what circumstances’. A 
plausibility design is perhaps best suited to answer this latter question and 
uses very different methods and tools from a probability design that is mainly 
used in impact evaluation to answer the former question(195). Evaluation 
needs to adopt a research strategy, rather than a specific research method, to 
be able to answer the evaluation questions. 
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Given the challenges of intervention and systems complexity and intervention 
fidelity, there is a general consensus in the research community to consider 
plausibility designs for evaluation alongside probability designs(195). They 
complement each other. Probability designs tell us ‘if’ an intervention works or 
not, plausibility attempts to answer the ‘how’ question. In other words, 
probability designs focus on the measurement of intervention outcomes while 
plausibility designs focus on the intervention mechanisms. Although there is 
consensus in principal, it is not clear how to operationalize such an evaluation.  
One of the current debates in literature is whether RCT can be considered 
alongside realist evaluation to evaluate complex interventions. The debate 
captures the epistemological standpoints of RCTs and realist evaluations. It 
also highlights some of the operational challenges such as measuring context, 
capturing the non-linearity of complex interventions and inter-action of the 
human agency, and the choice of comparison group(28, 254, 255).  
Comparison groups are usually a feature of probability designs and help to 
measure attribution of the QI intervention to the outcome. The choice of 
comparison group is therefore very important and is determined by the level at 
which the intervention takes place as well as the level at which outcomes are 
measured. QI interventions can focus at different levels such as improving the 
processes of care or service delivery mechanism or re-organization of the 
healthcare systems. In some cases it is a combination of these different 
levels. Furthermore, these different levels are inter-dependent thus making it 
difficult to isolate intervention effects even in the presence of a comparison 
group. Having a comparison group at a higher level such as district or 
organizational level, raises a challenge for adequate sample size for a 
quantitative analysis. While having a comparator cluster at a much lower level 
such as individual service provider level, raises challenges for appropriate 
comparative sample for outcome measurement.  
There are challenges to selection of comparison groups at a conceptual level 
as well. In quality improvement interventions, the selection of groups or 
clusters (typically these are facilities within a health system) is influenced by 
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their level of commitment or “readiness” to be part of the intervention. Such 
facilities are bound to possess individual and organizational characteristics 
that are inherently different from their comparison groups. Moreover, 
evaluation designs using a comparison group require them to be selected at 
the beginning of the intervention.  The diffusion of innovation approach might 
be a more organic and perhaps pragmatic approach from an implementation 
perspective, but this can be in conflict with most traditional evaluation designs 
where the selection of a comparison group happens a priori.  
From an evaluation perspective, focusing on only the ‘low hanging fruits’ 
(innovators) does not tell us if the intervention has the same effect on the ‘not-
so-enthusiastic’ (late adapters and laggards) facilities. A comparison group 
gives the opportunity to analyse and understand the mechanisms in play with 
‘innovators and early adaptors’ as well as the ‘laggards’. However, from an 
improvement science perspective(46) psychology plays a role in the organic 
spread of QI interventions. Focusing on the low hanging fruit and managing to 
get a ‘critical mass’ of facilities that will adhere to QI principles, is a strategy 
that is more likely to influence the intervention acceptance by ‘later adapters & 
laggards’. This aspect of psychology of influencing a larger stakeholder group 
by building a ‘critical mass’ to eventually influence the outcome, is difficult to 
measure using a comparison group. It gets further complicated if the 
comparison groups have to be randomly allocated so as to control for 
measureable and unmeasurable confounding factors. 
For impact evaluations, an important factor influencing evaluation design of a 
QI intervention is the indicator used to measure outcome and impact.  
Mortality measures alone are perhaps not the best indicator to measure 
intervention effect, given the relatively short period of time available for 
implementation (usually up to 5 years), the time lag between intervention 
implementation and effect and other contextual factors that influence the 
landscape for MNH. Evaluating performance measures such as the provision, 
utilization and coverage of interventions is equally important. Coverage 
especially is an important indicator of the interface between service delivery 
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(the managerial process) and the population (the epidemiological 
perspective). It can also be considered as a direct response to the 
implementation strength (dose)(256). Thus multiple outcomes need to be 
considered in the evaluation of whole system based improvement 
interventions.  
A combination of probability and plausibility design is often misinterpreted as 
a mixed methods design containing qualitative and quantitative research 
methods. While probability designs are usually quantitative, plausibility 
designs could be qualitative or quantitative. For instance plausibility design 
can be a step-wedge trial with simulation model(257) which are purely 
quantitative evaluation methods. 
Such a complex design requires a research strategy rather than a specific 
research method, which is another shift from a conventional evaluation 
design. The ultimate objective of such evaluation designs is about cumulative 
knowledge building by adding new knowledge to current understanding of 
programmes (202).  
Improvement research is steadily gaining prominence within social and public 
health interventions. How interventions are going to be adapted, adopted and 
diffused within existing health systems should be an integral part of the 
evaluation rather than a hypothesis or a statement on sustainability of the 
intervention in the concluding remarks of a paper. This is because there are 
well-established evidence based interventions available, for the improvement 
of maternal and newborn health. As we move from Millennium Development 
Goals to Sustainable Development Goals, the challenge for practitioners and 
evaluators of health systems improvement is to see how interventions can be 
embedded within existing health systems and quality of care sustained(258). 
A wider health systems research approach is needed where implementation is 
considered as an organizational, social and political process involving 
stakeholder perceptions and their inter-relationships rather than being solely 
focused on service delivery(206). The challenge for systems improvement 
research is to capture this broad research agenda and structure it in a manner 
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that makes it pragmatic and operational and allows results to be used by 
implementers and policy makers alike.   
8.4 Furthering/the/science/
Current methods and practices in improving health systems research needs 
introspection. According to WHO, a main challenge to current health systems 
research is that health systems is still thinking in terms of its health service 
silos(259). Secondly, there is an assumption about the know-do gap being a 
linear process i.e when an evidence based clinical practice si presented there 
will e a rapid uptake of that practice.. But that is not so. In advancing the 
application of systems thinking in health, there is a need to move from vertical, 
compartmentalized thinking of health services models to systems thinking 
model that will help narrow the know-do gap. 
Health systems thinking as suggested by WHO have 4 major steps for 
intervention design which includes convening stakeholders- collectively 
brainstorming- conceptualizing the effects and adapting and redesigning(260). 
However this is not a process that can happen at frequent intervals nor can 
the redesign be adapted very quickly at the grassroots level.  
On the other hand, this process is very similar to the PDSA (Plan-Do-Study 
Act) cycle recommended in Quality Improvement, except that the suggested 
WHO model happens at a much higher level within the health system whereas 
PDSA cycles are conducted at the clinical microsystems level. Interventions at 
a higher level within the health system can address some of the health 
systems building block issues, but they can seldom effect the day to day 
routine work at the health facility level. For instance, data dashboards targeted 
at improving processes of care, are of little help if the intervention keeps 
focusing on case fatality rates in the health facilities. More proximal process 
indicators such as blood availability, use of partograph are more helpful from a 
grassroots systems improvement perspective. By focusing on small test of 
change at the ward level and then taking it to scale among peer groups, the 
intervention can build a critical mass to influence a whole systems 
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improvement. But this will still need the intervention design to consider the 
interdependent layers within the health system.  
Current research in health systems is focused on investigating the individual 
components of the health systems building blocks, and there is very little 
research looking at system interdependence. When health systems 
component interact with each other, they exhibit systems properties such as 
reinforcing loops, non-linearity, disproportionate relationships (ie the critical 
mass required for change may vary in different settings) and emergence(248). 
These characteristics are difficult to measure and account for, using 
conventional research methods.  
An alternate approach to research in health systems is needed which begins 
by identifying the limitations of current health systems research approaches 
and figures out new ways to evaluate the dynamic and evolving health 
systems. I suggest systems improvement research as an alternative. Some of 
the basic differences are outlined below (Table 13).  
Table 13: Comparing Health Systems Research with Systems Improvement Research 
 
Centrality matters. In health systems, research is geared towards the policy 
makers to engage in research and make change. This is a more top-down 
approach. The centrality in systems improvement research is towards 
improving service delivery mechanism and processes at the point of care.  
Governance and accountability mechanisms, across different levels of the 
health system, are geared towards supporting this process. Systems 
Health Systems Research Systems Improvement Research 
Target 
Audience 
Policy Makers People engaged in improving the 
system, of which policy makers are 
also a contributory force. 
Centrality Policy centered Mechanism centered 
Research 
Strategy 
Independent/isolated mixed 
methods 
Interlinked/inter-dependent mixed 
methods 
Focus on policy to improve how 
things are done at the 
grassroots level 
Focus on change ideas at the 
grassroot level  
 286 
improvement research thus focuses on understanding bottom up 
accountability mechanisms. The target audience in systems improvement 
research are mainly the people engaged directly in improving the system. This 
also includes, but not only, the policy makers among others.  
The scope for systems improvement research is to evaluate the individual 
system components using conventional research methods but also use new 
and innovative research strategies to evaluate interdependence of the health 
systems components and its influence on interventions. This could use a 
research strategy similar to the one I have used in this study. 
For other component of the intervention implementation framework, further 
research is needed to consider ways to measure organizational culture and 
context, individual beliefs, trust and accountability mechanisms. This can be 
achieved by adopting plausibility design such as TBE. Such approaches 
provide an understanding of the role of context and complexity in evaluating 
QI interventions. They are extremely useful for people seeking to implement 
similar programs but they are more like a well-informed hypothesis that needs 
to be tested in future evaluation. Alternative evaluation methods which 
combines TBE approaches with other impact evaluation designs such as 
Bayesian methods, step wedge trial with modelling and time series regression 
analysis have been suggested(149, 172, 261).  These methods have the 
potential to incorporate research methods used in complex systems that have 
developed significantly over the past 10 years.  
There is need to develop dialogue between health systems researchers and 
complex system modellers. Health system can be considered as a network of 
networks characterized by WHO building blocks but also of network 
dynamics i.e. how the different components of the system interact with each 
other thereby influencing intervention implementation, sustainability and scale 
up. 
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Such complex evaluation designs are best developed using a research 
strategy than having a single dominant research method. An ideal research 
strategy would include the following: 
• Developing a program theory with key stakeholders. This involves 
identifying both formal and informal theories. 
• Mapping out the causal chain: This can be done using a causal loop 
diagram to understand the actual process pathway for proposed 
intervention. This will give an idea about intervention fidelity as well as 
help uncover some of the implicit assumptions regarding the intervention 
• Developing a probability design for an impact evaluation measuring 
improvements in health outcomes as well as intervention coverage. 
• Understanding the context in which the intervention will operate.  
o A formative qualitative research to understand stakeholder 
perceptions. 
o A network analysis to understand the relationship between agencies 
at different levels within the health system.  
• The next step would be collating all the available evidence. This can be 
done using CFIR or a similar framework. 
• TBE approaches such as Theory of Change or realist evaluation or a 
combination of approaches can then help analyse the program theory .  
• Interventions should also measure their implementation strength as part of 
their evaluation of the implementation theory.  
• Research strategy may include a component of economic analysis 
depending on funding availability and the research objectives.   
8.5 Limitations/of/the/study/
As my PhD was based on the secondary analysis of the data from 
MaiKhanda’s comprehensive evaluation, limitations within that evaluation had 
implications for the availability and use of evidence within the theory-based 
evaluation. 
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MaiKhanda evaluation was not based on the research strategy outlined 
above. Infact, the evaluation’s large focus was on the impact evaluation and 
the RCT design. While the process evaluation analysed the key areas of 
quality of care, it did not measure the dynamic relation between the different 
levels of the health systems and how it impacted on the quality of care 
provided. 
The evaluation design for MaiKhanda programme was comprehensive but it 
had certain limitations. Key elements of the process evaluation such as tools 
for the staff motivation survey, provider knowledge survey were developed 
based on observations from the ground rather than using validated 
measurement tools available in literature. This limited the comparability of the 
data when used as a secondary source for my PhD. 
There were not appropriate weightage applied to different variables within the 
staff psychology survey and provider knowledge survey and this could have 
influenced the results of the study. An exploration of the literature to 
standardize the variables was not done. Some of the studies such as the 
provider knowledge survey were only conducted at a single time point (rather 
than a continuous measure or at different time points) and therefore could not 
be compared over a period of time. Although there are objective tools 
available in literature to measure context and organizational culture, this was 
not used in the study.  
While I do consider some of elements of complexity such as non-linearity, 
emergence and tipping point in my analysis, this was not included in 
MaiKhanda’s original evaluation design and therefore data available was 
piece-meal and had to be inferred from the available data. .  
There was limited monitoring data available. There was an assumption that 
the monitoring data would be readily available from the implementation team 
but this was not the case, limiting the analysis for theory-based evaluation. 
But regular programme updates were available through the biannual progress 
reports and the reflective evaluation that was conducted between the 
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evaluators and implementers towards the end of the project in 2010, which 
supported the development of the theory-based evaluation.  
Since I was evaluating retrospectively, the selection of the various constructs 
for data synthesis and configuration was guided largely by the availability of 
data at hand rather than the ones most valuable to the study. For instance, 
the role of leadership was not independently investigated throughout the 
project. While health systems leadership was generally weak throughout the 
length of the intervention, it affect on the intervention or its embeddedness 
within the health system remains largely unknown.   
And finally, literature review was focused on traditional approaches to 
evaluating quality improvement. Challenges of a uniform definition for quality 
and outcomes limited the scope of the literature search.  
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Chapter/9 Conclusion/
A recent WHO multi-country study on maternal and newborn health concluded 
that there was no relation between health outcomes and high coverage with 
essential interventions, to reduce mortality in health care facilities(262). 
According to Horton the missing ingredient in this relation is quality of care(6).  
Quality of care has been an integral part of healthcare and clinical practice 
since the time Semmelweis in 1847 segregated obstetric care and introduced 
hand washing techniques thereby greatly reducing case fatalities in maternity 
ward(39). Since then quality has been a lot more in focus in healthcare 
especially after Donabedian shared his seminal work on quality of care in 
1980s(263). Quality improvement in healthcare has adopted techniques 
mainly from the manufacturing industry and has been used widely in Europe 
and US. However, evidence of their success in healthcare is not very 
conclusive, especially from low and middle-income countries. There have 
been limited efforts to critically analyse the techniques used in quality 
improvement interventions. One of the main challenges in evaluating quality 
improvement is the complexity of the interventions themselves and the 
complex nature of the systems in which they are implemented. The evidence 
regarding quality improvement interventions for resource poor settings is 
generally lacking. 
My PhD starts off with an examination of the completed MaiKhanda trial which 
looked at the effect of QI interventions and community women’s groups on 
maternal and newborn mortality in 3 central districts in Malawi(24). The study 
detected a 22% reduction in newborn mortality in the combined facility and 
community intervention clusters and a 16% reduction in perinatal mortality in 
the community intervention clusters. The study had statistical power to detect 
changes in neonatal mortality in both interventions individually. However, it 
failed to show an effect on newborn mortality for the QI interventions. The aim 
of my PhD is to understand why improvement intervention undertaken by 
MaiKhanda for newborn care failed to show an effect. Absence of effect could 
be attributed to a failure of theory, a failure of implementation, an evaluation 
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failure or a combination of these. In MaiKhanda, the lack of effect can be 
attributed mainly to a failure to implement key intervention strategies to a 
critical mass that would initiate changes to the mechanisms for improving 
service delivery and quality of care in the health facilities. 
My primary objective was to understand the mechanisms by which the QI 
interventions worked and explore the interaction between the various factors 
that mediate the effect on neonatal mortality as observed in the cluster 
randomized control trial.  
My research strategy consisted of developing a Theory of change, 
consolidating and synthesizing all the available evidence using an appropriate 
framework, analysing the program and implementation theory using theory 
based approaches to evaluation.  
The Model for Improvement begins by introducing small rapid tests of change 
at the local health facility level through QI teams, using package of 
interventions such as Kangaroo Mother Care, Neonatal resuscitation and 
sepsis management. While challenges in introducing the PDSA cycles within 
the Malawian health systems was articulated in the initial project proposal, the 
project did not address this in their intervention design.  
The Model for Improvement used in MaiKhanda is built around Deming’s 
improvement theory(46) and Roger’s diffusion of innovation theory(181). This 
theory considers improvement as a product of subject matter knowledge and 
profound knowledge. Subject matter knowledge on essential and emergency 
newborn care was generally lacking among health care providers. Similarly, 
understanding variations within the health systems is an acquired skill. While 
IHI through MaiKhanda, provided ample opportunities for people to learn the 
QI model, in general, QI teams lacked capacity to collate data and analyse the 
variations between the health facilities. QI was a fairly new concept in Malawi 
and MaiKhanda’s attempts to embed it within existing health system was 
limited by challenges of the health systems context, MaiKhanda’s own 
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organizational transition and QI and clinical capacity of health care providers. 
These findings are discussed further below.  
The study presents a unique approach to data synthesis for a comprehensive 
evaluation design using the Consolidate Framework for Implementation 
Research (CFIR)(151). The synthesis takes into consideration the various 
reports and documents cumulated through the life of the project and 
juxtaposes them with the process evaluation studies conducted during the 
same period. In doing so, it draws a picture of the intervention with a multi-
dimensional perspective, which provides insights into the evolution of the 
project. The framework is very comprehensive covering 5 major domains and 
a range of constructs, all of which were not included in my study. The choice 
of constructs was based on the availability of data rather than prioritizing the 
key constructs to consider. This is one of the limitations to my study. A 
drawback of the framework is that it does not enumerate the interaction 
between the different identified constructs. 
CFIR helps to produce structured and comprehensive data that is then used 
for analysing the program theory in relation to the intervention outcome. I do 
this by comparing MaiKhanda’s intervention strategies claimed to release the 
mechanism of the intervention and compare it with the program theories of 
Michigan Keystone Project which used Collaborative methods to successfully 
reduce their central venous line blood stream infections in 106 participating 
ICUs. The argument for such a comparison is that while the interventions per 
se are very unique and specific to their context, the program theories 
underlying the use of Collaborative methods in both the interventions is the 
same and therefore comparable. Theories offer a higher level of abstraction 
that can be comparable across different settings(202). The key finding from 
analysis of the program theory is that similar intervention strategies that 
triggered the mechanisms in the Keystone Project failed to generate 
mechanisms in MaiKhanda project. 
The main challenge for MaiKhanda was to simultaneously implement and 
sustain the various change packages it had introduced in the different 
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facilities. While there were isolated instances of successful intervention 
activities within MaiKhanda, it did not build enough momentum to generate 
mechanisms across a critical mass of the facilities that would eventually result 
in improved newborn outcomes. This can be attributed to the implementation 
strength, context and complexity of MaiKhanda’s interventions. This is 
explored in detail in my PhD, using the implementation theory.  
Implementation theory was based on diffusion theories where better 
performing facilities were to act as role models for other facilities to emulate. 
The evaluation design posed a hindrance to the theorized spread of the 
intervention was the. The cRCT design for measuring impact evaluation 
required a random allocation of the improvement facilities and this conflicted 
with innovation diffusion theories, which prescribed a gradual organic spread 
of the interventions by strategically engaging the innovators and early 
adapters.  
Limitations of the evaluation design notwithstanding, the implementation 
strength characterized by the dose, duration, intensity and specificity of the 
intervention was sub-optimal. There was a belief that given the dynamic 
nature of the intervention, the spread would be very rapid and perhaps even 
‘contaminate’ the control sites of the RCT design. Contrary to this, the 
intervention struggled to maintain a constant cohort of QI teams in the 
facilities and programme was intense only in the last 18 months of the project. 
In my dissertation, I provide a descriptive analysis of implementation strength 
and highlight some of the measurement challenges in quantifying 
implementation strength in the Discussion Chapter. 
Implementation strength is not the only factor triggering an intervention 
mechanism. Implementation strength tells only part of the story and an 
understanding of the context in which the intervention is operating is 
necessary in order to attribute implementation strength to changes in 
outcome.  Implementation strength also cannot be measured independent of 
the intervention complexity. For example, MaiKhanda struggled to show an 
effect of its interventions, despite having a long pre-intervention period to 
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refine its interventions, while the Michigan study produced results within 18 
month period. This can be because of other factors related to intervention 
complexity such as the long implementation chain for intervention delivery, the 
subjective perception of the agency (QI team) regarding QI and emergent 
properties of the intervention as well as contextual factors such as 
organizational readiness, the health systems context, QI team capacity to 
deliver QI interventions and MaiKhanda’s own internal capacity.  
The human agency is at the heart of implementation and the intervention 
required a continuous and prolonged time and effort, than was anticipated, to 
engage and train the health facility QI teams on the improvement model. 
One of the key factors affecting the uptake of strategies was MaiKhanda’s 
positioning within the health system and the degree of influence it could exert. 
This has a significant role to play in country where projects are donor 
supported and perhaps also donor driven. MaiKhanda lacked an ‘insider 
effect’ to influence change-the QI leadership at MaiKhanda did not belong to 
the professional community of nurses and clinicians which formed the bulk of 
the QI teams. The change agents such as the MaiKhanda technical lead and 
District QI officers were external to the Malawian health systems and the 
champions and leaders of QI from within the health system had competing 
priorities to engage at the level of detail that the intervention required them to. 
MaiKhanda’s own capacity to be a facilitator to the QI teams was limited. The 
period of the intervention also saw MaiKhanda going through a period of rapid 
organizational transition, which affected intervention implementation on the 
ground. Furthermore, MaiKhanda’s own understanding of QI concepts was 
evolving gradually and this coupled with its long implementation chain, 
influenced the subjective understanding of the QI teams regarding QI 
concepts. Health facility staff also lacked the necessary skills and knowledge 
related to management of newborn health.  
Despite these shortcomings, QI interventions were implemented in the 
selected health facilities. Limited resources within the health facilities meant 
that gains achieved in some aspects of the intervention could not be sustained 
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in the long run. External contextual factors such as fuel shortages contributed 
to poor implementation. Changes in policy such as government ban on TBAs, 
affected intervention uptake. It resulted in an increase in health facility 
deliveries, overwhelming the already under-resourced staff capacity in the 
health facilities. It is conceivable that quality improvement was not on top of 
their priority list.  
But, motivation to be involved in QI Collaboratives, especially in resource 
constrained settings, can be influenced by the lure of personal incentives 
(such as per diems for attending workshops and meetings) as much as 
individual’s commitment to broader social gains (ie reduction in newborn case 
fatality rates in their facility). Moreover, the improvement model was 
competing against other existing models and it was difficult to get enough 
stakeholder commitment to the prescribed model as there were huge 
expectations fuelled by the poverty and poor governance structures and a 
culture of “perdiemitis” was prevalent in Malawian health care system(234).  
While the Model for Improvement tends to focus at the clinical microsystem 
level and have been successfully implemented in other settings, Malawi in 
comparison to these settings, had system level limitations of human and 
material resources as well as organizational capacity. Perhaps a whole 
systems improvement would have been more appropriate for MaiKhanda’s 
interventions rather than a set of change packages focused at the clinical 
microsystems level only. A whole systems improvement framework considers 
health care as complex adaptive systems, which expands the scope of quality 
improvement definition thus considering the interaction between the different 
components of the intervention as well as its relation to the context(224).  
9.1 TBE/approaches/to/understand/QI/interventions/
In evaluating QI interventions, the process of introducing the intervention into 
a health system needs further consideration mainly because of the human 
agency involved(183). Unlike clinical trials, the dosage in public health 
interventions is unpredictable-a small (or large) stimulus i.e implementation 
dose, can invoke a greater (or lesser) participation of the human agency, both 
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at an individual level and collectively, based on their belief in the intervention, 
self efficacy, their individual motivation and relationship with their organization 
and contextual factors such as organizational culture. As was observed in the 
case of MaiKhanda, individual self-efficacy and health system readiness were 
key factors affecting intervention uptake and embeddedness within the health 
system.  
Impact evaluation methods have their limitations when evaluating whole 
systems improvement interventions and by themselves are not sufficient. It 
cannot not tell us how or why an intervention worked (or not). A paradigm shift 
from the methods based evaluation is theory based evaluation (TBE) 
approach suggested by Chen & Rossi in 1980's (197). For a TBE, 
interventions need to have established program theories (PT). The use of 
theories in improvement evaluation is under-recognized and under-utilized 
mainly because researchers are mystified with theories as being very abstract 
and irrelevant(264). Explicit or not, practitioners invariably do use theory in the 
development of their interventions. One of the first steps in TBE is to make 
these assumptions and theories more explicit. 
Mechanisms are not a set of activities; rather they are underlying causal 
levers that bring about change in the reasoning and behaviour of individuals 
and organizations. We use theories to elicit these mechanisms, as 
mechanisms cannot be directly observed, but only inferred(220).  It is likely 
that within the boundaries of established program theories for MaiKhanda 
project (i.e theory of profound knowledge and diffusion of innovation theory) I 
might have overlooked some of the mechanisms at play. For instance, 
consideration of social network theories and normalization process theory 
perhaps, could have helped to understand the mechanisms to navigate and 
embed interventions across different levels of the health system. The choice 
of theories plays an important part in evaluation using theory-based 
approaches.  
Evaluating interventions as purely ‘theories incarnate’ (202) can be less 
meaningful if the implementation strength is not measured alongside it.  This 
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is one of the limitations of a realist evaluation approach which looks at 
interventions purely in terms of its theories. However, measuring 
implementation strength itself is a challenge and it is further compounded by 
its interaction with context and influenced by intervention complexity. This is 
especially challenging for evaluation when interventions have defined and 
limited timelines. 
9.2 Issues and challenges in evaluating quality improvement in 
resource poor health settings 
Quality of care has been described as the third revolution in global health after 
the metrics revolution and the revolution in accountability(6). The first 
challenge with quality lies in defining it(17, 63, 142). Within the context of 
resource poor settings, quality improvement can be perceived as the optimal 
delivery of evidence based care by co-creating knowledge and re-organizing 
health systems to be resilient and responsive. This broadens the definition 
and scope of quality improvement intervention and challenges the status quo. 
The status quo is, quality improvement interventions are usually focused on a 
singular improvement technique or approach to resolve issues of quality 
across the various inter-dependent levels of the health system. However, 
there is a push to consider whole systems improvement approach, especially 
while applying QI in resource poor settings.  
From an evaluation perspective, one of the main challenges is to encompass 
the whole systems improvement approach within a single evaluation 
framework and link it to health outcomes. Innovative impact evaluation 
designs such as step-wedge design(96) and simulation models(261) or 
Bayesian methods(149, 155) have been suggested. 
However, given the challenges of intervention and systems complexity and 
intervention fidelity, a general agreement in evaluation is for plausibility 
designs to be considered alongside probability designs(27, 29, 171, 195).  
A little explored area is the role of comparison groups in plausibility designs 
where there is a need to understand differences in context and mechanisms 
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between intervention and comparison sites. Quality improvement models are 
based on diffusion theories, which makes the spread of interventions organic 
and is dictated largely by interpersonal networks.  Comparison groups can be 
considered as a hindrance to the organic spread of such QI interventions. The 
choice of comparison groups in such evaluation designs therefore, requires 
carful consideration. 
Recently, realist RCTs have been proposed as an approach to evaluate 
complex interventions such as QI(28). In such trials, the choice of comparison 
groups is likely to be related to the key intervention processes and functions, 
rather than the precise activities itself(164). Such approaches to evaluation 
have to take into account, three C’s: the context, the complexity and the 
choice of an appropriate comparison group. 
As is evident from the study, a single research method will not be able to 
provide justice to evaluation of a complex set of factors that influence newborn 
outcomes.  I propose a research strategy that includes developing a Theory of 
Change, followed by evaluation of the program theory, measuring 
implementation strength, analysing implementation theory and comparing this 
in relation to the outcomes of the intervention observed through the impact 
evaluation. The results arising from such a comprehensive evaluation will 
contribute to the growth of improvement science with the accumulation of 
knowledge and explanation rather than just a bedrock of observational facts 
(265).  
9.3 Recommendations for policy and practice 
Policy recommendations:  
• A whole systems improvement approach is needed for addressing system 
level inter-dependencies in healthcare. Failure to address 
interdependencies is particularly damaging in low-income settings where, 
improvement interventions tend to fall into the trap of generating 
‘patchworks of excellence’, with knock-on effect on other parts of the 
system. A systems improvement approach should place greater emphasis 
 299 
on improving processes (along with outcomes) at different levels of the 
health system.  
• Improvement science is a fairly recent concept in developing country health 
systems. Greater investments are required in implementation and 
improvement research in these settings.  
• Capacity building is required in using the science of improvement as well as 
evaluating it. Building the capacity of health care providers and 
stakeholders has to be a key function of improvement interventions atleast 
in the early phase of the intervention.  
• Skills building needs to be incorporated into the routine functioning of the 
health system, preferably through on-site training so as to avoid staff 
absenteeism from the facilities to attend training workshops.  
Programme changes 
• In implementing a QI intervention, simplicity of intervention is key. There 
needs to be a clear protocol to guide frontline workers. Projects need to 
consider a design that will be able to capture and document improvement 
without any extra burden on the health facility staff.  
• Investment in additional support staff as well as technology is required 
especially in the initial period of the study, for data capture and for 
demonstrating the value in improving quality of care.  
• Intervention design needs to factor in adequate time for improvement  
‘learning curve’ when designing the intervention. Robust feedback loops, 
backed up by routine mentorship and tailored to practice for the individual 
or team is needed as a vehicle through which to implement and actualize 
QI.  
• QI interventions should be closely aligned with the strategic goals of the 
organization as this increases their likelihood of success.  
• Improvement ideas for testing need to be feasible and should ensure that 
the improvement methods such as PDSA cycles are completely 
implemented.  
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• Data collection is crucial for improvement and can be more efficient if linked 
with evaluation data collection.  
Further Evidence 
• The evidence base regarding the role of leadership and their attribution to 
the success of an intervention remains thin and needs further investigation.  
• Improvement interventions can be human resource intense and some 
preliminary work and learning to understand organizational readiness is 
required before introducing a QI intervention in a healthcare setting.  
• Innovative research designs are also required to understand the linkages 
between different levels of the health systems and how that improves 
quality at the point of care. 
• QI emphasizes participation and engagement of local health facility staff 
from the design phase of the intervention. An understanding of 
organizational culture is needed to do this. Application of existing 
frameworks such as the competing values framework can provide a better 
understanding of the culture and practice existing in resource poor settings.  
• Evaluation of complex intervention such as QI needs to look at 
multitudinous factors and the interaction between them. This can be 
achieved by developing a Theory of Change and building a research 
strategy around it.  
• A research strategy should include evaluation of the context and 
measurement of implementation strength, using a range of data sources 
such as the district health information systems, project monitoring data, 
improvement data and evaluation data.  
• Harmonizing this data and optimizing their use for evidence requires 
partner commitments as well as significant investments in improving data 
management.  
• Analysing implementation strength is particularly important to explain the 
variances in quality of care across different settings. Measuring 
implementation strength needs to take the context and intervention 
complexity into consideration.  
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• A theory-based evaluation should include theorization of potential 
intervention harms when developing the ex-ante theory of change  
Alternative approaches to innovative evaluation models for QI interventions 
need to be considered, such as adapted randomised-controlled trials  and 
realist RCTs. 
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Appendix/1 Training/Summary/
 
 
 
 
  
 
Departmental Seminar Attendance - Per Term    
Socio-economic determinants of household food security and womenâ€™s dietary diversity in 
rural Bangladesh: a cross-sectional study-Helen Fry   
1 15/01/14 
Conference - Attendance    
Maimwana Dissemination conference, Lilongwe Malawi   
2 11/10/13 
    
Intensive Course in Epidemiology and Medical Statistics (ICEMS)    
Organiser: LSHTM   
10 01/07/13 
Literature Searching using PubMed    
Literature search on quality improvements in maternal and child health in Africa   
1 01/06/13 
MPhil to PhD Upgrade Session for Research Students    
Upgrade   
1 06/05/13 
Co-ordinating / Convening a Conference or Workshop    
Coordinating a workshop on UCL wide quality improvement collaborations   
5 01/06/12 
Report/Paper Preparation    
The MaiKhanda Report submitted to The Health Foundation   
2 20/01/12 
Using Word 2013 for Dissertations/Theses Using Word for Dissertations/Theses - 2009/10   
Once you have completed your training, please log your points here.   
0 1 
Introduction to Survival Analysis    
1 23/04/10 
Introduction to Logistic Regression    
1 21/04/10 
Introduction to Regression Analysis    
1 16/04/10 
Introduction to Regression Analysis    
1 15/04/10 
Research Student Induction Session    
1 15/04/10 
Conference - Attendance    
Attended the International Conference on Quality and Safety in HealthCare in Berlin in 2009. THis 
was a 4 day conference.   
    
Made presentations at the DevCo meeting which was held earlier on the 16th of March, 2009   
    
2 17/03/09 
Fieldwork - 6-12 Months    
Based in Malawi carrying out field based research on maternal and neonatal health.   
    
20 02/01/07 
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Appendix/2 Summary/of/individual/studies/
2.1 Baseline/survey/2006/
 
                                            
xvii HMIS-Health Management Information System. Division of the Ministry of Health responsible for Monitoring and 
Evaluation 
Study Title Baseline survey 2006 
Study objective To identify and assess the capacity of existing health 
facilities and document the level of functioning of 
facilities for delivery of MNH services prior to introduction 
of MaiKhanda interventions 
Study design Cross sectional survey 
Methods/Tools All District HMISxvii Officers were approached to obtain 
general district information such as district population 
and list of health facilities in the district. A Health Facility 
Rapid Assessment Tool (RAT) was used to collect data 
from the health facilities.   
Study period June-August, 2006. Data was collected over a 3 month 
period April, May and June 2006.  
Sample All hospitals and HCs in the three target districts of 
Kasungu, Lilongwe ad Salima, which provide maternity 
services, regardless, of managing authority, were 
included in the survey.  
Data management All data from the data collection forms were double 
entered by 2 data entry clerks, using SPSS version 12.  
Analysis plan Data was analysed and tabulated using SPSS v.12 and 
reported by district.  
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/
2.2 Baseline/evaluation/2007/
 
Study Title Baseline evaluation 2007 
Study objective To provide an overview of the programme 
implementation at the beginning of the pre-intervention 
period 
Study design Retrospective evaluation 
Methods/Tools Tools used during this evaluation included document 
searches, interviews, questionnaires and observations. 
Documents were sourced from THFC archives and from 
facilities. The documents included monthly reports, QI 
tools such as checklists employed by the facilities, and 
THFC charter. Anonymous questionnaires were 
distributed to all QI team members in the nine CEmOC 
facilities.  These questionnaires were followed up with 
semi-structured interviews with representative QI team 
members in MaiKhanda.  
In-depth interviews were also conducted with key staff 
involved in the QI implementation 
Study period June-August, 2007. Data was collected over a 3 month 
period  
Sample CEmOC facilities in the three target districts of Kasungu, 
Lilongwe ad Salima, where QI interventions were in 
operation over the past 12 months  
Data management All data was collected by a Research Assistant from IGH. 
Analysis plan Data was analysed and tabulated using qualitative 
research methods. 
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/
2.3 Health/facility/resources/survey/
Objective The objective was to understand the context in which QI 
interventions were being implemented 
Study design Cross-sectional survey 
Methods/Tools Survey questionnaire 
Study period First half of 2010 
Sample  69 health centres: 37, 18 & 14 in LL, KU & SA 
Data collection The questionnaire was completed by the MEOs during their 
routine field visit to the health facilities.  
Key variables Staff availability, physical infrastructure, material 
inventories, transport and communication 
Analysis plan Analysis will include a comparison of resource availability in 
intervention and control areas.  
Reference in 
MaiKhanda 
Evaluation 
Report(186) 
§2.2.5.1.1 (p.43) 
§4.2.5.1.1 (p.174) 
Tools: 
Appendix 10: Health Facility Surveillance Form (p.280) 
Appendix 11: Health Centre Resource Survey (p.281) 
 
 /
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2.4 Provider/knowledge/survey/
Objective To assess provider’s knowledge of best practice 
as well as their perception of the care they 
provide 
Study design Cross-sectional survey 
Methods/Tools Self completed questionnaire 
Study period December 2009- March 2010 
Sample size A purposive sample of 52 clinical staff 
comprising of different cadres across Lilongwe, 
Kasungu  and Salima districts and CEmOC 
facilities were interviewed 
Training  
Data management The self-completed forms were complted by the 
staff in the facility with MEOs readily available to 
clarify any queries. The data was completed by 
the MEOs and returned to offices to be entered 
into an excel database. Data was analysed using 
SPSS (V14.0) 
Key variables Questions related to emergency obstetric and 
newborn care, monitoring and routine labour 
Analysis plan Comparison  by staff category, between districts 
and between health centres and CEmOC 
facilities 
Reference in MaiKhanda 
Evaluation Report(186) 
§2.2.5.1.3 (p.44) 
§4.2.5.1.3 (p.179) 
Tool: 
Appendix 14: Provider Knowledge Survey 
(p.289) 
/
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2.5 Staff/Psychology/survey/
Objective To understand the factors influencing staff motivation 
Study design Cross-sectional survey 
Methods/Tools Mixed methods: self administered questionnaire & 
interviews 
Study period Data was collected over a period of 5 months from 
January –May 2008.  
Sample 132 staff members across 57 health facilities and 15 in-
depth interviews. It was not a random sample-more 
based on availability of staff during the MEO field visit-
purposive sample 
Data management Forms were made available to the staff during their 
monthly field visits. These were completed by staff in 
their respective facilities and returned to MEOs during 
their next visit. The data was entered in SPSS (v14.0) 
The interviews were done in Chichewa or English 
depending on the preference of the interviewee. The 
interviews were recorded using digital recorders and 
data transferred to the computer and transcribed by 
MaiKhanda data coordinator. 
Key variables 19 set question related to psychology 
Analysis plan Analysis will include an analysis of the factors affecting 
staff motivation 
Transcripts were analysed by a qualitative researcher 
using standard qualitative techniques 
Reference in 
MaiKhanda 
Evaluation 
Report(186) 
§2.2.5.1.2 (p.43) 
§4.2.5.1.2. (p.178) 
Tools: 
Appendix 12: Staff Psychology Survey (p.284) 
Appendix 13: Interview Guidelines (p.287) 
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2.6 CEmOC/survey/
Objective To assess the QI activities being carried out in CEmOC 
facilities and to gauge the understanding and general 
impression regarding model for improvement among QI 
team members.  
Study design Cross-sectional survey 
Methods/Tools Self completed questionnaire 
Study period August 2008 
Sample size All of 27 QI team members from the CEmOC facilities were 
approached of which 25 responded to the questionnaire. 
Data 
management 
The tool was distributed and collected by the Senior 
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Officer for Lilongwe, with 
the help of Assistant QI Officers. The data was compiled 
by the MEOs and returned to offices to be entered into an 
excel database. Data was analysed in excel.  
Reference in 
MaiKhanda 
Evaluation 
Report(186) 
This was not included in the MaiKhanda evaluation report. 
But was part of the evaluation report submitted to 
MaiKhanda as part of the Quarterly Progress Report, May 
2009 
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2.7 St.Gabriel/case/study:/QI/approaches/to/newborn/resuscitation/
 
Background 
In addition to the various sub-studies that were done to enhance the knowledge 
regarding QI interventions, a case study of the neonatal resuscitation improvement 
exercise at S.Gabriels was also conducted to add to the body of knowledge regarding 
implementation of QI interventions in Malawi. 
Introduction 
St.Gabriel is a missionary hospital, established in 1959 and managed by the Christian 
Health Association of Malawi (CHAM). It is located approximately 53 kms to the 
west of Lilongwe district in Chileka health area and provides health services to a 
population of more than 200,000 including some of the neighbouring population of 
Mchinji district. It is one of 8 health facilities providing comprehensive emergency 
obstetrics (CEmOC) services within Lilongwe district. 
St.Gabriel has an average of 235 deliveries per month. The maternity wing consists of 
a four bedded labour ward and postnatal ward. It has two operation theatres with one 
of them equipped with a neonatal resuscitation unit. The other resuscitation unit is in 
the labour ward. The labour ward has 1 Clinical Officer, 6 NMTs (Nurse Midwife 
Technicians), and 5 patient attendants.  
MaiKhanda was working with St. Gabriel’s hospital since 2007 with a 10 member QI 
(Quality Improvement) team there. 
Problem statement 
In 2009, the NCFR (neonatal case fatality rate) at St. Gabriel was 22 per 1000 live 
births, with asphyxia being one of the major contributors (27%). 
In a survey on provider knowledge conducted by MaiKhanda in 2010 amongst 52 
health facility staff in Kasungu, Lilongwe and Salima, the biggest gaps in knowledge 
in neonatal care were in the management of a baby who does not breathe 
spontaneously (only 35% answered this correctly) and management of a baby with 
low Apgar scores at 1 minute: 23% of respondents gave potentially life-threatening 
responses, including 8% who said no action was required and 4% who said they did 
not know what to do.  
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The Principal Nursing Officer at St. Gabriel hospital had similar observations 
as well 
“Last year when we reviewed our neonatal deaths, those occurring from 
asphyxia-there were a lot of them.  From observation of our nurses doing 
resuscitation, we realised the nurses did not have the technique and attempts 
at resuscitation resulted in failure”. 
Intervention 
MaiKhanda was working with the QI team at St. Gabriel since 2009 to reduce 
neonatal deaths due to asphyxia. The primary objective was to improve the 
skills and competency of the delivery team so that they are able to conduct 
neonatal resuscitation within one minute of delivering a baby (referred to as 
the ‘golden minute’).  
Staff at St. Gabriel were initially trained by a team from the US using the -
“Helping Babies Breathe” model developed by the American Association of 
Paediatrics. This was followed by a refresher on-site training (also referred to 
as in-situ training), which initially included all staff, followed by a fortnightly 
training (Thursdays) for the maternity staff, not lasting more than 30 minutes 
and supervised by the clinical officer.  A resuscitation drill kit (including the 
mannequin) ()Figure 25) was available in the labour ward at all times for the 
staff to repeat the drill at frequent intervals. MaiKhanda’s main role was in 
facilitating the refresher training. 
  
Figure 25: Neonatal resuscitation demonstration kit 
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During a neonatal resuscitation drill every nurse demonstrated their 
resuscitation skills on a mannequin and each drill got timed. The target was to 
complete the resuscitation drill correctly in one minute (as this is the amount 
of time they would have in a real life situation). The nurses were given a score 
at the end of each drill for their skill. After they completed their drill, the nurses 
themselves would point out what they did better and what they could have 
done better. The team would also give their comments and report how the 
resuscitation could have been done better.  
As part of the resuscitation protocol, for every birth with low Apgar score staff 
in the labour ward would give antibiotic prophylaxis.  
Another important feature of the intervention was that the patient attendants 
also received training on how to resuscitate the babies so as to improve 
teamwork and initiate prompt management in case of labour emergencies. 
“...for instance, sometimes you have cases where the mother goes into post 
partum haemorrhage after delivery and the baby is asphyxiated at the same 
time. This puts the nurse in a dilemma as whom to attend first. Having the 
patient attendants trained in resuscitation, helps the nurse on duty because 
then she can focus on one thing…” 
Results: 
The staff at St. Gabriel hospital mentioned that neonatal resuscitation drills 
have had a positive effect because it was improving their skills and has also 
improved their timing in helping babies to breathe. 
“My timing has improved; I can resuscitate a baby within a maximum of 3 
minutes whilst before I would take 10 -11 minutes and would still be struggling  
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Figure 26: St.Gabriel hospital-Asphyxia cases and neonatal resuscitation 
In the last quarter of 2010,100% of the asphyxiated babies received 
resuscitation, and most of them were successfully resuscitated (Figure 26). 
This in turn has had a positive effect on staff morale and confidence in 
managing asphyxiated babies. 
“… just coming straight from school and this my first posting. Before I was 
looking at neonatal resuscitation as something very difficult for a baby who 
was not breathing; now I don’t have any fears even if I am left alone in labour 
ward to resuscitate a baby whereas before I had a fear that I would kill the 
baby and the mother would blame me; I used to be really anxious but now I 
am confident..” 
 The level of confidence and self efficacy in dealing with neonatal resuscitation 
is evident from the excerpt provided below. 
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Whilst it is clear that the intervention has had an effect on improving staff skills 
and competency which resulted in a majority of the asphyxia cases being 
resuscitated, the study explored if there was an effect on asphyxia related 
mortality and neonatal case fatality rate at St. Gabriel’s hospital. 
As Figure 27 shows, the asphyxia case fatality rate (CFR) at St. Gabriel’s 
seems to have gone down, despite a higher incidence of asphyxia cases from 
Jun-10 to Aug-10 (the higher incidence could be attributed to a better 
recording of cases).  
It is notable that there were no deaths from asphyxia between Sep-10 and 
Dec-10. The zero deaths in these 4 months match with 100% of asphyxiated 
babies having a resuscitation attempt.  
Asphyxia case management at St. Gabriel Hospital - excerpts from 
an interview with nursing staff in labour ward. 
“The last case of asphyxia that I had was yesterday. There was a 
mother who came with APH [ante-partum haemorrhage] at 7 months. It 
was decided to take this mother for C-section [Caesarean section]… as 
soon as I was informed of the case being a pre-term, I prepared the 
resuscitation tray.  Then went to collect the baby from the OT 
(Operation Theatre)and as soon as the baby was delivered rushed to 
labour ward with the baby and did my resuscitation.  
After doing everything baby cried for 30 seconds and then it stopped. 
There was no secretion and airway was clear so tried to commence O2 
therapy. Meanwhile the baby was blue but the heartbeat was still there. 
I tried the ambu bag and then the baby cried. I commenced O2 [Oxygen 
therapy] and started antibiotics and left baby on same O2 therapy…” 
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Figure 27: Data on Asphyxia at St. Gabriel’s hospital 
In order to ensure sustainability of the resuscitation intervention the staff at 
St.Gabriel felt that it was important to sensitize mothers to identify the danger 
signs during pregnancy so that they present themselves early at the hospital. 
Secondly to avoid eventuality because of staff attrition, there was a need to 
keep practising neonatal resuscitation regularly. Keeping the staff skills 
updated as frequently as possible was thought to be important for 
sustainability, as one of the interviewees stated: 
“people have a recess and go backwards; still need to keep encouraging 
teams to keep practising”. 
The staff at St. Gabriel identified MaiKhanda to have an influential and 
complementary role to play in the intervention by helping identify the problem 
area, develop plans and implement them 
“…sometime you are doing things blindly but the way MaiKhanda  has helped 
is to look back on data, analyse data and try to learn from data and implement 
what can make the situation better”. 
 
Figure 28: St.Gabriel’s hospital asphyxia and neonatal deaths 
Looking at how the total neonatal deaths relate to asphyxia deaths at St. 
Gabriel’s (Figure 28: blue and purple lines vs. orange and turquoise lines; 
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medians change after 6 points below current median) it is apparent that the 
falls in the asphyxia CFR in late 2010 do not seem to be related to the total 
burden of NND at St. Gabriel, which has an unchanging median throughout 
the whole period (Jan-09 to Jun-11).  
Discussion 
By a global estimate, 3%-6% of all babies born in a facility require basic 
neonatal resuscitationxviii. By this estimate, 7 to 14 children born at St. Gabriel 
every month, will require resuscitation. Training providers in neonatal 
resuscitation in health facilities has the potential to reduce deaths due to 
asphyxia in full term babies. 
At St. Gabriel, on average, staff attend 235 deliveries and resuscitate about 7 
to 8 newborns per month. As these numbers are small and infrequent, it 
poses a challenge in maintaining a high standard of resuscitation knowledge 
and skills of the staff at all times. Refresher training is recommended every 6 
months to prevent loss of skills. A conventional 5-day classroom training for 
128 staff costs US $8,160 per coursexix.  Refresher trainings may cost a bit 
less than a 5 day classroom training, but would still pose a significant financial 
burden for organizations if conducted every 6 months. 
St.Gabriel’s neonatal resuscitation training method, consisting of on-site 
regular resuscitation drills at the facility under supervision, provides a low-cost 
alternative to maintaining the competency and skills of clinical staff. It also has 
the added advantages of staff remaining in the facility during training, and the 
training occurring at a much higher frequency of every 2 weeks as opposed to 
every 6 months. This improves the dose and duration of the intervention and 
                                            
xviii S Wall et al. Neonatal resuscitation in low-resource settings: What, who and how to overcome challenges to 
scale up?International Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 2009 (107)-S47-S64 
xix Based on estimates from Vidal et al study in Brazil covering 4 hospital and 128 staff. [Vidal et al. Comparison of 
two training strategies for essential newborn care in Brazil. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 2001; 79(11)] 
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depending on participation of team leaders & MaiKhanda staff, can also 
increase the intensity of the intervention.  
Using a health facility perspective, a rough estimate puts the cost of 
conducting the neonatal resuscitation drill at St. Gabriel at US $0.22 per baby 
delivered.  This includes the cost of initial training, the cost of four Laerdal 
neonatal mannequins and refresher training costs over a five year period (but 
does not take into account MaiKhanda’s follow up cost). The costs for a 
similar training in Indonesia was US$0.16 per baby deliveredxviii.  
There are other actors as well involved in improving resuscitation efforts at St. 
Gabriel (such as a US agency providing the initial training on neonatal 
resuscitation to all staff) and this contextual factor needs to be acknowledged 
in attribution programme success.  
One of the concerns emerging from the success of the improvement efforts in 
resuscitation, is whether this will lead to increased morbidity and mortality of 
infants surviving resuscitation, leaving overall burdens unchanged. The 
burden of subsequent neonatal mortality and morbidity in the community also 
needs to be assessed.  
Summary 
An in-house resuscitation drill for the staff, conducted every 2 weeks, using a 
resuscitation protocol and a scoring system on staff performance was 
implemented at St. Gabriel since 2009 to tackle the high rate of asphyxia 
related neonatal deaths.  
The exercise was a team effort, involved all staff, including patient attendants, 
in the labour ward, with the target of completing the neonatal resuscitation 
within the ‘golden minute’. 
Training tools such as a resuscitation mannequin were provided to the staff 
and were available in the labour ward at all times for staff to practice, in 
addition to the fortnightly drills. 
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A direct outcome of the intervention was improvements in the competency 
and skills of the nursing staff in labour ward at St. Gabriel hospital to conduct 
neonatal resuscitation. Their target was to complete the drill within the first 
minute of birth-and the staff felt competent enough to achieve that. The 
process had a positive effect on their morale and confidence as well.  
However, despite these improvements, there were no changes to the overall 
neonatal case fatality rates at St.Gabriel 
Sensitizing mothers on the danger signs of pregnancy and establishing links 
with the community for their continued support were considered crucial in 
supporting the neonatal efforts at the facility. 
 
                                            
!
